The Islamic Epistemological Element of Al-Yaqin in Critical Thinking

Mohd Nuri Al-Amin Endut* and Nur Arfah A. S.
Department of Management and Humanities, Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS, 31750 Tronoh, Perak, Malaysia

ABSTRACT

To think, in Islam, is actually to perform an act of worship (‘ibādah) and it is the thinking that strongly induces one’s belief, faith and personality. The failure to engage critical thinking with Islamic Worldview could expose Muslim students to the misconception of the thinking as to perceive it peculiar from the Islamic teaching. This paper aims to explore and reveal the epistemological concept of al-yaqin as part of the Islamic essential elements of critical thinking. Library research method is employed in addressing the issues of critical thinking from the Islamic perspective, where Muslim prominent classical works were reviewed and analysed inductively in order to come out with essential Islamic epistemological elements of critical thinking. The exposition of the concept is illustrated from the theoretical and methodological context al-yaqin and its implicit relation to critical thinking. The study signifies two edges of epistemological nature of critical thinking; from the data verification process to the conclusion state of a belief, which distinguish firm factual knowledge from vague assumptions. The findings of this paper distinguish critical thinking from the Islamic worldview to be advocated among Muslim students as an alternative to the existing modern concept of critical thinking.

Keywords: Al-Yaqin, Epistemological concept of al-Yaqin, critical thinking

INTRODUCTION

Critical thinking is essential in Muslim life since it is part and parcel of his/her motivation and reasoning process to accept Islam and reject any element of ignorance (jāhiliyyah). The Qur’ānic emphasis on critical thinking can be observed through its firm objection to blind imitation (Taqlīd).
which promotes uncritical adoption and unquestioning acceptance of a doctrine without any valid reasoning. When the Qur’ān (88: 17-20 and 3: 191) infers the sole lordship of Allah Ta’ala over the universe and asks man to serve his Lord, this is definitely derived from an analytical induction method built on a set of factual empirical premises that could critically be observed in verses that signify various evidences of God’s creation and lordship over the universe.

Similarly, when arguing against those who insisted in worshiping gods other than Allah, the Qur’ān (21: 24 and 27: 64) requires them to bring out their convincing proof (burhān), derived from reliable and certain (yaqin) premises. These are among the evidences that the Qur’ānic guidance and discussion are against any kind of blind imitation and ignorance. Furthermore, it has openly called for a ‘critical’ contemplation and urged people to willingly accept any of its teaching based on intellectual satisfaction and solid faith. This is the anthropocentric aspect of the Qur’ān, where the enlightenment and revealed wisdoms are blended with critical reasons and rationalism to reach the truth.

The difference between modern critical thinking and Islamic critical thinking, as stressed by Mumtaz Ali (2008), is not much at the operational level, but rather deeply involved in its conceptual underpinnings. A clear understanding of the Islamic perspective of critical thinking is distinctively important to provide accurate spiritual and epistemological consciousness into the Muslim thinking process. However, it is quite unfortunate for the Muslims to disregard the Islamic epistemological framework as the foundation of its critical thinking considering the great achievements of its prominent scholars in the area.

The attempt to present critical thinking to the Muslim students beyond the Islamic worldview would not only lead to the misconception of the thinking but to the ignorance of the thinking as part Islamic ventures. Any element of thought and mindset should never be segregated from the doctrine of religious fundamental belief, particularly in Islam. Therefore, it is important to elucidate critical thinking form of the Islamic epistemological framework so as to formulate a proper conceptual definition of the thinking.

This study intends to explore and establish the epistemological element of al-yaqin as an essential component of critical thinking from the Islamic perspective. It employs library research method, where data and information addressing the issues are collected from library resources that include books, journals, theses, on-line materials and others, particularly from the classical works of Muslim prominent scholars like al-Ghazzali and al-Farabi. These text materials and documentations were reviewed and analysed inductively in order to come out with the Islamic epistemological elements of critical thinking as its fundamental conceptual framework. The discussion of critical thinking from the Islamic perspective is
significantly important as it is a process of Islamisation of knowledge in which the modern critical thinking is to be perceived based on the holistic dimension of the Islamic worldview.

**THE QUR’ĀN AND CRITICAL THINKING**

M. Nuri and Wan Suaimi highlighted a few examples of the definition of critical thinking from western scholars. For instance, one of the comprehensive definitions proposed by American Philosophical Association defines critical thinking as:

> “a purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which the judgment is based.”

This can be seen in line with Michael Scriven and Richard Paul definition whereas both of them defines critical thinking as:

> “the intellectually disciplined process of activity and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information generated by observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action”.

From both of the definitions, the common characteristics of critical thinking proposed by them refer to active, purposeful and involves beliefs, observations, reasoning and argument.

The Qur’ān, from the anthropocentric part of its nature, strongly emphasises on the intellectual faculty of man. Wan Daud (1989) views this thinking faculty, apart from being an essential reality of man, as an indispensable feature for man’s unique position in accepting the noble role of Allah’s vicegerent on earth. In this sense, the faculty of thinking is the most superior feature that does not only distinguish man from other creatures, but also qualifies him to bear Allah’s responsibility in sustaining mankind and building civilisation.

Notably, the Qur’ān demands the readers to utilise the thinking faculty in many different approaches and styles. The derivative forms of al-‘aql or “intellect” alone, according to Ismail (1993), has been repeatedly used forty nine times in various chapters of the Qur’ān urging Muslims to exercise their intellect in pursuing good reasoning and drawing conclusions to discover truth guidance. In supporting those different approaches and styles, Badi and Tajdin (2005) indicated that the Qur’ān also uses other terms which carry different shades of intellectual emphasis such as tafakkur (contemplating), tadhakkur (taking to heart), tadabbur (pondering), tafaqquh (comprehending), tabassur (understanding), tawassum (reflecting), nazar (considering) and i’tibār (taking a lesson). The fact that al-Razi (2000) for instance, while commentating on the aspect of knowledge in the Qur’ān, has came out with 30 synonyms for the term related to thinking indicates the great emphasis of the Qur’ān on thinking.
Although these Qur’ānic terms carry different meanings with various manners, contexts or levels of thinking, they could generally be categories in a larger concept of critical thinking. They basically advocate Muslims to observe, reflect, examine and evaluate what they see and face in their lives, of which all these exercises are the vital components of critical thinking. These Qur’ānic terms evidently imply the significance of critical thinking concept from the Islamic view and the critical role of human intellect in undertaking the task of Allah’s vicegerency on earth.

Apart from the Qur’ānic emphasis on the specific intellectual terms in the assimilation of critical thinking, there are commandments and narrations from the sacred sources that implicitly promote the tradition of critical thinking, particularly in making a firm and fair judgment. The term taqlid (imitation) as opposed in a way to critical thinking, for example, although it is not mentioned in the Qur’ān, the rejection of the idea and concept is clearly indicated. The Qur’ān (43:22-23, 5:104, 7:28) has condemned the uncritical tradition of the pre-Islamic society (jahiliyyah) that tends to accept and recognise irrational beliefs inherited from their earlier generations. It also considers this attitude as neglecting the role of mind and being influenced by the evil desires. Moreover, this Qur’ānic condemnation of taqlid can be seen as a manifestation of its advocacy on the critical thinking tradition, particularly in examining the rational and logical aspect of any culture and belief prior to adoption.

The Qur’ān also alternatively advocates the critical thinking tradition to the Muslim society by demanding them to validate any claim with a firm reason and justification as part of the essential elements of critical thinking. The quest for reasoning in the Qur’ān has been articulated in different ways and terms which signify different meanings and contexts. The most relevant and frequent terms used to convey the quests are bayyinat (7:101, 40:22) (clear evidence), sultan (11:96, 51:38) (authority) and burhan (4:174, 28:32, 21:24) (definite proof). These Qur’ānic reasoning terms commonly refer to the Prophet’s enormous strength in associating the message of Islam with concrete evidences to satisfy man’s intellectual faculty in accepting Islam. On the other hand, the Qur’ān (27:64, 2:111) also challenges the non-believers to present evidences of their false claims to establish an intellectual climate of argument for one to make a critical decision in searching the ultimate truth of life.

In addition to the above implicit narration, there are many other narrations and stories that signify the tradition or spirit of critical thinking in Islam such as follows:

The Muslim is urged in the Quran (49:6) to ascertain any news brought by a wicked person (fasiq). They are obliged to examine the sources of information and not merely to accept any information and to make judgment without investigating the credibility of its sources as part of the evaluation process.
The event where the Prophet Sulayman had demanded the Hoopoe bird to come with a clear reason for its absence in the birds gathering led by him (Q 27:20-22) illustrates the requisition for man to think and act based on unambiguous statements or evidences instead of emotions and prejudices. Another good example (Q 12:25-29) of this requisition is the event where the Great al-‘Aziz of Egypt refused to accept the claim of his beloved wife, Zulaikha who had accused the Prophet Yusuf without having any concrete evidence. These Prophetic stories provide guidance and inspiration to Muslim to be more critical, analytical and objective in his decision far from any element of biasness and favouritism to whom he loved.

The warning to attach with the idea and tradition of the majority without having any critical and rational consideration (Q 6:116). In most cases, the common and widely practiced traditions were based on assumption and conjecture which need to be re-evaluated according to the teaching of Islam.

Based on these Qur’anic narrations and stories, it is clear that all fundamental aspects of modern critical thinking concerning issues such as clarity, precision, relevance, sound evidence, depth and fairness have been inclusively, if not deeply, covered. Moreover, these cognitive and logical issues of critical thinking have been approached within the context of the Islamic spirituality to provide special religious attributes to the discourse.

THE ELEMENT OF AL-YAQIN IN CRITICAL THINKING

The element of Islamic critical thinking principally deals with the Islamic epistemology, which normally relates to the intellectual discourse on the sources, nature, method and limitation of knowledge. Ibn Manzur (1990) defines al-yaqin or certainty as knowledge (al-‘ilm), the removal of doubt (izahat al-shakk) or the affirmation of a state (tahqiq al-amr). Terminologically, al-Jurjani (2000) defines al-yaqin as ‘a firm belief (I’tiqad) of a state of a matter with similar belief that it is unacceptable to have other than that state, which is in accordance to the fact and impossible to be dissolved’. Meanwhile, al-Fayyumi (1987), in his Misbah al-Munir, defines al-yaqin as ‘knowledge generated from reflection and evidential derivation’.

Basically, this definition and concept of certainty or al-yaqin can be concisely conceived from two interrelated contexts; methodological and theoretical. The methodological context of al-yaqin embraces the procedural aspect of attaining certainty by realising its opposite values and upholding its logical propositions, as represented in one part of the above definitions. The theoretical context of certainty, on the other hand, signifies the assertions of those particular natures and elements that constitute al-yaqin state, as manifested from the other part of the above-mentioned definitions.
These two contexts of al-yaqin, in spite of their differences, hold a strong relation between them in complementing each other and signify a strong element with regard to Islamic critical thinking.

The significance of al-yaqin element, in connection with Islamic critical thinking, is closely related to these two contexts of certainty. The methodological context that focuses on the practical and logical aspect of al-yaqin naturally deals with the analytical process of knowledge verification and evaluation which is known to be an essential aspect of critical thinking. Typically, this context explores the epistemological discourse on the sources and method of knowledge in examining its strength and validity. Moreover, this methodological context, being a process, is also part of the logical premises for the theoretical context of certainty that deliberates on the comprehension of the elements and state of al-yaqin. As such, the theoretical context of certainty actually functions as the aimed objective of Islamic critical thinking. This context epistemologically relates to the nature of knowledge in which it ultimately confirms and upholds the definite logical affirmation of truth and spiritual tranquility of soul.

In brief, the methodological context of al-yaqin is considered as a critical thinking process that engages the source and method of knowledge, whereas the theoretical context of al-yaqin is basically an aimed state of critical thinking with regard to the nature of knowledge. Thus, both contexts are essential and complementing to each, other than making al-yaqin to be regarded as a point, initial in one respect and final in another, process in one aspect and outcome in another, which work together to compose an inclusive element of Islamic critical thinking. This concept is evidently exhibited in many illuminations of the Qur’an and has been deliberated by Muslim scholars in their intellectual discourse and tradition.

**AL-YAQIN FROM THE QUR’ANIC PERSPECTIVE**

Indeed the Qur’anic assertion on the methodological context of al-yaqin is apparent from its affirmation of truth (al-haqq) which has always been associated with al-yaqin in the same way as falsehood (al-batil) is allied with doubt (al-shakk) and conjecture (al-zann). Thus the Qur’anic sacred transformation journey from al-batil to al-haqq continuously demands the elimination of doubt and conjecture as the method for its quest for the attainment of certainty as repeatedly prescribed in His saying:

“Certainly, conjecture can be of no avail against the truth.” (10.36, 53:28, 4:157)

Part of the methods of the quest for certainty has already been discussed earlier in the Qur’anic tradition of critical thinking with regard to the important function of revelational enlightenment in stimulating the pursuit for rational reasoning and critical judgment. The Qur’anic evidential terms such as burhan, sultan and bayyinat
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are relatively very significant in the methodological context of certainty that illustrates how the proof is well structured to reach the yaqin cognitive state. In fact the Qur’anic evidential methods are not in the same standard in their strength and nature. Not all the Qur’anic evidential terms are definite and certain in the same way as burhan for there are some terms, such as dalil for example, (Q 24:14, 20:40) that show a rather weak justification. Thus, these differences explicitly show the variety of degrees in the practical context of certainty that is based on its evidential method.

The Qur’anic discourse on the theoretical context of al-yaqin, on the other hand, can be observed from the way how the Qur’an insists that certainty (al-yaqin) must be the aimed state of belief as opposed to the attitude of doubt (al-shakk) and conjecture (al-zann). The battle of this affirmation is apparent in many Qur’anic events such as its assertion on the false Christian belief about the crucifixion of Jesus:

“And because of their saying (in boast), “We killed Messiah ‘Isa (Jesus), son of Maryam (Mary), the Messenger of Allâh” - but they killed Him not, nor crucified him, but the resemblance of ‘Isa (Jesus) was put over another man (and they killed that man), and those who differ therein are full of doubts. They have no (certain) knowledge, they follow nothing but conjecture. For surely; they killed Him not [i.e. ‘Isa (Jesus), son of Maryam (Mary)]” (4:157)

The above verse clearly describes the infirm faith of the Christians with regard to the crucifixion of Jesus, in which they themselves are not truly certain with the incident. Therefore, they could not consider it as their belief or faith because it is not certain knowledge but rather a pure conjecture.

Basically, the Qur’anic enlightenment of the theoretical context of al-yaqin is very significant in its remarks on the different states, natures and levels of knowledge including al-yaqin. In principle, al-‘Edrus (1992) views that the Qur’anic epistemological conception of knowledge can be categorised into six groups: ambiguity/similarity (tashabah), doubt (shakk), fantasy (rayb), conjecture (zann), knowledge (‘ilm) and certainty (yaqin). Each of these groups has its own system and position in the Qur’anic epistemology although some of them seem similar such as knowledge and certainty. However, one has to note that the Qur’an indicates two conceptions of knowledge (‘ilm); knowledge that belongs to Allah where there is no question of conjecture (zann) and certainty (yaqin), and knowledge of man which progresses from zann to yaqin. Hence, al-yaqin is recognised in the Qur’an as the highest level of human cognition and the final cognitive aim of the thoughtful scrutiny as advocated in Islamic critical thinking.

The Qur’an (102:5-8) describes the theoretical context of certainty or al-yaqin in three apparent degrees: cognitive certainty (‘ilm al-yaqin), certainty of sight (‘ayn al-
yaqin) and (Q 69:51) absolute experienced or truth of assured certainty (haqq al-yaqin). The certainty of ‘ilm al-yaqin, the lowest of its standard, is knowledge by pure reasoning or inference which satisfies the mind with its best theoretical certitude from man’s power of judgment. This level of certainty may be raised to the second degree of ‘ayn al-yaqin which refers to personal observation of empirical experiences like seeing things with one’s own eyes. The certainty highest degree of haqq al-yaqin is the absolute truth with no possibility for error on judgment or sight, which refers to the knowledge revealed by God to the prophets. These degrees of Qur’anic certainty are basically the three avenues for affirmative knowledge in the Islamic epistemology. In short the Qur’an has managed to delicately reveal the various Islamic epistemological contexts of thinking which broadens the scope and nature of Islamic critical thinking, thus making it more significant and appealing.

Therefore, the issue of certainty is one of the essential elements and trademark of Islamic critical thinking as it determines the benchmark of its reasoning process as well as the outcome belief. Unlike the Islamic epistemology, to describe knowledge or even thinking as ‘the acquisition of certainty’ is immediately problematic from the western liberal perspective. Western-based education, according to Halstead, considers certainty as a matter of religious belief that, according to their understanding, excludes the possibility of subjecting these beliefs to rational knowledge and critical investigation. This inaccurate perception essentially emerges from the long-established western dichotomy of knowledge and belief, which is not tenable within the Qur’anic epistemological framework. Islam, as a comprehensive and integrated creed, does not accept any segregation between religious and worldly dilemma, or devotional and ideological belief which all of that require a sound and firm evaluation in making a certain and right decision.

MUSLIM SCHOLARS DISCUSSION ON AL-YAQIN

Consequently the Islamic element of al-yaqin has been further deliberated and discussed by Muslim scholars, both from the methodological and theoretical contexts. An excellent illustration on the methodological discourse of al-yaqin can be observed from the work of al-Ghazzali in many of his works. In his famous quest for certainty, al-Ghazzali (1994) does not content himself with merely relying on doubtful, unreliable and incomplete knowledge. He carefully formulates the criteria of what he believes to be truly certain knowledge (ilm al-yaqin), which he defines as:

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\text{That in which the thing known is made so manifest that no doubt clings to it, nor is it accompanied by the possibility of error and deception, nor can the mind even supposes such a possibility.}
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Similar to his discussion on tafakkur, al-Ghazzali insists that al-yaqin should never come or even has any relation to doubt.
(shakk) or hesitation, but should be derived from comparable cognition knowledge. His assertion of the cognition reproduction (tawalud al-ma’rifah), for example, in which he states that proper assortment of various cognitions gathered in the heart which lead to the formation of another new cognition; similarly, it indicates that al-yaqin can only be reproduced from its own genesis and should never be based on any less cognitive level.

In fact, in the introduction to his work, al-Mustasfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul, al-Ghazzali (2000) further explained this methodological condition of constructing a yaqin cognitive knowledge. He stressed the importance of examining the sources of premises by analysing their strength and reliability before concluding any certain knowledge as the foundation of al-Ghazzali’s syllogism of al-burhan. The premises, according to him, must be derived from reliable sources and have reached the certainty level before one can conclude ‘ilm al-yaqin from them.

Al-Ghazzali’s critical evaluation on al-yaqin is even more evident when he established severe conditions for the data that could form ‘ilm al-yaqin. He initially outlined seven criteria or sources of data that are to be used as premises of a belief. These seven data are: al-awwaliyyat/al-badihiyyat (axiom or self-evident truth), al-mushahadat al-batinah (internal truth or knowledge from internal senses), al-mahsusat al-zahirah (truth or knowledge from outer sense), al-tajribiyyat (experimental data), al-mutawatirat (transmitted data), wahmiyyah (imaginative data) and al-mashhurat (popular data). Out of these data, he then identified the first five as what he deemed as certainty data which could lead to ‘ilm al-yaqin. In other words, the formation of yaqin knowledge, according to al-Ghazzali, must purely depend or be based on these five yaqin data. It is interesting to observe that, to some extent from the external context, al-Ghazzali’s classification of the premises data for verifying the credibility of their conclusion is very much similar to the ‘evaluation’ method of modern critical thinking in its analytical examination of the grounding of a knowledge or belief.

Out of the five certain premises data as the condition of certainty, al-Ghazzali has special emphasis on al-mutawatirat data in order to gain ‘ilm al-yaqin. Al-mutawatirat is a data source transmitted by a large number of narrators continuously in every stage of the narration, which leaves no room for doubts, as most of the narrators had been verified to be just, muttaqin (those who fear Allah) and trustworthy. This kind of data is perceived as significantly important in the nature of Islamic method not only because the transmission process had been meticulously investigated and the narrators’ trustworthiness status verified as discussed earlier, but the data also become the foundation of Islamic scientific method for accepting the truth of the Qur’ān and hadith of the Prophet pbuh, the primary sources in Islam. Thus, al-Ghazzali considers al-mutawatirat as a firm authorised data source which leads to ‘ilm
yaqin, even more reliable than external sensory data (al-mahsusat al-zahirah) and experimental data. Evidently, these methodological conditions of al-yaqin imply an explicit indication that does not only show the significance of the Islamic critical method in preserving its core revelational sources but constructively reveals a systematic and evaluative form of Islamic critical thinking, which has been applied in many areas of Islamic studies including Islamic jurisprudence. As such, the concept of al-yaqin is deemed to be significantly essential as the epistemological benchmark in the development of Islamic critical thinking tradition in its holistic manner which is worth to be re-explored and re-instilled into the present Muslim thinking culture.

As for the theoretical context of al-yaqin, this element of Islamic critical thinking has been justly discussed by the prominent Muslim scholar, al-Farabi (1987), particularly in his treaties of Kitab al-Burhan (Book on Demonstration) and Sharait al-Yaqin (Conditions of Certainty). In Kitab al-Burhan, al-Farabi divided certainty into two categories; necessary certainty (al-yaqin al-daruriyy) and non-necessary certainty (al-yaqin ghayr al-daruriyy). He describes necessary certainty as a solid belief on an existence state that is impossible to correspond to its otherwise at all time, whereas non-necessary certainty implies a periodically firm belief that only stands for a certain time.

Moreover, in his Sharait al-yaqin, al-Farabi has also theoretically signified six conditions that must be met in order to attain absolute certainty (al-yaqin ‘ala al-itlaq). These conditions basically outline the parts of a complex definition of certainty in which he later on analysed it into a genus-component. He quoted:

*Absolute certainty is: [1] to believe of something that it is thus or not thus; [2] to agree that it corresponds and is not opposed to the existence of the thing externally; [3] to know that it corresponds to it; and [4] that it is not possible that it does not correspond to it or that it be opposed to it; and further [5] that there does not exist anything opposed to it at any time; and [6] and that all of this does not happen accidentally, but essentially.*

In other words, as comprehended from al-Farabi’s definition of al-yaqin, a subject, S, is acclaimed to have absolute certainty of a proposition, p, if and only if: [1] S believes in p (the belief condition); [2] p is true (the truth condition); [3] S knows that p is true (the knowledge condition); [4] it is impossible that p is not true (the necessity condition); [5] there is no time at which p can be false (the eternity condition); and, [6] conditions 1-5 hold essentially, not accidentally (the non-accidental condition). Hence, these conditions do not only justify the state of certainty, but also illustrate its theoretical reality in a deep substantial approach.

Al-Farabi’s discussion of the conditions of certainty clearly signifies that certainty is not merely a matter of how and what one knows, but requires some form
of knowing that one knows. The inclusion of this reflexive self-awareness “knowing that one knows” into the very definition of certainty is very much essential to the concept of Islamic critical thinking since it requires us to be explicitly aware of the ground which justifies our beliefs and able to articulate exhaustively our reasons for claiming to know whatever we know. Critical thinking is supposedly aimed to reflectively construct a belief, and for a belief to be certain which is an affirmative principle in Islamic epistemology, it should has to consciously meet the theoretical criteria of an absolute or necessary certainty as suggested by al-Farabi.

CONCLUSION

In general, the yaqin element is essential in Islamic critical thinking due to the affirmation of its epistemological standards and nature on the two edges of critical thinking context; from the data examination process to the conclusion of a belief. Moreover, the concept of al-yaqin also serves to differentiate between factual and vague opinion, and to verify the sources status and reliability in constructing a certain inference of thought. To sum up, the concept of al-yaqin as an element of Islamic critical thinking can be described as follows:

1. In term of its definition, al-yaqin is deemed as the highest standard of Islamic epistemological state engaged in the critical thinking process as well as its aimed result.

2. In term of its objective, al-yaqin is an assertion of a highest level of confidence, affirmation and belief that is critically constructed from a certain data in searching for the truth particularly with regard to the concept al-tawhid.

3. In term of its application, al-yaqin is a critical process of knowledge verification that certifies the certainty of the premises in terms of its validation, reliability and authority in order to conclude from them certain knowledge.

4. In term of its impact, al-yaqin is a mind state of satisfaction in justifying judgments that ultimately lead to a state of religious tranquillity which, in a way, forms a high-esteem characteristic of Muslim being.

The element of al-yaqin basically illustrates the concept of Islamic critical thinking in relative to its contexts of epistemology which represents the thinking from the Islamic worldview at large, and distinguishes it from the western perspective. Even though the Islamic and Western definitions of critical thinking seem to be technically similar, the differences lay significantly on the conceptual comprehension of those defined technical terms with regards to the distinctive worldviews of both traditions that tend to render variation of perceptions. Islam provides a clear elucidation of the relationship between religion and critical thinking from the context of its conception of human nature. Fundamentally, Islam
holds great respects for both the mind and the conscience of man. Islam, therefore, is far from dogmatism concept, promotes the believers to embrace the religion based on critical justifications and to build this acceptance with rational reasoning and ultimate evidences. Muslims must perceive contemporary critical thinking from Islamic conceptual worldview to free themselves from the prevalent secular view of thought, especially in science, technology and human development, and to eventually rebuild the Islamic civilisation from its own perspective.

REFERENCES


