Current Issues and Challenges Facing Iran Through the Lens of the Social Sciences

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**Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities**

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The Introduction explains the scope and objective of the study in the light of current knowledge on the subject; the Materials and Methods describes how the study was conducted; the Results section reports what was found in the study; and the Discussion section explains meaning and significance of the results and provides suggestions for future directions of research. The manuscript must be prepared according to the Journal’s INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS.

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1. The Journal’s chief executive editor and the editorial board examine the paper to determine whether it is appropriate for the journal and should be reviewed. If not appropriate, the manuscript is rejected outright and the author is informed.

2. The chief executive editor sends the article-identifying information having been removed, to three reviewers. Typically, one of these is from the Journal’s editorial board. Others are specialists in the subject matter represented by the article. The chief executive editor asks them to complete the review in three weeks.

   Comments to authors are about the appropriateness and adequacy of the theoretical or conceptual framework, literature review, method, results and discussion, and conclusions. Reviewers often include suggestions for strengthening of the manuscript. Comments to the editor are in the nature of the significance of the work and its potential contribution to the literature.

3. The chief executive editor, in consultation with the editor-in-chief, examines the reviews and decides whether to reject the manuscript, invite the author(s) to revise and resubmit the manuscript, or seek additional reviews. Final acceptance or rejection rests with the Editor-in-Chief, who reserves the right to refuse any material for publication. In rare instances, the manuscript is accepted with almost no revision. Almost without exception, reviewers’ comments (to the author) are forwarded to the author. If a revision is indicated, the editor provides guidelines for attending to the reviewers’ suggestions and perhaps additional advice about revising the manuscript.

4. The authors decide whether and how to address the reviewers’ comments and criticisms and the editor’s concerns. The authors return a revised version of the paper to the chief executive editor along with specific information describing how they have answered the concerns of the reviewers and the editor, usually in a tabular form. The author(s) may also submit a rebuttal if there is a need especially when the author disagrees with certain comments provided by reviewer(s).
5. The chief executive editor sends the revised paper out for re-review. Typically, at least one of the original reviewers will be asked to examine the article.

6. When the reviewers have completed their work, the chief executive editor in consultation with the editorial board and the editor-in-chief examine their comments and decide whether the paper is ready to be published, needs another round of revisions, or should be rejected.

7. If the decision is to accept, an acceptance letter is sent to all the author(s), the paper is sent to the Press. The article should appear in print in approximately three months.

The Publisher ensures that the paper adheres to the correct style (in-text citations, the reference list, and tables are typical areas of concern, clarity, and grammar). The authors are asked to respond to any minor queries by the Publisher. Following these corrections, page proofs are mailed to the corresponding authors for their final approval. At this point, only essential changes are accepted. Finally, the article appears in the pages of the Journal and is posted on-line.
Preface

This thematic edition of the Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities explores current issues and challenges in Iran within the scope of the social sciences. A total of 14 articles are presented in this edition of the journal and all the articles are written by Iranian scholars and researchers who are academic staff and researchers of the University of Tehran (UT). Although the issues discussed in this edition of the journal are very much central to Iran and Iranian communities, they will strike a chord with Malaysian readers because Iran and Malaysia share certain common characteristics that include religious affiliation as well as cultural expression, to some extent. These articles present significant contributions as they highlight issues that are current and therefore, pertinent to the people of Iran, reflecting as they do on the country’s development across all sectors.

All the papers published in this edition underwent Pertanika’s stringent peer-review process involving a minimum of two reviewers comprising internal as well as external referees. The papers have been revised accordingly by their authors based on the comments and suggestions provided by the reviewers. This was to ensure the quality of the papers justified the high ranking of the journal, which is renowned as a heavily-cited journal not only by authors and researchers in Malaysia but by those in other countries around the world as well.

The guest editors of this issue of the journal wish to sincerely thank the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran (UT) for its support and commitment towards publishing this special issue. We would also like to state that we have learnt much from our collaboration with Universiti Putra Malaysia in preparing this special edition for publication.

We thank the Chief Executive Editor, Dr. Nayan Kanwal, for his tremendous efforts, leadership, courage and dedication to improving the quality of this issue. Through this experience, we have been able to deepen our own knowledge of the demanding processes involved in publishing with a journal of tremendous international standing such as Pertanika.

Last but not the least, we wish to thank all those who have contributed, either directly or indirectly, in the successful publication of this thematic edition of the Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities.

Guest Editors:

Aini Ideris (Prof. Datin Paduka Dato’ Dr.), UPM, Malaysia
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February 2018
Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities
Vol. 26 (T) Feb. 2018

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Iranians’ Attitudes about the Ideal Spouse: Preferences for Spouse Selecting and Transformations in Recent Decades

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ABSTRACT

Family is the primary institution in which the initial experiences of social relations take shape. Human beings are born into families and form their own families in return. The present study concerns the major preferences and criteria that Iranians hold for selecting the right spouse. The main question of the study is about the transformations that spouse choosing, and its underlying criteria, have undergone. It assesses the attitudinal aspects regarding the “ideal spouse” and is concerned about the choice of either husband or wife. The chief method of the study is secondary analysis of quantitative data gathered at the national level. The sources of the research are comprised of all surveys that measure Iranians 15 years old and above. The findings of the research indicate that the changes of Iranians’ understanding of the “ideal spouse” have been next to nothing. People’s behavioural patterns in choosing a spouse do not entirely match their attitudinal preferences; in other words, despite the change in behaviour, Iranians’ preferences for the ideal spouse has hardly changed in attitude.

Keywords: Attitudinal preferences, background variables, cultural change, ideal spouse, preferred wife, preferred husband, spouse selecting

INTRODUCTION

Family in Iran is one of the determining factors of social status and any transition in this regard would affect understandings of the whole social realities (Azadamaki, 2007; Koutlaki, 2010). Among the major transitions in the past decades in relation to the Iranian family are those in people’s
attitudes about the ideal spouse and its characteristics (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006). The diagnosis of Iranians’ criteria and preferences for the ideal spouse is key to understanding family transitions, specifically, and social transformations, generally. In other terms, understanding the characteristics of the ideal spouse enhances the understanding of a stratum of more general social transformations; because, following the gradual encounter with various social groups and the consequential evolution of their mindsets, individuals’ choices, including spouse selection, a critical decision in one’s personal life, changes as well. Individuals are increasingly liberated from family hierarchical power relations, thanks to the educational, occupational, and skill acquisition procedures they normally undergo in their modern lifestyle. The variety of alternative lifestyles, other than what family background traditionally dictated to individuals, presumably fundamentally changes people’s spouse selection habits and ideal spouse criteria (Abbasi-Shavazi & McDonald, 2012). The increased level of education for both sexes, the equal allocation of facilities for public education regardless of sex (in contrast to the norm in previous decades, especially pre-revolution) (Asadi, 1975; Touba, 1971), the escalation in urbanization, and the diversity of skills and specializations, have entailed the social mobility for both sexes. Diversified social encounters, in its own turn, have improved the opportunities in front of social actors. For example, the propagation of proper circumstances for higher education has provided the mating age youth with wider choices in spouse selection. Individuals are no longer obliged to choose from among the narrow list of alternatives their families recommend them. This very fact has optimized cultural intermingling of different family types (Azadarmaki, 2007; Behnam, 1992).

The assessment of spouse choosing behaviours and ideal spouse attitudes is vital for the analysis of the changes in the Iranian family not only because marriage is a family indicator, but also since the process of family dissociation and related social issues are explained based on spouse selection behaviour and the transition hereby taking place (Strong & Cohen, 2016). Divorce, late marriage, celibacy, and more are among such issues that could be explained relying on a proper understanding of spouse choosing patterns (Azadarmaki, 2016; Ember & Ember, 2003). On the other hand, there is no literature that presents a comparative analysis of spouse choosing behaviour and the transformation in Iranians’ attitude about the ideal spouse, mostly having sufficed to briefings on the condition of spouse choosing behaviours. This is another indicator that highlights the significance of the present study.

Considering the Iranian shifting social structures, the present study aims to understand the Iranians’ attitude about the “ideal spouse”. The central question of the study asks about the quality of attitudinal changes regarding the ideal spouse; considering the growing rate of exogamy among the new generations of
Iranians, what changes have taken place in their attitudes about the ideal spouse compared to other generational groups? The peripheral question of the study concerns the theoretical explanations behind the situation. Other than the descriptive approach of the study in investigating the two-spouse choosing behaviour, and the preferable spouse attitudes, it tries to outline the influential factors bringing about changes.

**Review of Literature**

Several books, articles, and studies deal with transformations in spouse-choosing marriage patterns among Iranian families. There are analytical studies in relation to the family transition. A canonical survey on the attitudinal and behavioural transitions regarding spouse selecting in Iran is Jacqueline Touba that was conducted in Shiraz city of Iran (Touba, 1971). Furthermore, *Family Structures and Kinship in Iran* is one of the first books that deals with various aspects of family and marriage transition being predisposed to urbanization and industrialization sways (Behnam, 1971). The author posits that chief transitions in family and marriage patterns are dictated by migration, occupational mobility because of specialization, and the consequential geographic mobility, especially of the youth (Ibid). In Family Transitions, the same author investigates various aspects of family as influenced by modernization and brings international examples to materialize his thesis (Behnam, 1992). In his belief, the future prospect of family transitions will be determined by demographic changes, senility, fertility, urbanization, migration, and scientific progresses (Ibid). What these studies share with the present study is the emphasis they put on patterns of spouse choosing by referring to secondary data in the field. What Behnam has demonstrated in these two surveys is the transformation of spouse selecting habits of Iranians under the influence of social variables which is adopted by the present study.

The disadvantage of these studies, nonetheless, is the perceptible lack of a comprehensible theoretical structure in their analysis of statistical data. Another series of studies have researched family transitions by emphasising demographic and biological discussions like that of cousin marriage (Abbasi-Shavazi & Askari Nadoushan, 2005; Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, & Hoseini Chavoshi, 2003; Kazemipour, 2004; Mahmoudian, 2004; Mirzaei, 1999; Zanjani, 2006). Others source to regional or local surveys and examine various aspects of family transitions, again including the manifest case of cousin marriage, in specified regions and localities (Abbasi-Shavazi & Torabi, 2006).

Considering family transition as a consequence of globalisation, a number of surveys by non-Iranian and Iranian researchers are concentrated on spouse selecting and its transformations. The attitudinal and behavioural transformations in this regard are among the variables concerned in the present study. Some of these surveys study the condition of Iran under the global transformational trends (Abbasi-Shavazi & McDonald, 2012; Daniel
& Mahdi, 2006; Koutlaki, 2010). Some, on the other hand, have elaborated on the general trends influencing family transition and spouse selecting in different societies (Blossfeld & Timm, 2012; Henriksen & Kurten, 2012).

Theoretical Framework

Theoretical approaches in investigating attitudinal and behavioural changes towards spouse choosing are divisible into two categories: the first puts the emphasis on the structural aspects and the institutional changes resulting from them. Outstanding in this category is William Good’s convergence theory of family. Based on the institutional approach, modernization and development cause families to gradually follow western and European models. According to Parsons’ structural functionalism, the institution of family manifests gradual differentiations in various dimensions towards the ultimate independence of actors from a priori models. As a result, not only do family structures change in household, role systems, hierarchy, and spouses’ relationships, but patterns of spouse choosing have a propensity toward exogamy, as exogamy is perceived to better match structurally differentiated models and gives the youth greater roles for choosing. The more traditional paternalistic hierarchy is extinguished, the more diverse spouse choosing patterns become. Under his discussion of universal family revolution, Good suggests a pattern of changes in family structures in which the preference is for a nuclear family. In his opinion, families gradually change into universal, homogeneous configurations (Good, 1970). In Good’s model of family transition, the structure of families keeping pace with development finds the potential to break off the foundations of traditional order and gives way to the modern patterns of spouse choosing that better match with parents’ control-free way of life. This explanation applies to a class of bourgeois families that develop with modernization and the canon of freedom (Poster, 1988).

According to this model, the change in spouse choosing patterns would presumably be simultaneous with changes in youth’s (as the marriage age group) attitudes about the preferred spouse; because the freedom in spouse choosing is concomitant with structural changes in the social life experience, and free patterns of choice are expected to find more primacy in shaping attitudes. In other words, changes toward the realization of nuclear, independent families obtain concrete as well as attitudinal dimensions.

The second category of theories gives more weight to the attitudinal aspects and emphasizes the role of cultural changes and value system in causing transformation in behaviours and mentalities. Prominent among others, the second demographic transition theory (SDT) analyses fertility transitions in the industrial west in association with changes in attitudes, mindsets, and family and parenting values, to acknowledge the synchronized impact of social, economic, and cultural facts on family changes. These factors, combined, have contributed to family transitions
becoming an independent, liberated institution (Sobotka, 2008).

According to this theory, again, spouse choosing has tended toward exogamy, with a shift from the previous constrictions towards individual freedom taking place. The second class of theories differs from the first in that, besides the already taken-for-granted role of socio-economic and technological transitions, they recognize in their analyses of family transition the role of the actors’ attitudes and mindsets, too. As a result, it becomes essential to reach an explanation of the emerging family patterns that conform to the ongoing cultural transitions. According to SDT, the progressive increase in individual freedom morally, religiously, and politically is the basic cause for family transition. Secularism, freedom movements, post-materialist values of individual improvement and self-expression, mistrust in organizations, and intolerance toward any outsider exercise of power in one’s personal matters are principles of the value transition that, in its own turn, has contributed to the idea of self-determination with one’s personal life (Rosina & Fraboni, 2004).

Based on either theory, it is expected that modernization and development bring concomitant changes to family structures and patterns of spouse choosing. The theoretical advantage of the second class of theories is its recognition of facilitating mentalities based in cultural backgrounds. The present study inclined by this approach is going to comparatively investigate the condition of spouse choosing behaviour and attitudes in Iran. According to Good, the diversity in spouse choosing patterns is essentially entwined with the liberation from the declining tradition of paternalistic hierarchies. Such transformations are in concurrence with the universal homogeneous transitions that enforce Europeanization and the nuclearization of families dictated by the inexorable modernization. Based on the second set of theories, these transitions are explained by referencing the attitudinal transformations. Under these circumstances caused by the concurring socio-economic, cultural, and technological transitions, the prospect for individual autonomy in spouse choosing improves.

METHODS
To answer the questions of the study, comparative methods are required for data analysis. Comparative study is a conventional method in sociological studies that investigates the transformations in one field, culture, or time setting and compares the results with changes in parallel fields, cultures, and settings. Therefore, dynamics study is a form of comparative study of phenomena across time and place. The major method in the present study is secondary analysis of quantitative data gathered from national surveys to investigate the trend of changes in spouse choosing patterns. In this study, several national surveys whose results provide the opportunity to compare are put to analysis.

One of the oldest surveys investigating the attitudinal and behavioural transformations in Iran is “Cultural Orientations and Social
Attitudes in Iran”, conducted by Asadi in 1975. Parts of the survey examine the familial behaviours and orientations in Iran with emphasis on marriage, spouse choosing, and ideal husband/wife indicators (Asadi, 1975). In 2004, a parallel survey was conducted by Goudarzi with the aim of comparing the results with the 1975 findings. Goudarzi used the main items of the Asadi survey, including indicators for measuring family-related attitudes and behaviours in Iran, and enacted slight modifications and supplementations to make the three-decade-long social change trends comparable (Goudarzi, 2005). Another national survey among the sources for cross-sectional and longitudinal studies is the one Goudarzi conducted in 2004 titled, “Iranians’ Attitudes and Orientation: Second Wave”. The first part of the survey is concerned with family values, including marriage norms and patterns of spouse choosing (Goudarzi, 2004). The last survey analysed here is Ghafari’s 2015 national survey on *Iranians’ Attitudes and Values*. Among the indices he evaluates is Iranians’ attitudes and preferences in spouse selecting. Beside these three, Mohseni (2000) is also considered as a complementary source for the present evaluation.

It is important to reinstate the lack of inclusive data that covers the whole duration of the study, as some of the time settings have passed unsurveyed. This has entailed many restrictions in performing statistical analyses; the comprehensive understanding of the situation requires thorough and compact data from all time spans under study, while the review of literature does not direct to thematic results in the form of distinct surveys and research. All that is available is a series of large-scale surveys that have intermittently measured aspects of spouse choosing patterns. Consequently, a selective approach confines this study to the distinct indicators that measure Iranians’ values, attitudes, and behaviours. Among the literature at hand, Asadi’s survey, the parallel survey by Goudarzi, and the second wave of surveys, complemented by a set of other sporadic data found in the literature of the field, comprise the main sources of this study.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

**Iranians’ behaviour in spouse choosing**

In recent decades, spouse choosing patterns have dramatically changed (Azadarmaki, 2016). Based on data available in Table 1 and considering generational variables, it seems that despite the decrease in generational gap in spouse choosing patterns in three decades, the youth are still more oriented toward exogamy than other generations. This can be explained by the fact that the exposure to more diverse situations and groups in comparison to previous generations has propelled them to exogamic choices.
Iranians’ Attitudes about the Ideal Spouse

Education level is another variable that influences spouse choosing behaviours. Based on the data in Table 2, the more educated people are, the less their preference for cousin marriage. It should also be noted that the whole rate of cousin marriage among all groups has noticeably lowered.

Table 2
Spouse choosing patterns in three decades by education (1975-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youngster</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cousin marriage</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asadi (1975); Goudarzi (2005)

Just as the attitudinal preferences in spouse choosing behaviours do, behavioural aspects corroborate the gradual decline in cousin marriage rates concurring with the pace of modernization (Good, 1970; Poster, 1988). No comprehensive study has yet examined the issue. According to Behnam (1971), the closer to urban areas, the lower the rate of marrying relatives Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald and Chavoshi (2008). The comparison between the rural areas (such as Torbat Heidariyeh in Khorasan Province) and Tehran neighbourhood of (Javadiyeh and Salamiyeh) with family samples in Tehran during 1970s shows that the rate of cousin marriage in rural areas is about...
32 to 33 percent compared to 29.2 percent in Tehran, neighbouring country, and 25.1 percent in Tehran, main city. Among relative marriages, marriage between paternal first cousins is of highest frequency both in country areas and in cities.

A key point to note in this regard is the logic of transformation in spouse choosing patterns not showing an even decline. Cousin marriage remains a yet ideal type, even with the decrease in age and increase in education, equalling exposure to new circumstances, expectations, and priorities, with the pattern changing considerably. Data related to the objective condition of changes in cousin marriage after three decades imply a smooth trend in various provinces. The findings of Abbasi-Shavazi and his colleagues (2003) in four Western Azerbaijan, Sistan and Balouchistan, Gillan, and Yazd show the rate of such marriages at approximately 40 percent. Sistan province, with 77.4 percent, obtains the highest rate of cousin marriage, followed by Yazd (46.3 percent), Western Azarbayjan (32.6 percent), and Gillan (24 percent).

The findings of Sa’adat and his colleagues in all provinces corroborate the smooth continuation of cousin marriage in Iran. Data in this study indicate a fluctuation from 16 percent in the north to 47 percent in the east. The central, northwestern, western, and southern parts of the country rates are 35 percent, 39 percent, 41 percent, and 43 percent respectively (Abbasi-Shavazi & Torabi, 2006).

According to the studies on spouse choosing patterns, it seems that cousin marriage is still the preferred style of marriage among parts of the population in Iran. As modernization progresses, the general rate of cousin marriage declines, but a relative smoothness in the continuation of cousin marriage is still detected. The findings of 1970s were indicative of kinship not only as central in spouse choosing patterns but also in all respects of family life and controlling conjugal relationships (Behnam, 1971). The findings of more recent surveys show a partial sovereignty of family hierarchy in exogamic marriages in a way that even marriages with non-relatives is supervised by the extended family (Azadarmaki, 2007).

Speaking based on the second wave of surveys on attitudes and values which is presented in Table 3, it seems that the almost all generations are against cousin marriage, while above 25 percent prioritize it. The findings are generalizable to the entire population with 99 percent accuracy.

Table 3
Cousin marriage pattern by generational groups (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Youngster</th>
<th>Adult</th>
<th>Elderly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Goudarzi (2004)
Iranians’ Attitudes about the Ideal Spouse

This tells about the relatively smooth trend in levels of cousin marriage preference among parts of the population (comprising one fourth of Iranians) despite its declining status due to diversifying experiences and the already discussed exposure to new circumstances (Goudarzi, 2004).

Attitudinal changes concerning the ideal spouse

As with respondents’ opinion about the ideal spouse, presented in Table 4, amicability and courteousness are atop the list of the ideal spouse among all generations in three decades (Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2005). Then comes fondness for family. Although honesty and decency have downgraded within the list, this might be due to the two terms connotational changes. Decency is a concept that suffers ambiguity due to different meanings it finds based on the situation; in the case of women, it implies modesty and adherence to hijab, while it denotes the observance of gaze among men (Moghiissi, 2007). What matters is the permanence of the attitudinal hierarchy and the durability of dominant preferences among Iranians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Youngster</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>Youngster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family fondness</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amicability and courtesy</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activeness</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty and decency</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asadi (1975); Goudarzi (2005)

Based on education and as observed in Table 5, amicability and courteousness are the primary characteristics for an ideal spouse in most respondents’ beliefs. At odds with what is conceived in everyday observation, beauty and charm are among the peripheral characteristics favoured by only one percent of respondents and only mentioned under the item “other”. The terminological explanation of the change in the hierarchical rank of decency that was explained above could be verified by interpreting data based on education, too.
The value-laden hierarchy in shaping Iranians’ mentalities toward the ideal spouse is the central issue that must be considered and, in this respect, changes in certain peripheral attributes should not mislead and undermine top priorities among the value-laden sequence of attributes, namely amicability and courteousness.

In the early decades after the revolution, due to the imposed Iran-Iraq war and various sanctions enacted upon the country, the scope of national surveys was lost. Governments, rather than contemplating social research, should have try to provide the people with their primary needs and fight the war. Hence, no valid surveys have remained from the first post-revolution decade. About 15 years after the Revolution, in 2000, Manucheehr Mohseni conducted a national survey (Mohseni, 2000).

In the 1975 survey by Asadi, where Mohseni was the second researcher and Asadi’s assistant, the preference for women in hijab was examined (Asadi, 1975). In the 2000 survey, however, there is no item specifically asking about the attitude or behaviour of people regarding hijab. Therefore, the 2000 survey does not directly relate to the present article, since there is no question of hijab and its dimensions in it. Despite this, the closest part of this survey to the present article is the item

Table 5
Ideal spouse criteria in three decades by education (1975-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family fondness</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amicability and courtesy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activeness</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty and decency</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Asadi (1975); Goudarzi (2005)*
Iranians’ Attitudes about the Ideal Spouse

put forward by respondents in response to one of the survey questions. This question is about measuring the most important characteristics of the “ideal woman.” The first choice offered by people is “decency” as the most important feature of an ideal woman. One of the meanings of “decency” in Persian is clemency and chastity, and the opposite is misconduct (Dehkhoda, 2006). The notion of decency generally indicates a lady to be covered and not exposed to others’ attention, especially by men. Therefore, this option has the closest meaning to the subject of the present article, i.e. hijab and cover. In Table 6, the attitude of the respondents towards the “ideal woman” is shown:

Table 6
Attitude towards the most important characteristics of an “Ideal Woman” (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Decency</th>
<th>Well-behaviour</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Originality</th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>High education</th>
<th>Housewife</th>
<th>Good looking</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mohseni (2000)

As shown in the table above, more than 40% of the respondents described the most important feature of an “ideal woman” as “decency”. For this reason, the most important feature of the “ideal woman” for 40% of the respondents was being covered and not being seen by men. From the above data, the minimum tendency of 40% of respondents is to observe the necessity of hijab for an ideal situation. In Table 7, respondents’ attitude to the most important characteristic of “ideal woman” comes from the following underlying variables:
Table 7
**Attitude about the most important characteristics of the “Ideal Woman Based on Background Variables (2000)”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>16-24</td>
<td>25-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decency</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courteousness</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of origin</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaking</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>286.4</td>
<td>168.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mohseni (2000)*
As can be seen in the table above, there was no difference between men and women in prioritizing “decency” for an “ideal woman”. For this reason, the relationship between gender and the most important characteristics of the “ideal woman” was not significant. This suggests that women like to be covered and not exposed. Of course, this does not mean the absence of women in society, but that women, like men, consider an ideal woman to have hijab. Among different age groups, there is no significant difference in the preference of “decency” as the most important characteristic of an “ideal woman”. Hence, there is an age unity between distinct groups in prioritizing “decency”. Various levels of education had a significant impact on respondents’ attitude towards “decency”. As education increases gradually, the decency priority is reduced. Illiterate respondents who consider “decency” as the most important “ideal woman” priority are 14.2 percent more than those who are educated with a bachelor’s degree (46.6 percent versus 32.4 percent). With the increase in income level, the importance of “decency” gradually decreases, so the gap between the lowest income groups and the highest is 16.3 percent (44.2 percent versus 27.9 percent). Among the variables, the level of education and then the income level of the head of family had the most significant effect on the attitude of the respondents.

For understanding the attitudes toward the ideal spouse more properly, the data of the second wave survey on attitudes and values in 2004 are observed based on the same variable. In this survey, different items ask about the attributes of the ideal spouse, the ideal husband, and the ideal wife. Table 8 presents the data related to the popular opinion about the ideal wife:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decency</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faithfulness and piety</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amicability and courteousness</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaking</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contentment</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijab observance</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docility</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family fondness</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Goudarzi (2004)*

Open-ended questions have the advantage of giving more freedom to the interpreter for manoeuvre, as the range of answers to these questions is not limited to predetermined items. In Table 8, findings are graded from the highest to the lowest. Accordingly, the main characteristic for the ideal wife is “decency”. When applied to women, decency connotes the observance (by women) for being covered in front of male gaze. Far from the perception of public exclusion of women, this means to optimize
protected public participation of them. The next major attributes after decency are faith and piety, together with amicability and courteousness. It could be inferred that in people’s opinion, religion and morality together form the basis for the main characteristics of the ideal wife. People’s religiosity has found deeper moral quality compared to the past. This why religious variables rival moral ones as top spouse choosing preferences. The viewpoint of respondents toward the first item, decency, has serious moral connotations, too, being associated with the culture of women’s dressing in Iran. Other criteria of honesty and contentment similarly have moral connotations. It could be deduced that the determining element in shaping people’s attitude about the ideal wife is more of a moral and religious nature than economic or physical (beauty and charm). This is a sincere consideration to the extent that docility is placed in the lower ranks at odds with the paternalistic culture in Iran.

Based on the findings in Table 8, sex is significantly influential in shaping the popular preferences for the ideal wife. Men prioritize decency as the characteristic of the ideal wife more than women do. Based on the definition of decency mentioned earlier, a similar difference is observed about hijab, as men have preferred hijab for the ideal wife three times as much as women have. Women have preferred other moral qualities instead. Therefore, both sexes prefer moral attributes; for men, this is manifested in form of the preference for hijab and decency, and for women it is manifested in the form of the preference of amicability, courteousness, faithfulness, piety, and honesty. Age is also significant in determining the ideal wife attributes. As the age of respondents increases, religious attributes find more force and distinction. On the other hand, with younger ages, the moral aspects are highlighted. The middle-aged and elderly respondents who are supposedly married admire women’s domesticity and fondness for family compared to the youth. The same distinction applies to marital status, as married respondents who are practically engaged in conjugal matters are sterner in demanding women’s homemaking duties than singles are. The degree holders are more concerned about the education of the wife than the illiterate. Concerning occupation, housekeeping is mainly considered a women’s activity in Iran, as married women are the major contributors to homemaking at home. They prioritize domesticity and homemaking, their own attributes, more than other groups do. People who are more in daily contact with other groups do place more emphasis on the women’s interactive capabilities and, for this reason, prioritize hijab and decency for the ideal wife more than other groups. Married respondents who have entered actual conjugal relationships are also concerned about hijab and decency compared to the singles that prioritize moral attributes such as honesty. The main priority among all groups is with moral and religious attributes while physical beauty gains the lowest rate at less than one percent (with a minute rise among pupils). Imagined characteristics like economic affluence (of
the ideal wife) is not mentioned at all or has so little importance as to be put under the item “other”. Comparing the practical behaviour and attitudinal preferences of individuals shows that people act in ways that are not totally compatible with their ideals. In better words, not always is there congruity between attitudinal and behavioural spheres.

Because the preferences for the ideal wife and the ideal husband vary, the respondents’ views about the latter are presented, too. Table 9 gives the general respondents’ views about the ideal husband:

Table 9  
Ideal husband criteria (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faithfulness</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amicability and courteousness</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activeness and hardworking</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decency</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobility</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Goudarzi (2004)

According to the data in Table 8, popular opinion about the ideal husband is similarly religiously and morally oriented. “Decency” has no considerable place among the attributes of the ideal husband in the Iranian mindset. Nor do economic and physical attributes rival with religious and moral ones. Therefore, seemingly important attributes of proper occupation, acceptable economic situation, and education have no place among people’s opinion about the ideal husband.

Amicability is more important in women’s view than men, because women are the ones who become the men’s spouses and they prefer well-mannered men. Like the ideal wife, in choosing the ideal husband, age matters in religious preferences as it finds more force with the rise in age, and is replaced by moral concerns among lower age groups. For youth who are seriously concerned with finding a proper occupation, occupation is more vitally the attribute of the ideal husband. It is evident that people’s actual situation is effective in their preferences. Therefore, the respondents’ occupation determines their attitude, as among those who are newly entering the workforce, like pupils and university students, having a proper occupation is more critically an attribute of the ideal husband. As the education increases, moral attributes such as honesty gain priority (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008). Therefore, moral concerns are central among all education groups, but they are more consciously adopted as the education increases. As a result, moral concerns decline in general, but concerns with specific moral attributes such as honesty are on the rise. Among the married who deal with conjugal issues directly, religious attributes are more important than moral ones. It is inferred that
moral attributes are more important among singles because morality helps them to shape their mental preferences, while religious determinations keep the conjugal life of the married ordered and principled.

In 2015, the popular opinion about the “ideal wife” was measured once again. Table 10 gives the findings of this survey:

Based on Table 10, moral and religious aspects continue to be of utmost influence in shaping preferences toward the ideal wife. “Chastity” in this survey denotes a similar meaning to the “decency” that was observed in the findings of the 1975 and 2005 surveys. People’s attitudes about the ideal wife has not changed significantly since. Rather, it has become more consciously adopted, having learned from the general morality or decency characteristics more concrete traits like chastity. Visual measures of beauty and economic preferences are not determining factors in respondents’ opinion about the ideal wife, comprising less than two percent of all (Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2005).

Since the preferences for the ideal husband differ from those for the ideal wife, the survey evaluates the characteristics of the “ideal husband” as well. Responses are presented in the following table.

### Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chastity</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faithfulness and piety</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amicability and courteousness</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijab observance</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobility</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of origin</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modesty</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtesy</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaking</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious observances</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docility</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contentment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family committedness</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic standing</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sameness and complementarity</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ghaffari (2015)*

### Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amicability and courteousness</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faithfulness</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobility</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of origin</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chastity</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic standing</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modesty</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic rearing</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Family in Iran is an endemic social institution that has experienced immense transition under modernization (Azadarmaki, 2014). A measure for understanding family transition in Iran is spouse selecting patterns and the attitudes toward the ideal spouse (Azadarmaki, 2007). Changes in this regard have been immense in the past decades and proportionate to the growing individual autonomy in spouse choosing behaviour (Azadarmaki, 2016; Ezazi, 1997). Nevertheless, the stable permanence of cousin marriages has established it as a major consideration among all items. Approximately one fourth of respondents from various groups and generations have manifested a preference for cousin marriage (Behnam, 1992). On the other hand, data show that youth and university degree holders alternate exogamy (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008). Surprisingly, the very groups that continue to arrange their exogamic marriages are in concert with the priorities of their extended families. Sometimes, even in urban areas, the commitment is extended to the whole kinship (Behnam, 1971). Individualism has in one respect contributed to the primacy of exogamic marriages; however, this needs to be analysed with caution (Behnam, 1992). The convergence theory of family does not provide the explanatory tool for investigating the totality of spouse choosing transformations (Blossfeld & Timm, 2012). The model of the western

Table 11 (continue)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vigor</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate income</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family committedness</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtesy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing manner</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family friendliness</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sublimity</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ghaffari (2015)*

Accordingly, moral and religious preferences are suggested along with occupational concerns. This reveals that people’s concerns in their attitude about the ideal husband are becoming more transparent. Since similar economic concerns are mentioned under income or accommodation items, it seems that by occupation, respondents mean something more, namely, self-sufficiency in the satisfaction of primary needs. Once more, the conclusion could be made that physical and material concerns remain below two percent among respondents. However, the arrangement of responses suggesting occupation along with moral and religious concerns underscores the autonomous connotations of the choice, rather than the material tendencies of the respondents (Azadarmaki, 2016).
nuclear family does not illuminate family structures and spouse choosing patterns in every respect. As a result, the theories that consider the attitudinal and value changes, such as second demographic transition, better met the purpose of this study in evaluating spouse choosing transformations (Sobotka, 2008). Based on such analysis, the attitudinal preferences about the ideal spouse and the resulting attitudinal pyramid of marriage has not changed dramatically; morality and religion continue to dominate the structure of Iranians’ mindset about the ideal spouse (Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2005; Ghaffari, 2015). Wealth and beauty occupy no significant place in this pyramid. This might not suggest the congruence between the objective and attitudinal respects but highlights the permanence of the prevalent pattern of earlier decades (Goudarzi, 2004). Of importance is a degree of stability in both objective and attitudinal patterns of spouse choosing, a reality that goes unnoticed in organizational and functional theories. Undoubtedly, Iranians’ preferences in choosing the ideal spouse stems from their morality and religion. Another conclusion is that individual Iranians’ mindsets have become plainer in structure. In the past, Iranians preferred a woman as the ideal wife who was decent and pious in manner (Asadi, 1975; Fathi, 1985). Decency continues to shape preferences about the ideal wife but has evolved to denote proper manner and modesty in behaviour best exemplified in observing hijab. In this regard, men appear more agreeable with women’s social participation (Goudarzi, 2005), although it seems that this conformity diverges from their real preference for the ideal wife (Goudarzi, 2004; Pourrezaanvar, 2003). In other words, men agree with women’s public participation in general, but do not admire it as such for their own wives (Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2004; 2005). In general, the Iranians’ agreement with women’s participation is provisioned by a preference for hijab and modesty (Faraji & Hamidi, 2014). What has changed about the ideal husband is the identification of self-sufficiency as an indicator emphasized under the term “occupation”. The value hierarchy of respondents clarifies the idea behind suggesting occupation as a top priority; by occupation, the respondents intend less wealth or income and mean more self-sufficiency in satisfying personal primary needs. Such a moral interpretation better fits the other items, as items such as economic standing, adequate income level, and accommodation are relegated to the lowest two percent and even half percent (Ghaffari, 2015; Goudarzi, 2005). People admire a husband who can fulfil his needs, and this is translated into maintaining a proper occupation. It seems that popular opinion about the ideal husband is still moral in nature but attached more precision; it has distanced from the cliché amicability and courteousness and found exact instances. Comparison of data in the past four decades clarifies that the foundations of Iranians’ preferences about the ideal spouse has not changed dramatically but has evolved to be more concrete. Iranians continue to prefer the morally and religiously observant spouse.
(Henriksen & Kurtén, 2012). It seems that their religious tendencies have found moral interpretations, as moral groundings are underscored among the youth’s responses.

Finally, attitudinal and behavioural dimensions do not essentially overlap (Joseph & Najmabadi, 2007). What constitutes Iranians’ actions does not reflect their attitudes to the full; rather, attitudes are to express the deep idealized and, probably, unfulfilled beliefs. The absence of congruity neither suggests disagreement nor discrepancy; such a conclusion requires more detailed longitudinal data that measure both attitudinal and behavioural aspects. Based on the existing sources and findings reviewed in this study, the general inference is that people’s criteria for the ideal spouse is not the basis for their actual spouse selecting behaviour. The present study attempted to assess behavioural as well as attitudinal aspects of Iranians’ mindset about spouse choosing, to reach as much comprehensive a sketch of the future family transition as possible.

REFERENCES


An Exploration into the Relationship between Social Capital and Mental Health of Inhabitants of Marginalised Areas of Kermanshah City

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ABSTRACT

Marginality or informal settlement is an important subject in urban issues that generates negative and destructive consequences for the mental health of those who reside in such areas. It is of such significance that is addressed in macro-policies of the Fifth Development Plan of Iran. Given the importance of marginality as a concerning issue, this paper explores the relationship between social capital and mental health of the inhabitants of marginalised areas of the city of Kermanshah using field method and survey technique. The statistical society includes all inhabitants of marginalised areas of Kermanshah city aged 18 years and older. A total of 384 individuals were examined as the sample using the Cochran formula. Results indicate that there are significant and positive relationships between the total social capital (P=0.34) and its various aspects, including social trust (P=0.40), social solidarity (P=0.32), social participation (P=0.37), social support (P=0.30) and social awareness (P=0.24), with mental health. Results from AMOS show that, in general, the effect of social capital as a dependent variable on the mental health of the youth living in the marginalised area is 0.48. Social capital is a main source of mental health among people living in marginal areas. A society that is rich in social capital can provide people with higher levels of social and health benefits by providing more social support for members, developing social participation and trust, and raising individual and social awareness.

Keywords: Kermanshah city, marginalised area, mental health, social capital
INTRODUCTION

In regard to the advancement of national objectives and ideals of the society, mental health is of remarkable significance in terms of saving on material and spiritual costs of society members. Results of recent research show that mental disorders are among the most important elements in the overall burden of diseases. It is predicted that by 2020, the share of mental and neurological disorders in the overall burden of diseases will increase by 50% and change the current share of 5.10% to 15%. Attention to mental health in every aspect of life, including personal, social, and career life, therefore, is remarkably important (Cheng, Kawakhi, Coakley, Schwartz, & Colditz, 2000).

Mental health is an important element of public health. This term is used to describe the level of psychological and emotional well-being and also to show absence of mental disorders. According to the World Health Organisation [WHO] (2011), there is no distinct definition for mental health, and cultural differences, personal evaluations, and rival specialised theories affect the way this term is defined.

Given the fact that in today’s life, a major portion of different diseases (whether mental or physical) in developing countries is highly connected with social factors and models, the impacts of such models reveal their effectiveness for a long-term period. Issues, such as poverty, failure in education, living in rather-improper physical environments (such as marginalised areas), and a high level of insecurity in the society (such as violence and accidents), along with factors like negative personal incidents, including parental separation, losing a job, or forced migration, are among social factors that significantly affect an individual’s mental health. Any decrease in the mental health of society members will lead to a decrease in their performance, which, in turn, provokes fundamental problems, not only for the individual, but for society as well (Woolcock, 2001).

As mentioned earlier, living in improper physical environment, such as marginalised areas, is one of the factors that decrease individual mental health. Usually, marginalised residencies are made up of non-standard and strictly dense houses that are unhealthy, unstable, and socially inappropriate. From a cultural viewpoint, marginality is at the lowest level and includes both social and physical aspects. Marginalised areas are in undesirable conditions and are of low quality in terms of health and service installations and equipment. They lack the basic welfare facilities. Open and non-sanitary toilets, as well as an environment contaminated with waste and rubbish, generate an expedient context for different diseases. In winters, alleys become full of filth and mud and on-street water slants through these areas, which results in an increase in diseases and fatality of the children living there (Ladan & Rezghi, 2009).

Marginality is a feature in many developing countries, including Iran. With the explosive pace of urbanisation and the emergence of urbanisation patterns in Iran, a considerable portion of urban
spaces and residential areas were occupied by a phenomenon known as marginality or informal settlements, which are at a large extent in different cities. From the early decades of the current solar century and with the arrival of industry in Iran, social reforms and land reforms in rural communities, injection of oil revenues into cities, reduction on fatality and, eventually, the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent war, along with other factors, forced a large part of the rural population and work force to migrate to cities, resulting in the expansion of marginalisation.

Marginality or informal settlements is considered an important urban issue that has brought about negative and destructive consequences for the mental health of those living in such areas. As a result, this issue is explicitly addressed in macro-policies of the Fifth Development Plan of the country.

One of the factors linked with mental health of individuals is their social capital. The term ‘social capital’ is defined as the capitals people use to solve general problems. As an axiom, social capital is considered a solution to various social problems, such as poverty, crime, lagging economy, and a low-yielding government. Social capital is deeply connected to concepts such as civil society and social communications (Adam & Roncevic, 2003).

Social capital positively affects various aspects of physical and mental health. It boosts self-confidence, generates social support, helps individuals obtain resources, and serves as a shield against stressful events of life (Salazar, Wingood, Diclemente, Lang, & Harrington, 2004).

Patel believes that the role of social factors in mental health is considerably specified. Increased attention towards such social factors and their role in mental health in third-world countries coincides with the development of social capital and it creates social models of mental health (Harpham, Carant, & Rodriguez, 2003). Lynch and Kaplan define social capital as a type of capital accumulation and networks that create social solidarity, social commitment and, consequently, self-esteem and health in individuals (Iman, Hoseini Roudbati, 2008; Lahsaezadeh & Moradi, 2007). Given these explanations, therefore, an exploration into the relationship between social capital and mental health in marginalised areas is fundamental and of great importance. In this regard, this paper seeks to examine the relationship between social capital and mental health of people who live in marginalised areas of City of Kermanshah as one of Iran’s metropolises where nearly 25 to 30 percent of the population live in marginality in poor conditions.

Though in Iran, social capital as well as mental health has been studied in many respects, research that examines the relationship between these two variables is rarely conducted. Particularly, the issue of social capital and mental health in marginalized areas has been neglected and has not been addressed scientifically. This is while people living in marginal areas are always exposed to social and
psychological harm. Therefore, considering the lack of research in this regard, the relationship between these two variables is a fundamental and scientifically verifiable problem.

**Literature Review**

Nekoonam, Ahmadi and Abbasi Jari (2015) conducted a research titled “An Examination on the Impact of Social Capital (in-group and out-group) on Mental Health of university Students (subjects: students of Tabriz University)”. The results of their research suggested that there was a significant relationship between social capital (in-group and out-group) and mental health, while there was a reverse meaningful relationship between social capital (in-group and out-group) and anxiety, social dysfunction, and depression. Results also indicated that there wasn’t a significant relationship between social capital (in-group and out-group) and physical symptoms.

Razavizadeh, Noghati and Yousefi (2012) conducted a research titled “Relationship between Social Capital and Mental Health among Students of Ferdowsi University of Mashhad”. The methodology included a survey and the sample consisted of 304 students of Ferdowsi University of Mashhad. The results showed that, although independent variables of trust, support, social relationships, self-esteem and mental health supportive behaviour did not have individual meaningful impact on anxiety and severe depression simultaneously, the impact of trust, support, and social relations on these two variables is significant.

Shoja, Nabavi, Kasaei and Bagheri Yazdi (2011) conducted a research titled “Factor Analysis of Social Capital and its Relationship with Mental Health of the Elderly of Tehran’s 9th District”. Results demonstrated that there was a relationship between social capital’s elements of individual trust and social solidarity and support and mental health of the elderly. However, no meaningful relationship was observed between social capital’s elements of social trust and association relations with mental health of the elderly.

Shakerinia (2010) conducted a research titled “Relationship between Social Capital and Significance of Life with Mental Health in Victims of Wife Abuse”. Results suggested that there was a meaningful relationship between social capital, significance of life, and mental health of the women studied in this research. Moreover, step-by-step regression analysis showed that variables of social capital and significance of life managed to predict the mental health of the subjects.

Hamano et al. (2010) examined the relationship between social capital and mental health in a study using a multi-level approach. They realised that both types of social capital (cognitive and structural) can affect mental health at the neighbourhood level.

Malberg (2010) examined the relationship between social capital and mental health among Norwegian social clients. Results indicated that there was a positive correlation between the elements of bonding social capital, such as social
trust and trust, in social workers with mental health.

Another research on social capital and mental health was conducted by Harpham et al. (2003) titled “Mental Health and Social Capital”. The sample consisted of 1168 individuals aged 15 to 25 years whose mental health was evaluated on a 20-point scale. Moreover, the variable of social capital was measured in cognitive and structural aspects. Results of this research showed that social capital affected individual mental health both in terms of its structural aspect (civil participation, membership and activity in official and unofficial organisations) and in terms of its cognitive aspect (trust, mutual relationships, norms).

In a research titled “How Much Can Social Capital Affect Health”, Roose and Wu (1995) examined the relationship between social capital and health. According to the results and data analysis, they concluded that social capital (engagement in or exit from official and unofficial social networks, friends and individuals that one relies on in the time of sickness, having control over life, and trust) affects individual health more than human capital (social base, age, sex, income).

Theoretical Framework: Mental Health Theories

Freud believed that most of the people are, to different degrees, neurotic, and that mental health is an ideal, not a statistical norm. He believed that the first characteristics of mental health is self-awareness, which means anything that returns to (me) in the unconscious. Eventually, true self-awareness is not possible unless the person has managed to pass through the levels of sexual mental health successfully and is not over-fixated in either of these levels. A mentally healthy person uses defense mechanisms, such as altruism, humor, piety, and austerity (Corsini, 1999).

According to Glasser, everyone has an implicit identity through which they feel relative success or failure. In general, a healthy person, according to Glasser, is one who has the following characteristics:

1) He / She does not deny the reality and does not ignore painful situations through denial; rather, he/she faces such situations objectively.

2) He / She has a successful identity (e.g. loves and is loved). He / She feels valuable and others confirm this feeling of theirs.

3) He / She accepts the responsibility of their life and behaviour and acts accordingly. Responsibility is the perfect sign of mental health.

4) Their attention to long-term joys are more rational and in accordance with reality.

5) He / She emphasises the present and future not the past while their emphasis of future is a foresight not a fantasy.

Glaser’s reality therapy is based on the three principles of acceptance, judgment, and responsibility. Any person who manages to realise these three principles is mentally healthy (Khodarahimi, 1995).
Maslow calls a healthy human ‘self-actualised’ and explains that those who seek to reach self-actualisation meet their low-level needs, such as physical needs, security, belonging, love, and respect. They are not psychotic or neurotic and do not have other pathological disorders. They are role models of maturity, wisdom, and health. They utilise all of their potentials and capabilities to reach self-actualisation. They know who they are, what they are, and where they are going (Schultz, 2012). Maslow proposes 13 clinical criteria for realisation of self-esteem and self-actualisation: 1) A good perception of reality, 2) ability to accept one’s self, others, and nature, 3) ability to maintain will, 4) relative achievement in fundamental issues, 5) having freedom and enthusiasm for life, 6) increasing autonomy and resistance in formation of groups, 7) initiation in judgment and richness in motivation, 8) numerous experiences, 9) a good sense of identification with humanity, 10) improving relationships with others, 11) easement in accepting others, 12) developing creativity, and 13) mobility in the system of values (Ganji, 2000).

Frankel believes that a mentally healthy or self-transcending person has the following qualities: freedom and choice of action, accepts the responsibility of their life and fate, and is not affected by external forces. This type of person has found a meaning to their life, has conscious control over their life, goes beyond self-attention, and is attracted to external meanings. He / She has career commitment, has a specific mission, and is well aware of it. He / She also has the ability to give and receive love and, finally, thinks about the future and pays attention to their future goals and duties.

Skinner is an experimental psychologist and a key figure in the Behaviourist approach. He believes that the past experiences of individuals make them conditional and that all human behaviours are a function of environment. If we manage to consciously change the social environment and optimise it, we can create more desirable qualities in them.

In short, the mental health of a healthy person, according to Skinner, is equal to behaviours that are consistent with rules and regulations of the society in a way that the person receives positive reinforcements from the environment and others due to these behaviours (Corsini, 1999). Dragotis defines mental health as the ability to live with joy, productivity, and a trouble-free life, along with the absence of nine symptoms of mental illness, including depression, anxiety, aggression, physical illnesses caused by mental illnesses, obsessive-compulsive disorder, interpersonal sensitivity, phobia, paranoid, and schizophrenia (Dragotis, 1994).

Kawachi and Brekman believe that areas with a higher level of social capital have better access to social and health services. Besides, such areas have the capability to enforce a campaign against the government in protest to budget or to prevent closure of a school or a hospital. These areas can also create official pressure groups to make health organisations available to the public. During crisis, war, or drought, for
example, areas with in-group and out-group social capital are more able to protect their residents, support them, and provide them with health services (Kawachi & Brekman, 2000).

**Social Capital Theories**

James Coleman maintains that social capital is not a unitary entity and consists of several elements, all of which have two features in common. First, social capital lies in the structure of the active (both real and legal) relations and, second, social capital facilitates social activities (Tajbakhsh, 2005 as quoted by Moeinoddini, Sanatkhah, & Dadkhahfar, 2013).

James Coleman puts social capital in the company of executives in social structures. Coleman considers social capital as a testator in the relations between and within the executives in a society in that it benefits some and doesn’t benefit others. Social capital is not a single unit but a spectrum of different units that have two common features. All include aspects of a social structure and they help certain executives present in the structure. The development of social capital is defined as the aspects of trustworthiness, obligations, and effective norms maintained by the participants in networks. It depends on the maintenance of progressing opportunities and resources. Coleman believes that the formation and destruction of social capital depends on the relationships within network groups. He also evaluated different aspects of social structures within different ideologies, as well as the role of governmental aid frequency, in social capital development. Even though some scholars have revised it, Coleman’s definition of social capital still excels recent sociological works (Salmani, Taghipour, Ramanzadeh, & Jalili, 2010).

Putnam claims that participation in community, like official and unofficial networks of the society, is the core to the concept of social capital (Hashemianfar & Heidarkhani, 2012). He states that volunteering in a community, which has inherited an enormous social capital in form of norms of reciprocity and social participation networks, is better (Putnam, 2001). Social networks encourage people to work together and trust others, rather than isolate themselves for personal interest purposes (Tajbakhsh, 2005). Contrary to economic capital, social capital is a public commodity. That’s probably why it is often undervalued and not much is done to increase its value. Putnam considers the following features for social capital as a locally-obtained social solidarity: 1) A dense set of local social organisations and networks; 2) High levels of civil commitment in local social networks; 3) Strong and positive local identity along with a sense of consistency and equality with local community members; 4) Generalised norms regarding trust and mutual contribution between local community members and whether they know each other in person or not; and 5) Civil participation networks are the embodiment of the previous successful cooperation which can serve as a cultural
model for future cooperation (Azkia & Ghafari, 2008 as quoted by Mohseni Tabrizi & Aghamohseni, 2010).

For Putnam, indicators of social capital include trust, norms, and social participation networks that improve the performance of society by facilitating actions (Hashemianfar & Heidarkhani, 2012).

In the 1980s, Bourdieu developed the concept of social capital, although this was less paid attention to as compared to other parts of his social theory (Field, 2003). One of the theoretical foundations of Bourdieu’s sociology was to consider society as a multiplicity of social domains. Various forms of capital (economic, cultural, and social) are the main elements defining the positions and possibilities of different actors in each domain. For him, capitalists can manifest themselves in two basic forms: economic capital, which has the ability to convert to money and may be institutionalised in the form of ownership rights; social capital, which consists of social requirements (communication) and in certain conditions has the ability to convert to economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of aristocracy or nobility (Majedi & Lahsaezzadeh, 2006).

Francis Fukuyama discusses social capital in an economic framework. He used the concept of social capital to compile a theory on social trust, which states that the power and performance of social capital in society depends on society members’ commitment to common norms and values and their ability to overlook personal interests in favour of public good and prosperity (Mohseni Tabrizi & Aghahasani, 2010, p. 150).

Bert defined the structural split theory in order to conceptualise social capital. Structural split theory is based on interpersonal relationships between an individual and their colleagues in a social network, which automatically is of value for the society (Mohseni Tabrizi & Aghahasani, 2010). According to this theory, if an individual in a social network established a relationship with colleagues with whom he/she has none or little relationships, he/she will have optimised it. Thus, the reinforcement of split networks has advantages, such as rapid information evaluation, double bargaining power, and increased control over resources and outcomes (Cybert, Kraimer, & Linden, 2001).

Brian Turner believes that social capital can be considered a paradigm for the definition of differences in health and illness among social groups in the public health domain. For Turner, this domain of social capital discussions is rooted in classic theories, especially in Durkheim sociology. He defines social capital as a membership of individuals in official and unofficial groups, as well as official and unofficial institutions, degree of social cohesion, social solidarity, and social membership density in local groups, voluntary associations, mutual social ties, and social trust (Turner, 2003).

In societies where social ties are not at a desirable level due to different reasons and where people avoid rational social interactions, the formation and development...
of social capital take place slowly. Therefore, a phenomenon called ‘selfish individualism’ grows in these societies, which leads to an increase in social solidarity. Decrease in social interactions causes social isolation to individuals. As a result, a sense of isolation and loneliness spreads in the society and, with the escalation of this situation, negative mental states emerge in individuals while their mental health decreases. He also proposes that high social capital is a means through which individuals are protected against mental illnesses because social investments create a supportive environment for them (Turner, 2003).

**Theoretical and Empirical Framework of Research**

This research uses various theories. However, only those theories that serve as the basis for the hypotheses form the theoretical framework of the research.

From Kawachi’s and Berkman’s viewpoint, areas with higher social capital have more access to social and health services. Besides, such areas have the capability to enforce a campaign against the government in protest to budget or to prevent closure of a school or a hospital. These areas can also create official pressure groups in order to make health organisations available to the public. During crisis, war, or drought, for example, areas with in-group and out-group social capital are more able to protect their residents, support them, and provide them with health services (Kawachi & Brekman, 2000).

Turner believes that, in societies where social ties are not at a desirable level due to different reasons and where people avoid rational social interactions, the formation and development of social capital take place slowly. Therefore, a phenomenon called ‘selfish individualism’ grows in these societies, which leads to an increase in social solidarity. Decrease in social interactions causes social isolation to individuals. As a result, a sense of isolation and loneliness spreads in the society and, with the escalation of this situation, negative mental states emerge in individuals while their mental health decreases. He also proposes that high social capital is a means through which individuals are protected against mental illnesses because social investments create a supportive environment for them (Turner, 2003).

Hamano et al. (2010) realised that both types of social capital (cognitive and structural) can affect mental health at the neighborhood level. Malberg and Himonan (2010) showed that there is a positive correlation between the elements of bonding social capital, such as social trust and trust in social worker, and mental health. Roose and Wu (1995) demonstrated that social capital (engagement in or exit from official and unofficial social networks, friends and individuals who one relies on in the time of sickness and having control over life and trust) affects individual health more than human capital (social base, age, sex, income).

Hence, the main hypothesis is extracted from the above-mentioned theories and
research: There is a relationship between social capital and mental health.

Moreover, according to various theories, social capital in the current research is evaluated in terms of social trust (Bourdieu, Putnam, Coleman), social solidarity (Putnam), social participation (Putnam), social awareness (Bourdieu), and social support (Turner). Thus, the sub-hypotheses are stated as follows:

There is a relationship between social capital (social trust, social participation, social solidarity, social awareness and social support) and mental health.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Main Hypothesis
There is a relationship between social capital and mental health of the individuals living in marginalised areas.

Sub-hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between social solidarity and the mental health of people living in marginalised areas.

Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between social participation and the mental health of people living in marginalised areas.

Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between social support and the mental health of people living in marginalised areas.

Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between social trust and the mental health of people living in marginalised areas.

Hypothesis 5: There is a relationship between social awareness and the mental health of people living in marginalised areas.

METHODS
Based on the data gathered and analysed, this research is a quantitative one and,
in regard to its manner of addressing the problem, it is a field study. The technique used in the research is survey. In the field study, Goldberg’s standardised mental health questionnaire, as well as a researcher-made social capital questionnaire, was used to collect data. The General Health questionnaire (GHQ) was designed by Goldberg (Goldberg & William, 1979).

To verify the reliability of the questionnaire, several university instructors and experts were consulted, and the Cronbach’s alpha test was used. Based on the alpha coefficient, the reliability coefficient of the mental health questionnaire is 0.83, while the reliability coefficient of the social capital questionnaire is 0.74.

The statistical population of this study consisted of all individuals aged 18 years and older in the marginalised areas of Kermanshah City. Since it was naturally impossible to study the opinions of all of the inhabitants of these areas, sampling was applied to determine the opinions of the subjects. According to the Cochran formula, a number of people (384 people) were selected and studied as the sample of the statistical population. The sampling method of this research consisted of two steps, including cluster sampling and simple random sampling. After data were collected, they were analysed using statistical software SPSS. Proper statistical tests were applied in accordance with each hypothesis to test them.

CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

Social Capital
Conceptual definition: The term social capital refers to capitals, such as social trust and the norms and networks that people devote to solving general problems. Social capital is said to be linked with concepts, such as civil society and social communication (Adam & Ransowicz, 2003).

Operational definition: This research investigates social capital with indicators of social solidarity, social participation, social support, social trust, and social awareness.

Mental Health
Conceptual definition: Mental health is the ability to find a balance in life and resist problems. Psychological problems impose a considerable amount of pressure on communities (Fata, Mutabi, Shakikba, & Barouti, 2008).

Operational definition: This research investigates mental health with indicators of physical symptoms, anxiety, severe depression, and disruption in social function.

DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics included variables of sex, education and age. Results of the sex variable show that 54.0% of the respondents were male and 46.0% female. Results of
the variable of age indicate that 18.0% of the respondents were aged 15 to 18, 25.0% were aged 19 to 22, 30.0% were aged 23 to 26, and 24.0% were aged 27 to 29 years. Results of the variable of education indicate that 28.0% of respondents have a diploma, 37.0% have an associate degree, 29.0% have a bachelor’s degree, and 6.0% have a master’s degree or higher.

Descriptive Statistics Regarding Mental Health Variable

Table 1
Descriptive statistics of mental health

<table>
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<th>Component status</th>
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<th>Research Variables</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>symptoms of physical problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>severe depression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>disruption in social functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Total mental health score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings of the mental health variable are in a way that the direction of the questions is the reverse. That is, the very high level of each variable indicates low mental health and its coefficient is 1, while the very low level of each variable indicates high mental health and its coefficient is 5. The findings showed that among the indicators of mental health, the mean of symptoms of physical problems is 3.91, anxiety is 3.13, severe depression is 3.91, and disruption in social function is 3.48. The overall mental health score of 3.40 indicates that the mental health of respondents is slightly higher than average.
Unlike the findings of the mental health variable, whose indicators have a reverse direction, social capital indicators have a direct direction. This means that very high social capital is estimated with coefficient 5, while very low is estimated with 1. Findings show that among social capital indicators, social cohesion has the highest mean (3.35) while social support has the lowest mean (2.66). Moreover, the general status of social capital components shows that, in all of the components, respondents acknowledge that social capital in the marginalised areas of Kermanshah is less than average (3) while the total score of social capital indicates that social capital in marginalised areas is low and near average (2.92).

**FINDINGS**

**Inferential Statistics**

**Normal Distribution of Data**
To use parametric tests, some preconditions are required, which include normalised data. To investigate the normality of the factors, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov single sample test is used as follows.

\[ H_0 : \text{data are normally distributed} \]
\[ H_1 : \text{data are not normally distributed} \]

**Table 3**
*Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine the normality of research variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscales indicators</th>
<th>Social trust</th>
<th>Social solidarity</th>
<th>Social participation</th>
<th>Social awareness</th>
<th>Social support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov values</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level (two domains)</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Table 3, it can be concluded that, since the values of significance level of all research variables are more than 0.05, data are normally distributed and, thus, parametric tests may be used for the analysis of the research hypotheses.

Testing the hypotheses
There is a relationship between different aspects of social capital (social trust, social participation, social solidarity, social awareness, and social support) and mental health of those residing in marginality. The Pearson correlation coefficient test was used to investigate the research hypotheses regarding the relationship between different aspects of social capital (solidarity, participation, support, trust, and awareness) with mental health. Results are presented in the following table.

Table 4
Correlation between independent and dependent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Correlation coefficient</th>
<th>Significance level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>Social solidarity</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social participation</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social support</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social awareness</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total social capital</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results suggest that there is a significant, positive, and direct relationship between all aspects of the social capital and mental health from the viewpoint of inhabitants of marginalised areas. Meanwhile, the relationship between social trust and mental health (P = 0.40) had the highest correlation coefficient, while the relationship between social awareness and mental health had the lowest correlation coefficient (P = 0.24).

Also, there is a positive and significant relationship between social participation (P = 0.37), social solidarity (P = 0.32), and social support (P = 0.30) with mental health from the perspective of the youth living in marginalised areas. Therefore, it can be argued that, from the perspective of inhabitants of marginalised regions, the higher the rate of social capital (P = 0.34) and its aspects, the higher the level of mental health. All the hypotheses of the present research are confirmed.

Regression analysis
How does each independent variable explain the dependent variables of the research?
Dependent variable: mental health of inhabitants of marginalised area

The table above lists the values of coefficients in the regression equation and probabilistic sizes based on the linear relationship between the predictive variables and dependent variables. According to the table, the social trust variable ($\beta = 0.37$) plays a larger role than other ones. This indicates that, for each unit of change in the standard deviation of social trust, a 0.37 change occurs in the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Subsequently, the social participation variable ($\beta = 0.31$), social solidarity variable ($\beta = 0.27$), social awareness variable ($\beta = 0.21$), and social interaction variable ($\beta = 0 / 18$) contributed to the prediction of the dependent variable.

It should be noted that multi-correlation of predictive variables with mental health is relatively high ($R = 0.60$). Also, five significant variables in general managed to significantly explain a change in the variable of mental health of inhabitants of marginalised regions by 0.36 ($R^2 = 0.36$).

**Structural Equation Model (AMOS)**

A structural equation model was used to determine the intensity and direction of the effect of social capital on mental health among the inhabitants of marginalised areas of Kermanshah in different situations. Nine visible variables are present in this model, where the variables h1, h2, h3, h4, and h5 are representatives of the hidden variable of social capital, while the visible variables F1, F2, F3, and F4 are the representatives of the hidden variable of mental health. The error variables, z and d, represent the measurement error of the nine visible variables.
Given that the direction of the arrows from the hidden variable to the visible variable that represents the hidden variable, it indicates the methodological point that the score of each respondent in the visible variable is influenced by the situation of the respondent, where the hidden underlying variable is associated with the visible one. In this model, for example, the hidden variable is social capital and its visible indicator is social solidarity (H1). In other words, the weights of H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5 in the research model determine the amount of respondent’s social capital.

In this model, the dependent and hidden variable is the mental health of the inhabitants of marginalised areas, while its visible indicators are anxiety (0.40), severe depression (0.26), symptoms of physical problems (0.35), and disruption in social function (0.18).

For example, the effect of the dependent variable of the research (e.g. mental health on F1 (0.40)) means that hidden variable...
of mental health has the highest potential to analyse F1 (or items directly linked to anxiety) with the highest coefficient. Social trust has the highest potential to analyse this variable with a coefficient of 0.59 in the hidden variable of social capital. In general, the effect of the independent variable of social capital on the mental health of the inhabitants of marginalised areas is 0.48.

**Model Fitness**

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Indices</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMIN</td>
<td>254.04</td>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>NNFI</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρ,df</td>
<td>0.000-231</td>
<td>AGFI</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN/DF</td>
<td>12.74</td>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fitness indices were used to examine model fitness. Fitness indices yield statistical values that help researchers choose the most suitable model. There are many fitness indices; however, the most effective one is the basis for the other indices and is called \( \chi^2 \). The closer the chi-square is to zero, the better the fitness of model. Since the chi-square value is influenced by the sample size and the number of relationships of the model, one cannot reach a desirable conclusion based on this value. Therefore, other indices are used along with this one to examine model fitness (Ezheie, Fata, Mutabi, Shakikba, & Barouti, 2008). Another index used to tackle this flaw of chi-square is \( \chi^2/df \). If this index is smaller than 3, it confirms the fitness of the model (Meyer, Eskandari, Grallath, & Rentsch, 2006). Based on the principle, Goodness of Fit Indices (GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Confirmatory Factor Index (CFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), and Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) are considered 90.0-95.0 for good models, while values higher than 8.0 indicate a rather good fitness of model. Also, if Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), suggested by Lohin (2004) for fitness, is less than 0.80, it shows good fitness, values of 0.80 to 0.1 show acceptable fitness, and values closer to zero indicate higher fitness. The above table shows the results of the analysis of the first-order factor for the above-mentioned model.

**CONCLUSION**

As mentioned before, mental health in the community is one of the main pillars of sustainable development and an essential part of prosperity and quality of life. A society is dynamic and vital only when its citizens, whether man or woman, enjoy favourable physical, mental, and social health. In this way, society can move towards improvement and fulfilment and reach a reasonable level of development. Mental health, especially in marginalised
areas or informal settlements, is one of the most important urban issues. Living in marginality generates negative and destructive consequences for the mental health of its inhabitants and, thus, this issue is addressed in macro-policies of Iranian Fifth Development Plan.

In this regard, given the importance and necessity of an examination of the relationship between social capital and mental health, this paper analysed and investigated different aspects of social capital (i.e. social trust, social solidarity, social participation, social support, and social awareness) as independent variables and their relationship to the mental health of the inhabitants of the marginalised areas of the city of Kermanshah as the dependent variable.

The results confirm a positive, direct, and significant relationship between all of the independent variables and the dependent variable. The higher the level of social trust (P = 40/0), social solidarity (P = 32/0), social participation (P = 37/0), social support (P = 30/0), and social awareness (P = 24/0) among inhabitants of marginal areas, the more likely mental health is to be realised for them. Meanwhile, the highest correlation with mental health belongs to the variable of social trust, while the lowest correlation belongs to the variable of social consciousness.

The results of this study concerning the relationship between social capital and mental health are consistent with the findings by Hamano et al. (2010); Malberg (2010); Nekoonam et al. (2015); Razavizadeh et al. (2012); Shakerinia (2010), and Shoja (2011). The findings of all of above studies indicate that there is a relationship between various aspects of social capital and mental health. Also, the results of this article are consistent with Kavachi, Brackman and Turner theories. Each of the aforementioned theorists referred to the connection between social capital and mental health in their theories. Therefore, the findings of this research are completely in line with the above theories.

Based on the theoretical discussions and the findings of this research, it can be said that with the transition of societies from traditional to industrial, the mental health of the community becomes more important, so that mental health is at the forefront of the global organization, including the World Health Organization. This issue has been discussed in Iran as a developing country. In the meantime, the existence of a large part of the marginalized areas has caused problems. Issues and problems affecting the health of riders in marginal areas from different perspectives. Living in the marginalized areas requires the development of a spirit of trust, participation, support, coherence, engagement, and cooperation, according to their particular circumstances. The results of the research show that with the increase in each of these variables, the mental health of marginalized individuals also increases. Given that mental health means living in a situation where participation, trust, support and social interaction are integral to it, it provides safe and comfortable conditions, especially in marginalized areas with
multiple forms of deprivation in which one has the power to calm down and relax himself and others, is conscious of his inner self and emotions, has the power of decision-making in crisis, and can successfully cope with psychological pressures; this is in fact the meaning of mental health.

A rich society in terms of social capital can provide a higher level of health achievements through securing more social support, developing social participation and trust, and increasing individual and social awareness. Solidarity in a social network directly creates positive mental states and a sense of belonging in individuals which, in turn, improve their mental health. Moreover, those highly involved in social networks have access to broader social sources and are in more desirable conditions in terms of well-being. Social capital increases marginalised inhabitants’ tendency towards interaction and cooperation with various social groups and creates a network of voluntary relationships among such groups in various aspects of social life. Social capital binds people together like a book end and prevents them from separation and scattering and, thus, secures their mental health.

REFERENCES


Abdolhossein Kalantari, Nowzar Ghanbari and Habil Heidarkhani


A Missing Dialogue among Advocates and Opponents of 19th Century Short-Term Reforms in Iran

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ABSTRACT

This article applies rational choice theory to analysis three reformative periods in 19th century Iran: the reforms of AmirKabir, Naser-ed-Din Shah and Sepahsalar. It analyses the arguments of the advocates and opponents of reforms, as well as the reasons and counterarguments of reformers. Using the method of agreement and the method of concomitant variation, it examines the triangular rational interaction of opponents, reformers, and advocates of reforms. Based on a nominal comparison of the arguments of opponents, the reasons they offer in all three reformative periods include: “endangerment of Shah’s household”, “homeland security disturbance”, “the danger of losing territorial integrity of Iran”, “political dependency of the reformer and/or his advocates on foreign countries”, “neglecting people’s rights”, “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits”, and “personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates”. Based on an ordinal comparison, the most repetitive arguments offered by distinct groups of opponents include: “endangerment of Shah’s household”, “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits”, “neglecting traditions by the reformer and/or his advocates”, and “personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates”. Analysing the triangular interaction of the reformer, advocates, and opponents of reforms indicates that the reform of Sepahsalar is the only one that demonstrates an interaction among reformer, advocates, and opponents. Further, it is the only period in which the reformer and the advocates react to the most repetitive arguments of opponents.

Keywords: Advocates of reform, AmirKabir, Naser-ed-Din Shah, opponents of reforms, Qajar dynasty, rational choice theory, Sepahsalar
INTRODUCTION

The historical yet ongoing process of modernisation and reforms in Iran, along with its achievements and failures, has been affected the current socio-political path of the Iranian society. Duality of Modernity and Tradition in the past two centuries, the impact of their relationship, and its implications on the current social, cultural, political, and economic situation of Iran are what have been addressed by many Iranian scholars. This scrutiny can be found in the works of historians and political scientists like Abbas Amanat (2004); Abbas Milani (2001); Ali MirSepassi (2005); Hairi (1988); Mohammad Tohidi (2008). Yet, a sociological analysis of the early attempts to overcome the ‘boundaries’ of tradition and reform various aspects of Iranians life is missing.

Focusing on the early reforms conducted in the 19th century, during Nasser al-Din Shah Era, this article will analyse the arguments offered by the opponents and advocates of the reforms. Going beyond the commonsensical pictures which drew the opponents of reforms as the traditionalist reactionaries, this article specifically concentrates on their own arguments that resulted in the failure of the reforms. Consequently, this article will answer the question “how the opponents and advocates of the reforms in Naseri Era offered and presented their arguments for or against the reforms”. Besides, it comparatively analyses the impact of these arguments and the reactions of the reformers in each of the three reform periods in Nasser al-Din Shah Era on the execution of reforms and its achievements.

To give a background on the events occurred in these three reformatory periods, in the following article, first a short account on the reforms in these three reformatory periods will be offered. Moving forward, the article briefly introduces Rational Choice theory as theoretical framework and elaborates on method of agreement and method of concomitant variations as methodology to approach the questions. This setting provides the context to analyse the arguments offered by the opponents of the reforms as well as its advocates and the reformers.

Historical Background

The shocking defeat of Iran in the war against Russia in the beginning of the 19th century, which resulted in the loss of some of Iran’s most important territories in the North, brought about self-consciousness among Iranian elites and alarmed them on the West’s increasing developments. As a result, Abbas Mirza (1803–1828), the crown prince at the time, and his followers in Tabriz initiated the first reformatory attempt. By his death, however, this early attempt for reforms ended. To fulfil the goal of Abbas Mirza, there were three short-term reforms in the Naser-ed-Din Shah era (1848-1896). Naser-ed-Din Shah was the descendant of Abbas Mirza and one of the most important kings of the Qajar Dynasty (1785-1925). These three eras of reform were headed by Mirza Taqi Khan AmirKabir (Prime
Minister, 1848-1851), Naser-ed-Din Shah (the king himself 1858–1861), and Mirza Hussein Khan Sepahsalar (Prime Minister, 1871-1873). However, all these attempts at reform failed due to the extreme oppositions by clergymen, courtiers, government officials, and women of the royal harem.

Mirza Taqi Khan AmirKabir, started the first “comprehensive” reforms in Iran as the first Prime Minister of Naser-ed-Din Shah, which included stabilising internal security, introducing an accurate and fair tax system, empowering Iran’s military, establishing legal justice courts, prohibiting bribery, and building the first Iranian college.

However, the first reformative period in the Naseri era ended in 1851 due to the wide opposition of courtiers, officials, clergymen, women of the harem, and foreign embassies. A worsening of Iran’s internal and global situation in the following seven years under Prime Minister Mirza Agha Khan Noori resulted in Naser-ed-Din Shah’s decision to take the leading role in the upcoming reforms in 1858 and to establish the Council of the State, the Assembly of the House of Consultation, and the government judicial bureau. In this period, an enlightening informal reformative trend, led by Mirza Malkum Khan, complemented formal reforms. But just like AmirKabir’s reform, the reforms in this period faced extensive opposition and were finally halted in 1853 by the arrest, exile, and murder of the advocates of the informal reform.

Nine years after the defeat of the second reformative period in the Nasir Era, Naser-ed-Din Shah appointed Iran’s ambassador in the Ottoman Empire, Mirza Hussein Khan Sepahsalar, as the new Prime Minister. Sepahsalar immediately emerged as the leader of the third reformative period by empowering the Iranian army and the industrial apparatus, implementing financial reforms, and focusing on cultural policies like civil rights and providing public education in Dar ul-funun. Yet Sepahsalar’s reforms were confronted with extreme opposition, probably most severe in the Naseri era. Because of these oppositions, Sepahsalar was forced to resign after his return to Iran from a triumphant trip to Europe with the Shah himself. Unlike the other periods of reforms in this era, Sepahsalar was not murdered or arrested, and he returned to power shortly after his resignation. However, his resignation ended the last attempts of reform in the Naser-ed-Din Shah era.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Theoretical Frame

Using historical sociology, this article analyses the arguments of reformers, opponents, and advocates of reforms by applying what James Mahoney (2004) calls “general theory” in his article “Revising General Theory in Historical Sociology”. Introducing functionalist, rational choice, power, neo-Darwinian, and cultural theories as “general theories” in historical sociology, Mahoney emphasises that the core of these theories is demonstrated by specific “causal agents (i.e., basic units of analysis)” and special “causal mechanisms (i.e., abstract properties of causal agents that produce
outcomes and associations)” (Mahoney 2004, p. 460).

According to Ian Craib (2006, p. 92), “one of the simplest way to describe rational choice theory is analysing it by attempts of constructing models of individuals’ behaviour when they are acting rational in a special circumstance”. In rational choice theory, the rational individuals (agents) are those whose actions are “instrumental” and rely on rationality. This theory is not seeking to show that a given individual in a “special circumstance” will do a specific action, but it seeks to analyse “social outcomes”. In other words, according to this theory, even if the agent is acting rational, the social outcomes still might be irrational and undesirable (Hatcher & Kanazawa, 1997, p. 192; Javadi Yeganeh, 2008).

Although the rational choice approach has various attitudes toward social actions that are examined by different scholars, it is mainly trying to explain an individual action in terms of rationality of actors. In Norkus’ words, “the individual actions are explained as the consequences of acts of rational choices” (Norkus 2000, p. 260). It is worth noting that rational choice theory, especially in more recent approaches, is aware of the boundaries of this general theory; however, stating these boundaries does not negate the rationality of individuals’ actions. Yet, acknowledging these boundaries and limitations in examining the rationality of individuals, sociologists came up with notions like bounded rationality.

Rational choice theory, following individualistic methodology of Max weber, focuses on the social phenomena in terms of the rational choice of the social actors. There are two forms of rationality in Rational Choice Theory, namely forward-looking rationality and backward-looking rationality. In forward-looking rationality “actors choose alternatives by predicting the social outcome of their choices. […] they are assumed to try to choose the alternatives that produce the best outcome for them. Game theory assumes this forward-looking rationality” (Sato, 2010). In the backward-looking rationality, the actor learns from his past and the positive or negative outcomes of the alternative outcomes. Yet, it is worth noting that rational choice theory, especially in more recent approaches, is aware of the “boundaries” of this general theory; however, stating these boundaries does not negate the rationality of individuals’ actions.

Although some recent research has applied rational choice theory (Congleton, 2006; McLean, 2001; Milner, 2002; Murshed, 2010), these authors are mainly focused on political science and events occurring in the late twentieth century as opposed to earlier historical incidents. There are two notable exceptions, however, in The Logic of Evil, the Social Origin of Nazi Party 1925-1933, William Bernstein explains the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany based on rational choice theory (Mahoney, 2004), and Eskandari Qajar’s (2010) article, “Between Scylla and Charybdis; Policy-making under conditions of constraint in early Qajar Persia,” explains the decision of the first kings of Qajar Dynasty for protecting Iran in the wars against Russia.
According to Ian Craib (2006, p. 92), “one of the simplest way to describe rational choice theory is analyzing it by attempts of constructing models of individuals’ behavior when they are acting rational in a special circumstance”. Rational Choice theory doesn’t neglect the irrational acts of the players but assumes them as rational actors and begins with a rational analysis of the social phenomena.

Therefore, in the following article, rational choice theory is applied to investigate the arguments of the opponents and supporters of reforms in these three reformative periods during the era known as the Naseri era. Rational choice theory has been used to examine historical data. Most of the conceptual and historical analyses focus on the backwardness of oppositions in the Qajar era, seeing them as passive reactioners who follow their own financial and even sexual desires. In the absence of alternative approaches in other research reforms in Iran, this article argues that rational choice theory—which assumes rationality of the individuals and analyses the reason of these actions and decisions—opens a new window unto this realm. In other words, this theory enables the authors to focus on the “rational” context of the choices of these opponents and understand the irrational, unwanted outcomes of these protests.

METHODS
Investigating the rationality of the agents of reform (reformers, advocates of reforms, and opponents of reforms) in each period of reform in the Naseri Era, this article focuses on the arguments as expressed by opponents and advocates of reforms. In other words, for analysing the rationality of their arguments in supporting or opposing the reformers, the arguments of opponents of reforms (divided in four groups: clergymen, courtiers, governmental officials, and the women of the royal harem) will be discussed, and the responses of the reformer and his advocates to opponents’ critics will be assessed. Reviewing the archives and documents of Nasser Era regarding the arguments of rational actors of the reforms – opponents and advocates- four categorises has been recognized. Therefore, using rational choice theory, applying the comparative perspective of the arguments proposed by opponents and advocates, studying the letters, pamphlets, and books written by these opponents, advocates, and reformers themselves, and considering the arguments offered by them to defend or criticize reforms, the categorised arguments emerge as follows:

- Religious arguments: the opposition of reformative actions with Islam, neglect of Islam by the individual reformer and/or his advocates;
- Financial arguments: the financial performance of the reformer and/or his advocates, financial corruption of reformer and/or his advocates, and the erosion of the financial benefits of elites by them;
- Political arguments: the endangerment of the kingdom of Naser-ed-Din Shah, attempts to abolish the Qajar dynasty,
attempts to change the monarch system, dereliction of the power of the heir by exercising ultra-monarchical power by reformer and/or his advocates, homeland security disturbance, the absolute power of the reformer, the interventions of aliens in Iran, the danger of losing territorial integrity of Iran, the danger of the colonisation of Iran, the political dependency of the reformer and/or his advocates in foreign countries;

- Social arguments: neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits, neglecting the people’s rights, low social origins of the reformer and/or his advocates, negligence of traditions by the reformer and/or his advocates, cultural westernisation of Iran;

- The personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates.

For analysing the arguments of the advocates, this article uses the common arguments of the opponents to assess the pro-reform reasonings in four ways by pointing out the same criticisms of opponents, criticising opponents for such arguments, denying the accusations of opponents, and emphasising the importance of the reformative actions. It is worth noting that the advocates of reforms—except for Mirza Malkum Khan—were not eager to defend reforms or offer reasoning to support it, unless pressured by the opponents who did not hesitate to attack the reforms.

Inspired by John Stuart Mill’s direct method of agreement and method of concomitant variations and applying the nominal and ordinal comparisons explained by James Mahoney, this article then analyses the arguments of reformers, advocates, and opponent of reforms. According to Mahoney, nominal comparison “involves the use of categories that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive” (Mahoney 1999, p. 1157). In the direct method of agreement, which is one of the simplest methods offered by Mill (2009), “omitting” is crucial and the researcher should try to discover the “firm, common, or non-changeable patterns among the cases”. Unlike the nominal comparison, in an ordinal comparison, which weights the causes, the potential causes cannot be omitted easily (Taleban 2009, p. 65) As Mahoney states: Ordinal comparison entails the rank ordering of cases into three or more categories based on the degree to which a given phenomenon is present (Mahoney 1999, p. 1160).

Therefore, in this article, in the nominal level and based on Mill’s direct method of agreement, non-common arguments of distinct groups of opponents in the three reformative groups in the Naseri era will be omitted. In the ordinal level, based on Mill’s method of concomitant variations, the most and least common arguments among advocates, opponents, and reformers will be ranked. With nominal comparison, using the thin methods of rational choice theory, this article focus on the rationality of the choices of the opponents of reforms.
By so doing, it reveals the arguments that demonstrate which groups were influential in the failure of reforms. Concentrating on the arguments of the opponents in these three reformative trends, their arguments in an order of twenty-one arguments will be categorized. Additionally, the ordinal comparison of these twenty-one arguments will be offered. Subsequently, the arguments of the advocates of reforms and the reformers will be analysed based on these twenty-one categorised arguments.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Short-Term Reforms in 19th Century Iran

1. AmirKabir’s Reform

The first round of reforms headed by AmirKabir emerged in 1847, the exact year Naser-ed-Din Shah ascended to power. In his three years as Prime Minister (1848 – 1851), AmirKabir conducted widespread reforms empowering the army as well as financial, social, and political developments. Some of his many attempts to modernise Iran include stabilising internal security, establishing an accurate and fair tax system, empowering Iran’s military by hiring military experts from Italy and Austria, opening weapon factories, controlling and limiting religious justice courts (Mahakem-e Shara’) and establishing legal justice courts instead, prohibiting bribery, performing nation-wide smallpox vaccination, building the first public hospital, building the first Iranian college (Darul-funun), promoting translation and publication, hiring technicians from Prussia and England for establishing new factories, and establishing Iran’s first daily paper -Vaghaye’ Ettefaghyeh- (Adamiyat, 1983; Haj Sayyah, 1980; Khormoji, 1984; Lesan al-Molk Sepehr, 1958; Mahbobi Ardakani, 1975; Makki, 1987; Martin, 2010; Mohit Tabatabaei, 1975; Rezvani, 1975; Shamim, 1996).

Yet, his reformative actions faced harsh criticism and immense opposition from both Iranian and foreigner opponents (Amanat, 2004; Hedayat, 1983; Raadi Azarakhshhi, 1975; Tohidi Chaffi, 2008). Inside Iran, there were four major groups opposing the performance of AmirKabir: the clergy, courtiers, officials, and the women of the royal harem.

1.1. The Opponents of AmirKabir’s Reform

AmirKabir reduced the power of the clergy to almost nothing, an act which was not common in Iran at that time, and caused serious oppositions by clergymen who were among the most important political actors in Qajar Iran. The strict manner of AmirKabir toward clergymen (such as removing one of them due to a case of bribery), replacing the religious courts by legal courts, nullifying the law of taking refuge in a sanctuary (which was very common in Iran),¹ and

¹It is worth mentioning that due to the humbleness attached to taking refuge in a sanctuary as an act of commoners, other places were replaced such as foreign embassies and even the Shah’s stables. The determination of this law limited maneuvering power in Iran of foreign embassies and courtesies as well as clergymen.
indulgency of religious minorities ignited the anger of clergymen and their countless followers. However, considering the lack of official historical data in AmirKabir’s era, there is no written opposition argumentation by clergymen against the Prime Minister.

Courtiers, who were one of the most important and influential groups in Qajar Iran, were another group that opposed the reforms of AmirKabir. One of the main and yet basic reasons the courtiers opposed AmirKabir was because of his humble background. Unaccustomed to this in Iran in the 19th century, the courtiers found it offensive that a person with a low social status could reach the second highest position in the country. AmirKabir’s irritating approaches gave them even more reason to oppose. For example, the Prime Minister reduced the governmental budgets dramatically and remained himself the only one who had unlimited access to the Shah, a privilege that bothered all the groups in power—especially the courtiers. Moreover, AmirKabir was negligent to the status of courtiers as the ‘royal family’ and refused to consider their royal blood a special social or financial privilege for them (Amanat, 2004; Lesan al-Molk Sepehr, 1958; Makki, 1987). Like the clergymen, there is no written documentation regarding courtiers’ opposition toward reforms; however, formal historical books, such as Nasekh-ol-tavarikh written by Lesan al-Molk Sepehr (1958) in the Naser-ed-Din Shah era, provide some of the courtiers’ arguments.

Along with courtiers, the officials were the most important internal players in Iranian policies in the Qajar Dynasty. The officials—mostly from the non-royal prominent families in Iran—oversaw running the government. They were a well-educated and well-established group who had essentially inherited their jobs from their ancestors. From the beginning of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s kingship, officials who preferred the Prime Minister to be one of their own started to oppose AmirKabir’s campaign. However, it was not until after the dismissal and murder of AmirKabir that they became vocal about their oppositions. The authority of AmirKabir, his charisma, and his absolute power prevented them from confronting directly and, as a result, they tried to express their opposition to the Shahs² (AleDavood, 2000; Amanat, 2004; Etemad al-Saltaneh, 1978a; Etemad al-Saltaneh, 1978b; Eghbal Ashtian, 1961; Mahboobi Ardakani, 1975; Makki, 1987; Sasani, 2003).

Finally, there were the women of the royal harem—the veiled and hidden power of Iran’s Qajar court—who were in some cases among the most effective powers in the country who stood against AmirKabir. Although the women of the royal harem were mostly considered “playthings” to the powerful men in 19th century Iran, they had

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²For the letter of Mirza Agha khan Noori to Naser-ed-Din Shah see Aledavood 2000: 220.
For the government announcement regarding AmirKabir’s dismissal see Makki 1987: 490.
For the letter of Mirza Agha khan Noori to Russian Ambassador to Iran see Aledavood 2000: 213.
For the letter of Mirza Agha khan Noori to Iran Ambassador to Russia see Aledavood 2000: 213.
an exciting potential to influence those in power in practice, since they had unrivalled access to the Shah—who no other man was allowed. During AmirKabir’s reformative period, these women (in particular Naser-ed-Din Shah’s mother, Mahd-e Olia) were some of the few vocal opponents of the reforms (Amanat, 2004; Makki, 1987; Sasani, 2003; Tohidi Chaffi, 2008).

As mentioned earlier, there has remained no argument from clergymen during this period, either due to the poor formal historical narrations in the first decade of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, the lack of informal history writing, clergymen’s unwillingness to document their personal lives, the unsuitable maintenance of historical data, or simply because the clergymen did not offer arguments (although that seems unlikely). Most of the oppositions against AmirKabir’s reform came from officials. The arguments of opposition are mainly focused on political reasoning and followed by social ones. Notably, the only distinguished opposition to AmirKabir’s performance was suggested by women of the royal harem focusing on systematic “financial corruption”, “the inappropriate actions of army soldiers”, and “people’s irritation by soldiers”. Interestingly, unlike the other reformative periods in the Naseri era, the opposition does not indicate any religious argument against AmirKabir and his reforms.

In nominal comparison, “neglecting the opposition’s status and threatening their class benefits” and “depriving the heir of power from power” are two arguments that the three dissenting groups share and, therefore, are the most frequent opposition arguments. The other arguments are omitted in the nominal comparison because they do not occur in at least one of the arguing groups. In ordinal comparison, besides the two arguments of nominal comparison that are the most frequent, “the personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates”, “the absolute power of the reformer”, and “homeland security disturbance” are suggested by two out of three opposition groups and, therefore, have moderate importance. The remaining arguments are suggested by only one of the opposition groups and, therefore, have the least importance.

In this reformative period, the opposition arguments merely focused on class benefits and group interests. In the nominal comparison, there were no national interests in the arguments of the opposition, while in the two other periods of reform in Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, there were shifts in the level of arguments from the group and class arguments to national and religious ones.

3For the letter of Mahde olia to Shah see Amanat 2004: 205.
For the letter of Mahde olia to Shah see Aledavood 2000: 208.

4They are the most frequent arguments based on groups who suggest the arguments.
1.2. The Advocates of AmirKabir’s Reform

In this reformative period, because of the shortage of historical data on the one hand, and the absent of advocates of reforms and reformer’s consultants on the other, there are no arguments from the supporters of reforms. Regarding the absence of arguments by the advocates of reforms in AmirKabir’s era, it is essential to focus on some facts:

1. As with AmirKabir’s opponents, his advocates were his subordinates. It does not seem that they had been consulted, and, apparently, they were obeying the Prime Minister’s orders instead of supporting his ideas or bringing new reformative ideas.

2. AmirKabir’s reforms were the first to be carried out across the country that were not exclusively focused on strengthening the army (while the previous reforms were). Thus, unlike the reformative periods to follow, the reformist and his advocates did not perceive the importance of arguing and reasoning to prove and advocate the reformative campaign in the society.

In fact, it seems that the experience of AmirKabir’s reforms brought a condition in the following reforms in which the reformer, advocates, and opponents were ready to protect the reformative trend or to oppose it.

As for the reformer, AmirKabir was considered a laconic pragmatist who spent his time carrying out the reform rather than arguing with the opponents. Furthermore, the opponents were mostly AmirKabir’s subordinates. Therefore, being authoritarian in character, AmirKabir did not feel it necessary to defend himself. He simply gave an “order” to change the opposition’s attitude (Adammiat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; Sepehr Makki, 1987). Yet, from the letters written by AmirKabir after his dismissal and before going under arrest, these were the arguments he offered to defend his performance and answer the opponents’ critics: personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates, the absolute power of the reformer, and endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s kingship. Notably, none of these arguments address the most repetitive arguments of the opponents, which included depriving the heir of power by the reformer and/or his advocates, neglecting the opponents’ position, threatening their class benefits, and neglecting the people’s rights.  

Interestingly, even most of the opponents’ arguments are shaped in conversations with foreign countries (Britain and Russia) that were objecting the death of AmirKabir.

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For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah before his dismissal see Aledavood 2000: 81.
For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah after his dismissal see Aledavood 2000: 78.
For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah see Aledavood 2000: 85-86.
For the last letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah see Sasani 2003: 35.
2. Naser-ed-Din Shah's Reforms

The assassination of AmirKabir in 1851—owing to the widespread opposition of courtiers, officials, clergymen, and women of the harem to AmirKabir’s reforms, and his replacement by Mirza Agha Khan Noori—was the end of the first reformative period in the Naseri era. Seven years later, however, and due to Iran’s increasingly worsening internal and global situation because of the inferior performance of the new Prime Minister, Naser-ed-Din Shah decided to take on his role in reforming the infrastructure of the country as well as its cultural and social policies. Therefore, he restructured his governmental apparatus starting with dismissing Noori and abolishing the position of Prime Minister. Restructuring some governmental parts resulted in a new reformative period from 1859 to 1862. Among the most important reforms and achievements of this period are establishing the Council of the State; establishing the Assembly of the House of Consultation, Majles-e Maslahat-Khaneh (the earliest form of parliament in Iran, in which the members had been elected by Shah); establishing a governmental judicial bureau called divan-khana; personally overseeing people’s complaints by the Shah; sending students to Europe to study; and founding the telegraph (Adammiat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; Katiraei, 1976; Khormoji, 1984; Martin, 2010; Mostofi, 1998; Ravandi, 1999; Schneider, 2004; Tohidi Chaffi, 2008; ZibaKalam, 2003).

This reformative period was a peculiar one in which there was an informal and unofficial reform running alongside the formal and official one. In the formal reform, the idea and the performance of the reform was led by Naser-ed-Din Shah himself. In fact, although the Shah gave decision-making power in most “prominent issues of the country” to the Maslahat-Khaneh, and gave pursuing reforms to the ministers in the Council of State, he kept the right to interfere and make final decisions himself. Considering his permanent “Royal” rights and the fact that he had been repeatedly changing the governmental decisions based on his personal opinions, this decision of the Shah might be a sign of his personal interest and his attempt to play a role as the key reformer, rather than his effort to exercise his royal authority.

Yet, one of the most notable events in this period was the emergence of an unofficial, non-governmental reformative camp. In fact, besides the official, governmental, royal reforms that were operating by the Shah, there were some reformative actions in which Naser-ed-Din Shah did not play the key role (Elgar, 1990). The two main non-governmental reformative actions in this period were translating the social and political ideas outpouring from the West and establishing a missionary society called Faramosh-Khaneh. Mirza Malkum Khan’s establishment of Faramosh-Khaneh was a major part of the non-governmental reform in this phase of reforms. Mirza Malkum Khan also had a significant role in the emergence of formal reforms by composing some reformative pamphlets. According to Malkum, Naser-ed-Din Shah...
was informed about the emergence of these unofficial reforms (particularly establishing of Faramosh-Khaneh) and he approved (or at least was not opposed to) them. The letter of the Foreign Affairs Minister of Iran to his ambassador in Ottoman approves this claim of Malkum (for more information about Faramosh-Khaneh see: Adammiat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; Elgar, 1990; Katiraei, 1976; Kermani, 1983; Raen, 1978; Shamim, 1996). However, as the previous reformative period, these reforms faced great oppositions and extreme reactions by clergymen, courtiers, and officials, which resulted in torture, arrest, and murder of the reformists.  

2.1. The Opponents of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s Reforms

The focus of clergymen, as one of the opposition groups of the 1859-1862 reforms, was on Faramosh-Khaneh, which they considered as a centre for promoting anti-religious ideas. Haj Molla Ali Kani, the prominent clergyman in the Naseri era, was among the fierce opponents of Faramosh-Khaneh (Adamiyat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; PourAmini, 2000). The most important document remaining from the clergy in this period was an anonymous letter to the Shah (Raeen, 1978; Katiraei, 1976), believed by some scholars to have been written by Kani (Rajabi Davani, 2011), who also wrote a letter in 1862 to the Shah to express his concerns and to object to the beliefs and rituals of Faramosh-Khaneh.

Regarding courtiers, the other opposition group in this reformative period, there is no first-hand documentation. In fact, some of the courtiers had joined Faramosh-Khaneh and the meetings were held in the house of one of the courtiers, Jalal ed-Din Mirza, the ceremonial chief of Faramosh-Khaneh (Amanat, 2004; Bamdad, 1992). Yet, the arguments of the courtier opponents of reform can be found in Ebrat al-Nazerin va Ebrat al-Hazerin, a book written in the Naseri era by a hawkish opponent of reform, Agha Ebrahim Novab Badaie’ Negar (Adamiyat, 2006; Sasani, 2003). This book is the sum of the most radical arguments against reforms.  

In this reformative period, there is no confrontation with the formal reforms that were headed by the Shah or by officials, although there were some officials who tried to sabotage the reforms (Adammiat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; Benjamin, 1984; Elgar, 1990). In this period, the officials, as well as two other groups, mainly focus on Faramosh-Khaneh’s instructions, and argue against the reforms. The most important first-hand document of officials who opposed the reform is an anonymous pamphlet, believed to have been written by Ali Monshi Tabrizi.

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7In the second period of reforms in the Naseri era, unlike the first, there was no serious opposition against reforms by the women of royal harem. Or at the very least, there exists no historical evidence on this.


10Mirza Yusuf Mustawfi al-Mamalik and Mirza Saeid Khan are among those who tried to sabotage the reforms (Adammiat 2006; Amanat 2004; Elgar 1990; Benjamin 1984).
This pamphlet was written in response to Malkum’s “Ketabche-ye Faramosh-Khaneh” (handbook of Faramosh-Khaneh).11

“Endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household” and “neglecting traditions by the reformer and his advocates” are the common arguments among the groups of opponents (clergyman, courtiers, and officials) in this reformative period. Two religious arguments, “opposition of reformative actions with Islam” and “negligence toward Islam by the reformer and/or his advocates” as well as other arguments such as “attempts to change the monarchy system”, “homeland security disturbance”, “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits”, “culture of westernisation in Iran”, and “the personal manner of the reformer and his advocates” are offered by two groups of opponents. The rest of the arguments are merely suggested by one group of opponents.

As is clear, most of the arguments against the reform are political, followed by social and religious arguments. Most of the arguments in this period have been offered by clergyman and followed by courtiers. It is worth mentioning that since the reforms in this period mostly focused on the structure of the power (formal reforms) and the idea of modernity and the intellectual aspects of reforms (informal reforms), there are few financial arguments in this period and the opponents do not focus on their own class interests. Notably, depriving the heir of power from power, one of the main arguments found in the informal reform, is absent from the formal reforms, since the reformer is the Shah himself.

2.2. The Advocates of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s Reforms

As of the advocates of reforms, members of Faramosh-Khaneh, including some of the prominent figures among clergyman, courtiers, and officials, were the most significant advocates of reforms from 1859-1862. Hassan Ali Khan Garosi, Iran’s ambassador to France is another advocate of reforms in this period, who had elaborated on Iran’s achievement and the importance of reform in a letter to the Napoleon III.12 Yet, the legendary reformist and the most significant advocate of reforms in this period was Mirza Malkum Khan, who wrote six pamphlets in defence of reforms from 1859-1862. Malkom had been influencing the Shah and his formal reform with his ideas stated in his book Ketabcheye Ghaybi, on the one hand, and leading the informal reforms on the other (Adamiyat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; Bamdad, 1992; Elgar, 1990; Elgar, 1977; Katiraei, 1976; Kermani, 1983; Malkom, 2002; Mostofi, 1998; Sasani, 2003; Sayex, 2001).

Most of the arguments by advocates in this period are political in nature. However,

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11For the text of this pamphlet see Raeen 1978: 556-560.

12For Hassan Ali Khan Garosi’s letter to Napoleon III see Aledavood 2000: 297-299.
For Mirza Malkum Khan and Welford Scothen Belant see Elgar 1990: 12-14
For Malkom’s defense of reform see: Malkom Khan, 2002.
for countering opponents’ arguments, the advocates of reforms emphasised religious and social issues as well. Notably, the emphasis on Islam for defending the reform highlights the importance of religious discussion in opponents’ counterarguments and its significant effect in conducting public opinion.

In the second reformative period in Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, ten out of fourteen arguments offered by the opponents were the opposition of reformative actions with Islam, financial corruption of the reformer and/or his advocates, homeland security disturbance, the danger of losing territorial integrity, neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits, neglecting people’s rights, neglecting traditions, cultural westernisation of Iran, and the personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates. The advocates did evoke the other four arguments, which included endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household, negligence toward Islam by the reformer and/or his advocates, colonisation of Iran, and the political dependency of the reformer and/or his advocates on foreign countries. However, the advocates were not successful in responding to one of the two crucial arguments of the opponents against the informal reform, namely the “endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household.”

In this reformative period, just like during AmirKabir’s, there is a lack of triple interactions among opponents, reformers, and advocates. Unlike the previous period of reforms, in which the advocates did not counterargue against the opponents—and therefore the reformer himself had to defend his reforms—in this period, it was the reformer, Naser-ed-Din Shah himself, who did not offer any response to the critics of opponents. In fact, given the type of the oppositions that were focused on informal reforms, Malkum, as the most significant figures of reform, defended the reform.

Interestingly, in three reformative periods in the Naseri era, only in the informal reforms of 1858-1861 is there a dialogue between advocates and opponents. Although in this dialogue, just like the other cases, the first opponent (the writer of the report, Faramosh-Khan) writes a letter to the Shah and Malkum, as an advocate of reforms, and answers him, however indirectly. In the end, an official answered back to Malkum. In fact, it is only during this period that the whole attention did not focus on the Shah—instead of trying to just convince the Shah, both sides tried to answer each other. Choosing the audience of this informal dialogue is interesting as well: while the first one—the clergyman—chose the court and the Shah (indirectly) as his audience, Malkum wrote his letter for an unknown—Jenab Agha (“His Excellency”, most likely Seyed Sadeq Tabatabaei, a famous clergyman who had been approved the establishment of Faramosh-Khan). The third one—the official—wrote his letter to the people. Yet, the failure of formal reformative attempts of the Shah as well as the informal reforms from 1859-1862 resulted in the arrest, torture, and murder of the reformists.
The Shah, as the reformer of the formal reforms in this period, pointed out in some of his letters that the performance and the attitude of the opponents focused on profit-oriented actions of courtiers and officials, their ignorance toward country’s situation, and the false promises of courtiers and officials. The Shah addressed the political arguments (impracticality of courtiers) as well as the financial arguments (profit-oriented actions of opponents). Yet, in the informal reforms, the Shah had no role other than an informed advocator; therefore, he did not offer any arguments protecting the unofficial reforms (if any). Besides, the Shah as the highest position in the pyramid of power did not need any explanation for his wishes and it was expected from all individuals to “obey” his “majestic rules”.

3. Sepahsalar’s Reforms

Nine years later, Naser-ed-Din Shah appointed Sepahsalar as the new Prime Minister of Iran. Sepahsalar, the third reformer in the Naseri era, had pursued plenty of reform movements in the period, such as establishing the board of state, empowering the army, determining a specific time and location for governmental affairs, empowering the industrial apparatus, and financial reforms. He also focused on some cultural policies, like civil rights, empowering the Dar ul-funun (the first Iranian college), advocating public education in Dar ul-funun, and establishing new daily papers, which were unique in his time (Abbasi, 1993; Adamiyat, 2006; Bayani, 1978; Ceronin, 2010; Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh, 2000; Hedayat, 1996; Keddi, 2008; Mostofi, 1998; Saeidi Sirjani, 1983; Sasani, 2003; Sasani, 1975; Sedigh ol-Mamalek, 1987). However, Sepahsalar’s reforms were not exempt from the extreme opposition that eventually forced him to resign due to the widespread protests of the courtiers, elites, clergymen, the women of the royal harem, the foreign embassies (particularly Russia), and at times, the public.

3.1. The Opponents of Sepahsalar’s Reforms

The clergymen, who viewed this reform as an attempt for westernising Iran, were undoubtedly one of the most influential opponents of Sepahsalar’s reforms. Regulating the judiciary system, reducing the appointment of clergymen as judges, and prohibiting physical punishment were among Sepahsalar’s programs that directly and indirectly reduced the power of the clergy and put them on the list of opponents.

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13 For Naser-ed-Din Shah’s letter to Malkom see Teymori 1978: 15
For Naser-ed-Din Shah’s letter regarding reforms see Teymori 1978: 2-5
14 Four years prior to this time, the title and status of Prime Minister was brought back to Iran’s political system.
15 Although Anis-od-Doleh, the wife of the Shah, is known as one of the most influential opponents of Sepahsalar, due to lack of written arguments against the reform by her, the women of harem are not rostered among the opponents of reform in this reformative period.
Further igniting their opposition was Sepahsalar’s attempt to manage the Shah’s travel to Europe, his focus on freedom, and the Reuter concession\(^\text{16}\) (Benjamin, 1984; Curzon, 2001; Elgar, 1977; Kermani, 1983; Serena, 1983; Teymori, 1978). Although the clergy considered Sepahsalar and his consultant team anti-Islamic, their opposition was not merely concentrated on religious arguments. They offered other arguments, including the focus on national financial interests and the endangerment of Iran’s territorial integrity. Molla Ali Kani, the prominent cleric and the prayer Imam of Tehran, can be considered as the most influential opponents of Sepahsalar who expressed opposition to his reforms in a letter to the Shah, right after Sepahsalar’s involuntary resignation.\(^\text{17}\)

As of the courtier opponents, Farhad Mirza Moatamed od-Doleh (the Shah’s uncle) and Masoud Mirza Zel ol-Soltan (the Shah’s son) are among those who offered arguments against Sepahsalar and his reforms (Adamiyat, 2006; AleDavood, 1992; Bamdad, 1992). Unlike Farhad Mirza, however, Zel-ol-Soltan’s (1983) arguments were presented years later in his personal journals.\(^\text{18}\)

Regarding the officials, many of them opposed Sepahsalar. Mohammad Hasan Khan Eetemad ol-Saltaneh wrote one of the most important (of the few) written arguments by the officials against Sepahsalar (Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh, 1978a; Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh, 2000; Sasani, 2003). The Reuter Concession and the railways contract were among the main reasons given by Etemad al-Saltaneh for his opposition against reforms. In a letter attributed to Etemad-ol-Saltaneh, written right after Molla Ali Kani’s letter to the Shah, he highlighted every aspect of the contract he considered a catastrophe for Iran. Further, in his personal journal, Etemad ol-Saltaneh enumerated his differences with Sepahsalar, at times harshly criticising him (Etemad ol-Saltaneh, 2000).\(^\text{19}\)

Most of the arguments of opponents in this period were political and financial in character and concern the Reuter concession as one of the most important causes of opposition against Sepahsalar. The social and religious arguments are not highlighted in this period despite the presence of Molla Ali Kani, the most powerful clergyman, and an active and vocal opponent.\(^\text{20}\) “Financial performance of the reformer and/or his advocates”, “endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household”, and “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening...

\(^{16}\)Mirza Agha Saleh Arab and Haj Molla Ali Kani are among the most important figures who opposed the prime minister’s reforms.

\(^{17}\)For Molla Ali Kani’s letter to the Shah see: Teymori: 1978: 124-126

\(^{18}\)For Farhad Mirza’s letter to the Shah see: Teymori: 1978: 129.

\(^{19}\)For critics of Etemad-ol-Saltaneh regarding Sepahsalar’s reform see Etemad-ol-Saltaneh 1978a: 97-111.


\(^{20}\)Although Anis-od-Doleh, the wife of the Shah, is known as one of the most influential opponents of Sepahsalar, due to lack of written arguments against the reform by her, the women of the harem are not rostered among the opponents of reform in this reformative period.
their class benefits” are the arguments offered by all the opposition groups during this reformative period and are the most important in ordinal comparison. The next important arguments, which were offered by two opposition groups, are “the opposition of reformative actions with Islam”, “financial corruption of the reformer and/or his advocates”, “depriving the heir of power”, “the intervention of aliens in Iran”, “the danger of losing territorial integrity of Iran”, “colonisation of Iran”, “neglecting the traditions by the reformer and/or his advocates”, and “cultural westernisation of Iran”. Finally, “reformer’s attempts to abolish the Qajar dynasty”, “reformer’s attempts to change the monarch system”, “homeland security disturbance”, “political dependency of the reformer and/or his advocates on foreign countries”, and “neglecting the people’s rights” are the arguments offered by just one of the opposition groups.

Regardless of the performance of the reformer in these three periods, the arguments of opponents in the 1871-1873 reformative period compared to the preceding two periods of reform in the Naser-ed-Din Shah era are the most calculated. In this period, opponents offer different political, social, financial, and religious arguments against the reformer and, at the same time, had the foresight not to act on their own class and group interests—unlike the opponents in AmirKabir’s era, for example. In the reformative period of Sepahsalar, “financial performance of the reformer and/or his advocates” and “endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household” are two arguments that the reformer and his advocates argued against. Notably, these two arguments, along with “neglecting the opponents’ position” and “threatening their class benefits” are the most important arguments in ordinal comparison of opposition groups in this period.

3.2. The Advocates of Sepahsalar’s Reform

As Flour (1987) states, the influence of reformists like Malkum Khan, Yousef Khan, and Akhondzade in Sepahsalar’s reforms is obvious. These reformers, along with Majd ol-molk, in their books, pamphlets, and letters emphasised the importance and necessity of reforms; yet, these emphases do not necessarily indicate that these reformists supported Sepahsalar’s reforms. However, although the Prime Minister had some advocates and subordinates, when he faced the serious accusations of critics, his advocates had no power or voice to defend him. Some, such as Naser-ol-Molk, left him to join the opponents, while others, including his own brother (Yahya Khan Moatamed-ol-Molk), remained silent and did not defend the reforms (Bamdad, 1992). At some point, the line between Sepahsalar’s advocates and opponents was vague: some who were recognised by their defence of reformative actions retracted their support later (Bamdad, 1992; Malekara, 1976).

The advocates of reform in this reformative period responded to four
criticisms among nineteen arguments of opponents. Although the quantity of the reformer’s (and his advocates) responses are not significant in number, they address three of the most important critiques given by opponents: “financial performance of the reformer”, “endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household”, and “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits”. However, the reformer and his advocates failed to answer the second most important criticism of opponents; that is, “homeland security disturbance”, “attempts to change the monarch system”, “attempts to abolish the Qajar dynasty”, “the opposition of reformatory actions with Islam”, “the absolute power of the reformer”, “the intervention of aliens in Iran”, and “colonisation of Iran”. The failure to address these criticisms led to the dismissal of Sepahsalar after his return to Iran from significant travel with the Shah. In fact, it seems that the emphasis of opponents on religious arguments (the opposition of reformatory actions with Islam) and the governmental arguments (reformer’s attempts to change the monarch system and to abolish Qajar dynasty) disarmed the Shah in defending his Prime Minister and resulted in the failure of the third reformatory period in the Naser-ed-Din Shah era.

As discussed above, during the reforms from 1871 to 1873, the arguments of the advocates focused on the necessity of the reform and did not offer any arguments against opponents’ performances and attitudes. These arguments were generally political and there was no religious reasoning among oppositions’ arguments.\(^\text{21}\) One of the most significant points regarding the advocates is Malkum’s silence during this period, given that in the previous reformatory period (1858-1861), he supported the reforms by writing pamphlets in addition to detracting the opposition by writing letters. During Sepahsalar’s reformatory period, however, Malkum (the formal consultant of Sepahsalar) withheld his opinion and did not write any pamphlets in his defence.

As for the reformer, Sepahsalar tended to answer the critiques of his opponents, either as the Prime Minister or when he was the War or Foreign Minister. In his many letters to the Shah, he responded to his critics by offering reasons for conducting reforms, by refusing the accusations, or by highlighting the same critiques in the opposition’s own behaviour. Although Sepahsalar responded to ten critiques of his opponents, he remained silent on the other nine. Still, compared to other reformers in the Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, Sepahsalar is somewhat more successful in stating the importance of the reforms, in addition to conducting them. He addressed the three most frequent critiques given by opponent groups and defended his reforms, including

\(^{21}\) For Garosi’s letter to Malkom see Adamiyat 2006: 157-158.
For the letter of officials and courtiers’ council for approving Reuter concession see Teymori 1978: 105.
For Malkom’s letter to the Foreign Ministry of Iran see Sasani 2003: 163-164.
For the letter of a group of officials to the Shah regarding the great famine of 1870-1871 see Abbasi 1993: 30
CONCLUSIONS

Comparative Analysis of Reformers, Advocates, and Opponents of Reforms

This article adopts rational choice theory as its framework in the analysis of the process of reforms in 19th century Iran. By using rational choice theory, this article was enabled to go beyond the mainstream narratives of Iran scholars who claim that opponents of these reforms were merely reactionaries. Therefore, focusing on the arguments of opponents and advocates of these reforms and assuming them as rational actors, this article has shown their progressive and backward rational choices. For analysing the arguments of the opponents of reform in these three reformative periods—AmirKabir’s reforms (1848-1851), Naser-ed-Din Shah’s reforms (1858-1861), and Sepahsalar’s reforms (1871-1873)—this article focuses on a combination of opponents’ arguments. In nominal comparison, the existence/absence of arguments in the three periods is analysed to understand the arguments that were most influential. This analysis continues by assessing the similar arguments offered by at least one of the opponent groups in each period of reforms in the Naseri era.

The most common arguments which were seen in all the periods of reform include endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household, homeland security disturbance, the danger of losing territorial integrity of Iran, the reformer’s political dependency on foreign countries, neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits, neglecting the people’s rights, neglecting traditions by reformer and/or his advocates, and personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates. The other arguments are omitted in this analysis due to their absence in at least one of the reformative periods.

As mentioned before, most of the existing analytical and historical analyses focus on the backwardness of the opponents and consider them to be passive reactioners who chase their own financial and even sexual desires. Interestingly, the only reactionary arguments offered by the

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For Sepahsalar’s letter to Malkom see Sasani 2003: 110-114

23 Despite the absence of three groups of opponents in the list of opponent groups/reforms, since the purpose is the assessment of a collection of arguments in a general group as opponents, this absence does not disturb analyzing the arguments. In fact, in these three reformative periods, the arguments of one group affects the arguments of other opponent groups and forms the trend of opposing the reform in general.
opponents are “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits” and “neglecting traditions by the reformer and/or his advocates”. In fact, the opponents of reforms, consciously, offered many well-reasoned arguments against reforms, and often tried to argue that reforms were a threat to Iran politically, financially, and culturally.

Assessing the repetition of opposition arguments in these reforms results in an ordinal comparison. Based on the number of groups that had mentioned one specific argument in these three reforms, these are the most repetitive arguments:24 “endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s household”, “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening their class benefits”, “neglecting traditions by the reformer and/or his advocates”, and “personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates”. Next to these arguments in importance are those that were repeated by at least four groups in these three periods: “the opposition of reformative actions with Islam”, “financial performance of the reformer and/or his advocates”, “depriving the heir of power”, “homeland security disturbance”, “the absolute power of the reformer”, “the danger of losing territorial integrity of Iran”, “neglecting the people’s rights”, and “cultural westernisation of Iran.” Finally, the least common arguments are: “the negligence toward Islam by the reformer and/or his advocates”, “financial corruption of the reformer and/or his advocates”, “neglecting the financial benefits of elites”, “attempts to abolish the Qajar dynasty”, “the intervention of aliens in Iran”, “attempts to change the monarch system”, “colonisation of Iran”, “political dependency of the reformer and/or his advocates on foreign countries”, and “the humble social status of the reformer and/or his advocates”.

Although at least one group of opponents in one of the three reforms in Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era focused on these arguments, the other groups of opponents were reluctant to mention them.

The arguments “the opposition of the reformative actions with Islam”, “financial performance of the reformer and/or his advocates”, “depriving the heir of power”, “absolute power of the reformer”, and “cultural westernisation of Iran” has been eliminated from the nominal comparison due to their absence in one of the reformative periods. They remain in the ordinal comparison, however, because of the repetition of these arguments in other reformative periods.

In analysing the arguments of advocates of reforms, there were no arguments from the advocates of AmirKabir’s reform. Therefore, the comparison of advocates of reforms in these three reform periods

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24If all the opponent groups in these three reformative periods offered one specific argument, that argument in the ordinal comparison would have received nine (three opponent groups in each of the three reformative periods). However, it is crucial to notice that the numbers offered here are not real and do not demonstrate the repetition of arguments in “each” of opponent groups. But they merely reveal that a specific argument has been offered by the number of opposing groups, including clergymen, courtiers, officials, and women of the harem.
is not possible. However, comparing the arguments of advocates in the other two reform periods (the Shah’s and Sepahsalar’s) shows that the arguments of advocates in Sepahsalar’s era are more concentrated on the repetitive arguments of the opponents. However, these arguments are fewer in number compared to the arguments of advocates of the Shah’s reforms. The convincing arguments of Sepahsalar’s reform advocates are one of the most important reasons that Sepahsalar came back to power as the Minister of Foreign Affairs fifty days after his dismissal—unlike the other two reform periods in the Naseri era, in which the failure of the reforms resulted in the death or imprisonment of the reformer and/or his advocates. 25 Beside, compared to AmirKabir and Naser-ed-Din Shah, Sepahsalar offered more accurate arguments in defence of his reforms, responding to the critiques, and criticising them back. However, there was no common argument among reforms in the Naseri era and, as a result, analysing the common arguments is not possible.

Thus, assessing the triple relation of the reformers, opponents, and advocates of reforms, in two of three periods of reforms in the Naseri era (reforms of AmirKabir and reforms of Naser-ed-Din Shah), there was no mutual counterargument among advocates and reformers to retreat the oppositions. It was only during Sepahsalar’s period that both the reformer and advocates of reforms responded to the arguments of opponents. Therefore, although all of these short-term reforms failed, considering the results of the first reform (which led to the exile and murder of the reformer) and the second reform (which ended in the exile, imprisonment, and murder of some of the advocates), the return of Sepahsalar to power highlights the importance of the ability of the reformer and his advocates to respond to the opposition. In fact, the integration of the reformer and advocates in response to powerful opponents gave power to the Shah to stand against the pressure of the opponents (by insuring his own status).

Therefore, in the three reformative periods during the Naser-ed-Din Shah era, whenever the reformer and advocates both were successful in offering arguments and responding to at least a part of the arguments, the chance of the continuance of reformative ideas persisted, such as when Sepahsalar followed some of his reformative efforts as the Minister of State. 26

25 In some of the arguments offered by opponents and advocates of reforms, the transposition time has not been considered. But since these arguments are not the only ones discussed, and since they are merely some of the many arguments, this non-linear narrative has no effect on analyzing the arguments of reforms in these three reformative periods.

26 It is not merely the accountability that saves the life of the reformer and his advocates—there are other factors involved in this process including protection from foreign embassies. Further, the accountability of the reformer had, perhaps, been facilitated by the social condition in which the advocates of reforms and the reformer found the courage to support the reforms and to emphasize their achievements. However, this article is focused on the arguments offered by the opponents and advocates of reforms in these three reformative periods, and consciously ignores the other elements.
REFERENCES


The Relationship between Leisure Time and Social Capital among Iranian Youth

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ABSTRACT
This paper is an attempt to study the relationship between leisure time and social capital. Attention is paid to the theoretical and conceptual aspects of the two constructs in the literature of the field. An attempt was made to study the association between leisure time and social capital within the framework of extrication between the individual and collective leisure times, as well as intergroup and intra-group social capital. Through a secondary analysis of national surveys data about the Iranian youth, the linkage between leisure time and social capital is statistically analysed.

Overall, the findings of the study show that the youth who spend most of their leisure time in collective leisure activities compared to the youth who spend their time in personal activities enjoy more social capital. Society in extending public spaces prepares the chance for the formation and promotion of collective leisure-time activities as contrasted with private and personal leisure-time activities. In cases where they meet the necessary conditions and capabilities, through attending these spaces, youth can reproduce and strengthen the constructive indices and components of social capital.

Keywords: Collective leisure, Iran, leisure time, personal leisure, social capital, youth

INTRODUCTION
How people use their leisure time has always been a key issue for past and present thinkers of social sciences. Leisure can be measured in both working and rest times. Considering the role of social sciences and cultural studies in the modern era, leisure and its relationship with other social constructs, such as social capital, has become highlighted more than before and, in contemporary cultural studies, the way of spending leisure is known to be a matter of lifestyle.
The focus of this article is on leisure as a collective behavior in pastime that generally involves withdrawal from formal activities. Collective behaviors are associated with numerous activities such as spending leisure time with others in public spaces. The focus of social capital on social relations is in form of internal and external relations that are called bonding social capital and bridging social capital.

Meanwhile, the quality and quantity of leisure time, the ways of using and taking advantage of it, and its manifest and latent functions have created new fields for social and cultural studies to study and proposed new questions to answer. One of these questions is the relationship between different forms of leisure time and social capital, the subject of the present article.

**Theoretical Framework**

Social scientists have expressed different views on the conceptual definition of leisure time. Leisure, in terms of vocabulary, was synonymous with words, such as convenience, comfort, ease of work, and free from daily work. Therefore, leisure time is defined as the daily intervals between the imperative activities of the individual that can be enjoyed as the person wishes. In fact, leisure implies the relief from duties, society, family, and religion, and unlike occupation, it is not oriented toward profit or earning money. However, the ability, status, and financial resources available to individuals should not be ignored in how leisure time differs from occupation or assignment.

Empirical investigations on leisure in social sciences started since the second decade of the twentieth century. Codifying the rule of eight-hour daily work and emerging concepts, such as culture and leisure community, made it further necessary to manage leisure time. In 1924, the International Labour Organisation held the first international meeting on the free time of workers. Most participants in the meeting believed that by moderating the working hours, leisure activities should be more disciplined. Lynd and Lynd’s studies about leisure activities in (1957), Lundberg’s study in 1934, *The Lonely Crowd* (2001) by David Riesman, and Towards a Sociology of Leisure (1966) by Dumazedier are some of the endeavours that created new theories and added to the empirical data and the richness of the sociology of leisure. From the perspective of Dumazedier, leisure is defined as activities that are free from duties and obligations with no economic and social purposes. Therefore, it is so pleasant as it recognises the individuals’ freedom of choice. Dumazedier has expressed four types of activities: 1) working for a livelihood, 2) family obligations, 3) meeting socio-cultural obligations, and 4) activities leading to self-expression and self-realisation. In his opinion, spending leisure time includes a set of activities that are willingly performed by a person after he is released from the requirements of job, family, and society and takes pleasure for
relaxation, recreation, self-education and studying, or social engagement. Dumazedier expressed three functions for leisure time:

1) Rest in order to compensate for physical and mental fatigue caused by continuous load of work.

2) Have fun in order to relieve fatigue caused by uniform daily tasks in the workshop, office, or home.

3) Look for personal growth. Leisure releases individuals from daily work and routines. It enables the individual to grow physically and mentally and, thus, is effective in the formation of personality.

These functions are more related to the social-psychological dimensions. On the other hand, collectivist leisure, in addition to the psychological functions, purports collectivist functions mainly in improving social participation, social cohesion, socialisation, and social identity. Therefore, a fourth function must be added to the above three functions in order to better demonstrate the linkage between leisure time and social capital. It is known as the communicative and participative function. The communicative and participative function of leisure time helps to strengthen social cohesion by providing the opportunity to establish family, friendships, teams, and professional relationships; it provides a basis for collaborative activities. Moreover, it increases accountability and civic engagement. Although the concept and use of leisure time are the fundamental issues, it is affected by social and cultural differences of communities and, therefore, it is an expression of cultural and social specificities.

**Leisure time and social capital**

According to the collectivist, communicative, interactive, and participative nature of leisure time, its relationship with social capital makes it constitutive of quantity and quality in terms of the amount of social relations it preserves. Hence, there is a significant relationship between social and cultural scholars’ view. The quantity and quality of social relationships has always been a major interest of social theorists. Nowadays, the concept, as understood by many nineteenth-century social scientists, is the investigation topic for social capital scholars who have revised it in the social capital framework with a new format. Coleman (1988) defined social capital as a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions among actors. That facilitates collective action, generated by networks of relationships, reciprocity, trust, and social norms.

It is obvious that considering the essence of social capital and the content of leisure time, a link between these two constructs can be thought of and investigated. This linkage is mainly interactive and the very interaction should be observed in terms of the production and reproduction of social capital and the erosion of it, as well as the role that social capital plays in the development of collectivist leisure. In
Ingen and Eijck’s opinion (2009), leisure activities especially further people’s social capital among groups that are already gifted with high levels of civic engagement and helping. In addition, the effect of various forms of social capital, such as inter- and intra-group social capital based on the extent of relations, should not be ignored. In this respect, the relationship between leisure time and different forms of social capital can be indicated in the following table.

Table 1
The relationship between social capital and leisure time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-group Leisure time</th>
<th>Intra-group Leisure time</th>
<th>Social Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaker</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Personalised leisure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Collectivist leisure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On one hand, the linkage between leisure and social capital can be also considered in the “third space”. The concept of the third space or public sphere was used to separate public space from the home and the workplace. These are places where public services are available for leisure. The type of space and the quality and quantity of services offered in it affects the social capital in micro- and macro- scales. The presence of appropriate third spaces or public spheres increases the possibility of the presence of people in these spaces, thereby, improving social interactions between intra- and inter-groups and promoting social capital in micro and macro scales. However, as the services provided in the third or public space are devised by public policy formulated by government officials and NGOs, it increases the trust in public and state institutions and invigorates social capital at a large-scale.

Leisure time as input for social capital

While working hours are necessary for producing economic capital, leisure is the important input for generating social capital. The relationship between leisure time and social capital may not be linear and its effects are manifested in the production of social capital due to the effect it has on social inputs, such as social norms, identity, and time management. Although the metaphor of time as a production factor for social capital is not taken for granted unanimously, its influence on the quality and quantity of relations and interactions is acceptable. The time that is spent on affairs relating to the interaction with family members, friends, obtaining information, mutual assistance, protection and preservation of common cultural values, emotional support and other civic, participatory and collective activities, has an important role in the production of social capital. With this viewpoint, if we consider social capital as an asset and also take into account the potentials and backdrops that produce this asset, then, the role and effect of time cannot be ignored in the production of assets and social capital.

In social capital literature, the concept of ‘available time’ was observed to improve social capital. In this case, the time devoted to mutual aid between friends, neighbours, and extended family members, as well as activities in the form of formal communities and visiting friends and neighbours, enhances
trust in society and the feeling of belonging to the community. According to the findings of Putnam in Italy, Hemingway suggests that specific forms of leisure activity contribute to the development of social capital central to democracy and democratic citizenship. Participation in specific forms of leisure activity was, in Putnam’s findings, strongly and positively associated with the existence of social norms of tolerance and trust, which, in turn, support democratic attitudes and practices. The longer these social norms had existed, the greater their association with democratic social capital (Hemingway, 1999). Leisure time and production of social capital through the development of intergenerational relationships in collectivist leisure time is a notable issue.

In Putnam’s belief, television, which is one of the main sources of leisure in America, is an effective factor in the erosion of social connections and the reduction of civic activities, with a higher incidence seen among the younger generations of Americans (Putnam, 2000). He concluded that Americans prefer to be alone rather than join political and social movements. It is observed that, although the relationship between leisure and social capital was analysed in theoretical and experimental ways to reach considerable related data, the theoretical results and experimental results do not demonstrate the relationship to be extensive or persistent. Therefore, firm and decisive judgements cannot be achieved in relation to the relationship between various forms of leisure and social capital. By the way, the presence of theoretical and experimental consensus should not be neglected in terms of the impact and interaction between collectivist leisure and social capital.

**METHODS**

This study is based on secondary analysis quantitative data. The research method includes the analysis of existing data from data national surveys that were conducted in Iran. In this study, research questions were used to collect secondary analysis quantitative data. Questions were included regarding the relationship between spending leisure times and social capital among youth. Data were collected through national surveys in Iran, including Iranians’ Values and Attitudes in 2003; 2005, The Values and Attitudes of the Iranian Youth in 2005, Measurement of Social Capital in 2015 and Iranians’ Values and Attitudes in 2016. Activity in leisure time is classified in two parts: personal activity and collective activity. For measuring personal activity in leisure time some activities are described including watching TV, watching videotapes, internet, computer games, listening to music, learning artworks, reading books and newspapers, listening to radio, and watching satellite. For measuring collective leisure time, other activities are considered such as socializing with friends and with family, going to the cinema, theatre, park, and recreation centres, traveling, going to a friend’s party and going to pilgrimage. Social capital is measured by proxy’s institutional trust, public trust, association participation and number of friends. For
the statistical analysis of data, we used the statistical ANOVA test to determine the mean of three indicators of social capital for issues relating to any of the leisure activities, and Chi-Square for testing the association between variables.

Findings

The study of the relationship between leisure times and social capital demands independent quantitative and qualitative studies. Nevertheless, in this study, the relationship between different forms of leisure and social capital was analysed according to three indicators and by referring to the mentioned surveys. Three indicators used in this article to measure social capital were institutional trust, association participation, and number of friends. Institutional trust was assessed through a combination of trust and belief in the success of a set of social, cultural, political, and economic institutions. Association participation was measured based on the number of associations and social institutions in which the individual participated. The number of friends was measured by asking about the number of friends of either sex (for both boys and girls). The ANOVA technique was used to determine the mean of the three indicators of social capital for issues relating to any of the leisure activities.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leisure activities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Institutional trust</th>
<th>Means Association participation</th>
<th>Number of friends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watching TV</td>
<td>a lot</td>
<td>64/97</td>
<td>26/1</td>
<td>73/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per week</td>
<td>83/95</td>
<td>37/1</td>
<td>43/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per month</td>
<td>29/93</td>
<td>36/1</td>
<td>23/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rarely</td>
<td>2/96</td>
<td>36/1</td>
<td>22/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>never</td>
<td>23/92</td>
<td>4/1</td>
<td>38/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>19/97</td>
<td>28/1</td>
<td>65/8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>3/5</td>
<td>¼</td>
<td>59/0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>000/</td>
<td>002/0</td>
<td>673/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching videotapes</td>
<td>a lot</td>
<td>79/96</td>
<td>24/1</td>
<td>47/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per week</td>
<td>07/97</td>
<td>24/1</td>
<td>16/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per month</td>
<td>38/95</td>
<td>33/1</td>
<td>41/8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1It is clear that social capital indicators are much more than the three criteria presented in this article. However, as no data was available other than the three mentioned indicators, it was sufficient to use these three.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leisure activities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Institutional trust</th>
<th>Means Association participation</th>
<th>Number of friends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>rarely</td>
<td>92/97</td>
<td>36/1</td>
<td>37/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>never</td>
<td>41/99</td>
<td>38/1</td>
<td>78/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>18/97</td>
<td>28/1</td>
<td>64/8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>96/6</td>
<td>5/4</td>
<td>69/1</td>
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<td>sig</td>
<td>000/0</td>
<td>001/0</td>
<td>15/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a lot</td>
<td>78/95</td>
<td>49/1</td>
<td>92/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per week</td>
<td>19/95</td>
<td>49/1</td>
<td>7/8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per month</td>
<td>09/95</td>
<td>39/1</td>
<td>47/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rarely</td>
<td>93/95</td>
<td>42/1</td>
<td>9/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>never</td>
<td>65/98</td>
<td>14/1</td>
<td>06/8</td>
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<td>total</td>
<td>16/97</td>
<td>28/1</td>
<td>64/8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>31/15</td>
<td>15/40</td>
<td>11/6</td>
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<td>sig</td>
<td>000/0</td>
<td>000/0</td>
<td>000/0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computer games</td>
<td>a lot</td>
<td>65/97</td>
<td>38/1</td>
<td>43/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82/96</td>
<td>38/1</td>
<td></td>
<td>29/10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>43/1</td>
<td>29/10</td>
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<td>a few hours per week</td>
<td>78/95</td>
<td>35/1</td>
<td>05/8</td>
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<td>35/96</td>
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<td>17/1</td>
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<td>16/97</td>
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<td>total</td>
<td>65/97</td>
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<td>82/96</td>
<td>38/1</td>
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<td>16/9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>F</td>
<td>38/3</td>
<td>4/21</td>
<td>47/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>009/0</td>
<td>000/0</td>
<td>001/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening to music</td>
<td>a lot</td>
<td>87/95</td>
<td>28/1</td>
<td>01/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per week</td>
<td>92/96</td>
<td>28/1</td>
<td>93/7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per month</td>
<td>51/97</td>
<td>27/1</td>
<td>93/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rarely</td>
<td>94/99</td>
<td>32/1</td>
<td>87/7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>never</td>
<td>85/99</td>
<td>26/1</td>
<td>37/11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>17/97</td>
<td>28/1</td>
<td>63/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33/14</td>
<td>4/0</td>
<td>17/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>000/0</td>
<td>807/0</td>
<td>002/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning artworks</td>
<td>a lot</td>
<td>82/98</td>
<td>45/1</td>
<td>86/10</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8/98</td>
<td>47/1</td>
<td>38/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a few hours per month</td>
<td>96/96</td>
<td>36/1</td>
<td>48/8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data presented in Table 2 show that the average of institutional trust and association participation versus watching television in leisure time is statistically different among the youth under study. Young people who spend more time watching TV during leisure time have higher institutional trust. Young people who spend more time watching TV, have a lower association participation average. There is no significant relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leisure activities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Institutional trust</th>
<th>Means Association participation</th>
<th>Number of friends</th>
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</table>

Source: Values and attitudes of Iranian youth (2005)
between watching television during leisure time and the number of friends of the studied youth.

There is a significant difference between watching videotapes and the level of institutional trust and association participation of individuals. As the amount of watching videos during leisure time decreases, the level of institutional trust and association participation increase. It is observed that watching TV and video during leisure times is in negative association with the level of institutional trust of the studied population. This means that by increasing the amount of watching TV, the mean level of institutional trust increases too. However, an increase in watching videos causes a reduction in institutional trust. Participants with a high volume of watching TV during leisure time have an institutional trust mean of 96.62, while participants with a low volume of watching TV have an institutional mean of 92.23. The people who reported watching videos “a lot” and “never” in their leisure time had an institutional trust average of 96.79 and 99.42, respectively. The situation is related to the nature and scope of authority and choice of the youth. Regarding watching videos with a friend, no significant difference was observed. Though watching TV and watching videotapes are both considered as personal leisure activities, the limited choice of TV channels and programs compared to the wider options in watching videotapes may partly explain different means in the personal experience of watching the two media and the consequent varying degrees of institutional trust. There is no significant relationship between watching videos and the number of friends of the studied youth.

There is a significant relationship between the time spent on the internet, computer, computer games, and learning of art works with the three indices of social capital, while there is a significant relationship between the time spent listening to radio and watching satellite with the two indices of institutional trust and association membership. Reading books has no significant relationship with institutional trust, but it shows a statistically significant relationship with the two indicators of association membership and the number of friends. There is no statistically significant relationship between these two categories and the number of friends. Listening to music also has a significant relationship with institutional trust and the number of friends, but it shows no significant relationship with association membership. Statistics show that by decreasing the amount of use of the internet, computer, computer games, listening to music, and watching the satellite, the mean of institutional trust increases. Among the proposed cases that spend leisure time personally, increase time in listening to the radio and learning artwork causes an increase in the institutional trust mean. With increasing the use of internet, computer, computer games, learning artworks, and studying, an increase in the average of association membership and the number of friends is observed. There is no
statistically significant relationship between listening to the radio, watching movies, watching videos, and watching satellite with the number of friends.

Table 3
The relationship between collective leisure activities and social capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leisure activities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Institutional trust</th>
<th>Means Association participation</th>
<th>Number of friends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socializing with friends</td>
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<td>9/96</td>
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<td>18/1</td>
<td>79/6</td>
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<td>28/1</td>
<td>66/8</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3/25</td>
<td>5/9</td>
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<td>000/</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2/8</td>
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<tr>
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Table 3 (continue)

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<th>Means Association participation</th>
<th>Number of friends</th>
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<td>88/101</td>
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<td>3/44</td>
<td>46/8</td>
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<td>000/</td>
<td>000/</td>
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<td>09/8</td>
</tr>
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<td>79/95</td>
<td>12/1</td>
<td>04/8</td>
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<td>06/2</td>
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<td>000/</td>
<td>004/0</td>
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<td>81/12</td>
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<td>37/1</td>
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<td>19/96</td>
<td>28/1</td>
<td>93/7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>sig</td>
<td>000/</td>
<td>000/</td>
<td>000/</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Values and attitudes of Iranian youth (2005)*

Table 3 refers to that part of leisure activities that have a more collectivist nature compared with those outlined in Table 2. All cases presented in Table 3, except socializing with friends, which do not show a significant relationship with institutional trust, show a significant relationship with three social capital measures. With the increase in
socializing with friends during leisure time, the association participation mean, and the number of friends show an increase. With increasing socializing with family, going to the cinema and theatre, going to parks and recreation centres, going on pilgrimages and tourism travels, exercising, and going to friends’ parties, the means for the three social capital indicators increase. A decrease in the participation in religious ceremonies increases the mean of the institutional trust and association participation. The average number of friends of individuals who mostly participate in religious ceremonies is 9.4 compared to the average number of friends of those who never have participated in the religious ceremonies is 12.98.

In Iranians’ Values and Attitudes (2003), the data of which is provided in Table 4, the relationship between the way of spending leisure time (i.e. alone or with others) has a significant relationship with the public trust among the youth (persons aged 18 to 29 years).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public trust</th>
<th>Spend leisure time</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>With others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square= 12.44   Significance =.002   N=2200   static=.38
Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2003)

In Iranians’ Values and Attitudes of (2005) as observed in Table 5, this relationship is a significant relationship, which indicates that collectivist leisure among young people has a more positive relationship with social trust and is one of the important measures of social capital.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public trust</th>
<th>Spend leisure time</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>With others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square= 14.9   Significance =.001   N=4389   static=.34
Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2005)
In addition, according to data of national surveys (2003; 2005) in Table 6, the general trust of young people who spend their leisure time alone is less than the general trust of the youth who spend their leisure collectively with others.

Table 6
Compared means of general trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spend leisure time</th>
<th>General trust</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>sig</th>
<th>Eta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With others</td>
<td>38.9441</td>
<td>9.299</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.072</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>36.7000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38.8431</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With others</td>
<td>39.4107</td>
<td>8.998</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>37.6746</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.3454</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2003, 2005)

The score of association membership, which is an indication of commitment and civic participation among young people, who spend their leisure time in the community with others is also higher than that among young people who spend their leisure alone.

Table 7
Compared means of association participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spend leisure time</th>
<th>Association participation</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>sig</th>
<th>Eta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With others</td>
<td>1.8789</td>
<td>7.661</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>1.3304</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.8510</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With others</td>
<td>1.8504</td>
<td>7.474</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>1.4368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.8329</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2003, 2005)

A total mean score of the three indicators of social capital for those who spend their time on collectivist activities shows higher values compared to those who spend their time on personal and private activities. Therefore, in spite of exceptions in the studied population in terms of the use and impact of TV, radio and religious ceremonies, the obtained experimental findings generally agree with the theoretical literature discussed above in terms of the of linkage between leisure time and social capital.
The statistics in the above table shows that the mean score of institutional trust among the young people who spend their leisure time with others is again higher than young people who spend their leisure alone.

Table 8
The compare means of institutional trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spend leisure time</th>
<th>Institutional trust</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>sig</th>
<th>Eta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With others</td>
<td>19.7923</td>
<td>3.529</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>19.4567</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19.7700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iranians' values and attitudes (2016)

According to the findings of the survey Iranians' Values and Attitudes (2016), the rate of association membership among young people who spend their leisure time with others is higher than young people who spend their leisure time alone.

Table 9
The compare means of association participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spend leisure time</th>
<th>Association participation</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>sig</th>
<th>Eta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With others</td>
<td>1.8634</td>
<td>12.386</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>1.3812</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.8297</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iranians values and attitudes (2016)

DISCUSSION

Today, the importance of leisure-time activities for improving psychological, cognitive, emotional and social development of youths is recognized in all societies. Scientists of social sciences have argued leisure time as an important part of life policy and quality of life, not only due to social development for individuals but also for strengthening growth and extending social capital and civil society. Thus, leisure time is one of the aspects of life that has a major role in the improvement of social life. The findings of this article showed that collective activities in leisure time associate with measures of social capital such as institutional trust, public trust, association participation and the number of friends, measures that are important for social integration, dynamic social order, social tolerance and social democracy. Thus, for governments it is critical to pay attention to the contribution Leisure-time activities in social and cultural polices. Thus, social policy must try to prepare the situation, context, and opportunities that give way to easier access to collective leisure activities, so that more leisure activities are sustained in the collective form. In the meantime,
individuals who spend their time in personal and private leisure activities continue to do so along with improving their presence in the interactive social activities, again enhancing the general rate of social capital in the society.

CONCLUSION

For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the subject in this study, further data is needed. However, the present article is based on secondary analysis of available national data and there are limitations as a result. Considering the importance and role of the social capital construct, in both forms of intergroup and collective, the social freshness and dynamism needs to be measured by the social, cultural, and political officials of the society. Among different mechanisms that might reinforce this construct, collective leisure is one of the most important. However, the linkage and the interaction between this mechanism and the social capital construct should not be neglected because, in a society where social capital is rich and suitably evolved, the formation and development of collective leisure activities are more viable. The theoretical and empirical literature and findings presented in this paper show that the collectivist leisure activities have a significance relationship with and a notable effect on improving the indicators and items related to social capital. Consequently, the collective leisure strengthens interpersonal trust, collaboration and mutual cooperation, inter-generational linkages, unity, and social cohesion. It is effective in the reproduction of social support, generation of trust and mutual aid, and contributes to the maintenance and stability of social capital.

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An Anthropological Study on Female Peddlers’ Lingual and Paralingual Advertising in the Subway in Tehran

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ABSTRACT
The current research pursues an answer to the question of how female peddlers’ verbal and nonverbal communication in the subway in Tehran attracts passengers, encouraging them to buy, and how they apply lingual and paralingual advertisements to sell their commodities. It attempts to analyse the female peddlers’ actions that make the passengers shop in the subway. To realise the issue observation, deep interview, consistent presence, and frequent attendance in the designated location for the research (different routes of the subway trains in Tehran) was employed and after necessary investigations on the domain, deliberative results were discovered. For instance, female peddlers in different ages-young, middle aged or elderly-pay significant attention to the acquisition of lingual skills to advertise their commodities, since the peddlers are growing in number every day; some are genius in this regard and invent particular lexis and behaviours, and some others imitate lingual and paralingual skills and the body language from other peddlers to sell their commodities among the passengers. Due to the excessive number of rivals (female peddlers) with comparable products, they are distinguished through the method they use to advertise. Putting together the verbal and nonverbal advertising, the applied method makes each individual unique and different from the others, thus the peddlers attract the passengers’ attention to sell their commodities.

Keywords: Female peddlers, lingual and paralingual skills, method of advertising, subway, Tehran

INTRODUCTION AND THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
People in society must do economic activities for a living, and the activities are chiefly
based on a variety of factors such as the
level of literacy, expertise, efficiency, etc.
Among these, there are individuals working
as peddlers for several reasons, including
the lack of expertise, capital, a second job
besides their main one, emigration from
villages to cities, etc.

Peddling is a type of hidden employment;
the person is occupied through buying some
commodities and selling them with a special
amount of interest, and does not have a
certain location for business. Peddling is
one of the menial, brittle, and irregular
jobs which can be explicitly observed in
big cities and is not merely men’s job, but
children and especially women have tread
in the domain as well. The female peddlers
in the subway are among the new ones who
are increasing in number daily.

In his dictionary, Nezam-ol-Ateba,
Dehkhoda defines peddling as, “A retailer
and peddler who sells his commodity as
much as the customer wishes, though a
little” (Dehkhoda, 1957, p.707). Dehkhoda
states, “one, who sells in the street and
bazaar with a piece in hand, is a peddler”
(Dehkhoda, 1957, p.707).

Now it has been a while since the
wagons of the subway trains in the capital,
especially women’s, have turned to mobile
stores. Men, children, and particularly
women are growing in number every day,
peddling in the subway stations and wagons.
Once the number of peddlers increases,
the competition also rises. They try to sell
various goods according to the season,
situation, and different occasions (Nowrooz,
Mehr month, and the school opening,
Ramadan, and special dates like Mothers’
Day, Fathers’ Day, etc.) to be capable of
absorbing more customers; therefore,
lingual skills in advertising, including verbal
and nonverbal skills and body language,
are the first and key principles for female
peddlers to attract customers, and they
try in the subway to apply verbal and
nonverbal skills while advertising for their
commodities.

One of the skills the peddlers use in the
subway is the selection of the commodity
to sell. They select goods that are regularly
used by the passengers. Decorations,
cosmetics, stationery, socks, women’s
clothing, and edibles are the biggest part
of commodities for the peddlers to sell. Of
course, many goods the peddlers advertise
in the subway are not included among
the priorities and necessities of life, but
they encourage many of the passengers to
buy, through their lingual and paralingual
advertising skills. Since these actions are
repeated every day, a certain brand of
behaviour forms. Compact commodities,
cheap products, availability, combined with
the female peddlers’ verbal and nonverbal
advertising, and has gifted the passengers’
consumerism. The passengers are wooed
by the peddlers’ skilful advertising, mostly
buying things unconsciously, presupposing
that the goods are cheaper than the ones in
the stores and might be necessary one day.

The expert peddlers know what lexis and
how to use them, sometimes emphasising
certain words and sometimes changing
the tone. They diagnose each situation to
find a way to convey the meanings through
nonverbal messages. “The indirect meaning needs inference and deduction of the relative utterance, because most of what is intended by the speaker is not expressed explicitly. So it can be said that the indirect verbal action is perceived through the common contexts and beliefs between the speaker and listener” (Nyota & Mutasa, 2008, p. 93).

While advertising the exceptional quality and the sale of the lowest price in the subway, the female peddlers are using a direct verbal action. When using statements in their advertising to inspire the passengers’ interests and needs, knowing their principle interests, they are telling them indirectly that the merchandise, inspiring their interests and filling their needs, is available. In other words, they are applying indirect verbal action when attracting the passengers to something further from what they have in mind.

The excess population in the subway wagons has limited the space for peddlers’ extensive advertising to some extent. When there is a large population, peddlers are not able to pass through the passengers easily, so they advertise loudly; which can be annoying for the passengers. Clever peddlers realise when verbal advertising is a priority over the theatrical one, and vice versa. “In order to convey the meaning, people do not only produce utterances including words and grammatical structures, but they also act along with the utterances. The actions done by the utterances are generally called verbal actions” (Yule, 1996, p.47).

When the wagons are busy, peddlers can both attract the passengers and advertise their goods very skilfully. Watching the peddlers’ theatrical actions, the passengers are entertained and might never complain about the annoyance of advertising in such a populated place. Hence the peddlers publicise the commodities in the form of a show by indirect verbal actions.

Thus, the questions intended to be answered are:
- How does peddlers’ verbal advertising in the subway persuade the passengers to buy?
- What lingual methods do the peddlers apply to win the customers’ best trust?
- To what extent has the peddlers’ lexis for advertising been efficacious in increasing sales?

Research purposes
The purpose of this study is to investigate the methods of lingual and paralingual advertising of women peddlers in the subway in Tehran, how these influence the behaviour of passengers, and what peddlers do to attract the passengers’ attention.

Lingual and paralingual skills of women peddlers in the subway has maximised their sale; therefore, finding the tricks and techniques that these women use to improve their skills is another purpose of the study.

Among such techniques is creating new terms with various implications and functionality in order to increase their sale. These terms are, sometimes, describing the commodity and, sometimes, methods of accosting the passengers. As a result, comprehending the impact of peddlers’
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terminology in the subway on the passengers is another purpose of this study.

METHODS

In the field of anthropology, there are various tools used to study cultural situations which are rarely technical. Among the most significant tools is the researcher himself. The researcher must perceive the cultural situation of the study case in different dimensions and attend persistently in the designated research location.

The perception of a cultural phenomenon must be formed in its own cultural background. The researcher is not the controller of the affairs, but he receives the findings from the real world and analyses them. “To perceive the subsistent experience, the qualitative work has to be continued to the point that the researcher reaches a theoretical saturation; i.e., the researcher feels that the new interviews do not raise any new dimensions of the study and the answer is almost repeated” (Northcutt & McCoy, 2004, p. 87).

The anthropologist completely drowns himself in the lives of the people under research. In the current research, the researcher has tried to attend directly the location of the study during successive years and observe acutely. During 2010 to 2018, the researcher in this study observed the customers’ behaviour as consumers and that of the peddlers in the subway in the capital. He spent prolonged periods of time in the subway trains as a passenger, from the first station to the last, and observed the peddlers’ and passengers’ actions and reactions deeply. The time process is very important in anthropological studies. The researcher discovers the cultural phenomena through time and will never collect data using questionnaires because the method of the questionnaire, in short term, might not provide the access to a cultural affair.

Observing women’s peddling, their social interactions, the peddlers’ treatment with each other and with the passengers, the method of verbal and nonverbal publicising of the commodities by the peddlers are the subject of the research at this level of study, which have been recorded, completely registered, and used as the analytical document to register the results. In fact, the study of the peddlers’ wording, the lingual ways of advertising, and body language to attract the passengers’ attention in the subway is impossible through quantitative methods, because the current research needs consistent presence of the researcher in the designated location of the study to have impartial findings by applying qualitative methods. Therefore, deep observation of and interviews with informants are the main axis of this research. Interviews are recorded in the research location and, immediately after, the main points were written, revised, and collected. Regarding the selection of the atmosphere for the interviews, it should be noted that the interviews with the peddlers were accomplished in the research circumference, such as on waiting platforms and within wagons in each station.

The process of interviews is conducted with the absolute consent of informants and they have been completely informed about
their voice being taped. Of importance is the point that throughout the interviews and despite their complete knowledge of the study, the names of informants have been kept confident and the present article does not include their names.

Nowadays, the subway has turned to a mobile market. Female peddlers work as salespersons and all the passengers are customers. The large population and the security of the train have provided an appropriate place for peddlers’ salesmanship. Selling goods, the consumers’ behaviour, and the peddlers’ lingual and non-lingual advertising to sell goods, are all part of the process in the subway every day; studying such actions are possible through anthropological methods.

“Anthropology and specially its ethnographic methods are turning to popular cumulative resources by which some tools are applied to research upon marketing and consumer behaviour in the 20th century” (Olsen, 1995). The approach of market research emphasises the relationship between studying the consumer’s behaviour and the investigation of the action of marketing (Finch, 1997).

Research society

In this research, the society is the subway in Tehran, the undergrounds where the subway trains travel in specific routes. The subway undergrounds, train wagons, and all the lines and routes the subway in the capital passes through form the scope and location of the research.

The significance of the research subject

Peddling is considered a menial and brittle job in society; the income loss or profit do not influence the increase or decrease in national revenue, and it is propounded as a social problem. The significance of the subject deserves deliberation and research as the number of female peddlers in the subway is growing everyday regardless of the obstacles and legal restrictions against the job; the peddlers’ solution to their rivals is to use a variety of words to publicise their goods. The peddlers’ lingual methods of advertising are mostly respectful, and one can rarely see or hear begging or pleading in their publicising and statements. Sometimes they also convey a satirical and joking manner.

The subway is not merely a means of transportation anymore; instead, it has become a mobile bazaar. On the way towards their destination, the passengers can watch a different variety of commodities and buy, if necessary. Of course, occasionally the variety of commodities, the way of advertising, and the certain lexis about the high quality of the goods make the passengers shop unnecessarily, resulting in the formation of fanciful shopping.

In the first years of studying the peddling process in the subway, female peddlers used to work only inside the wagons, but through time and an increase in the number of peddlers, the wagons became extremely populated. To solve the problem, some peddlers sit in the subway platforms and begin to advertise their commodities and attract the passengers when they detrain.
In fact, the peddlers evoke thrilling emotions within the passengers through advertising, and the passengers start to buy goods which might not be efficient, so they gradually turn to consumerists. Therefore this paper intends to study the significance of the peddlers’ lingual and paralingual skills and body language to persuade the passengers to buy.

Theoretical Framework

In *The Language of Advertising* (1998), Goddard assumes that advertisement is so axiomatic to the modern audience that any question of “what advertisement is?” appears as nonsense. He believes that in the discussion of advertisement, text should be understood in its broadest sense, suggesting that text, in this sense, is in the meantime, a visual and verbal medium. He reminds of the attraction methods in advertising as inclusive of shocking pictures, font of typing, and the direction of writing.

In Goddard’s opinion, advertisements are present everywhere, which is exactly why nobody thinks about their nature and concept as a lingual discourse. He considers discourse as largely limited to its direct circumference. Actually, a large part of the meaning intended by the speaker is conveyed through the physical appearance of the conversation, such as gesture, body condition, and eye contact. Goddard calls the marginal aspects in conversation, paralingual factors, including cadence, pitch, and loudness of voice. These meaningful factors are all performed on purpose in daily speech.

In advertising, the mere expression of the sentences in written or speech form, to be heard or read by the audience, is not enough. Uttering the sentences, the pitch of the voice, prolonged pronunciation of certain sounds, knowing the situation, are all important, including which gesture and body movement can be more effective for creating the feeling of shopping in the customer. Some female peddlers in the subway advertise the goods deliberatively, and due to this intelligence, they are successful in sale. They are good at recognising the situation considering the time and place. In the morning, they advertise and call the names of the goods loudly and with prolonged sounds, because everyone is happy to go work, university, etc.; in the evening, the population increases relative to that in the morning, and the majority are exhausted and going back home. Therefore, the skilled peddlers advertise the commodities in a low voice, and even are occasionally silent and only show the goods to the passengers to avoid complaints from an annoying voice.

In *The discourse of Advertising*, Cook (1992) mentions three components of advertising as material, text, and people, and explains that popular behaviours against any discourse arises from individuals’ ideological, social, and personal positions. However, in his belief, there is a series of discourses that highly manipulate sensitivities. He continues stating that in a time that people confront a flood of social and natural problems, advertising could prompt them to consume more, create dissatisfaction toward the existing
Anthropology of Female Peddlers' Advertising in Tehran

commodities in the market, and increase anxieties and concerns that lead to the demand for better commodities.

Regarding the advertisement in the subway, Cook also explains that while people are inside the trains or waiting in the stations, they not only see the advertising in the trains and platforms but sometimes they study them carefully. Cook divides the advertisements into two categories of hard and soft. He includes the advertising with joke and satirical roots in the soft category, and the advertisements directly inviting people to buy through presenting the attributes, not logically, of the goods as the hard one. He also mentions the tools applied to convey meaning and messages, referring to speech, writing, and gestures as the basics for communication. Selecting the appropriate materials to present an advertisement is one of the most important parts of advertising, which depends largely on the advertiser’s intelligence and innovation (Cook, 1992). Some female peddlers in the subway are very talented in their approach to advertise the commodities. In peddling, the more innovative the advertisements are, the more commodities are sold, and vice versa. So evidently, if female peddlers are in the subway wagons, and mention only the name and price of the goods, they are directly inviting the passengers to buy. Such advertising can only be efficient if the merchandise itself is attractive, appropriate in material, colour, variety, and indicated as essential merchandise. However, when the commodity is a decoration or not necessary to have, in addition to lingual skills, peddlers also need paralingual skills to advertise. Sometimes, female peddlers advertise using satirical and joking statements. They directly make the passengers laugh and indirectly advertise their goods.

“The appearance of an advertisement along with its internal meaning is a type of discourse” (Cook, 1992, p. 4). Believing that advertising includes three parts of materials, context, and people, Cook initially states that people’s behaviour towards any kind of discourse implies their ideological, social, and personal status. He thinks there is a type of discourse that stimulates emotions. As he says, in a period when people are involved in the invasion of social and local problems, advertising can affect people’s persuasion to consume more, the feeling of dissatisfaction with the inferior quality of the existing commodities, intensify the feeling of avidity, anxiety, and a sort of motivation to wish for better goods (Cook, 1992).

“After defining the advertisement as a type of discourse, Cook considers several factors as influential in advertising, and the information about their relation and interaction with each other can lead to a convincing and influential advertisement. Among these factors are: society, image, material, discourse, role, other advertisements, partners, music, situation, language and para language” (Cook, 1992, p. 3).

Johnson states that the influence of advertisements on daily life has made advertising carry not only a meaningful and cultural load but become a part of the cultural texture in society nowadays,
while used to impose itself on people to be able to influence the culture (Johnson, 2007, p. 1). Johnson names seven specific elements of discourse which are noticed in making and codifying advertisements. The seven elements are: ellipsis, connotation, paralanguage, tropes, point of view, person, and narrative. This paper mostly applies paralanguage, person, and narrative. “Paralanguage includes several factors such as stress, tune, volume, audio features and body language. Paralanguage in writing is specified as the size, type, and font, and the imposition of the text. The factor of person has an important grammatical effect on the discourse of advertising. The advertiser must determine the addressee’s position relative to the advertisement and whether to address him ‘he’, ‘you’, or somebody else. Narrative also makes the style of discourse more influential. Television advertisements usually use a narrator to tell the story of the commodity. Likewise, in written advertisements, a narrator might be used to show the distinct phases of the advertisement” (Johnson, 2007, pp. 9-12).

Being repeated frequently, a behaviour is finally institutionalised. Sometimes, such a behaviour might be normal or even considered irregular. Although it is an irregular behaviour and many actions have been taken to prevent it, peddlers’ advertising in the subway is increasing and relatively institutionalised. Entering the subway trains, it is impossible not to see the peddlers’ advertising. It might be said that the peddlers’ presence in the subway and advertising have turned into a part of the cultural texture in the subway in Tehran.

Barthes is among the thinkers who have studied advertising with semiotics approach. In the “Rhetoric of the Image”, he ponders on the internal relationships between image and message in advertising to conclude that there are three types of messages encrypted in advertisement: lingual, message encoded in images, and messages apparently given through images (cited in Tanaka, 1994, p. 1). He points to two levels of interpreting lingual messages, namely, implied and apparent messages. Putting lingual message aside, we are faced with “specific advertising” that is divisible into two levels: implied and apparent images as the pictorial versions of implied and apparent messages. Implied image is itself divided into encoded, symbolic, and cultural messages. Barthes’ distinction is not clear-cut about image because cognitive information is not separate from cultural knowledge (Tanaka, 1994).

**RESEARCH FINDINGS**

To distinguish the skilled and amateur peddlers based on the method of advertising

The way female peddlers advertise in the subway reveals whether they are skilled or amateur. The manner some of them sell or even walk in the wagons attests to their inexperience, and do not actually have the necessary skills for peddling. Worry, anxiety, and embarrassment is evident on their faces.
Additionally, their quiet, trembling, and muttering voice while advertising displays their inexperience.

The way inexperienced women peddle is that they do not start to advertise the commodities upon their arrival, but after a short pause and hiding among the other passengers, they start to advertise with a quiet, trembling, and not strong voice; they role play as a passenger at one moment and as a peddler at the other.

At first the inexperienced female peddlers are embarrassed to advertise in the wagons. Not only do they merely name the goods quietly, but they pass through the population quickly and do not pause. They travel around the train wagons nonstop from the beginning to the end in a brief time. It is difficult to stand among the population because they are not adjusted to the peddling conditions yet, so they do not stand and are therefore seen less. After a while, they get used to the conditions and find that short pauses and standing among the population when advertising is efficacious for higher sales, because a short pause indirectly helps the passengers watch the goods carefully and stare at the colours and designs and might be persuaded to buy.

As mentioned, the amateur peddlers only name the commodities and do not use inspiring lexis and exciting words regarding the quality, price, and the certain features of the goods, whereas the skilled peddlers have already discovered the influence of verbal and nonverbal communication, and they use them to advertise their goods skilfully. They publicise the material, quality, incomparable prices on sale, use eye contact, a special and strong voice, agreeable manners, and monotonous tone; in nice and proper appearance, they pass through the population quickly and continue to advertise the goods along the train wagons.

“I have toothbrush, ladies I have toothbrush” (an amateur female peddler).

“I have shawl, colourful shawls, I have shawl” (an amateur female peddler).

“I have rainbow shawls, I have worn a model myself, rainbow shawls only for four dollars, it is a sale, ladies” (a skilled female peddler).

“I have slimming belts, they are herbal, fat burning, six dollars on satellite, four dollars in stores, but I sell them only for two dollars, ladies who go to the gym and do not lose weight, ladies who go on diets and are annoyed, you’ll lose weight and be in a good shape using these belts, nice bodies, everyone was pleased with them” (a skilled female peddler).

The skilled peddlers start to advertise once they enter the train wagons. Of course, the time of advertising also depends on the number of the passengers. In the first stations where there are fewer passengers, the peddlers do not begin advertising but they sit on the chairs like the passengers; they start to peddle when the wagon is populated enough.

Occasionally, the amateur female peddlers get intimate with the skilled ones and ask for help to sell their commodities. They give some of their own goods to their friends and ask for help. The amateur peddlers’ help request from the skilled ones...
reveals the impact of verbal skills, certain lexis, and tone on the scale of customer attraction.

**Verbal advertisements**

**Advertising peddlers’ commodities by the passengers**

Once a subway passenger buys merchandise from a peddler, there usually appears two states: the hesitant passengers ask the buyer about the quality, or the peddler asks the passenger who had already bought something to talk about the quality and the appropriate price. Hence, if the buyer compliments the price and quality of the merchandise, it will be an approval for the passengers. The same process is true about edibles. The peddler says: “I have Razavi doughnuts, made today, really fresh, I have Razavi doughnuts my lady, anybody wants?” One of the passengers buys some and eats, then the other passengers ask her about the taste and freshness. If the buyer approves them, many other passengers will also start to buy. In other words, a passenger’s shopping means an approval of the material and quality of the merchandise.

Even if the passenger is silent and does not express a word on the quality, the very action of buying is an advertisement to sell the peddlers’ goods. It is frequently observed that the passengers do not purchase anything from the peddlers for a long time in a day, but in stations where the passengers change lines, most transfer occur, and new passengers enter the wagon. Female peddlers start to advertise again, and if a passenger buys something, many others will also start to buy. Therefore, it can be said that peddlers’ wording and lingual and paralingual advertisings are not always effective for them, but the passengers’ behaviour, their shopping or avoiding, are efficacious in selling or failing to sell the commodities.

Thus, the female passengers who choose the peddlers’ goods are meticulous, and hesitate to buy; the passengers nearby help her choose and comment on the better colour and quality; in such conditions, deciding becomes easier for the buyer. In fact, the passengers begin to advertise the peddlers’ goods or express that they have already bought that merchandise and are pleased with the quality. Such statements and approvals by the passengers will gift the peddlers more sales. It can be stated that the skilled peddlers have been able to attract the passengers’ attention to their commodities through lingual and paralingual methods, and sometimes the passengers speak as the peddlers and advertise their goods strongly. It is frequently observed that a passenger has bought some cosmetics from the subway peddlers and addresses the peddler and the passengers: “I am your permanent customer and I always buy cosmetics from you which is both well-qualified and relatively cheaper than those in the stores.”

As mentioned above, such verbal advertisements from the passengers’ part is an approval for the quality of the peddlers’ goods that leads to selling more.
Presenting advertising card by the peddlers

While advertising their commodities in the subway wagons, the peddlers also offer the passengers some cards including a phone number and tell them: “we give our phone number therewith the merchandise, to ensure you of the quality and you will certainly call and ask for it again.”

By giving cards to advertise their commodities, the peddlers become distinct from the other peddlers working in other locations, such as conjunctions, streets, or elsewhere. In this way, they ensure the customers that the peddlers are available upon request.

Such an action directly wins the passengers’ trust and confidence and indirectly advertises the goods.

Another female peddler says:” Any time and any moment you needed my goods, just call on my cell phone, I’ll reach you in any line and any wagon. If you wish, you can give me your address anywhere and I’ll come, and you don’t need to disturb.”

Such verbal advertisings are expressive of conveying other meanings to the passengers. Availability, high quality commodity, and the buyer’s calmness are some implicit meanings of such verbal advertisements. Finally, the most key factor that is essential in purchasing commodities is security. Therefore, female peddlers indirectly guarantee their goods when they present the card including their phone number. Lack of a fixed location to sell and frequent transferring is a feature of peddling, so if the customer is not satisfied with the commodity, although inaccessibility of the peddler is completely natural, it leads to the buyer’s distrust. The peddler giving her phone card is a significant step in winning the passengers’ trust. When advertising in the subway for selling commodities, female peddlers say loudly: “Buy the goods, it is impossible you don’t call and ask for it again, many people have my phone number and are permanent customers.” Offering phone cards is an action resulting in a win-win situation. By giving their phone numbers to the passengers, the peddlers are both extending the advertising scope further out of the subway and developing their advertisement (when out of the subway, the passengers can still buy the necessary commodities through the phone number), and the passengers are encouraged to buy and no longer worried or anxious about the low quality of the goods, because if they are not pleased with the products, they can complain to the peddlers. Giving the phone number improves the peddlers’ accessibility.

Satire, joking, and offering

Provoking emotions and creating excitement for the audience is an influential way in advertising for sale. Sometimes it is not necessary to logically approve the quality. Occasionally they must invent a novel approach to advertise, like using satire and joking while advertising.

The young female peddler with jugglery tools says, “Those who like riddles, I have riddles for them, a physic riddle; if you solve
it, you’ll win a prize; if you wish to buy it, I’ll tell you the trick secretly and only for two dollars.”

Another female peddler says, “Ladies, buy a shawl for your sister-in-law, buy socks for your mother-in-law, and buy anything for your in-laws from me.”

Another female peddler says, “I make fruit-rolls at home and sell in the subway. I cut some into pieces and publicise with joking and offer the ladies telling them ‘apparently you like sour, come on and eat, my dear, and buy if you like’.”

In the evening, when many passengers are on the way home and spent a day working, applying satire and joking when selling commodities seems an effective method, because customers can both enjoy watching such scenes and will be willing to buy.

Another peddler advertising cosmetics humorously says, “Ladies, I have mascara, if you buy the mascara and use it, your eyelashes will be like Serendipity’s; ladies, is there anyone who likes to have eyes as Serendipity’s?”

Satirical verbal speech and joking along with offering is an innovation from peddlers and delivers the message, “You can test the stuff without paying and if you are interested you can buy.” This method is, on one side, entertaining and interesting for the passengers, and on the other, leaves them almost a fait accompli, so they are encouraged to buy.

1A pink dragon in a cartoon called “the unknown island”, with big blue eyes and very long eyelashes.

**Inventing certain lexis**

As previously stated, the wording and advertising of commodities are extremely efficacious in the scale of the sale, so most female peddlers use words like, “my flower”, “my lady”, “my dear”, “dear ladies”, “my loves”, and “my pretty ones” to attract the female passengers’ attention. They also use the word “only” to mention the low price, like, “Only for two dollars.”

“My flowers, I have Maryami shawls, only for one dollar, I have worn a model, Maryami shawls only for one dollar” (a female peddler).

“The cloth of my shawls will never run, it won’t be napped, I sell each only for ten two dollars, they sell four dollars in stores” (a female peddler).

Female peddlers also use exaggerated lexis to be more influential; “miracle” is an exaggerated word and widely used by peddlers. They say, “Buy, take home, test and you’ll see it is a miracle.”

They also use the word “magic” like “magic needles, magic tissues”, which means the peddler’s commodities hold unique features.

“Iron” is another attribute used in their advertising, to express that their goods “last long”. “Ladies, buy socks, my socks are made of iron and last for life.”

Female peddlers, as already mentioned, use exaggerated lexis and statements. Both the peddlers and passengers know about the exaggeration, but such lexis largely influences the sales.

“I have eyeliners ladies, the line remains as if you got a tattoo, I have fortifying
Collyrium for your eyelashes. My ladies, you sleep at night and wake up in the morning, you’ll see your eyelashes has grown 5 times longer” (a female peddler).

“My colleagues are selling the same product twice as much as this price, it’s on sale ladies” (a female peddler).

Another commonly used word among women is “free size”. When the female peddler has clothing as commodity, she uses “free size” to infuse the audience that regardless of their weight and size, the clothing items would fit their body with no problems.

“Local”, “home-made”, and “self-produced” are among the words encouraging the passengers and often influencing them to buy.

As repeatedly stated, peddlers use certain lexis and attributes to describe their commodities to attract more customers. The more provoking the attributes are to the audience, the more influential the advertisements; therefore, the peddlers who are talented in inventing certain lexis will earn more profit. For instance, many commodities hold “magic” as an attribute or they are introduced as cheaper than the commodities advertised on the satellite. Upon hearing such lexis, the passengers are encouraged to buy the products, so the tone and word rhythm used sequenially will lead to the attraction of more of an audience.

Imploration and beggary
Few among the peddlers attempt imploring and begging language and tone. They desperately ask the passengers to purchase from them and sometimes succeed as some passengers dare to buy not out of real need, but sympathy.

Peddling by imploring is done in two methods. Sometimes, the peddlers are well dressed and sell socks by stating that:

“For God’s sake, buy from me, buy my socks, I have an ill family member [in need of drug and care].”

“For God’s sake, buy, may God give you what you wish, I’ll pray for you, buy from me, I’d not sold anything today.”

“Ladies, may God give you what you want, God bless you, buy from me.”

Sometimes, they wear torn cloths and sell cheap items like band stripes, chewing gum, etc., for triple the actual price. Since they do not carry noticeable goods, they do not promote, and beg instead for the passengers to pay two or three times for a wretched item.

It should be noted that this is within the minority among peddlers and the majority are skilful in promotion methods, selling items by pointing to the high quality and low price and enticing the most indifferent to buy.

Nonverbal advertising
Peddlers’ trust in buyers
The peddlers intermittently give their commodities to the passengers for them to view and choose as they wish; at such moments, the peddlers do not stand by the passengers, but rather go on with their advertisement in a nearby spot in the wagon. The passengers may claim they have chosen
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from among the baggage and pay for it; the peddler, then, takes the money and calculates without focusing on the condition of the remaining goods. This daily cycle of trust in the clients continues as the peddler moves across spots and sells and advertises in the train.

The trust the peddlers vest in passengers makes potential clients of them. The passengers feel good about this trustfulness and try to return it by being responsible towards the salesperson and her sale. The nonverbal method of customer appreciation indirectly pushes passengers to become volunteer agents for maintaining the peddler’s baggage, so that the process of promotion and sale throughout the wagon becomes easier for the peddler. Moreover, a quasi-friendship results from such give and takes between the peddler and the passenger-customers that facilitates the sale.

When the baggage is overloaded, the peddler divides it into small packages and thrusts each to groups of passengers so that the process of viewing and choosing becomes optimal for the passengers. The peddler then uses a strategic promoting method by pointing to the passenger who holds one of such packages; this encourages the assistant passenger to enjoy viewing and, perhaps, choose from the available colours.
and options at hand; the same occurs with the passengers who are normally watching the process.

In summary, the strategy to deposit the goods in the hands of random passengers burgeons trust in passengers and tempts the trustee passenger to consider the items in her hand and perhaps dare to purchase, without having been a serious customer in the first place.

**Peddlers as models**

A major feature about metro peddlers is their clothing style. The more fashionable they are, the more inclined the passengers are to purchase. Most subway peddlers have noticed the rule and count on it for promoting their sales. They try to be communicative and compassionate to others and they always smile. This is part of the reason why passengers become clients of metro goods despite their low quality and cheap price.

Dependent of what they sell, the peddlers use various techniques of selling. For example, if she sells odds and ends, she hangs the items on her body both as a method for advertising and carrying the goods. A handful of pins, head flowers, bracelets, bangles, and rings are attached to her cloths and, as she urges the passengers to buy, the items glitter on her cloths.

“Dear ladies, I have pencil lipsticks, a sample is applied on my own lips, it has hues, and various hues are applied on my hand” (the peddler).

“Dear madams, all sorts of shawl and headscarf only two dollars, a sample is worn on my head” (the peddler).

The peddlers who sell cosmetics tell the passengers that they themselves apply the items they sell and invite to look at her worn makeup. This way, they simultaneously show the appearance of the items they sell and ensure the health of them.

“Ladies who are used to go to the pool, those who want their makeup to last long hours, purchase my mascara, water proof, look at my eyelashes, I apply this mascara” (the peddler).

Sometimes, when peddlers find passengers wary, they invent methods to call for their attention. For example, they might begin to apply makeup and ask the passengers to carefully consider the quality of products. Another might teach in front of all passengers how to fasten a head flower again and again, to plead them to purchase.
Peddlers, especially women peddlers, have explored that body language is more forceful than verbal. Consequently, they play a modelling role and use their body parts to advertise.

**Passengers as models**

When a higher number of peddlers are rivalling to sell their goods, diverse sale strategies are a must. This is enforced by the need for diversity because of the general urges in the advertisement industry. The peddlers have truly noticed that body language is a successful promotion method and apply it with all their potency.

Those who sell cosmetics insist on convincing passengers that their own makeup is the same they promote. They ask passengers who among them might wish to test the products. They use verbal ploys and eye contact to gain the consent of a passenger to volunteer for testing, and present an entertaining theatrics performance in front of the eyes of passengers. If anyone volunteers, the peddler applies her test makeup to adorn her in a performative style. The rest of passengers are entertained by the performance and induced to purchase an item.

“I have face hair remover scissors, ladies, easy to use and no need to go to salon, remove your own face and hands hair, anyone whose hands or face is un-tweezed volunteer to test?” (the peddler).

“I have eyebrow mascara, if you buy it you won’t need brow pencil or tattoos, in various colours, it has tester too ladies, anyone wants me to pencil her brows?” (the peddler).

These types of promotions are very amusing for customers and highly relied upon by subway peddlers. It has been frequently observed that a passenger lady in other wagons will move herself, when she notices these performances, so that she can watch and, in most cases, make a purchase.
CONCLUSION

Tehran, as the largest and most populated city of Iran, is not exempt from the rule. The inauguration of the subway system was devised for facilitating transportation in Tehran. The metro has found another function other than transportation, becoming a site for enterprise and a mobile market for peddlers.

Metro wagons provide a safe haven for peddlers since they are so crowded, and this crowd is the best potential customer. Peddlers usually choose spots that are more commuted, as the denser the crowd, the higher the sales will be. Therefore, the metro is nowadays a place normally frequented by peddlers. They do not pay taxes, do not pay for rent, and earn well. Despite all efforts by metro personnel to eradicate peddlers’ disturbances, peddlers are only alarmed enough to be more watchful; they have thrived in number against all odds.

Peddlers are comprised of various social and age groups: women, men, children, youth, and even the elderly are earning a life in the subway, but women and girls are a solid majority among them. Being educated or studying at university, backed by expert job experiences, or family negation do not prevent them from peddling in the subway, even though it is a job perceived to be low in prestige.

Peddlers’ sale strategies are immensely diverse. They mix verbal and nonverbal communication methods to optimise their sales, although it could not be exactly said which method is most usually employed by them. They know when to increase their tone at the right time for all to hear and when to pitch lower, as when passengers are few and wary. It seems that they are conscious of the marginal, but vital, aspects of discursive, linguistic, and paralinguistic dimensions of communication.

With the passage of time, the number of women peddlers in the subway in Tehran increases. The increase, on one hand, and the sale of various commodities, on the other, has promoted rivalry among the peddlers. Here, peddlers seek ways to optimise sale and attract the passengers’ attention among the load of goods and the increasing number of peddlers. The best methods in this relation are observed in their advertising. They attempt to promote their goods by upgrading their peddling skills. They are knowledgeable that they could not rely simply on lingual instruments to achieve the purpose and, therefore, adopt body language techniques in their advertisements. Whenever they solely rely on lingual advertisement, they coin lexis that are generally innovative and viable.

Some peddlers dare to coin terms for describing their goods. These terms are more suggestive of the unrivalled attributes of their products. They use adjectives like “magic”, “iron”, “domestic product”, “immortal”, “cheaper than everywhere”, etc.

Women peddlers amazingly rely on the physical manifestations of their body and language for promotion; they use eye contact and postures and appear as models to attract passenger-customers. They also use soft advertisement methods containing humorous content to flatter passengers.
Based on what they sell, the working time, density of passengers, and calendar occasions, they use lingual and metalingual strategies for promotion variations.

Therefore, when women peddlers present a short performance in a wagon, they present their real intention of selling the product. Since verbal methods are common, indirect methods better entertain and absorb, enticing customers to unconsciously purchase items that they very probably are not in need of, but which are so artistically presented that they have no power to refrain. Peddlers artfully transform passengers into customers and turn them to unconscious consumerists. Passengers passively observe all types of advertisement on their way to their destination, sometimes entertained and sometimes bored; nonetheless, they are drowned in all-encompassing advertisements and purchase unconsciously. Sometimes, they do not need what they buy, but do it out of entertainment, fun, or the impulse of consumerism.

Leaving goods among the passengers is peddlers’ best method in motivating them to purchase. The peddlers, in this way, achieve the highest result. Firstly, the prove to the passengers that they are trustworthy and there is no need to monitor them during their choice and sale, while they indirectly count on passengers for monitoring each other. Secondly, they provide for the passengers to freely search between the items and thus become tempted to buy. Lastly, passengers are given the opportunity to consult with each other on the purchase, and thus, become potential advertisers themselves.

Figure 3. Strategies for women peddlers’ advertising commodities in Tehran subway

Non-verbal

Verbal

advertising via passengers
Providing advertising cards
Jokes and fun
Inventing lexis
Modeling passengers
Modeling peddlers
Vest trust in passengers
REFERENCES


The Discursive Politics of Women’s Clothing in Iran at Revolutionary Transition Era (1979-1981)

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ABSTRACT

This research is based on descriptive-analytical study on the changes of aesthetic standards of Iranian women’s clothing following the discursive politics during the revolutionary transition era (1979-1981). Until the Islamic revolution, women’s clothing was one of the most controversial politico-cultural issues for decades. The harsh policies of the Pahlavi regime for women’s emancipation and unveiling was opposed by the emotional resistance of religious leaders and their traditionalist followers. Based on social constructionist discourse analysis, this article investigates the aesthetic styles of women’s clothing during turbulent era and examines the discursive practices of various dominant and competing groups and ideologies. Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis method is used to analyse the polemics and practices carried out by all competing classes and ideological discourses that resulted in the domination of hijab at a national level. The dominant revolutionary discourse opposed the symbolic power of modernity, freedom, and rationality represented by western fashion and replaced a symbolic force of morality, chastity, and conceitedness. This symbolic power has since remained alive although contested in a variety of forms due to social and cultural changes. Although the form of Iranian women’s clothing after 1979 revolution remained a religious code, the aesthetics of woman’s clothing is still influenced by numerous cultural, social, economic, and political factors. The post-revolution discursive politics led to the homogenisation of women’s clothing in Iran denying the differences between clothing cultures.

Keywords: Discursive politics, Iran, revolutionary transition era, women clothing

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:
Received: 18 October 2017
Accepted: 01 February 2018

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INTRODUCTION
It is important to know how dominant discourses in every period in the Iranian history have dealt with the issue of women’s clothing - whether the governments decide to take a stance or not - as it has made a significant difference on the aesthetics of Iranian women’s clothing. It is noteworthy how, in different epochs, politics and the state can effectively influence cultural attitudes and the culture of women’s clothing in both social and cultural systems and subsystems. Various aspects of culture (such as clothing) are tremendously influenced by the discourses and ideologies championed by governments. This role is better understood during regime changes, especially those cases fuelled by a mixture of cultural as well as political revolutionary motives. Such a study can open a window towards understanding the interrelationships between culture and politics by discovering the structuration and domination phases of a competing discourse.

Clothing is an important sign of cultural identity: ‘Important indicators of cultural identity include popular rituals and ceremonies, festivals, eves, traditional values, clothes and dressing, architecture of buildings and places, customs, and national and local art’ (Varjavand, 1999 [1378]). Also, in creating one’s social identity, clothes play the same role as they do in creating one’s personal identity: ‘In many settings of pre-modern cultures, appearance was largely standardised in terms of traditional criteria. Modes of facial adornment or dress, for example, have always been, to some degree, a means of individualisation; yet the extent to which this was either possible or desired was usually quite limited. Appearance primarily designated social identity rather than personal identity. Dress and social identity have certainly not become entirely dissociated today and dress remains a signalling device of gender, class position, and occupational status (Giddens, 1991).

Having been populated by various ethnicities, Iran is a multicultural society which has left its mark on the aesthetics and function of women’s clothing. ‘The way the Kurdish women in Khorasan (Kurmanj Kurds) dress and choose their clothes’ colour differs based on a number of factors such as the clan, age, and the presence (or absence) of a husband. A yellow skirt accompanied by a simple purple scarf, for example, indicates a virgin, while a scarlet skirt with striped margins and also a chador (Islamic covering) worn in a specific manner are signs that the woman in question has recently lost her husband’ (Papoli-Yazdi, 2002). ‘While having aesthetic attributes, the way Qashqai women dress relays some information about their age and personal and tribal status. Young mothers and wives wear clothes of vivid, light colours. However, they can now dress clothes in red or any colour of their choice with some design on them. Old women wear dress in black and grey’ (Amirmoez, 2002).

Considering the religious, cultural, geographical, and ethnic characteristics of Iran, power centres and discursive signifiers have had a considerable influence on the changes of women’s clothing in the
Discursive Politics of Women’s Clothing in Iran

discursive fields attended by this essay. Whereas the discourse of the Pahlavi regime revolved around modernity, the Islamic revolution focused on religious fundamentalism, and they both influenced women’s clothing, which has always been subject to the ruling power. While the former placed a woman unshackled from the binds of religion in the centre of its discourse, the latter introduced an ideal Muslim woman at the central point of the Islamic revolution’s discourse. According to Moghadam, gender relations play a pivotal role in culture, idealism, politics, and revolutionary societies, and the ‘ideal society’, as it were, implicates the notion of the ‘ideal woman’ (Foran, 1997). To counter the Pahlavi discourse, the revolutionary discourse during the transition phase (the 1979-1981 Period) tried to formulate in its meta-discourse the features of the ideal Muslim woman, while going to lengths to once again promote the Islamic covering for women. Thus, a special form of clothes with a specific aesthetics was introduced for the revolutionary Muslim woman. This paper aims to examine this type of aesthetics in contrast to the one prevalent during the Pahlavi period, and determine its characteristics within the scope of the Islamic revolution discourse during its Transition Phase.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
This article aesthetically analyses women’s clothing according to the concept of discourse and its aesthetic function. Discourse ‘is a language or system of representation socially and politically developed to produce and distribute a coherent set of meanings about a critical subject; these meanings serve a part of society where the discourse originates and makes attempt to turn these meanings into the common sense through its ideological function’ (Mehdizadeh, 2005 [1384]). In the 1970s and 1980s, the concept was introduced, according to Foucault’s ideas, as a place where power and knowledge meet. Discourse analysis includes ‘a set of analytic techniques applied to uncover the patterns of understanding, beliefs, values and the structure of faith embedded in a discourse. It is an interdisciplinary field comprised of grammar, text analysis, cultural, and semantic studies’ (Connell & Galasinski, 1996).

Discourse in this paper is the analysis of thought systems in lingual forms (MacDonell, 1986) viewed from a critical vantage where power and ideology are dealt with as elements that go beyond the text. As Macdonell says, ‘All discourses are ideologically positioned; none are neutral’.

‘Critical discourse analysis, as a qualitative methodology, studies language as a social action in relation to ideology, power, history, and society at the level of both written and spoken text’ (Agha-golzadeh, 2006 [1385]).

This paper seeks to analyse multiple discourses on women’s clothing in a specific period. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, critical discourse analysis has a post-structural viewpoint, which ‘speaks of multiplicity of discourses and, more specifically, of tensions and discursive
contradictions within the texts. As a matter of fact, we no longer have a homogeneous text written based on a single discourse aimed at a homogeneous audience which produces a homogeneous response. The text itself is fraught with contradictions. This is where discourses are in tension and interaction. These are the nodes of which Laclau and Mouffe speak as ‘places where discourses relate to each other’ (Moghadami, 2012 [1390]).

According to Foucault, power is the main player in the field of discourse distributed across society, and the most general sense in which power is productive for Foucault is through knowledge. Knowledge, especially the social sciences, is closely implicated in the production of docile bodies and subjected minds. ‘Discourses’ is the term Foucault uses for these systems of quasi-scientific knowledge. Knowledge as discourse is not knowledge of the ‘real’ world as it exists prior to that knowledge. Although it presents itself as representing objective reality, in fact, discourses construct and make ‘real’ the objects of knowledge they ‘represent’. Knowledge is distinguished from other ways of apprehending the world and considered to be ‘knowledge’ of the objective world, because it is supported by practices of power. As Foucault sees it, knowledge involves statements uttered in institutional sites in which it is gained according to certain rules and procedures, by speakers who are authorised to say what counts as ‘truth’ in that particular context (Nash, 2010).

This paper considers the feminine body and, therefore, feminine clothes as the central signifier of the ruling discourse and/or rival sub-discourses in the discursive field. The prevalent signifiers put forth in the body of the discourses of the period are as follows: freedom, women’s rights, chastity, identity, feminine beauty, etc., each defined differently from the perspective of various discourses to reach different discursive meanings for women’s clothing that would ultimately exclude other definitions provided by rival discourses for these signifiers. Articulating the central and prevalent signifiers around the subject of dress in the discourses of both Pahlavi and the Islamic Revolution, accompanied by an analysis of the subject in the light of the discursive practices of the two fields, will lead us to determine how the aesthetics of women’s clothing was influenced by the definition of this central signifier by these discourses.

As this paper seeks to discover the discursive aesthetics of women’s clothing in different periods and communities, it makes use of the sociological approach as well. [This is because] sociology places immense importance for the aesthetics of clothes. In Veblen’s analysis, then, are the foundations of an approach that interprets fashion goods as aesthetically inscribed resources, collectively consumed by individuals whose primary rationale for purchasing particular ranges and types of garments is their use in the articulation of shared lifestyle statements (Bennet, 2005). Thus, in analysing women’s clothing during the Transition Phase of
the Islamic Revolution, theoretical and sociological aesthetic concepts act as the basis of our analysis and are made use of in our quest for effective discursive factors in these fields.

Methodology
The present study relies on the discourse analysis method, which is a popular qualitative method in various fields, due to its multidisciplinary character. Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis suggests rather plainly how we might construct linguistics for the next century, which, in addition to its pervasively critical and explanatory focus, would require interdisciplinarity as a central principle, without, however, compromising in any way the central capacity to describe (Fairclough, 1980). The study seeks to recognise the aesthetic changes of women’s clothing before and after the Islamic Revolution and the way they appear in the society. Accordingly, the critical discourse analysis method is selected due to its practical advantages in the subject matter. Laclau and Mouffe extended the critical discourse analysis from linguistics to politics and social sciences and used it as a powerful means of their social analyses. This type of discourse analysis emphasises the role of power and ideology and aims to reveal the hidden relationships between the power and the ideological processes in the lingual texts that study the social applications of the language.

Discourse is a historical phenomenon; thus, in this article, the aesthetics of women’s clothing in the transient revolutionary period is compared to the aesthetics of the women’s clothing in the preceding Pahlavi discourse. By identifying the discursive elements of the mentioned discourses and analysing the discourse of each period regarding clothing, the effect of the discursive elements and the type of their application to form and aesthetics of clothing are recognised as the central core of each discourse, and the results, including types of women’s clothing in each period, are explained.

The context of studying the type and aesthetics of women’s clothing in each one of the aforementioned periods is the study of texts about the Iranian women’s clothing in the subject periods, including ‘textual’ and ‘visual’ documents, and putting them into qualitative analysis. The print texts like ‘news, speeches, interviews, and compilations’; ‘pictures and magazine images’ are regarded as the visual media sources, which prepare the ground for interpretation of the aesthetical cores of the aesthetics of women’s clothing through pictures. Thus, beside special women magazines, all the issues of “Ettelat” and “Keyhan” newspapers—which were the main newspapers published in Iran during the mentioned era- were studied.

Dominant (Hegemonic) and Rival Discourses during the Revolutionary Transition Era about Women’s Dressing
The 1979 revolution brought about a tremendous evolution in the Iranian society. One of its consequences was the changes in the rules of women’s dressing and the aesthetics of their clothes on a religious
basis. One of the reasons for this was the widespread and effective participation of women in the Islamic Revolution. During the formation of this revolution, women formed a large group of protesters (fighters) against the Pahlavi regime, but not all of them had religious attitudes. Nevertheless, the clothing and dressing of these women were distanced from the patterns of women’s clothing during the Pahlavi era, influenced by the religious spirit of the revolutionary period. However, as far as the Pahlavi’s discourse and the Islamic Revolution’s discourse are concerned, the influence of non-Iranian culture on women’s clothing continued to be observed. Yet, it was a phenomenon strengthened by the dominant discourse of the Pahlavi regime, and discarded and marginalised by the discourse of the Islamic Revolution.

According to research on women’s performance and position in the world revolutions, ‘gender relations have tremendous contribution in revolutionary cultures, idealism, politics, and societies’. Hana Papanek maintains that the construction of the ‘ideal society’ entails a notion of the ‘ideal woman (Foran, 1997). In the meantime, and after the revolution, a system of language was formed that, on the one hand, was developing the values, and on the other hand, was a combination of Islamic values due to its religious background. To understand this system of obviously ideological language and its functions in the case of women’s clothing, the social texture of this system during the revolutionary period of 1979, 1980, and 1981 should be taken into consideration.

The integration of politics and religion (government and religion) is the result of the new perception of the founder of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, of the way of governance which was presented in the theory of ‘absolute authority of the jurisprudence’, brought about a great transformation in the history of Iranian governance and, as the theoretical basis of dominant discourse, redefined various social, cultural, economic, legal, judicial, administrative, and military relations of Iran, leading to the emergence of a new legal juristic political discourse that affected the issue of women’s clothing.

In the early months after the victory, the late leader of the revolution expressed clearly his opinion about the type of covering - and not the women’s clothing - that eventually led to the determination of a structure for women’s clothing in the society. Before the revolution, in an answer to a question about women’s rights after the victory of the revolution, he said that ‘the Muslim women have chosen to wear Chador because of the Islamic education. In the future, women will be free to decide on this; we will only ban the fripperies’ (Imam Khomeini, 1979a). His apparent position at the beginning of the victory of the revolution on the need to observe the Islamic limits as far as the women’s clothing is concerned led, after much ups and downs, to the ‘revolutionary state bureaucracy’ on this issue, and various perceptions of ‘Islamic Modest Dress’.
At the same time, popular and political groups were engaged in producing different discourses on this issue.

During the transition period of the revolution, ‘being revolutionary’, in the sense of denying past beliefs, was one of the most important paradigms of the Islamic Revolutionary Dialogue. In the important paradigm of being revolutionary in Iran in 1979, in addition to the proactive and thought-minded features that existed to establish this characteristic in individuals, some lifestyle characteristics were also considered effective to bring revolutionary appearance to one’s face, including the aesthetics of clothing as the closest object to the body of women and men that had undergone tremendous development in these years.

At that time, the type of dress was an indication of the identity of a person as a revolutionary; therefore, many Iranian women who contributed to the formation of the revolution and its victory, as well as the women who followed it after the victory, tended to show their revolutionary identity through choosing a special type of dress. The Islamic Revolution had just come to a victory; thus, there was no chance for systematisation of the various aspects emerging from the revolution and the formation of political-cultural discourse. Therefore, it cannot be said that the women’s revolutionary dress was part of the discourse of the revolution, but more should be acknowledged that this kind of dress was naturally tied with the intellectual foundations of the revolution expressed by its leaders and rooted in Islamic beliefs that were also worn by religious women before the victory of the revolution. But these clothes - including Chador - were subject to structural changes in the context of the events of the revolution and in accordance with its necessities. On the one hand, the unanimous rise of most Iranian people, in conjunction with the revolution, created social conditions that made people in Iran lack any social class, except the supporters of the Pahlavi regime. Consequently, the revolutionary style had come to be enjoyed by all, a manifestation of which was in the form of women’s clothing. This was a kind of dressing that, combined with a comfortable and loose coat and a scarf, was a manifestation of feminine simple lifestyle and fighting spirit, even though jeans were seen among them.

Of course, these particular conditions were related to the first months after the victory of the revolution. The statement of the leader of the revolution was the beginning of a discourse on the coverage of body by the women and ‘revolutionary dress of Muslim women’, which gradually distinguished it from other women’s revolutionary dresses, which did not necessarily adhere to the religious limits [of Hijab]. The basic principle in this discourse was the obligation of women to observe the limits [of Hijab]. Of course, the traditional religious class also had a special interest in the Chador as a Muslim woman’s modest dress.

Women are considered key human elements in the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Through reviewing
developments related to the type of women’s clothing after the Islamic Revolution, as well as some attitudes of the legislative institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the status of women and men, Moghadam noted that ‘the signal importance of the woman question to the Islamist revolutionaries and state-builders and in particular the significance of veiling has been widely discussed in the (expatriate) literature on Iranian women.’ Afsaneh Najmabadi, for example, has discussed an editorial that appeared in a 1984 issue of Zan-e Rouz (Today’s Women), which described the veil as ‘a shield that protects [woman] against conspiracies aimed at her humanity, honour, and chastity’, as well as the means to protect Islam from cultural imperialism. The editorial maintains that the revolution ‘transformed everyone, all personalities, all relations, and all values’ and that ‘woman was transformed in this society so that a revolution could occur.’ Other publications of the Islamic Republic and speeches by its leaders indicate the importance of the family unit, and the links between veiling and family values: ‘hijab is a spiritual bulwark around the family which protects it against degeneration’ (45), and ‘the family is the basic unit of the society and plays a crucial role in prosperity, public morals, and education of new generations, as well as social integration and social stability’ (Foran, 1997).

Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the non-observance of the Islamic modest dress (Islamic hijab) is against religion and law and a disrupting factor for social affairs. As a matter of fact, he referred to this issue many years before the revolution’s victory. In 1962, in a critical review of the situation of that time, he said: ‘The uprising that took virtuous women’s headscarves was an uprising for personal gain; and now this matter which is contrary to religion and law is ongoing in the country’ (Khomeini, 2000 [1379]b).

He considered the lack of faith in the principle of hijab contrary to the laws of Islam and contrary to the principle of the right to freedom and said: ‘Is it possible for a person to be a Muslim, and on the other hand, be agree with not wearing hijab? ... Says you are free, but you should go to schools without Chador or scarf; is this freedom?’ (Ibid).

Ayatollah Khomeini also did not know the Chador as the sole Islamic modest dress and did not consider any obligation to use Chador: ‘The Islamic modest dress means observing the limits [of Sharia’ (religion)] and wearing simple dresses..., not necessarily Chador’ (Ibid).

Another key point is that Ayatollah Khomeini’s approach to the issue of Islamic modest dress was positive through inviting women to observe this kind of covering, not a negative approach: ‘Hijab ... does not oppose the freedom of [women] ... and we invite them to observe the Islamic hijab’ (Ibid).

Although he also adhered to observing the regulatory rules in this regard: ‘the Islamic ministry is a place where no sin
should be committed. Women can go to the Islamic ministries ..., but they should wear hijab’ (Ibid. V. 6).

Currently, the main challenge in respecting the scope of Islamic modest dress (hijab) was for the freedom of women. Thus, several clergies expressed their views and announced that the purpose of the invitation to wear hijab is not the social isolation of women, and women will enjoy all legitimate benefits and social rights. As a result, Ayatollah Khomeini focused his attention on the type of women’s clothing, not their social activity. He said ‘there is no obstacle to women’s working ... but they should observe the limits of Islamic hijab’ (Ibid).

Contrary to the view that the type of women’s clothing during protesting against the Pahlavi regime was Islamic, and it is therefore necessary to observe the Islamic hijab, some others believed that the use of Islamic modest dress by a group of women in the Pahlavi anti-regime marches was symbolic and remonstrative, and had nothing to do with their religious beliefs. ‘The street march involved a huge number of women who came to the streets while wearing hijab as a sign of opposition to the bourgeoisie or the Pahlavi westernised decadence. Many women who used hijab as protest did not expect the hijab to become mandatory’ (Moghadam, 1995). From this perspective, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, this kind of covering (cloth) has lost its symbolic function and could have been replaced by any other clothing.

Prior to this, Ali Shariati expressed his view of Islamic hijab as a symbolic matter and appreciated it. He said: ‘Hijab belongs to a generation of consciousness who returns to Islamic modest dress; a generation that wants to say ‘no’ to western colonialism and European culture ... This person who consciously chooses the Islamic modest dress or hijab ... is a representation of a specific culture, a particular school, a particular intellectual party, a particular wing, and a particular front’ (Shariati, 2012).

After expressing the position of the dominant discourse on the type of women’s clothing (hijab) in 1979, the minority spectrum among government officials as well as the religious intellectual spectrum, with an emphasis on ‘no compulsion in religion’, emphasised the modesty in both men and women’s behaviour. Pro-revolutionary thinkers took positions and contributed to the formation of this discourse through sharing their interpretations of the words of Ayatollah Khomeini. They emphasised the correction of the appearance and inside of the government offices simultaneously and considered the observance of Islamic hijab as a change in the appearance.

In deepening this discourse, conferences were held in Tehran with the presence of pro-active Muslim women, and the speakers of these conferences sought to formulate principles for the realisation of Islamic modest dress (hijab), which guaranteed the goals of the revolution in this regard and, at the same time, protected women’s rights. In addition, the production
of literature focusing on Islamic modest dress in the press, including the publication of the ‘Etelaat Banovan’, which was a weekly magazine focusing on women’s issues, was also aimed at strengthening this discourse.

The Practices of the Dominant Discourse during the Revolutionary Transition to Establish the Signifying Islamic Dress Code for Women

Given that the social developments in Iran are the outcome of two hegemonic discourses of traditionalism and modernity, it can be inferred that the traditionalist discourse deemed the obligation of Islamic dress code as the demand of the Islamic Revolution, and interfered with women’s choice of clothes, while the modernist discourse emerged as the opposing one.

The dominant discourse openly announced their stance regarding the female dress code, but the differentiation between the pros and cons took a while to build up. Those women, who did not embrace the Islamic dress code, marched in February 1979 to voice their dissent. Later, similar demonstrations were spotted in smaller scales, which were occasionally suppressed by the supporters of the Islamic dress code. Ayatollah Khomeini declared his opposition to disoblige women who did not wear the hijab, as did some other clerics, and even the then-attorney-general of Tehran said that in case of any insult to the women, the violator would face punitive acts.

Seculars and religious leftists also declared their stands in this regard. The Marxist organisation called Peykar held a rather moderate ground and stated that the majority splinter of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran guerrillas would condemn the restraint of women’s social and legal rights, and would stand against any set of beliefs that degrades women to mere ‘dolls’. Their minority splinter as well condemned the compulsory Islamic hijab. The Tudeh Party, too, had a moderate stand. The Women’s Party of Iran and the Laborers’ Party of Iran expressed opposition to the demonstrations held against the compulsory Islamic dress code. Rahaaii-ye Zan Community was against the compulsion of the Islamic dress code. It goes without saying that in the years 1979-1980, in the heat of the revolutionary atmosphere, leftist and nationalist parties were all about fighting the Arrogance (referring to the capitalism led by the United States and the Pahlavi Dynasty), and all other phenomena were defined for them within that context. Thus, the issues of Islamic dress code and woman’s rights were considered functions of this principle, and communities and parties took it into consideration, along with their interests, when taking positions. This was how female leftists accepted the Islamic dress code against their absence of religious beliefs, as they saw it as a symbol of opposition to the concept of the ideal woman in the west. Educated intellectual females, too, took it as

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1It means ‘women information’
the symbol of a revolution against the status quo and the undesirable rule of the Pahlavi, and they accepted it even though they were not religious.

Meanwhile, most people and Islamic parties and communities, who saw the practice of Islamic rules as the cause of their revolution, not only had already accepted the observation of Islamic dress code for women, but also demanded that this law should be put into practice. Religious traditionalist revolutionary people held peaceful rallies and issued statements and resolutions to further stress the importance of observing the Islamic dress code as the fortress of battle and the barrier of virtue. The discourse also used revolutionary press to propagate the Islamic hijab through literature and poetry.

After the official establishment of the rule of the Islamic Republic in April 1979, the efforts made to establish the traditionalist discourse on women’s clothes grew more rigid. The revolutionary press started producing articles and graphics, publishing summons to call people to the rallies, and reciting the resolutions issued in the rallies.

The solemn demand of the Revolution about the necessity of observing the Islamic dress code by the women was further established in July 1980, following the command of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the government demanding the Islamisation of offices and organisations. As an answer, the announcement approved by the Revolutionary Council, which banned women without Islamic hijab from entering offices, was dispatched, and measures were taken and announced by the Revolutionary Attorney-General. Also, the government ministers and managers all circularised the regulations regarding the female employees’ dress code on July 5, 1980. The regulations instructed women to wear plain dresses with head scarves or long-sleeved outfits, pants, and head scarves. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a circular to oblige women in the foreign missions to observe the Islamic code of conduct and dress code in public appearances. Figure 1 shows the network of the dominant discourse’s practices (Islamic Traditionalists) in the revolutionary transition era, and Figure 2 shows the articulation of women’s clothing in Pahlavi and Islamic revolution fields of discourses (1926-1979).
Figure 1. Network of the dominant discourse’s practices (Islamic traditionalists) in revolutionary transition era.

Figure 2. Articulation of women’s clothing in Pahlavi and Islamic revolution fields of discourses (1926-1979)
Types and aesthetics of women’s clothing during the revolutionary transition

The women involved in the triumph of the Islamic Revolution of Iran came from a wide range of political and religious tendencies as ‘there were countless women participating in Iranian people’s uprising against the Shah during 1977-1979. Like any other social groups, they had their own reasons for opposing the Shah, such as economic deprivation, political repression, determination of Islamic identity, and a tendency towards a society with a socialistic future’ (Moghadam, 2011). Thus, women who belonged to various revolutionary groups wore distinct types of clothes, somewhat reflecting their tendencies. They presented themselves to society with clothing that had distinctive features.

For example, girls and women in Marxist groups, such as Organisation of Iranian Fadaiyan-e-Khalgh Guerrillas, wore plain clothes (Figure 3), including a loose blouse, a coat, or a jacket, coupled with loose jeans or trousers, sometimes accompanied by a kerchief, which represented their ideal: defending the rights of the workers.

Another active political group with eclectic Islamic tendencies, which had numerous supporters among women, was the People’s Mujahedin of Iran. Supporters of this organisation wore ordinary clothes as most of their activities were covert and, therefore, it was necessary for them not to stand out. Since they considered themselves Shia Muslims, they emphasised the observance of Islamic coverings. Sometimes, especially during special occasions and political meetings, they wore green overcoats and white kerchiefs.

Figure 3. Fadaiyan-e-Khalgh Guerilla Women
Moreover, many of the women participating in the Islamic Revolution were Shia Muslims. These women, who were marginalised during the Pahlavi dynasty, found the opportunity during the Revolution to wear Islamic coverings of their choice, which were in accordance with their religious law, and chador was the first choice for many of them. At the same time, there were other groups of Muslim women who accompanied the Revolution without any political tendencies and participated in special occasions without full Islamic coverings. They wore common feminine clothes, but tried to cover more of their bodies using socks and long sleeves. This effort was a result of the revolutionary spirit, as Islamic coverings still were not a legal requirement. Like the years of the Pahlavi reign, during the revolutionary transition, more traditional women preferred to wear chador, while wearing kerchiefs along with common women’s clothing was also prevalent among religious women.

Large kerchiefs became very popular during the revolutionary transition. Kerchiefs were used as a piece of clothing along with home and party dresses and were not part of a uniform. They were either ready-made or were sewn by women themselves. They were even decorated with embroidered flowers on the back and ribbons on the edges. Women who adhered to Islamic coverings used kerchiefs to cover their foreheads and extended their sides to cover their shoulders, while other women did not cover themselves fully and parts of the hair and neck were visible. Since most religious women wanted full coverage of the front hair and adherence to the religious boundaries of clothing, an attempt was made to secure the sides of the kerchiefs. This was done through a rubber band attached to the kerchief at the forehead sides – like a prayer maghna’e’ (wimple) – which provided full coverage of the hair. Securing the kerchief under the throat using a pin and covering the whole upper body using its sides were observed in special occasions, such as military parades. Aside from kerchiefs, another type of head covering used was called a ‘maghna’e’ (wimple). Wimples were originally a piece of head covering women wore under their chadors during prayers. This head covering is like a very short chador covering the shoulders; it has a closed front, and is secured on the head using a rubber band. Underneath, the chin is covered with a triangular piece so that full Islamic covering is observed during prayers. Different forms of Iranian women’s wimples in 1979 and 1980 are shown in Figure 4.
During the Islamic Revolution, wimples got popular amongst the women, to the extent that sometimes they wore prayer wimples in the public, though this was very rare. Many of the women used plain or black textiles to make wimples, which were longer than the prayer wimples, and stretched a band fixed underneath the wimple around their heads to make it look better. Besides several types of headdresses, the women used to wear sunglasses, which sometimes functioned like a mask to cover their faces. Since the sunglasses were relatively large at that time, they provided a better coverage for beauty of the face.

In those years, chador was one of the major garments of the Muslim Iranian women. The chador used in Pahlavi era had a semi-circular pattern, and, when worn, covered from the head to the feet. Usually both hands were used to hold the chador, and normally one hand brought the chador up to cover the lower half of the face, almost to the nose, which was called ‘face-covering’; only a small part of the eyes and the nose remained uncovered. During the Pahlavi’s reign and the first year after the revolution, in addition to the black chadors, some less official thin cotton chadors, known as ‘Kudari’, were also used by urban women. The black chadors were usually made of non-cotton heavy fabrics and were held on the head by hands. When women needed to use their hands, they would hold the chador by their teeth. Of course, the cotton chadors were lighter, and this method was more used more for the black chadors.

The chadors were not fixed on the head; but later, women who participated in the demonstrations, made some changes to their chadors to fix them on their heads. One of these methods was to sew a long rectangular band to the upper edge of the chador to the front of the forehead, which was tied behind the neck and fixed the chador on the head. Later, this band was replaced by an elastic tape, which did not need to be tied and was also more flexible. Different types of wearing chador in 1979 and 1980 are shown in Figure 5.
In other creative methods, measures were taken to release the hands when using the chador. The front part of the chador was stitched to the bottom of the chin, and a triangular piece was added to the chin to allow only the ‘face’, which is permitted under the Islamic dressing code. The two sides of the chador around the forehead were tied behind the head using an elastic tape or a band. In the elbow area or lower, two slots were made on the front of the chador to pull out the hands. This solution was especially useful for releasing the hands when chanting, taking banners and handwritings, and holding weapons - which were often symbolic. The front part of the chador was stitched, and two sleeves were added to them. A triangular piece was placed under the chin and the two sides of the chador around the forehead were tied behind the head using an elastic tape or a band.

In 1979 and 1980, women’s clothing faced changes, which were known on one side, and unknown on the other. Most women, being exposed to the religious atmosphere of the Islamic Revolution, tended to follow the clothing style of the fighting women; the clothing which were possibly not chador, but close to the Islamic dressing codes. These clothes were selected from the ordinary and the most commonly used clothes, which were more covered, were not fancy looking, and complied with the active revolutionary environment, while allowing more mobility. This analysis is based on the case study of the clothing style of women who participated in the demonstrations, which spread all over the country, especially to the big cities, and created the dominant atmosphere. In other places and environments, the woman’s clothing still consisted of clothes which were popular before the revolution. Before the late leader of revolution decreed that the women must observe the Islamic dressing code, there were no concerns about the women’s clothing. Therefore, the same pre-revolutionary clothing was used.
by the women with the aforementioned considerations. The late leader’s remarks attracted attention to woman’s clothing and led to reflections on types of clothing that could meet the Islamic Revolution requirements. The women who did not wear chador wore trousers or socks, and covered their hair by scarf to respect the Islamic dressing code to some extent. Of course, there were some women who kept on their original clothing style without covering their hair.

Up until this time, there was no structured outfit for women, and they dressed just the same way as the men did, with similar variety. There were few exceptions, including certain rituals or ceremonies, where the women’s clothes would be harmonised in one way or another. For instance, on those occasions when women would march with weapons, all would dress uniformly with head scarves and jackets of the same or similar colour and shape. The ends of the head scarf would drape over the chest, or chador was worn.

All in all, it is safe to say that most women wore the ‘revolution outfit’, which was characterised by being plain, long, and loose, free of any flashy colours. It reflected the spirituality which emerged in revolution, and avoided the common attractions attributed to the female clothing styles in the previous regime.

The development in the aesthetics of female clothing styles during the revolutionary transition that can be examined is part about the structures used in these styles, which are strongly influenced by the boundaries of the Islamic dress code. The type of clothes used by women at this time was mainly the same as the old styles: several types of feminine outfits modelled after the European and American fashions, which were common during the Pahlavi’s rule. The choice of outfit for traditional women’s social appearance was chador. Those women who participated the revolutionary rallies and meetings in the heat of the revolution would wear chador or would cover their heads and hair with diverse types of head scarves or wimples. Yet some women would take part in rallies without hijab. After the revolution, too, women’s clothing style, on occasions other than revolution-related meetings, was the same style, using the same clothing items. In other words, since there was no obligation regarding the observation of the Islamic dress code, women would opt for Islamic outfits at their own discretion. The clothing items were not new, but in the context of the revolutionary culture, they came to be used in new combinations inspired by revolutionary values. In other words, a new aesthetic perspective was emerging which belonged to the Islamic traditionalist discourse. In this discourse, the regulations of the dress code were decided by the majority revolutionary groups and were not officially issued. They would gain symbolic power as certain categories of revolutionary clothes would mark the person wearing them as a member of certain groups or parties.

Men would also wear revolutionary clothes, but since the women’s clothes were of particular Islamic features, the female
revolutionary outfit of 1979-1980 was obviously distinct from other categories. The regulations pertaining to this clothing style created aesthetic principles of their own. As we know, beauty is a subjective entity, and can be influenced and changed by several factors. Women’s revolutionary clothes would bring with them a certain type of aesthetics, which was acceptable in accordance with the newly emerging, mainly Islamic mindset and values. Thus, it was collectively accepted, and scores of women would be happy to adopt it.

All in all, the aesthetic aspect of women’s clothes during that period was down to the covering and veiling of the body. This was observed by the women who donned the revolutionary clothes or supported the revolutionary discourse, insomuch as it sometimes breached the aesthetic principles. It must be considered, however, that the heat of the revolution would not in fact call for the time or opportunity for a thought-out change in the structure and model of clothes while considering the aesthetic aspects. Thus, the demanded issues would be put on an agenda, and then put into practice in an equally urgent manner. An example of this was the chador designed and made under the name hijab chador, which was like the ordinary chador, except that it was stitched and sewn on the front side as well and had two openings to let the hands out up to the elbows or wrists. The formal structure of this outfit was nowhere near the visual aesthetics, but it was received and used well since it made possible the practical use of chador as the revolutionary outfit, which in turn reflected commitment to the Islamic practice as a common value.

Also, when it came to tying the head scarves, all that was considered was the issue of coverage around the face, and thus the quality of the formal proportions made were absolutely ignored. In other words, during this course, the aesthetic function of clothes was overshadowed by the symbolic and ideological functions.

In the heat of the revolution, which corresponded a particularly cold winter, the winter coats provided another choice of clothing. Normally long and loose, these common outfits of the winter later inspired the design of another Islamic outfit called Mantou, which was especially meant for female office workers, and gradually came to be accepted and used for public appearance along with chador. Another piece of clothing that was considered as a part of revolutionary attire was the glove. This is yet another example that depicts the symbolic and aesthetic values of the time. Use of gloves, together with sunglasses that further covered the facial beauty like a mask, was the new fashion for some women. At that time, women’s clothes in the metropolitan streets were not meant to add to the structural beauty or to complement their feminine beauty but were the outfits to present the revolutionary character of a woman and highlight her support for the revolutionary forces and the spirit of the revolution.

In the revolutionary discourse, use of chador was not mandatory, so the new
outfit and clothing style were a matter of various interpretations by different authorities. Confusions about the type of clothing style for women which would fit the paradigm of the discourse in question is evident in the regulations and circulars issued, even though they all highlight the necessity of eliminating the dressing style from the previous regime referred to as Taquti (equivalent to ‘tyrannical’). Various government offices and other official entities would define the acceptable dress code for female employees as long-sleeved Mantou, pants, and plain head scarves, bare of accessories which might draw attention to the user, appropriate for the workplace, and distinct from party dresses (Figure 6). Some organisations, such as the former Ministry of Health, gradually started to design their own uniform clothes for the female employees.

CONCLUSIONS

A set of values related to a discourse leads to development of certain principles for clothing style of the social groups related to it. Some of these principles are general rules. For instance, in a religious discourse with an Islamic approach, the principle of conceitedness and concealment is a general clothing rule, while in a non-religious discourse the main principle might be beauty and attractiveness. In the time of Pahlavi I, the state tended to change the women’s clothing based on the Non-Iranian and Non-Islamic patterns, relying on the authoritative power. In the time of Pahlavi II, the state discourse for development of Pahlavi I discourse was inevitable for adopting a cultural approach; because, relying on the authoritative power was proven inefficient in the time of Pahlavi I.

In the Islamic Revolution discourse, the symbolic power of modernity, freedom, and progress in the form of western fashion which was derived from Pahlavi discourse,
was replaced by the symbolic power of chastity and conceitedness in form of the revolutionary clothing, which was influenced by the Islamic Revolution discourse. This symbolic power is still alive, although it has appeared in a variety of forms due to the social and cultural changes that have been taking place for years. This study investigated the transverse discursive currents in clothing style of the Iranian women from 1979 to 1981, which were rooted in the religious, ideological, or aesthetic tendencies of the social groups and led to some controversies. It is a subject that involves Iran’s contemporary cultural society as well, and requires serious investigations. Pahlavi and Islamic Revolution discourses both focused on antagonism to consolidate their approaches towards women’s clothing; but, considering the fact the two-year transient revolutionary period had inherited the women’s clothing culture from the 50-year Pahlavi state, the Islamic Revolution discourse stressed specifically on this antagonism. Therefore, the emphasis on observing the Islamic dressing code by women a few months after the revolution targeted the most the antagonism towards Pahlavi discourse and manifestations of the anti-religion state. At that time, most of the Iranian women observed the Islamic dressing code and liked it. By the way, marginalisation of Pahlavi discourse in women’s clothing, which was still represented by a small part of the Iranian women, made it necessary for Ayatollah Khomeini to point out the necessity of observing the Islamic dressing code by everyone.

There is certainly a close interrelationship between the cultural system and the political system in the field of dominant discourses. In most cases, culture acts beyond politics and covers the realm of power, so that the politics are derived from the culture. For this reason, the political systems of the dominant discourses may cause changes in the cultural approaches and prepare the ground for emergence of new cultural thoughts, but cannot develop or annihilate a culture relying on their power.

We believe that the aesthetics of women’s clothing, having confronted various discursive alternations, and a combination of post-revolutionary negotiations and resistance, led to certain differences in types and levels of covering the body. Although the form of women’s clothing, as a religious code of the Iranian society, remained a function of social-political circumstances after the 1979 revolution, the aesthetics of woman’s clothing was still influenced by numerous cultural, social, economic, and political factors, which are sometimes in line with (negotiation) and sometimes against (resistance) the clothing aesthetic approach of the dominant discourse. Sedghi (2007) refers to the issue of gender for the state and politics and explains how urban women in Iran under different states veiled in the early 1900s, unveiled from 1936 to 1979, and re-veiled after the 1979 Revolution. The studies show that the discursive policies and emphasis on
the antagonism of the Islamic Revolution discourse towards Pahlavi discourse led to a type of homogenisation of the women’s clothing in the post-revolutionary Iran. The Islamic state built itself on the ruins of the old regime, that it succeeded (Sedghi, 2007, p. 276). The revolutionary Islamists in Iran felt that “genuine Iranian cultural identity” had been distorted by Westernization or what they called *gharbzadegi* (a coinage literally suggesting “West-struck” or “Westoxicated”). The unveiled, publicly visible woman was both a reflection of Western attacks on indigenous culture and the medium by which it was affected. Following the policy of homogenising women’s clothing, the differences between the clothing cultures of various ethnic groups were not considered. This was an outcome of disregarding the natural diversity of type and level of clothing in different contexts and different cultural-social grounds. Neglecting the fact that the cultural functions changed the dressing style years after the transient revolutionary period, it led to a kind of turmoil in the dressing system and women’s clothing in Iran, and it is foreseen that it will cause further problems in the future.

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The Methodology for Prioritising Iran’s Social Problems

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ABSTRACT

The primary objective in scientifically examining social problems is preparing the grounds for solving them. One of the essential steps in designing concrete practical measures to address social problems is determining the order of priority between social problems, as social problems are innumerable, while a society’s resources in resolving them are limited. Iranian researchers have made several attempts at prioritising Iran’s social problems. Yet, in addition to being very few, they suffer from several methodological flaws that drastically diminish their credibility. In the article at hand, we will first analyse the key concepts of social problem and methodology. Thereafter, we will examine the various methods and criteria used in the most credible studies available that have attempted to prioritise Iran’s social problems. From this examination and analysis, we have inferred five principal theoretic steps that need to be observed in the prioritisation of social problems so as to ensure the credibility and practical applicability of the article: (1) deciding who determines the priorities, (2) defining a particular theoretic approach, (3) drafting a comprehensive list of prospective social problems, (4) ensuring the homogeneity of the proposed social problems, and (5) defining a clear and distinct criterion for prioritisation.

Keywords: Iran’s social problems, methodology, prioritising, social problems

INTRODUCTION

Social problems have existed since the very beginning of human social existence. With the advent of modernity, however, there has been a drastic escalation in the degree and variety of social problems owing to a wide range of reasons, including epistemic
transformations, social upheavals, and demographic shifts. In response to this escalating trend, social scientists have made it their primary concern to study and address these problems (Moidfar, 2008, p. 11). Social issues partake of certain qualities and features that prevent scientific research regarding them from ever reaching the point of exhaustion; their volume and variety continues to increase rather than decrease. Some of these qualities and features are as follows.

(1) In most societies, social problems are always growing. We would be hard-pressed to locate a society that has succeeded in eliminating or even reducing its social problems.

(2) Social problems tend to expand, constantly encroaching on new areas of social life.

Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the capacity of human societies in addressing and resolving social problems is limited. It is nearly impossible to expect that societies should be able to find the theoretical solutions to social problems, translate these solutions into practical measures, and implement them while keeping pace as the problems emerge and develop. Furthermore, another factor to keep in mind is the order governing the relations of the theoretical solutions and the consequent practical measures to one another. The theoretic engagement in scientific endeavours to find the solution to some problems can pave the way for finding the solution to further problems, just as implementing the solutions to and eliminating some problems can potentially lead to the practical resolution of other social problems or at least to a reduction of their intensity. Considering these two factors—the disparity between the rapidity with which social problems develop and the pace at which societies can address them, on the one hand, and the different sequence of relations that hold between social problems and their solutions, on the other—in addition to the aforementioned qualities and features of social problems help us better understand the critical importance of prioritising social problems and determining the appropriate order in which they must be addressed.

The study of the social problems of Iran—a country with a rich history and a dynamic and vibrant culture—naturally faces the same challenges highlighted above. Additionally, however, two key facts render an examination of Iran’s social problems even more difficult. The first is that until a decade or two ago, compared to political and economic problems, social problems received very little attention in Iran. Second, once social problems rose to the same level of prominence as that of political and economic problems, they faced yet another obstacle, which was the fact that the methods
used to deal with them suffered from serious problems, in theoretical investigation as well as in practical implementation. One problem, in both theory and implementation, relates to determining the order of priority between social problems, compounded by a chronic failure to duly acknowledge the strong relation that ties them together. In conducting theoretical examinations and in implementing the practical measures intended to address social problems, little concern has been given to prioritising them, and when there has been some level of prioritisation, the criteria and factors used have lacked sufficient comprehensiveness. Furthermore, there has been a persistent failure to realise that social problems are inextricably interrelated and that there is more than one way in which two social problems can be interconnected. These two general shortcomings about the theoretical examination of social problems and the practical measures taken to address them have severely impaired and limited their effectiveness.

The available studies on social problems in Iran can be grouped into two general categories. One category comprises studies that scrutinise one or more social issues in a descriptive or explanatory methodology and offer solutions for them. The second category consists of studies that conceptually analyse a social problem and consider how it can be addressed. The latter studies are generally considered to precede the former studies. Studies of social problems in Iran generally fall into the first category. The present study, however, belongs to the second category. What we seek in this article is specifically to study the methodologies underlying the available prioritisations of social problems in Iran so that by comparing and contrasting the relative advantages and disadvantages of each, we may arrive at a better understanding of the most appropriate method in prioritising the social problems in Iran. With the better understanding, we can hope to solve these problems. The better understanding is first step to solve them.

To this end, we will analyse the meaning of social problem and methodology, look at the available prioritisations of social problems in Iran, and scrutinise the criteria and factors underpinning these prioritisations, enumerating their comparative pros and cons. We will then present five steps that we perceive as essential to any study that aims to prioritise Iran’s social problems.

**Research Background**

In this section, it is provided an overview of the studies that have attempted to prioritise Iran’s social problems in table format to simplify.
Table 1
An overview of the studies that have attempted to prioritise Iran's social problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year Conducted</th>
<th>Statistical Population</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owlawiyatbandi asibha wa masa’el ejtema’i dar iran (“Prioritisation of Social Problems and Issues in Iran”)</td>
<td>Motamedi (2007)</td>
<td>1385 AHS [2007]</td>
<td>823 individuals – managers and other employees of Iran’s State Welfare Organisation (Sazman Behzisti)</td>
<td>Delphi (three rounds)</td>
<td>Most important: joblessness, opioid addiction</td>
<td>Least important: homelessness, widowhood</td>
<td>Social problems and issues; family-related issues; other issues and problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arzeshha wa negareshhaye iranian (“The Values and Views of Iranians”)</td>
<td>The Office of National Projects, The Ministry of Culture, and Islamic Guidance</td>
<td>1381 AHS [2002] (second wave)</td>
<td>Individuals over 15 years of age in 28 capitals of provinces</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Most important: economic issues, joblessness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’ammoli jame’eshenakhti dar tashkhis wa ta’yn owlawiyat masa’el ejtema’i iran (“A Sociologic Reflection Aimed at Identifying and Determining the Priority of Iran’s Social Issues”)</td>
<td>Yasefi &amp; Akbari (2011)</td>
<td>1390 AHS [2011]</td>
<td>Four national surveys</td>
<td>Secondary analysis</td>
<td>Most important: economic issues, social issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owlawiyatbandi masa’el ejtema’i wa farhangi ostan esfahan (“Prioritising the Social and Cultural Issues of the Province of Isfahan”)</td>
<td>Esmali (2005)</td>
<td>1384 AHS [2005]</td>
<td>The municipalities of the Province of Isfahan</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Most important: joblessness, opioid addiction</td>
<td>Least important: environmental problems, problems arising from inadequate social education</td>
<td>Social issues, cultural issues, political issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Conceptual Definition

Methodology

The terms *method* and *methodology* are often used interchangeably, and this is a very unfortunate mistake (Blaikie, 2000, p. 8). As defined by Blaikie, *method* consists in the techniques used for gathering and analysing data. *Methodology*, on the other hand, refers to discussions of how research is done, or should be done, and to the critical analysis of methods of research. Methodology also deals with logics of enquiry, of how new knowledge is generated and justified...

Methodology includes a critical evaluation of alternative research strategies and methods. (Blaikie, 2000, pp. 8-9).

Giddens accepts research methods as real techniques used to study social life (Giddens, 1993, p. 676), but he defines methodology as the study of logical questions relating to research (p. 679).

Therefore, it would be correct to describe methodology as a second-order knowledge that reflects on another piece of knowledge, which means that methodology is logically subsequent to method. There is no discipline, no science, no research that is devoid of method. After the fact, once the scientific research and investigation has been undertaken, the method that the researcher utilised in the process and the path that he traversed is re-examined and reflected upon, and it is this re-examination and reflection that constitutes methodology. As such, methodology is the observation of the ways in which a research is produced (Jawid, 2012, p. 8). That, therefore, is what this article is about. The available research projects that have been done on determining the order of priority among social problems presuppose various factors and criteria and proceed via different *methods* in pursuing their subject of research. This article aims to critically evaluate the methods pursued in these research projects, and so this article is a methodological investigation in the proper sense of the term.

Social Problem

As pointed out in the introduction, the current state of research on social problems in Iran suffers from two shortcomings: one, lack of due consideration of their order of priority, and two, a chronic disregard for the fact that social problems are often interrelated in many ways, theoretically as well as practically. In addition to these two shortcomings, the available prioritisations are plagued by some fundamental flaws, and it is precisely these methodological flaws that we intend to examine in the present article. Considering the aforementioned flaws and shortcomings, there are two primary reasons that compel us to consider—here and in the process of our methodological examination of the available prioritisations—the definition of social problem. Prior to specifying these two reasons, however, it is worth mentioning that the existing definitions of social problem are of one of two kinds: they are either general definitions or definitions arising from specific theoretical standpoints.

The first reason that inclines us to examine the meaning of social problem
relates to the difficulty that is caused by neglecting the importance of prioritisation. In many general definitions of social problem, one particular feature is highlighted despite the wide-ranging differences, which is “to motivate people to eliminate the problem” (Crone, 2011, p. 1; Loseke, 2017, pp. 6-7). The motivation to eliminate social problems ipso facto leads to the subject of prioritisation, as there are naturally many problems in every society, not all of which can be eliminated simultaneously. As such, people, generally, and a society’s leaders, specifically, are bound to prioritise their social problems with recourse to clear criteria to be able to meaningfully strive to eliminate them. Thus, the need for prioritising social problems is included within and highlighted by the general definitions of social problem.

The second reason for analysing the definition of social problem is related to the flaws of the available prioritisations. Prioritising social problems naturally begins with preparing a list of the problems. To prepare a list, we must first identify the problems, which in turn requires that we have a clear definition of what a social problem is. Identifying actual problems is impracticable without being in possession of a clear definition. Thus, the first step in any attempt at prioritising social problems is to offer a clear and distinct definition of what a social problem is. One of the fundamental problems that bedevil the research projects that attempt to prioritise Iran’s social problems is their inherent ambiguity concerning what a social problem is.

We will now briefly consider several definitions informed by different approaches concerning what constitutes a social problem, and, by comparing and contrasting them and showing how their differences affect the process of identifying social problems, we will demonstrate how each of these definitions impacts how we prioritise social problems (For the seven definitions of social problem, which stem from seven different approaches, we draw on The Study of Social Problems: Seven Perspectives by Earl Rubington and Martin Weinberg (2003)).
Table 2
Comparing the various definitions of social problem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social pathology</td>
<td>Flouting moral expectation</td>
<td>Failure in socialisation</td>
<td>Social environment (technology, etc.)</td>
<td>Becoming devoid of human traits</td>
<td>Reforming the failing institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social disorganisation</td>
<td>Failure of laws and regulations</td>
<td>Social change</td>
<td>Dissolution of the circumstances contributive to dynamic equilibrium</td>
<td>Change in system and individuals</td>
<td>Restoring the parts of the system to equilibrium following diagnosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value conflict</td>
<td>Opposition to values of certain groups</td>
<td>Conflict of values and interests</td>
<td>Intergroup conflict and competition</td>
<td>Jeopardising greater values, making values more transparent</td>
<td>Agreement, compromise, force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>Becoming disenchanted with the prevalent norms</td>
<td>Inappropriate socialisation</td>
<td>Increase in opportunities to learn ways of deviation</td>
<td>Founding deviant societies</td>
<td>Increase in primary group’s contact with patterns of deviant behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labelling Theory</td>
<td>Social reaction to alleged violations</td>
<td>Concern on the part of people or elements of social control about the subject</td>
<td>The labeller’s benefitting from the resultant environment</td>
<td>Intensification of deviation</td>
<td>Revising the definitions, eliminating the benefits consequent on labelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Theory</td>
<td>The state consequent on the enslavement of the working class</td>
<td>Class domination</td>
<td>Scope of domination, class consciousness and conflict</td>
<td>Increase in crime rate</td>
<td>Political activity for bringing about reform or revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social constructionism</td>
<td>Fluid and problematic cultural circumstances</td>
<td>Efforts by people to compensate for their dissatisfaction</td>
<td>Process of interaction between accuser and accused</td>
<td>Indeterminable and fluid</td>
<td>Researcher’s attention throughout the process of definition to reconstruct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The aim in specifying these various approaches to defining social problem is to demonstrate the fundamental impact that one’s approach has on the proffered definition and, in turn, the latter’s fundamental impact on identifying social problems. To shed more light on this, we will compare two approaches along with their suggested definitions. We will take the pathological and the constructionist approaches as two samples. According to the social pathology approach, society is an organism that can be considered healthy when it properly performs its functions. Desirable social behaviours indicate that the society is in good health, and undesirable behaviours signal its disease. In this light, a social problem consists of the act of defying society’s moral expectations, and the main cause for the occurrence of this disease in society is an individual’s failure in socialising. The constructionist account, however, of the definition of social problem and its cause is drastically different. This approach views a social problem, regardless of what is taking place in a society, as that which the people of a society identify and define as a social problem. Whether there is an objective circumstance that may or may not exist in society, and may or may not have caused a certain conception of a social problem to take shape in the minds of the people, is irrelevant to how a social problem is defined. The pathological approach is strongly attentive to objectivity, whereas the constructionist approach has little concern for objectivity. The key point to bear in mind here is that depending on which definition we side with, the social problems we identify will look very different. As such, failure to acknowledge the significance of how we conceptualise social problems will undoubtedly impair our attempt at prioritising them and will distort the results we seek to obtain because of such prioritisation. There are ample samples of such distortion in the available research projects that have sought to prioritise Iran’s social problems.

Research Method

There are a variety of ways in which we can define our method of research. From the viewpoint of the variable of setting, this is a library research. From the viewpoint of data material, it is a qualitative research. From the viewpoint of the object variable, it is a theoretic foundational research. In terms of its substance, it is exploratory-descriptive. The method of data collection used in this article is content analysis. The instrument employed in data collection is cataloguing (For an explanation of terms, see Jawid, 2012, pp. 85-98). For our critical evaluation of the methods used in research projects concerned with identifying social problems in Iran, it has been our sincere intention to reconstruct the internal logic of the criticised
material and to truly penetrate the meaning intended by the authors. Naturally, however, the interference of the writers’ personal convictions and biases cannot be entirely ruled out, but we have tried our best.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

**A Critical Analysis of the Available Prioritisations of Iran’s Social Problems**

In “Owlaviyyathandi asibha wa masa’el ejtema’i dar iran” (which would translate as “Prioritisation of Social Problems and Issues in Iran”), Hadi Motamedi (2007) takes the views of the officials and the employees of Iran’s State Welfare Organisation as the basis in determining the order of priority of Iran’s social problems. After two rounds, he presents a list of social problems in Iran and then goes on to determine which problems have priority. He divides social problems into three classes: social problems, family-related problems, and miscellaneous problems. He attempts to prove that the social phenomena he points to are in fact social problems by citing their frequency in the body of statistical data that he presents.

There are several severely damning points that we can elaborate in our critique of this study.

1. Quantity and frequency are inadequate measures for proving the validity of a thesis. Solid theoretic grounds—including, among others, a clear and technical definition of what a social problem is—are required for this purpose.

2. Should a researcher deem it appropriate to presuppose frequency as the criterion for identifying a social phenomenon as a problem, he must unambiguously assert this, rather than merely touching on it in passing and amid an overwhelming volume of explanations and data that can only be confusing to the reader.

3. In order to statistically demonstrate that a purported social problem is in fact a social problem, the researcher must have access to a sufficient statistical database. In the research in question, the researcher lacks such a sufficient database, and the statistical resources that he has at his disposal are insufficient in proving that the social phenomena he cites are in fact constitutive of social problems.

4. The research fails to offer a clear definition of what constitutes a social problem, and the researcher fails to identify any approach as underpinning the research. For this reason, in addition to the fact that it is unclear whether the cited phenomena are social problems, the relations between the purported social problems are not at all clear, and therefore it is difficult to pass judgment as to whether they are in fact social problems or not.
(5) Due to the fact that the presented list of problems was obtained “in various meetings with experts in the form of brainstorming sessions” (Motamedi 2007, p. 337), the list can in no way be considered exhaustive.

(6) The problems listed in this study are not consistent and congruous. The researcher fails to distinguish between subjective problems and objective problems, major problems and minor problems, and general problems and particular problems. For instance, the problem of runaway girls is placed alongside joblessness, dropping out of school, and such overarching rubrics as youth problems, unstable families, and prisoners. Such indiscriminate assortment of social problems renders a meaningful comparison of these problems impossible.

(7) Many of the cited problems are grossly overlapping, such as running away from home and runaway girls.

(8) The presented classification lacks any logical theoretic pattern as its basis. This is evident in the juxtaposition of social problems and family problems, which is not supported by any sound theoretic or technical justification. Even worse is the class of “miscellaneous problems”, which is devoid of any substantive meaning and content and thus cannot be assigned any true value, and as such one cannot arrive at any results by comparing it to its two counterparts.

(9) The respondents offer orders of priority solely based on their distinctive personal views and opinions without there being a shared understanding as to common criteria for prioritisation. Considering the stated objective, this flaw alone suffices to undermine the credibility and validity of the research.

Ali Yusefi and Hoseyn Akbari (2011) base their research article entitled “Ta’ammoli jame’eh shenakhti dar tashkhis wa ta’yin owlawiyyat masa’el ejtema’i iran” (which would translate as “A Sociological Reflection Aimed at Identifying and Determining the Order of Priority of Iran’s Social Issues”) on a secondary analysis of two available surveys: (1) a three-wave survey entitled “Arzeshha wa negareshhaye iranian” (which would translate as “Values and Outlooks of Iranians”) that determines how the Iranian people prioritise social problems and (2) another survey documenting how the Iranian elite, government officials, and the intelligentsia, view and prioritise social problems. The two researchers adopt the constructionist approach in defining social problems, and they clearly indicate this choice: “In the constructionist approach,
identifying and prioritising social problems is done either by a considerable number of ordinary people or by a number of prominent figures. Both classes (the people and the elite) play a significant role in shaping, identifying, and prioritising social issues” (Yusefi & Akbari, 2011, p. 207).

Several notable points may be specified by way of critiquing this study.

(1) The theoretic approach of the study is inconsistent with the practical method that the authors pursue. How can one expect to arrive at the subjective constructs of the people, the officials, or the intelligentsia by means of a questionnaire comprising of closed-ended questions?

(2) The problems cited in this study, like the previous study, lack congruity and consistency. Such disparate problems as dearth of cultural centres, theft, and tenancy are grouped together, and in the final analysis these problems are placed side by side with such general rubrics as the problem of democracy, social problems, and defining religious role models.

(3) The authors of this article fail to demonstrate how the cited problems correspond to the theoretic definition and approach purportedly undergirding their research.

(4) The criteria used in determining the order of priority of social problems remains unclear and undefined.

(5) When there is no clear criterion for prioritising, it would lend greater credibility to the survey if there is more homogeneity among the respondents. This, unfortunately, is not the case regarding the study in question. The respondents of the basic study—the three national surveys that serve as the basis on which the study in question relies—are random individuals from various towns, villages, and regions, who may, depending on their peculiar living conditions, have distinct criteria and factors in mind for the prioritisations they suggest.

(6) In addition to geographic dispersion, the lack of a unifying timeframe diminishes the credibility of the study even further. For example, the inhabitants of villages in the three national surveys have offered their responses at different timeframes, while it is genuinely possible that the national and regional circumstances may have undergone some change in the different timeframes in which the surveys were conducted, and this exacerbates the aforementioned problem of geographic discontinuity.
“Moshkelat ejtema‘i dar owlawiyat iran” (which would translate as “Social Problems of Priority in Iran”) by Hasan Rafiyee and Saeed Madani is presumably the most credible of the available studies. It was conducted in accordance with the Delphi method and in four rounds. In the first round, the authors presented their definition of social problem to the panel of experts. The presupposed definition of social problem in this study is that ratified by the High Council of Social Welfare and Security:

A social problem is an undesirable social phenomenon that adversely impacts quality of life and the most significant values agreed upon by the [Iranian] society and that, due to its harmful social causes or consequences, requires social intervention to be rectified, mitigated, or contained (Rafiyee & Madani, 2008, p. 197).

In the second round, with the help of the experts, they devised two separate lists, one of the proposed social problems and the other of the proposed criteria. By criteria, they mean “the rules or criteria for identifying the social problems that partake of a higher priority insofar as social planning and intervention are concerned” (ibid). After proposing and settling on the agreed-upon list of social problems and prioritising criteria, they prioritised the social problems following the matrix model. The experts on the Delphi panel were selected purposefully rather than randomly from among individuals with at least one of two characteristics:

1. Having written an article or a book or conducted a research project related to the study subject, or
2. Having professional experience pertinent to the study subject or administrative experience in a government or nongovernment organisation involved in work related to the study subject (Rafiyee & Madani, 2008, p. 195).

In other words, two groups of experts have participated in determining the order of priority: academic professionals and experienced administrators.

Three critiques come to mind in relation to this study.

(1) One shortcoming in this study is its sole reliance on the opinions of the experts in drafting the primary list of social problems instead of providing the experts with a comprehensive and accurate list as a tentative list they could work from, which makes it possible that the experts may have missed some important social problems. A case in
point is that based on the definition presented in more traditional works in the field of social issues and problems in Iran, such prevalent habits as lying and flattering may have been added to the list, but they were left out presumably since the experts were not working from a tentatively drafted comprehensive list.

(2) Some of the listed problems—such as joblessness and joblessness of the educated class—overlap.

(3) The problems grouped together lack compatibility and congruity. Objective problems—such as joblessness—are listed next to such subjective problems as lack of social confidence and declining social capital. The list juxtaposes such non-legal problems as malnutrition and traffic congestion with such large-scale legal problems as organised crime.

This study is relatively successful in defining social problems and in identifying them considering its proposed definition, and it can also be considered successful in setting forth and consistently implementing clear and distinct criteria for prioritisation. That which detracts from the credibility of this study more than anything else is the inconsistency pervading the social problems it enumerates, and this inconsistency naturally harms the accuracy of the order of priority that it posits, for in the process of prioritisation it compares problems that are not genuinely comparable and that cannot, correctly speaking, be considered rivals competing at the same level. The various social problems that this study lists should be assigned to different arenas and their order of priority examined in their respective arenas, and it is only when we view them from this perspective that we can properly devise and carry out plans to satisfactorily address them.

The above three articles critiqued, are as far as we will go in this article by way of examining the conducted studies of social problems in Iran. We cannot cover all the conducted studies, for we are constrained by the limited size of this article and some of the conducted studies are unavailable. Several the conducted studies were commissioned by governmental or private organisations that have refrained from publishing their studies, and so these studies are inaccessible. Furthermore, several the available studies are either regional in scope, and thus do not cover all of Iran, or lack even the minimal standards of professionalism and acceptability. Yet, in order that our readers should have at least a general idea of these studies, we offer a cursory evaluation in the following chart.
Table 3

_A cursory evaluation of conducted prioritisations of Iran's social problems_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Whose views provide the basis of prioritisation?</th>
<th>Does the author identify an approach in defining social problem?</th>
<th>Does the study present a comprehensive list of social problems?</th>
<th>Are the suggested social problems congruous?</th>
<th>Are the criteria for prioritisation clearly and distinctly defined?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owlawiyyatbandi asibha wa masa’el ejtema’i dar iran (“Prioritisation of Social Problems and Issues in Iran”)</td>
<td>Hadi Motamedi, Government officials</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moshkelat ejtema’i dar owlawiyyat iran (“Social Problems of Priority in Iran”)</td>
<td>Hasan Rafifye, Saeed Madani, Administrators and experts</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arzeshha wa negareshhaye iranian (“The Values and Views of Iranians”)</td>
<td>The Office of National Projects, The Ministry of Culture, and Islamic Guidance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arzeshha wa negareshhaye iranian (“The Values and Views of Iranians”)</td>
<td>The Office of National Projects, The Ministry of Culture, and Islamic Guidance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’ammoli jame’eshenakhti dar tashkhis wa ta’yin owlawiyyat masa’el ejtema’i iran (“A Sociologic Reflection Aimed at Identifying and Determining the Priority of Iran’s Social Issues”)</td>
<td>Ali Yusefi, Hoseyn Akbari, General public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mas’aleh shenasi wa owlawiyyatbandi asibha wa masa’el farhangi (mowed motale’eh: ostan ilam) (“Identifying Problems and Prioritising Social Harms and Cultural Problems (Subjeqt of Study: ÏlÁm Province”)</td>
<td>Khalil Kamarbeysi, Mojtaba Rashidi, Administrators and experts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owlawiyyatbandi asibhaye ejtema’i dar shahr waramin (“Prioritising Social Problems in the City of Varamin”)</td>
<td>Maedeh Qorashi, Nasim Nematzadeh, Arefeh Hasani, General public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Five Proposed Steps Essential to a Credible and Effective Prioritisation of Social Problems

1. Deciding Who Determines the Priorities

The first step in the process of prioritising social problems is determining the objective sought by the prioritisation, and the objective is determined by those undertaking the prioritisation: the various groups of people who bring their preconceptions and their experiences—as products of their social, economic, and cultural standing—to bear on what social phenomena they identify as social problems and how they arrange them in order of priority. In the various research studies conducted in Iran, the researchers have sought out different target groups. Some of these studies distinguish three target groups: the general public, the officials and administrators, and the experts. These studies also indicate the order of priority preferred by each target group (Mohammadi, 2001; Table 1). These studies highlight a very important point, and that is the noticeable difference between the prioritisations each of these three groups proposes.

Now, as already mentioned, one of the essential factors that compel us to prioritise social problems is the need to take practical measures to resolve these problems. As the subject of this study is a methodological examination of the conducted prioritisations, we are compelled to inquire concerning the following question: To what extent can we rely on the different prioritisations offered by these three target groups in drafting a comprehensive plan to address, in a national capacity, Iran’s social problems? Put differently, each of these groups regards society from its own distinct perspective and in line with its own peculiar outlook, and it is in light of this distinct perspective and peculiar outlook that the members of these groups identify and prioritise social problems. It would seem then that relying solely on one of these three groups for identifying and prioritising social problems would seriously undermine the practical results that we seek from any given study. Serious problems can result if, for instance, we decide to identify social problems based exclusively on public opinion. One possible problem is that studies that rely solely on public opinion tend to overlook the problems and priorities of the minorities. If our identification of social problems is directed only by the most general expectations and opinions of the general public, there is a good chance that we will fail to notice the special needs of such minorities as people with physical disabilities or impairments. Another possible problem is that relying solely on the opinion of the general public tends to distort social studies and administrative plans and causes them to lose sight of “the existing social order,” for, generally speaking, macrostructures tend to remain hidden to the general public, which is more inclined to see the objective, the particular, and the behavioural and is less likely to discern the macrostructures. Therefore, in their attempt to define, identify, and prioritise the
problems of a society as vast as a country, they must bear in mind that their study must take the vastness of the administrative task into consideration and thus include the input of all social groups in Iran so as to ensure comprehensiveness.

2. Defining a Particular Theoretic Approach

The second step in the process of prioritising social problems is defining what a social problem is. Our definition of social problem is in large part determined by the theoretic approach governing our study. A very frequent problem that plagues most of the studies that attempt to prioritise Iran’s social problems is the failure to clearly indicate the adopted approach. Without a clearly specified approach, it is impossible to have a definition, and without a definition, any attempt at identifying social problems would result in failure, for in the absence of a clear definition of social problem, the researchers and the participants lack a clear criterion for determining which social phenomena are problems and which are not. Furthermore, without first drafting a list of potential social problems, it would be a waste of time to embark on prioritising them. As shown above, a number of the studies conducted in Iran fail to offer a clear definition of social problem and, consequently, they identify and prioritise social problems based on personal and subjective views.

In addition to the importance of the adopted theoretic approach for defining social problems and the importance of the definition for the process of identifying social problems, it is critical to be mindful of the close connection that binds the first and second steps in the process of prioritisation. To arrive at a correct order of priority of social problems, the adopted theoretic approach and the defined objectives of a study must correspond. When two researchers or two organisations embark on prioritising social problems for entirely different objectives, the respective approach they choose must be consistent with their objectives, and so they cannot necessarily adopt the same approach. As an example, the mayor’s office and the judicial branch of the national government are charged with entirely different duties and responsibilities in the Iranian society. Yet, both are in some way responsible for social problems, and so in this respect they share a common sphere of activity while also shouldering clearly distinct functions. Thus, it is only natural that if these two government entities commission studies to identify and prioritise social problems to use the results in improving their effectiveness, they are pursuing different objectives and are searching for different sets of problems, for their responsibilities and functions are different. Thus, owing to their disparate functions, they seek different social problems, and this difference in the choice of social problems is the result of differing definitions, and this difference in definition, in turn, is the result of adopting different theoretic approaches (it is worth noting that different approaches inevitably produce different definitions, but it is not necessarily true that having the same approach will yield the same definition.).
As such, a very important point that must be taken into consideration in selecting a method for prioritising social problems is the correspondence between a study’s objectives and its approach. If a researcher fails to bear this key point in mind, the results that his or her study produces may not translate into practical measures that can realise the objectives for the sake of which he or she conducted the study in the first place.

3. Drafting a Comprehensive List of Possible Social Problems

The third step in prioritising social problems is drafting a list of social problems in view of the chosen definition. At this stage, there are two important methodological points that need to be observed. The first point is that it is crucial that the drafted list of social problems be exhaustive, and the failure to ensure the exhaustiveness of the list will have a direct impact on the prioritisation process. It is on the basis of this list that social problems are prioritised, and this means that if this list is not exhaustive, the credibility of the consequent prioritisation of social problems will be undermined considerably. For, the absence of even a few important social problems on this list will mean that they will not be included in the order of priority, and this methodological flaw will then carry over and become evident in the practical stage when the results of the prioritisation are put into practice. To succeed in satisfactorily preparing such an exhaustive list, the researcher, in addition to adopting the right theoretic approach and the appropriate definition to correctly identify social problems, must be careful to choose a method that is most effective in diminishing the possibility of missing any social problems. For instance, it would be insufficient to base our list of prospective social problems on, as seen in some of the conducted studies, surveys of limited groups of people or the brainstorming of some individuals, and then use this list in prioritising social problems, which will in turn be utilised in establishing practical policies to implement in addressing social problems.

The second point is that the researcher, having given his chosen definition of social problem and having identified social problems in light of the chosen definition, must demonstrate that the social problems he has identified are in fact social problems. What takes place in this process is that in light of his chosen definition, which develops out of the adopted theoretic approach, the researcher comes up with a certain criterion that he then uses in designating certain social phenomena as social problems. It is very natural to expect that the researcher ought to clearly delineate his reasons for identifying the particular set of problems that he has identified so as to allow those reading his study to know on what basis he has made his choices and to possibly engage in a meaningful critique of his methods.
4. Ensuring the Homogeneity of the Proposed Social Problems

The next key point that a researcher must bear in mind, after drafting an exhaustive list of prospective social problems based on his chosen definition and in light of his theoretic approach, is to make sure that the problems on this list are homogeneous. This homogeneity requirement is dictated by a clear logical principle. To legitimately compare two discrete phenomena, they must be consistent and congruous so as to be logically comparable, for if two things lack logical comparability, we cannot legitimately make judgments based on their juxtaposition. It would be a mistake, for example, to place social problems pertaining to subjective and cultural matters next to those concerned with objective matters or to compare large-scale and structural problems with small-scale problems and then proceed to prioritise them. The distinct groups of social problems must be homogeneously categorised in view of their proper scope and prioritised within the context of their specific scope. To indiscriminately list all the incongruous social problems together would definitely preclude a meaningful study that would result in effective practical measures. How can we meaningfully compare the weak work ethic in Iran with the problem of runaway girls and prioritise between the two? They are fundamentally two incongruous problems that are incomparable.

The crucial methodological point that any study must take into consideration is to ensure the congruity and consistency of the studied problems, in the absence of which no sound comparison or conclusion can be drawn, and so to ignore this crucial point would drastically diminish the credibility of the study.

One of the ways in which the failure to observe consistency and congruity in the prepared list of social problems based on clear and logical categorisations (by incorporating, for instance, such distinctions as subjective vs. objective, material vs. cultural, small-scale vs. large-scale) can distort the results of the study is that the less noticed but still very important problems tend to be eclipsed and side-lined by the more visible social problems, whose degree of importance is not necessarily any more than the former. For instance, the absence of the cultural tendency to honour the law is sure to be overshadowed by such salient social problems as joblessness, poverty, opioid addiction, government corruption, and divorce. Due to this methodological flaw, the role of the researchers or study participants who are responsible for the prioritisation takes on an increased importance compared to a situation in which the right methods are used, for they—working from their personal experiences and preconceptions—tend to give greater priority to those social problems with which they are more intimately engaged, unaware that many of the problems they have considered are not even comparable as they pertain to widely different domains.

In the process of prioritising social problems, ensuring the consistency and congruity of the social problems under consideration functions as the crucial link
that connects the third step—preparing an exhaustive list of prospective social problems—with the last step, which is the actual prioritisation of social problems is critical. Without this crucial link, even if the first three steps of the prioritisation process are executed flawlessly, the entire process would be jeopardised, thus fundamentally undermining the legitimacy of the results of the prioritisation.

5. Defining a Clear and Distinct Criterion for Prioritisation

The fifth and final step in the process of prioritising social problems is determining a clear and distinct prioritising criterion. One of the more impactful and frequent errors that occur in the available prioritisations of Iran’s social problems is the absence of a clear and distinct prioritising criterion. The importance of heeding this condition is logically obvious. When faced with a prioritised order, the first question that may arise is what criterion underlies the prioritisation. A study that cannot answer this very preliminary question clearly suffers from a fundamental methodological error. Of course, there need not be only one criterion. It is possible to apply multiple methods and then feed all methods into a matrix diagram to arrive at one uniform order of priority. The key point is to define one or more criteria and to consistently and meticulously apply them in the prioritisation process.

There are numerous criteria that can be utilised in prioritising social problems. The extent of a problem’s reach, the severity of its harm, and the degree of its social impact are a few examples of possible criteria. If we choose to work with the extent criterion, it is essential to have comprehensive and accurate statistical data of the target society in order to determine the extent of every social problem’s reach to thereby prioritise social problems. If we instead opt for the severity criterion, the social problems that cause the greatest and most irreparable injury will take precedence. As such, homicide, fatal accidents, and other such injuries that result in loss of life will occupy the very top of the order of priority. The social impact degree criterion is analogous in meaning to Durkheim’s definition of crime as an offence to the society’s “collective conscience.” Certain social problems—such as rape and paedophilia—strongly affect the society’s sentiments, and so naturally people expect a swift and severe punishment for the perpetrators. Now, when considering which of these criteria one should use in the process of prioritisation, the researcher must take several factors into consideration. Arguably, the most determining factors are the objectives of the study and its theoretic approach. Yet, determining our research criteria is always a complex issue and therefore cannot be simplified in the form of universal formulas. We cannot, for instance, say that whoever takes such-and-such approach in defining social problems must by extension adopt such-and-such criterion in prioritising social problems.

A very critical flaw affecting the available prioritisations of social problems in Iran, to which an allusion was made in
the introduction, is neglecting the web of interconnections between social problems. A very helpful criterion for use in a study of the order of priority that is meant to serve as the basis for a comprehensive plan to address a country’s social problems is the degree to which a problem can impact other social problems. Taking this criterion into consideration can considerably increase a plan’s efficiency and efficacy in combatting social problems. For example, a very prominent social problem in Iran that merits a top place in the order of priority of social problems in view of many criteria is the high volume of motor vehicle crimes and road accidents. It is a problem that entails a host of other social problems: from the bankruptcy of Iran’s insurance industry, to the excessive rate of fatalities, and to numerous emotional, psychological, and behavioural problems from which families suffer as a result of losing one or both parents. Neglecting the web of interconnections that exists between these problems, government officials and administrators tackle the motor vehicle problem with a one-dimensional approach: they considerably raise the monetary value of traffic fines every year and expand the amount of inner- and inter-city roads monitored by traffic cameras in the hope of reducing motor vehicle crimes and accidents. A more holistic approach, however, would be to acknowledge the often multi-pronged interconnections of social problems, to prioritise social problems in view of this criterion, and to thereby address the loaded problem of motor-vehicle-related crimes and accidents in a more fundamental and long-term fashion by laying emphasis on and devising plans to strengthen the social sense of respect for law, a key cultural factor that can help in reducing many crimes and resolving many other social problems.

CONCLUSION

Vigorous attempts are being made in Iran to fundamentally and scientifically address the existing social problems. To succeed in these attempts, there needs to be a fundamental re-evaluation in conducting the studies dealing with social problems. Simply addressing one or more social problems will not go a long way in resolving social problems. The sociological studies that are conducted to this end must aim to shed light on the conceptual interconnections of social problems. One of the best ways in which this can be achieved is studying the order of priority between social problems.

In examining the research that has been conducted in Iran so far, we considered seven studies concerned with the prioritisation of social problems in Iran, three of which we analysed in depth. What our analysis showed was that the available studies are, for the most part, methodologically flawed, and this greatly diminishes the credibility of their prioritisations and undermines their conclusions.

After examining the available studies of social problems in Iran, we presented five key methodological points that are critical in ensuring the integrity and credibility of any study that aims to prioritise social problems. These five are, in summary, as follows. (1) It is important to bear in
mind that depending on the social group we consult in determining the order of priority of social problems, we will arrive at different results. Furthermore, if we wish to survey the views of all the three main groups of people—general public, academic experts, public administrators—there are certain methodological requirements that ought to be observed. (2) Due to the existence of drastically different approaches to social problems and the separate ways in which they impact our identification and prioritisation of social problems, it is crucial to define a specific approach according to which we carry out our prioritisation of social problems. Neglecting this key point will obviously result in theoretical flaws that will show themselves in the practical results that we wish to draw from our study. (3) A comparison between social problems to determine their order of priority is incomplete and ineffective if done without first drafting an exhaustive list of all prospective social problems in view of the approach adopted in the above-mentioned second point. Once we have such a list, we can then legitimately embark on prioritising the social problems by comparing all or, where sanctioned by a sound logic, a selected number of them. (4) Examining and prioritising social problems without first ensuring that the social problems under consideration are consistent and congruous can potentially lead to a lopsided and inconsistent prioritisation. When the social problems being considered are made consistent and congruous, the results are more accurately distinguished, more logically cogent, and more practically efficacious. (5) For an effective and sound prioritisation, it is necessary to work on the basis of a carefully defined criterion, for various criteria produce various results, and the absence of a determinate criterion will render the conclusions of our study unreliable.

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Women’s Access to Family Justice in Iran: Exploring the Main Barriers

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ABSTRACT

Access to justice as a procedure and practice-based concept is defined as the capacity of people to access judicial organisations and institutions. While having the problem of access to justice is ordinary among different groups of people, women may be affected more frequently for accessing these institutions and organisations, as they have to overcome many socio-political, economic, and structural barriers that reinforce this inaccessibility. This article emphasizes on women’s access to family justice in Iran. It explores the perspective of women who have experienced Iran’s judiciary system in terms of divorce, custody, dowry, and alimony in the family court. The data were collected through the women referring to the family courts, and data analysis was conducted based on thematic framework. The participants acknowledged low levels of legal awareness, feminisation of poverty, and low self-esteem because of the masculine hegemonic structure as the major barriers in their access to family justice.

Keywords: Access to justice, barriers, Iran, judiciary system, women

INTRODUCTION

Access to justice is recognized by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the just trial provisions; yet there is an increasing concern that “justice for all” does not apply to every Iranian and in all
cases. There is unequal access to justice between the different groups of people in the most societies, characterized by gaps among the socioeconomic status of citizens, level of education, gender, religion, and so on. Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is to attempt to present a general understanding into women’s access to family justice in Iran. It analyses a range of challenges that women confront when trying to take legal action to settle their problems. It further emphasizes that the step-by-step recognition of women’s rights, access to equal legal remedies, and legal empowerment are key aspects in shaping the prospects for better access to family justice for Iranian women.

An instant review of current problems to women’s access to family justice reveals three priority fields of concern: 1) Discriminatory legal structures. Despite improvement in different areas, Iran has legal provisions that discriminate against women. For example, Iran has laws that place men as head of households and legally expect wives to obey their husbands, prohibit a woman from getting a passport without her husband’s permission, and has legal restrictions on what types of jobs women can do. 2) Limited justice sector capacities to dispatch family justice for women. Unresponsive justice organizations continue to discourage women from seeking family justice. In many cases, conventional justice revisions have effectively postponed the justice needs of women. For example, Iran’s family justice sector often disregard inner household and community disputes, because it sees them as private matters and outside the fields of public dispute resolution. 3) Exclusion and disempowerment of women in the family justice. In spite of the fact that there is an increasing recognition of the noteworthiness of women’s inclusion, they are often excluded from fully participating in and benefiting from different dimensions of law, justice and development work. Geographic, financial and political distance from justice structures hinders women from claiming and realizing their rights. Iranian women face additional barriers due to discriminatory social and cultural norms and practices.

Women’s access for getting the justice is changing. The aim of this study is to examine the status of women with access to family justice processes. Resorting to judicial organisations’ authority, urban transportation facilities, poverty, economic concerns in petitioning to the courts, masculine hegemony in structure, access to legal information, illiteracy, and inequality in everyday life are some of the elements that alter the position of women in their access to family justice processes.

Theoretical Background

Access to justice

Access to justice is the subject matter of the difference between existing laws and the implementation of the same laws in two areas of social life and legal and social studies. Access to justice also provides opportunities for discussing the equality efficiency scale against the law which is
one of the principles underlying modern law (Rhode, 2004). It is very important to look at the gender issues as well as access to justice, along with the discussion of classes and social groups, because this is a topic that deals with the ambiguity between equal rights and inequalities in society. In daily life, mechanisms based on the principle of equality were not successful in solving the problems and differences arising from gender inequality. For example, the feminization of poverty or inequality in social activities affects access to justice (Morris, 1999; Sandefur, 2009).

**Women’s access to family justice**

In her book “Justice, Gender, and the Family”, Susan Moller Okin defines family justice as a range of issues from child custody and terms of divorce to physical and sexual abuse of women and children. She believes that family justice must be of vital importance for social justice (Okin, 2008, p. 8 / 101). Eekelaar also remarks: ‘Family justice is concerned with more than simply bargaining, fairly or otherwise. It is concerned with upholding some elemental features of personal relationship. Family justice cannot do this without the law and effective means of upholding it’ (Maclean, Eekelaar, & Bastard, 2016).

As many socio-legal researchers pointed out, most issues are disposed of elsewhere in the family justice system while the judiciary remains at its core. This is because, quite simply, the purpose of a justice system is ultimately to safeguard people’s legal rights. This does not, of course, mean that these legal rights should be pursued or defended in that way. There may be many occasions when the responsible thing to do is to compromise, or even abandon, one’s legal rights. This could be inherent in a full concept of responsibility (Eekelaar & Maclean, 2013). However, it is one thing to make a responsible decision to compromise or abandon one’s legal rights, it is another thing to yield without any knowledge of what rights are or if they are known, to yield under pressure due to lack of means to protect them.

The justice system is there to try to prevent those things from happening. A justice system is anchored in the judiciary. However, attention should be paid to the women’s challenging conditions in the context of family justice. For example, Singer (2009) has observed that the goal of maintaining relationships conflicts with another objective, often thought to be desirable, of bringing about a ‘clean break’ between the parties. She surmises that maintaining relationships favours men because women are likely to receive less money than under a clean break settlement and are more restricted in what they can do.

**Iranian women’s experience in the justice routes**

The fear of being alone in a society like Iran for a divorced woman is pervasive. Being a mother in a family, many rights are sacrificed in the favour of inappropriate law. Sometimes, women, for getting custody...
rights, give up other rights (especially financial rights like dowry or Mahriyeh).

The fear of separation, the fear of being alone, and the fear of how society views divorced women are among the hardest conditions that divorced women can experience in Iran. Such a condition is clearly visible in family courts. Many women from different social classes and backgrounds have experienced these circumstances. Therefore, many people have complained through talking and interviews about ignoring motherhood by courts’ staff, topped by judges. Another major issue ignored by these family courts is the social position of women, which goes unnoticed.

‘Maryam’, a 20-year-old woman with a pale face sat on the bench of family court on the campus. After asking her whether she agreed to be interviewed, she started to cry and ‘screeds out of her damn life’ (this was her own expression). Having some papers and files in her hands, she said: ‘I cannot continue this life. I married him at 16, and I was pregnant at 17. Before finishing my high school, I had given birth to my daughter. Now, my daughter is my life, but the judge said the custody was the right of the father and I could not live with my daughter after I got a divorce.’

Maryam’s husband, is seven years older than her, is a drug addict. She is also a battered woman because her husband did beat her many times.

The judge dealing with her case believes that ‘according to the existence of evidence of case, there are not acceptable reasons for a divorce order. Her husband has a job and provides economic demands of life for Maryam and her children. The only acceptable reason in terms of what the court sees is unemployment caused by the husband’s drug abuse.’

However, Maryam could not prove in the court to what extent she had suffered from her husband’s violence; and, therefore, she had no choice but to give up all financial rights (which include her dowry and alimony) to get the judge to issue her divorce.

There are no approved laws on marital violence in Iranian family courts; hence, women are not able to prove violence perpetrated against them. This forces women to give up all their financial rights stated by the family law to get their divorce. According to the Iranian family protection act, women cannot claim for a divorce in the family court; only men can do it.

‘Sara’ is a lawyer in family justice cases; she believes ‘any woman according to her family backgrounds has an especial experience of justice path.’

She said many women, for reasons related to their reputation and their children, would give up initiating a divorce claim. Many women give up this right, especially in the case of infidelity claims for divorce in the family court. However, there is no considerable support for them in the current family law.
The statistics of the National Organization for Civil Registration in Iran suggest that 13.3% of all divorces happen during the first year of marriage, while 47.2% take place during the first five years of marriage (2015). In Tehran, there happens one divorce out of every three marriages. Also most divorces happen for men and women between 25 and 29 years of age. Though this news is irritating, but it would increase attention to raise and discuss the problem and rethink strategies applied to prevent more problems in family justice matters through a gender-sensitive approach with a special emphasis on women as a vulnerable group in Iran.

Methodological framework
A methodological framework provides a framework for both data collection and data analysis, which basically encompasses all the aspects involved in planning and executing the research (Bryman, 2012, p. 46; D'Cruz & Jones, 2004, p. 84). Besides this framework, understanding the research purpose helps the authors pick an appropriate theoretical framework. This, then study was conducted in Iran with the purpose of identifying the family justice barriers faced by women, assisted with the participation of the 'Research Centre of Judiciary' in Tehran. The data were gathered through interviews and reviews of secondary sources (Bryman, 2012, p. 70).

Overall, 50 women (Table 1) were interviewed from June to August 2016 in Tehran Family Courts (Shahid Mahallati; the second branch of family court). Some of the in-depth interviews could be recorded by a recorder, yet a few of the participants did not satisfy with recording some part of the interviews. All the women interviewed had passed through a court experience in the civil or criminal courts earlier. All of them had sat for litigations or hearing sessions in the family court. The authors used a semi-structured interview that taken to account questions to emphasize the most important problems related to the legal system, conventional justice systems, courts, prosecutors, police, legal aid, and determinant socioeconomic elements regarding the law. In other words, the questions of interview were designed to focus on the women’s basic legal knowledge, their familiarity with legal procedure, their perceptions of cultural barriers, the issues that influence their preference for mechanisms of dispute solutions, and their level of satisfaction with their chosen courses of action.

The data analysis was initiated with open coding, where categories of information about the phenomenon being investigated were formed (Robson, 2002, p. 194). The transcriptions were read by the researcher, and codes were given to the statements in the data. Related codes, which arguably represented the pre-determined themes, were then grouped under the same category or categories, and later were gathered under themes (Saldana, 2013, pp. 10-13).
Analysis and Main Themes
While the barriers to access to justice are ordinary for various groups, women may more frequently suffer from these barriers and suffer more to prevailing them due to the structural elements contributing to inequality. Such structural components of inequality for women is available in ownership, inheritance, rights, employment and family law. Women may experience obstacles to access judicial organizations that is more than anything else aggravate by poverty. Institutional barriers are caused by masculine hegemonic proceedings and security institutions and male officers worsen the situation and propel an increment in the complaints of women. In addition, proceedings are followed up with fears, including shame of being stigmatised, particularly in such issues as domestic violence and rape. Also, elements like working at home, poverty, being elderly, and childcare have been considered as creating a dearth in time and resource for women in the processes of legal claiming. It is crucial to target certain conditions as well as on problems with regarding justiciable event while considering women’s access to family justice.

According to the output resulting from the women’s interviews in the family courts of Iran, there are five main themes related to their access barriers to family justice in the judiciary system (Table 2).

Table 1
Demographic characteristics of the interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background variables</th>
<th>Abundance</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (year)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-35</td>
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<td>35-45</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-55</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>55-60</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
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<td>Undergraduate and bachelor</td>
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<td>Masters and higher</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>Divorced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married with a life separate from the spouse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal cases</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the output resulting from the women’s interviews in the family courts of Iran, there are five main themes related to their access barriers to family justice in the judiciary system (Table 2).
Legal awareness

Legal awareness is a socio-legal term that mentions to the knowledge of the law and legal organizations, together with attitudes towards them between the members of the public. It helps the authors realize the importance of the people attachment to the law in relation to their everyday matters. Legal awareness is in the tight bond with popular culture, which depicts law, lawyers, and judges in the media and the arena of life that involves norms and expectations of behaviour, including morals and laws. According to the American Bar Association (1989), Commission on Public Understanding, legal awareness is ‘the ability to make critical judgments about the substance of the law, the legal process, and available legal resources, and to effectively utilize the legal system and articulate strategies to improve its legal literacy’.

The output of the interviews, however, reveals an awareness of justice sector problems that grown consistently up alongside with a higher educational base. Most interviewees were unable to distinguish among criminal and civil cases or civil and criminal courts. According to the definition of the Canadian Bar Association (1992, p. 23), awareness of rights and legal processes is useless if a user of justice does not have adequate awareness of the legal organizations that regulate public life (Maranlou, 2015; Wan, 2014).

‘Hamideh’, a 25-year-old woman, has a master’s degree in Accounting but is jobless. She had claimed a divorce six months ago because of her husband’s infidelity, and now she lives in her parents’ house with them. She is economically dependent on her father, but before starting her divorce’s claim, she gave up her job in a private organization (without unemployment insurance) due to depression. She says: ‘I did not know what I should do, and because I had no money to hire a lawyer, I had to apply for free legal advice in the family justice court, but it was not helpful …’

Table 2
The items of main barriers to women’s access to family justice in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central item</th>
<th>Main item</th>
<th>Basic concepts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main barriers to women’s access to family justice in Iran</td>
<td>Legal awareness</td>
<td>Inability to distinguish between criminal and civil cases, false resources and wrong addresses, lack of access to sources of awareness in the public media and lack of awareness of the lawsuit in practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Lack of access to legal language (lawyer language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural stereotypes</td>
<td>The behavior of relatives and acquaintances, the way society looks at divorced women</td>
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The lack of knowledge of the legal organizations is a crucial matter, since the public’s awareness of the judicial system is an important prerequisite of their path to justice (Hough & Roberts, 2005, p. 71). It is an obvious fact that the police or courts have the most responsibility to protect the rights of the people and keep social order up. This pervasive blindness of the legal system impresses women’s perceptions of justice. ‘Zohre’, a 27-year-old woman who initiated a dowry case before her divorce order case, does not know anything about the procedure of her judicial case affairs, and her mental condition is not good; she is stressed out and has many worries about her only daughter after divorce. She says: ‘The court staffs’ behaviour is not good with me, and my case affairs have witnessed numerous delays in progress. I have an attorney for my case (alimony), but I would come to the court for some papers work myself. At first, all I knew about such a case was little information from my relatives. I was not familiar with the process of my case; I was just confused in a place like this.’

Language

All over the world people ‘perform’ their roles within society and become socialized by using language as one of the many ways. Language filters whatever one wants to see and, by doing so, he/she influences what is communicated to others. The communication people have with others gradually creates social conventions and norms, which subsequently, affect what language is deemed proper and suitable in certain situations (Kramsch, 1998).

In its widespread sense, gender-neutral language is achieved by avoiding ‘gendered generics’, which are masculine or feminine nouns and pronouns used to refer to both men and women (Curzan, 2003). The constant use of male-gendered generics to show all people can have a psychological effect on women by making them feel excluded and by strengthening traditional gender stereotypes – even when that effect is not predestined (Chew, 2014). Social science research illustrates that language is a social force that can have an impact on how women see themselves and are seen by others. The ‘Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis’ argues that ‘culture and language are interconnected and that the words that people use affect the way they view both the world and their self-concept’ (Sniezek & Jazwinski, 1989).

Fourotan did a content analysis of educational system books in Iran. He divided words and key concepts representation in these books into two groups (male and female). The content analysis results revealed that 65% of these words were dedicated to the male group while only one out of three words referred to the female group (Fourotan, 2014, p. 133/155).

‘Bani’, a 57-year-old woman, lives in Qom with her daughter after her ex-husband died in Tehran; her case is financial (marital inheritance and alimony). She speaks both Farsi and Arabic. She must come from Qom to Tehran to follow her case in the
family justice court. She says: ‘I came to the family court’s free advice centre to pursue the matter but I could not understand the language, and I became more confused.’

Cultural stereotypes

Regarding ‘The Analysis of Culture’, Williams (1963, 2009) demarcates the ‘three common categories in the definition of culture’. First, there is the ‘ideal’ in which culture is a process of human perfection in terms of certain universal values. Second, there is the ‘documentary’ record: the living texts and practices of a culture. Third, there is the ‘social’ definition of culture in which culture is an explanation of a way of life. Based on this definition there are three new ways of thinking about culture: A) the anthropological aspect, which views culture as an explanation of a way of life; B) the idea that culture represents special meanings and values; and C) the claim that the work of cultural analysis should be the illumination of the meanings and values implicitly and explicitly in a way of life, a culture.

The considered whole paradigm of social definition of culture, the importance of culture in gender differences constructing is received centrally. This paradigm of socialisation theory - in explanation of boys’ and girls’ different behaviour from the first years of childhood- is faced with the public interest. The educational system is a laudable part of this process, so it guides boys and girls to different activities and achievements. In a recent analysis on gender and culture, there has been a major emphasis on literature and on deconstructing the Theory of Derrida (Derrida, 1967) and the discourse analysis of Michael Foucault. The central emphasis here is turning to creating context, representations, and discourses, which would make the conceptions of gender (Weedon, 1987). In this approach, the authors will talk about the differences among both women and men and between women; here, the concept of ‘being woman’ has a messy understanding itself.

Unfortunately, the existence of hegemonic masculinity in the context of the legal space of Iran emphasizes only ‘those differences that could lead to stereotyping’ (Martin & Nakayama, 2010, p. 182) (that women are emotional or that men are rational). As these stereotypes of gender differences persist, it may be pervasive because of the stereotypical of women everywhere in media and specially in Iranian movies.

The attitudes and stereotypes adopted by the Iranian community regarding claims against a husband by his wife do not only affect the woman’s individually but often leads to discrimination towards certain groups of them, especially many poor women who lack financial resources.

In Iran, although statistics show that the divorce rate has gone up steadily, yet divorce is pondered a social taboo (Maranlou, 2015). Women are more stigmatized by divorce, as indicated in a Persian proverb: ‘A woman enters her husband’s house with a white wedding dress and they should be in husbands’ house till burial shroud’. This means that the women they think living with their husband and being with him is better
to divorce. ‘Sharare’, a 33-year-old woman, was dumped with her two children by her husband without any financial support: ‘My father helps us in our daily costs, but I do not like to depend on him. What would other people think of me … Many of my relatives blame me, the court’s staffs blame me, too. The judge told me: ‘If your husband pays for your food, it is enough, but he could not understand I have many demands like emotional ones, financial progress and other …’.

Cultural stereotypes in the judiciary in Iran have more impact on the judges’ views in issuing sentences, especially when the case is related to family justice. Such a view can leave a case pending for more than three years in the family court without any final verdict. ‘Zahra’, a 45-year-old woman from Abadan (620 miles from away Tehran), sat at the family court campus crying, and said: ‘This year is my third year of attending in the family court; I am the fourth wife of a man that had three other wives before marrying me. He lied to me about everything related to himself and his life …. During these three years, every time I try to file a demand of confiscating his property so that I would claim my marriage due (Mahriyeh), he comes to the court and talks to the judge, then the judge comes to this belief that he has three more wives and that he is the bread winner of all of them and his children. At the end, I get zero marital financial support because the confiscation order is rejected by the judge.’

**Feminization of poverty**

As Mahoozi (2015) shows in his research, there is a multi-dimensional poverty in Iran for four distinct groups (rural households with a male head, rural households with a female head, urban households with a male head, and urban households with a female head) for each of the 30 provinces in Iran. The poorest groups in each province are rural households, mostly the rural female-headed households. Poverty is more prevailing among the rural households compared with the urban households of the same region. The reason could be the inequality of welfare distribution in favour of urban areas, or could be the immigration of wealthier rural households to urban areas. But then, there is rather less poverty among the male-headed households (in both urban and rural areas) in comparison with the female-headed households, which shows an increasing risk of female-headed households falling into poverty, particularly in rural areas and the poorer provinces.

Mahoozi’s study underlines three dimensions of inequality in Iran: provincial inequality, gender inequality, and regional inequality (Mahoozi, 2015). So, there is a phenomenon in Iran in the name of the ‘feminisation of poverty’. Iranian women are more educated than men. A recent report¹

¹“Feminization of poverty” address Increasing poverty among women in Third World countries, deprived women and women of minorities in Europe and United States. This term was first used by American sociologist “Diane Pearce”.

shows that nearly 70% of the university intake is female. Yet, statistics show that 80% of governmental jobs are assigned to men. Also, official reports say: ‘There are two million and 500 thousand female-headed households, which means 80% of women are unemployed and 60 thousand women per year are added to them. So, these increasing statistics of female-headed households lead to many serious problems in society.’ These statistics acknowledge an increasing number of divorces as a significant determinant in the feminization of poverty in Iran. Divorce adds to number of female-headed households in the country.

‘Samira’, a 23-year-old woman with no children, only six months after her legal marriage registration had claimed a divorce against her husband in the family justice court. She now lives with her parents. She has no job and is dependent on her father economically; she said: ‘The costs of my lawsuit were so high, my father was able to provide them. But if a woman had no money, she would not have been able to do anything in the family justice court for her marital rights or court matters in Iran.’

In this context, women’s poverty negatively affects their ability to invoke the family justice courts to redress themselves, and the attitude of the court clergy judges in the family court of Iran is, generally, reluctant to use their discretion in women’s favour. ‘Zoleikha’ is a 48-year-old woman who has two children. Her case started 14 years ago. The reason for this long-lasting case is because her husband left home without any support for living costs and she has no idea of his whereabouts. She is a gym coach in a club for women in Tehran; she said: ‘I have two children who are 21 and 18 years old, I don’t have an employment insurance and I provide my children with living costs. There isn’t a governmental support group. I do not know anything about my husband or where he lives; he is always fleeing from his responsibilities towards me and our children. I am so tired, our home is rented; both rental payment and other costs of living have been a trouble that I had to deal with in hard conditions. Alongside these difficulties, the judge dealing with my case told me you should first publish an advertisement in the newspapers to announce your husband’s disappearance and wait for his coming to the court. During this time and delays, I have had many financial concerns.’ Factors like this discourage women from enforcing their rights in the family justice courts.

**Hegemonic masculinity in the justice path**

As Connell mentioned, ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is part of the gender order theory, which recognizes multiple masculinities that vary across time, culture, and the individual. Hegemonic masculinity is defined as the current configuration of practice that legitimizes men’s dominant position in the society and justifies the subordination of women, and other marginalized ways of being a man (Connell, 2005). Conceptually, hegemonic masculinity suggests to explain how and why men preserve dominant social roles over women, and other gender
identities, which are perceived as ‘feminine’ in a certain society.

According to Connell, the politics of gender (in this case, of gender and law) arises from the always-contested nature of men’s power and the ever-present possibilities of resisting and contesting the present gender arrangements. It is a key feature of the thesis, in short, that hegemonic masculinity is never, finally, closed, fixed or resolved (Collier, 2010, p. 454).

The conceptual beginnings of hegemonic masculinity represented the culturally idealized form of manhood that was socially and hierarchically exclusive and concerned with bread-winning; that was anxiety-provoking and differentiated (internally and hierarchically); that was brutal and violent, pseudo-natural and tough, psychologically contradictory, and thus crisis-prone; economically rich and socially sustained (Donaldson, 1993).

The hegemonic masculinity within the Iranian family justice system seems to be pervasive. A male hegemonic system for accessing justice is closely linked to the capacity of law enforcement agencies to provide non-effective legal remedies for women. A male hegemonic system and discriminatory norms seem to pervade the administration of justice, and therefore, create more multi-dimension barriers that women must get over to access the family justice. In this system, some policies are connected to the proportion of female staff too. The number of female personnel working within the justice organizations (such as judicial officers, judges and police in Iran), even though increasing, is still much lower than the number of male personnel (Maranlou, 2015). This hegemony is reverberated in the family laws that arrange gender relations and the rights of men and women. Islamic jurisprudential texts—which are the basis of Islamic laws in Iran, including family law—consider women as second-class citizens and locate them under men’s domination.

One result of these laws is the low representation of women as judiciary staff, especially barricaded from being judges. The prohibition began instantly after the 1979 Islamic revolution. This practice was legitimized later by adding an article to the constitution, which demonstrated that only men may become judges. The law reformation in 1992 helped women to sit as assistant judges in some civil courts, but yet, women were prevented from becoming judges (Maranlou, 2015).

In the present work, most of the interviewed women during the field study gave priority to the fairness of the legal procedure. ‘Other parallel studies have also revealed that people attach a perceived fairness to processes that result in special decisions’ (Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). ‘Hoda’, a 32-year-old woman, has a master’s degree in law. She is an attorney in family justice cases and has a high social and economic position equal to that of her husband. She has not claimed a divorce, but has rather claimed for their son’s custody right in the family justice court. She says: My eleven-year-old son’s custody order was issued in my ex-husband’s favour, and
the judge determined 24 hours per week visitation for me; this is while I and my ex-husband have equal situation economically, socially and …’

One of the considerable sample in the fieldwork given by the interviewees addressed the concern of whether a woman has been rendered the opportunity to voice her claim. The interviewees also noted that the male hegemonic framework of the court was a factor that influenced women’s trust in the family justice system. The framework of court and the settled hierarchy may cause women to feel fragile and discrimination. ‘Shiva’, a 36-year-old woman, holds a high school diploma and has no job; she is economically dependent on her father now; before her divorce, she was dependent on her husband. She said: ‘My ex-husband had claimed divorce and the judge issued the order in favour of him. Before divorce, I only lived with him for the sake of our children but when a man claims divorce, the woman can do nothing about it. Now, I just came to the family court to pursue my dowry and alimony cases. The divorce order issued by the judge is something not in my hands and I cannot do anything about it.’

Within a context like this, in recent years, some of the Iranian news agencies announced the increase of ‘white marriages’ in Iran, especially in the metropolis. In this kind of cohabitation, the parties live without legally registered marriages. Some specialists argue that white marriage in Iran is the result of discriminatory laws against women, because many women, especially in the urban environments, are well-educated, and the current family law is not in accordance with the women’s socially changing conditions. On the other hand, marital life in the form of white marriage would make many problems for women and young girls in the current social context of Iran.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study aimed to examine what kinds of obstacles are present for Iranian women so that they can access family justice. The case study and the interviews showed that wider, more complex factors have an impact on the identity and development of individuals. The results further revealed the fact that an individual can be greatly shaped by his or her wider environment to the point where he/she would not seek help for accessing family justice matters, became certain aspects mentioned as the main themes (legal awareness, feminisation of poverty, cultural stereotype, language, and a male hegemonic structure) discourage seeking support or accessing family justice. While the way an individual’s environment (context) impacts his/her view towards seeking aid for Iranian women in the family justice path, the general background of these women has no impact on the type of support they receive from some organizations or advisory centres in the family court.

White marriage is a kind of cohabitation in Iran in which the couples have no legal commitment toward each other, but are heartfelt; the judiciary system in Iran considers it illegal as non-protected, especially for women, and against the Islamic values.
Five main themes (Figure 1) as obstacles that prevent Iranian women from accessing family justice were emerged through the interviews and their outcome on women’s experiences in the family justice path. First, the lack of adequate legal awareness is a problem of access to family justice. Almost all women know little about legal organizations, procedures, and responsibilities to which they can refer to settle their legal issues. So, their awareness of their rights could not be converted into legal actions, because they are not aware of how they should use the family justice system.

The language barrier is one of the things the interviewee women frequently mentioned in their answers to the researcher’s questions. Almost all of them referred to the humiliating language used by the court personnel or judges. Besides this language, there are other issues arising from cultural context; the complexity of legal technical language completely confuses many women in the family court. Many women, who have financial difficulties, would provide the attorney fees with the help of their families because of this legal technical language issue.

Cultural stereotypes comprise a certain view based on the way in which gender roles are defined by a certain community in a given context. These stereotypes in Iran’s family courts have appeared mostly in the judges’ views, especially in the process of case sentencing. Many women interviewees said that both the judge and the court staff did not understand them. Many of these judges see the men as the breadwinners, and the women should obey their husbands because they provide financial needs. Unfortunately, this view is the reason of much domestic violence occurring in different Iranian families.

Feminization of poverty is a remarkable problem related to women’s access to family justice in Iran. There are many educated women, even more than men in some areas, in Iran, but there is no special mechanism for...
equal and supportive employment of women in the society and law. So approximately 75-80% of the governmental jobs are occupied by men, and women can only contribute to 20%. As mentioned above, many women-headed households suffer from poverty more than their male counterparts. On this path, high legal fees represent another barrier facing women’s access to family justice.

High cost of court fees could be another obstacle for women finding justice. Women who are unable to pay the fees might bow to the inevitable by giving up their rights. Also, long waiting time given to women for opportunity to present their case in court can cause them to lose faith in justice system. Often families intervene and try to solve the problem by passing the court. Enhancement of human resources and number of courthouses, judges, and prosecutors adjudicating family disputes will settle this problem caused by the high workload.

A male hegemonic structure and many different obstacles within the procedural justice and sociocultural and cultural matters, play a more important role in preventing women’s access to family justice in Iran. As current study has shown, despite written approved law in family matters, it is already observed that, notwithstanding the protection provided by the law, women’s access to family justice in many different positions, has been ignored.

These obstacles and barriers will lead to a reduction of Iranian women’s self-esteem within the society’s different spheres. This decrease causes a fragile agency (Figure 1), as a main mentally severe problem for women who are barred from any action to achieve their rights and access family justice. The lack of access to justice itself in a cyclic manner would result in a wider range of problems in both personal and marital life.

The data retrieved through fieldwork also declare that Iranian women’s understanding of the justice system includes depriving feelings and unmet demands. To meet these demands and empower Iranian women, it is essential to adopt and apply a gender-sensitive approach both in law-making processes and administration. In the law-making process, preserving a gender sensitive approach for anti-discrimination and making, adopting, and performing laws in accordance with this approach will sweep a main obstacle to women’s access to family justice.

The present research results present a number of absorbing views into the understandings of Iranian women of access to family justice. However, like any study about such a complicated subject, there exist a number of limitations, and it is crucial to identify these limitations and to make recommendations for future study. This research has also its limitations in terms of methodological framework and application. The interviews were limited by use of a non-random sample. They were carried out in two main distracts of Tehran Family Court with an almost small population. Subsequent research about women’s understandings of access to family justice should overlay different cities in Iran. Furthermore, the
questions in the interviews were arranged based on the researchers’ knowledge of the existing issues about legal empowerment and access to family justice literature. So, it is fair to say that the result of this paper may reflect the interests and the concerns of the researchers as much as the interests and the concerns of the respondents. Nonetheless, the interpretations demonstrated based on the items came out from the interviewees’ answers seem to sufficiently indicate that the results of this study reflect the respondents’ views.

Ultimately, the previous study is the next study question, and this study is no exception. It is only one of the early efforts to explore the main barriers of access to family justice from the users’ view in Iran. For instance, this study has not covered the extent to which minorities or defendant or prisoner women have access to family justice. In addition, study would also be needed to present more up-to-date data in relation to these issues in Iran. Taking to account the lack of literature regarding access to family justice from the different Islamic perspectives, it would also be of great concern to examine how various schools of thought reflect on such a subject.

REFERENCES


Religiousness and the Impact of Education on It in Iran

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ABSTRACT

This article shows, as Peter Berger’s desecularisation theory indicates, that the contemporary world is mainly religious as much as it was in the past, and although pluralisation somewhat loosens religious beliefs, people are largely religious. On a probability sample of a national survey in Iran, we show that Iranian’s people are mainly religious. However, they are not very comment to religious behaviours, especially in treatment with others and the affairs of everyday life. Also, education has a negative, but minor impact on individuals’ religiousness. However, it exerts a more impact on other dimensions of religious life, religious tolerance, and secularisation of individuals.

Keywords: Education, individual secularisation, pluralisation, religiousness, religious tolerance

INTRODUCTION

Religion is a fundamental aspect of social life and the classical theorists of sociology have generally emphasised the importance of religion in society. August Comte (1849) tried to create a positivistic religion (religion of humanity) for modern society to fulfil the cohesive function of traditional religion. Emile Durkheim, in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), highlighted the social function of religion and its role in bringing social cohesion. Max Weber, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1985), emphasised on the role of religion in the rise of modern industry and capitalist economy. However, the classical theorists of sociology explicitly or implicitly saw the declining importance of religion in modern society. For Max Weber, the major specificities of modern society is rational action towards the target that implies a reduction in traditional action and value-oriented rational action, as vital features of religion. Durkheim’s emphasis...
on the development of science in organic societies implies the decline of religion in modern society. According to him, religion is not only a system of behaviours and actions but also a system of ideas and beliefs whose aim is to express the world and scientific thinking and is, thus, evolved into religious thinking. Therefore, scientific thinking takes the place of religious thought: “Hence, it seems natural that religion should lose ground as science becomes better at performing its task” (Durkheim, 1995, pp. 427-428).

The assumed decline of religion arose centuries ago, in the Enlightenment, when it was thought that the development of science replaced the supernatural (religious) with the scientific (natural). However, it was in 1950s and 1960s that the idea of religion declined, as the theory of secularisation attracted theorists’ attention. The most famous of such theorists is Peter Berger, one of the major figures in the sociology of religion. Some writers (for example, Woodhead, 2001) recognise him as one of the sociologists who have contributed the most in the theoretical study of religion. Berger’s theoretical ideas were formed in his early work in the 1960s, especially in *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), which is a canonical work of the sociology of knowledge. It explores the relation between beliefs and social reality. He developed his ideas in his later work, *Sacred Canopy: Element of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (1967), in the realm of religion. Berger presented his secularisation theory in this book. According to him, there is an intrinsic link between modernisation and secularisation that means the former does necessarily lead to the latter.

However, religious movements in the closing three decades of the twentieth century, including the Islamic Revolution, Solidarity in Poland, the Church’s support of Revolutionaries Sandys in Nicaragua, and elsewhere in Latin America, are a reincarnation of religion, challenging secularisation theory. As a result, a new theory under “desecularisation” appeared (Casanova, 1994). Again, one of the most prominent theorists of desecularisation is Berger, who revised his previous opinions and saw secularisation theory was wrong. Now he believes the modern world is as religious as it used to be.

Therefore, given the importance of the relationship between modernisation and religion in sociology, this paper seeks to answer the questions of how religious Iran’s society is and whether education has a role, as a representative of modernisation, in the secularisation of people. The authors have tried to derive appropriate assumptions from Berger’s theories (secularisation and desecularisation) and test the empirical credit of the authors’ theoretical response to these questions in Iran, which has experienced modernisation, especially with the spread of public education and higher education for several decades.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Secularisation Theory

Berger defines secularisation as the process of separating the sectors of society from the dominance of religious institutions and symbols (Pfadenhauer, 2013). Secularisation in the history of the modern West is the separation of fields that had previously been dominated by the Christian church, including the separation of state from church, confiscation of church lands, and separation of education from religion. Berger sees secularisation as a wide process which influences all cultural life and is the unpopularity of religious themes in arts, philosophy, literature, and, above all, sees it as the emergence of science as an independent and completely secular worldview (Berger, 1967).

Berger argues that secularisation includes not only the social institutes and cultural spheres, but also the minds of people: “Secularisation is … a decline in religion both in society and in the minds of individuals” (Pfadenhauer, 2013, p. 56). Thus, secularisation has two interrelated dominations: (1) institutional secularisation (or, in Berger’s terms, social structural secularisation), which means the removal of religion from the realm of public institutions; and (2) individual secularisation (or, in Berger’s phrase, secularisation of consciousness), which means individuals not resorting to the interpretation of religion in their behaviour and thought. According to Berger, the modern West has raised growing number of individuals who look upon the world and their own lives without recourse to religious interpretations (ibid).

Berger sees the modern economy, industrial capitalism, as the main cause of secularisation. Hence, different segments of modern society, based on their closeness to or remoteness from the process of secularisation, are affected differently. Very secular segments emerge in the immediate vicinity of these processes. In other words, the modern industrial society has created a central sector that is free from the realm of religion. Secularisation has expanded from this sector to influence other social sectors (Berger, 1967). Thus, even though secularisation is the general phenomenon of modern societies, it does not distribute uniformity within society and affects different groups differently. For example, the impact of secularisation is greater on men than women, on middle-aged people than the very young and very old, on urban than the rural, on the classes that deal directly with the modern industrial production (especially working class) than traditional occupations groups (such as artisans or small shopkeepers), and on the Protestants than the Jews and the Catholics, etc (ibid).

In Berger’s view, another key factor in the secularisation of individuals (secularisation of minds) is pluralisation. He argues that throughout much of human history, religious organisation has had a monopoly over legitimising individual and collective lives. Religious institutions
defined the world, and going out of this religiously defined world was stepping into chaotic darkness, anomalies, and possibly madness, on the one hand, and deserved harsh punishment, on the other hand. However, Modern life is segmented and this segmentation and pluralisation not only is on the level of social conduct, but also on the level of consciousness (Berger, 1974). According to Berger, the pluralisation of social life-worlds has grave effects on religiousness. Now, different parts of social life are under a different semantic system and it is difficult for religious institutions to have a single meaning for this plurality of social life. Moreover, the subjective consciousness of the individual threatens the plausibility of religious definitions of reality, too (Berger, 1974). Pluralisation forces individuals to recognise others with different meanings, values, and beliefs. Thus, pluralisation causes the secularization of society and minds (Berger, 1974).

The main feature of all pluralist situations is that religious institutions cannot take the loyalty of the people for granted any more. Loyalty is voluntary and, therefore, less certain itself. Thus, religious tradition that was already firmly imposed should be marketed. The religious tradition must be levied onto individuals who are no longer programmed to bear it. Particularly, the pluralist situation is the “market situation”. In this situation, the religious institutions become marketing institutions and religious traditions become consumer commodities. In this situation, any type of religious activity is subject to the logic of the market economy. Pluralisation changes the relationship between religious institutions in line with ecumenical and interfaith tolerance (Berger, 2014).

Pluralisation makes previously monopolising religious groups become competitive marketing firms. Previously, religious groups were organised, so they had control over their followers. However, now religious groups must organise themselves in competition with other groups that have the same goal to attract people. Success in this competitive situation involves rationalisation and bureaucratisation of religious structures. Expansion of bureaucratic structures in the religious institution makes all religious institutions, regardless of their different faith traditions, socially like each other. This pluralisation in a religious market situation requires increasingly friendly cooperation between religious groups. The affinity causes religious rivals to no longer be considered “enemy”, but peers with shared issues. Pluralisation makes religious institutions lose earlier monopoly privileges. Now, they have to compete without use of coercion. There are pressures toward restricting the competition, which makes a degree of cooperation practical (Berger, 2014).

Thus, in everyday life, the individuals subjectively tend towards uncertainty about religious affairs, because in everyday life they are objectively exposed to a wide variety of religious and other factors, which define reality and compete with their loyalty or, at least, their attention, and none of these factors can make them loyal (Woodhead...
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et al., 2001). In short, pluralisation, as the infant of modernisation, inevitably leads to subjective secularisation (individual secularisation).

Desecularisation Theory

Beginning in 1974, Berger began to doubt the secularisation theory and came to believe that many observers of the religious scene have over-estimated the degree and irreversibility of secularisation (ibid). Bruce stated conservative and evangelical church growth in the United States, the decline of the liberal church, the continued trend of religion in western countries, and the continued existence of religion in the rest of the world as reasons for this doubt (Bruce, 2001). In the late 1990s, Berger came to completely reject the secularisation theory and recognized the biggest mistake of those who worked in this field in 1960s to be that they thought the modernity inevitably to result from weakening of religion (ibid).

Berger rejected the secularisation theory under the discussion of the desecularisation of the world (Berger, 1999). He discarded the notion that living in a secular world is unsound: “most of the world today is as religious as ever it was, and in a good many locales, more religious than ever” (Woodhead et al., 2001, p. 91). Now, Berger argues that although the term “secularisation theory” related to the works of 1950s and 1960s, in fact, the basic idea of this theory can be found in the Enlightenment with this simple idea that “Modernisation does necessarily lead to decline of religion both in society and in the minds of people”, and precisely that this main idea that was wrong. Certainly, modernity has some secularising effects, but it has also led to powerful movements of counter-secularisation. Secularisation on the societal level is not necessarily leading to secularisation on the level of minds (Berger, 2013).

According to Berger, a main reason for desecularisation is that modernity usually undermines the taken-for-granted certainties. This is not pleasant to many and is not tolerable for some, and religious movements that claim to give certainty have a lot of charm for these people” (ibid).

Berger holds two exceptions for desecularisation. First, is Europe, especially Western Europe, where, the old secularisation theory would hold (Berger, 2013). Second, is an internationally secular subculture which is carried out by the western-educated as a main carrier of progressive values and beliefs, and enlightenment ideas. This subculture includes the progressive beliefs and values of Enlightened. The number of its bearers is small, but they are strongly influential. They control the institutions which determine the official definitions of reality, especially the educational system, the media of mass communication and the legal system (Berger, 2013).

However, Berger continues to stress the influence of pluralisation on the secularisation of individuals, albeit with some modifications. According to Berger, modernisation has created very heterogeneous societies and great intercultural mutations that together make the two factors in the line of pluralisation
and not the line of establishing (or re-establishing) religious monopoly (Berger, 1999). He recognises that this was wrong about secularisation but was not wrong about pluralisation. According to him, pluralisation does not necessarily lead to individuals’ secularisation, but it does undermine all religious certainties, as it does in other areas of life (Woodhead, 2001).

Later, Berger (2014) came to concede that the secularisation theorists are not quite as wrong as he previously thought: ‘I now understand more fully the global reality of the secular discourse, not just in Europe and in faculty clubs all over the world, but in the lives of many ordinary believers who succeed in being both secular and religious” (Berger, 2014, p. 20). Berger sees some of the main processes of modernity (industrialisation, urbanisation, migration, education) move religion out of much of the institutional order (Berger, 2014). Also, he argues that pluralism undermines the taken-for-grantedness of religion (Ibid).

Berger believes modernity produces a secular discourse, which compels people to deal with many areas of life without reference to religious definitions of reality (Ibid). This discourse exists both in the minds of individuals who deal with everyday world without any supernatural presuppositions and in the society. The implication of this for individuals is simple and very important: “For most religious believers, faith and secularity are not mutually exclusive modes of attending to reality; it is not a matter of either/or, but rather of both/and (Berger, 2014, p. 53). In short, people generally have religious beliefs, but they are secular in daily life. Some, such as Warner (1993), acknowledged that, today, Berger’s theory about the relationship between pluralisation and religion is such a central issue in the community of religion that it has become a new paradigm in the sociology of religion.

**Hypotheses**

Based on the later Berger’s idea (desecularisation) which holds most of the world today is as religious as ever it was, the authors conclude that religiousness is prevalent in Iran’s society (First hypothesis). In other words, the authors expect that the vast majority of Iranian people are religious. In fact, in a non-European society like Iran, there is not a strong force such as Enlightenment subculture that can struggle religious beliefs and weaken it. Therefore, people generally are religious.

From Berger’s argument on the expansion of pluralisation in contemporary societies and that people are faced with a wide variety of religions and other factors that define human realities in everyday life leading to uncertainty about religious affairs, it could be concluded that people do not have very strong commitment to follow religious instructions and duties or neglect to. In other words, people’s commitment to practice religious rulings, duties, and rites is not very strong (Second hypothesis).

Again, based on the above reasoning, the authors expect that people tolerate
perceived non-religious subjects or acts. This means, non-religious actions and non-religious people are tolerated. In other words, religious tolerance is prevalent in Iran’s society (Third hypothesis), too.

From Berger’s argument that science is a completely secular view of the world, and his emphasis on the existence of a secular culture in the world among those with high education, the authors expect that people with higher education are less religious. In other words, there is an inverse relationship between education and religiousness (Fourth hypothesis). However, it is a weak one, because, as mentioned above, there are not any variables with strong inverse relationship with religiousness. Also, it could be expected there to be an inverse relationship between education and commitment to practice religious duties and rites. Furthermore, based on above reasoning, the authors expect there to be a direct relationship between education and religious tolerance.

METHODS

To test the hypotheses, the authors did a secondary analysis of a survey, “Values and Attitudes of Iranians”, which is a national survey based on a large probability multistage cluster sample on the 15-65-year-old people who lived in the capital cities of the Iran provinces. In that sampling, in the first stage, the blocks have been selected by random sampling proportional to the size (population) of each block and in the second stage, individuals have been selected by random sampling from the selected blocks.

As is manifest based on the hypotheses, the authors’ discussion about secularisation in this article is limited to the subjective dimension of it; that is, secularisation of individuals, not the institutional secularisation, which is a vast subject area. Following Berger’s argument, the authors define subjective (individual) secularisation as the abandonment of religious rulings, duties, and rites in treating with people and issues (for different definitions of secularism and the history of its use (Robertson, 1970).

In this article, religiousness and other variables are measured by single items or indicators consisting of several items. Religiousness is measured by this simple self-assessment statement: “How religious are you?” with these options as its answer: not at all, little, somehow, very, and very much.

Commitment to practice religious rulings, duties, and rites has two indicators: obligatory prayers and participation in religious rituals. Obligatory prayer (Namaz) is required from every Muslim that needs to be performed along a special ritual five times a day. This variable is measured by this self-assessment statement: “Have you prayed regularly during the past year?” with these options as its answer: never, seldom, sometimes, most often, and always. Religious rituals are measured by an indicator includes variables which are participation in Muharram (Tasua and
Ashura) rites, in the religious ceremonials (Hey’ats), and other rites.

Religious tolerance is measured by two indicators, too: tolerance toward non-religious behaviours and secular attitudes. The first indicator is composed of four items: “how do you encounter with an unveiled lady (Bad Hejab)?”, “how with friendship between boys and girls?”, “how with mixed party?”, and “how with the strip and illegal movies?” with five options: (1) I intervene, (2) I report to police, (3) I warn, (4) I am opposed to but do not intervene, and (5) never mind. The indicator scores range from 1 (low tolerance) to 5 (high tolerance). The indicator of secular attitudes is composed of four questions, requesting a response regarding the opinion about each phrase: “we must not associate with who is non-religious”, “the religious affiliation must not be considered in employment”, “secular individuals must not be at high position” and “we must prevent non-religious books and movies.” The indicator scores range from 1 (non-secular attitude) to 5 (secular attitude). These variables are mainly at the ordinal level, but are considered interval to calculate the average of a set of them as an indicator of the concepts within this research (this is acknowledged by experts; for example, Borgatta & Bohrnstedt, 1980, pp. 155-160). These indicators construct a continuum from the very religious to non-religious (or secular). (Discussion about the dimensions of religion and its operational aspects is one of the topics in the field of sociology of religion; for example, see Glock & Stark, 1965).

RESULTS

Religiousness

Table 1 indicates that the vast majority of people are religious (they consider themselves religious) and only a little bit (1.4%) consider themselves not religious at all. However, religiousness does not have a uniform distribution, and the majority (58.9%) of people consider themselves somewhat religious, although nearly one-third (29.2%) consider themselves very or very much religious.

This data shows that religiousness is common among people and only very small proportions among them are secular. This finding confirms the first hypothesis that “religiousness is prevalent in Iran’s society”. In other words, the vast majority of people in Iran are religious, although not very religious.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religiousness</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somehow</td>
<td>2698</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4576</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commitment to Practice Religious Rulings, Duties, and Rites

Obligatory prayer, which is the most important religious obligation in Islam, is also largely prevalent among people. Table
Religiousness and the Impact of Education on It in Iran

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obligatory pray</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most often</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4551</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Histogram of religious rituals

Religious Tolerance

The two indicators of religious tolerance suggest the prevalent of it among Iranian’s people. Figure 2 indicates a broad tolerance with non-religious behaviours. Also, figure 3 shows that the secular attitude is relatively common among people. Thus, these findings confirm our Third hypothesis, that religious tolerance is prevalent in Iran’s society.
Religiousness and Education

As Table 3 shows, there is a negative correlation between religiousness and education (r = -.172). This means that with increasing education, the religiousness decreases. Also, here is seen the inverse relation between religious practices and education (r = -.100), which means that with increasing education, the level of...
commitment to religious duties decreases. Again, as expected, there is a reversed correlation between the religious rituals and education \((r = -0.114)\). These findings confirm forth hypothesis, “religiousness has an inverse relation with education”. Education plays a role, however small, in the secularisation of people.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Religiousness</th>
<th>Obligatory pray</th>
<th>Ritual</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
<th>Secular Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4576</td>
<td>4539</td>
<td>4565</td>
<td>4539</td>
<td>4556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All Correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

On the other hand, as seen in Table 3, there is a positive correlation between education and tolerance toward non-religious behaviours and secular attitudes \((r = 0.168)\), as well as between education and secular attitudes \((r = 0.239)\). This means, as expected, that education plays a role in religious tolerance and secularisation of people.

DISCUSSION

The findings of this study indicate that the Iranian people mostly believe in religion. This is just according to Burger’s argument that the people of the world are generally religious. The religious beliefs are prevalent among the Iranian people, because in Iran, like most of non-European societies, there is not a strong force such as Enlightenment subculture to struggle with religious beliefs.

However, religious tolerance is prevalent among Iranians, too. People mostly tolerate non-religious behaviours. Also, secular attitudes are relatively common among people. These findings are in line with Berger’s pluralism theory which argues that modernity leads to pluralism as people are confronted with different religions and perspectives.

This leads to unreliability in religious affairs, and inevitably, people do not resort to religious interpretations in their everyday lives and tends to deal with many issues by a secular approach.

Anyway, the general prevailing religious beliefs among people generally prevent social variables from playing a role in religiousness, with the exemption of education. The findings show that education has an inverse relation, though weak, with religiousness and a direct relation with religious tolerance in Iran. These correlations are also in line with Berger’s view that there is an internationally secular subculture which is carried out by the western-educated proportions of population. He sees education as one of the main processes of modernity forcing religion out of much of the institutional order. The empirical researches confirm this sort of correlation, too. For example, James Leuba (1916; 1934) shows in the early twentieth century that scientists have less religious
beliefs than ordinary people and the gap will grow over time. Larson and Witham (1998) show that almost all leading natural scientists are atheist. Ecklund and Scheitle (2007) show that academics in the natural and social sciences are less religious than general public. Pahlevan Sharif and Ong (2018) show that education weakens the relationship between spirituality and the quality of life and stress.

CONCLUSION

The idea of the decline of religion is traced back to the Enlightenment, when it is thought the spread of science makes the scientific (natural) replace the supernatural (religious). By the 1950s and 1960s, this idea evolved into secularisation theory, which claimed that modernity necessarily leads to secularisation, a process by which sectors of society and culture are released from the domination of religious institutions and meanings. Secularisation is a decline in religion in the minds of individuals, which means that individuals do not resort to the interpretation of religion for their behaviour and thoughts.

However, some decades later, and following the rise of religious movements around the world, the theory of desecularisation emerged, holding that the contemporary world, with few exceptions (a tiny layer of educated Western Europe and worldwide) is as religious as it was in the past. The experimental data on Iran informs this view: almost all people recognise themselves as religious, although most people consider themselves somewhat religious, and just under a third of people consider themselves very religious.

Modernity may not necessarily lead to secularisation, but it ends the religious monopoly and leads to pluralisation in contemporary societies the consequence of which is religious tolerance (less adherence to those beliefs and rituals). The empirical data show that religious practice (duties and rituals) is common among people, but not as highly as before. Instead, tolerance is generally accepted in dealing with seemingly non-religious behaviours.

Moreover, since science is a purely secular view and there is a secular international subculture among a small group of the educated around the world, the authors speculate that education makes people rather secular. Again, the findings support this hypothesis. On the one hand, religion is related inversely to education: religiousness decreases with the increase in education. Also, the generalisation of religious practices has an inverse relationship with education. On the other hand, religious tolerance (tolerance in dealing with seemingly non-religious social behaviours as well as people) is directly related to education as religious tolerance increases with the increase in education.

However, in all cases, the role of education in undermining religious orientations and creating secular attitudes among people is minor. As a result, it can be said that education has a role in the secularisation of minds, but this role is not great.
REFERENCES


Altruism among Iranian Families a Trend Study in Tehran

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ABSTRACT

Altruism is a voluntary action aiming to help others without reward expectation. In this type of action, the individual cares for others’ interests rather than those of his own. This type of behaviour that goes beyond social norms falls into the sphere of morality. The frequency of such actions in society promises ethical behaviour. In this regard, the role of the family as one of the most important agents of socialisation is highlighted. This article seeks to examine altruism among the Iranian families and show its process of change over a decade (from 2005 to 2015). The findings of a longitudinal study were used to achieve this objective. This survey was done in 2005, for the first time, and was repeated in 2015, for the second time, in two developed and less developed regions of Tehran, using cluster sampling. The results show that the number of people showing altruistic actions declined by 7 percent between 2005 and 2015 (from 26 percent to 19.2 percent). The number of people having high altruistic attitudes was higher in 2005 compared to 2015 (90.9 percent versus 86.6 percent). Also, the number of people with high cultural capital was more in 2005 compared to 2015. Accordingly, altruism among Tehranian citizens has declined within a decade, while the economic and social capital has slightly increased. In both surveys, there is a noteworthy relationship between social capital and altruistic attitudes with altruistic actions, specifically regarding marital status.

Keywords: Altruistic action, altruistic attitude, cultural capital, economic capital, social capital

INTRODUCTION

Altruism is a voluntary action done to help others without the expectation of reciprocity or compensation. In this type of action, the individual places the interests of others before his or her own. The person who does altruistic actions goes beyond social
relations corresponding to social norms and social responsibilities into the realm of morality. Altruistic actions can be done in temporary and stable forms. In the first type, the person may have an accidental altruistic action, but in the second type, he or she acquires an altruistic worldview. These people create patterns, which are not based on social norms, but on beliefs and values that are intrinsic to the worldview. The scope of altruistic worldview is all humanity, not a small insider group.

According to Rushton (1981), a person who has an altruistic worldview internalises universal standards of justice, social responsibility, moral reasoning, and wisdom. He or she empathises with the pains of others. This gives the person an emotional and motivational perspective to the world. He or she is motivated to do things like helping the poor, providing peace for others, and saving others from adverse conditions (Anderson, 1989). Based on Daniel Baston’s researches, helping others may have altruistic or selfish motivations (Batson, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). Baston believes that the person who reacts to others’ pain has selfish motives to alleviate his own pains.

Accordingly, altruistic actions help the individual committing the actions achieve peace rather than being focused on the needy person. Archer (1981) established a link between motivation, helping others, and sympathy. He believes a selfish desire to avoid others’ negative judgments is a motivation for altruistic actions (Anderson, 1989). However, the altruistic action itself is important regardless of many motives. In other words, the functions and consequences of altruistic actions are more important than the motives. The presence of these actions in the community promises moral behaviours, and the lack of them is a threat to social order. Family is one of the institutions that teaches these behaviours. Family as the primary institution of socialisation plays a key role in the development and institutionalisation of moral and altruistic actions. Therefore, successful family life increases the occurrence of such behaviours. Many studies confirm the above claim (Einolf, 2006; Wilson, 2000).

Some studies indicate that married people are more likely to perform altruistic actions than singles (Einolf, 2006). This seems to also be true for people having more children than those having no children (Einolf, 2006).

Accordingly, it is proved that the more nuclear a family, and the more people and children born in the family, the higher the probability that altruistic actions will occur. This paper is primarily aimed at examining the status of altruism among married, single, and divorced or widowed Tehranian people in the developed and underdeveloped regions, and explains altruism among these three groups.

MATERIALS AND METHOD
Altruism is a voluntary action done to help others without expectation of reciprocity or compensation. In this type of action, the individual places the interests of others before his or her own. The person who
Altruism among Iranian Families

does altruistic actions go beyond social relations corresponding to social norms and social responsibilities into the realm of morality. Different theoretical approaches have investigated the concept of altruism from diverse perspectives.

**Sociological Approach**

**Rational Actor Theories**

Rational actor theories maintain that human beings are profit-driven by nature. Some theorists believe that altruistic actions are in fact self-interest. According to them, the purpose of helping others is social prestige. Some other rational choice theorists argue that people may not expect material rewards, but do gain internal emotional rewards by helping; the positive feeling of emotional solidarity with the helped person, and the avoidance of the emotional costs of feeling pity or guilt that would come with not helping (Einolf, 2006). Many rational actor theorists argue against the existence of pure altruism by pointing out that all helping behaviours bring the helper either a material or psychological reward, but Mansbridge (1990), working from a rational-actor perspective, argues that the mere existence of some reward does not render a helping behaviour non-altruistic. As Mansbridge points out, it would be surprising indeed if helping behaviours were not usually rewarded; since helping behaviour is beneficial to the functioning of a society, it is rational for societies to reward helping behaviour when it occurs (Schervish & Havens, 2002). Some rational actor theorists try to explain altruistic behaviour through “identification theory”, which argues that altruistic acts are rational because altruistic people identify strongly with others. According to this theory, individuals who give to others are engaging in a rational, self-interested act, as they are giving to an extended version of themselves (Schervish & Havens, 2002).

Monroe (1996) offers a more sophisticated version of this, arguing that the single distinguishing characteristic of altruistic individuals is a universalistic moral perspective. Monroe states that altruistic people view all humankind as members of their moral and social community. Whereas typical individuals consider themselves morally obligated only to help family members and close friends, altruists consider themselves to be morally obligated to help all people. Because altruists identify all human beings as an extension of their family or their “self”, their helping behaviours are a self-interested and rational action (Einolf, 2006, p. 13).

**Social Exchange Theories**

Social exchange theorists regard rewarding as a form of social exchange that facilitates social solidarity and creates a hierarchy of power. The most useful theory of gift-giving as social exchange is that of Blau (1964), who sees helping behaviour as a type of social exchange which both creates social solidarity and places an obligation upon the recipient of the help to reciprocate in the future (Einolf, 2006).
Collins and Hickman (1991), working from the standpoint of conflict theory, propose a similar theory of charitable action, arguing that participation in charitable activities is the primary means of “status legitimation” in societies that lack a single dominant religion. While the desire for prestige and power motivates some giving and helping behaviours, social exchange theory can point to another motivation for altruistic action, that of generalised reciprocal obligation. The term “generalised reciprocal obligation” describes the feeling that some individuals have that they are obligated to make a repayment for the good fortune that they have received in life. To these people, assets and good fortune are a blessing from God or society; since there is not a possibility of compensation to the source of this good, they try to help others to compensate for this blessing indirectly (Einolf, 2006).

**Biological Approach**

Altruistic behaviour can be argued to originate both at the beginning of the human lifespan and from the beginning of human history (Huneycutt, 2013). Rushton and Sorrentino (1981) define altruism as sympathetic instincts correlated with the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin. Darwin’s theory “proposed that humans were biologically disposed to behave socially, cooperatively, and helpfully to one another” (Anderson, 1989; Rushton & Sorrentino, 1981).

In their book, *Super Cooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed*, Nowak and Highfield (2011) argue that cooperation was and is necessary for human survival. They propose that in addition to mutation, competition, and natural selection, cooperation was a major player in the evolution of man. Just as humans are wired to compete, humans are also wired to cooperate, and helping each other could therefore be something human beings are driven to do. The ability to cooperate is presented as a major reason human beings were able to survive in a variety of climates and compete with a variety of other species arguably more physically suited to survival (Huneycutt, 2013; Nowak & Highfield, 2011). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest cooperative and altruistic behaviour begins very early in life and appears to be intrinsically motivated (Huneycutt, 2013, p. 9).

Developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello argues that human altruistic behaviour is intrinsically motivated from infancy. Multiple trials observing infant helping behaviour found that neither the addition of tangible rewards or prompting from mothers increases the helping behaviours of infants, suggesting that such behaviour is intrinsically rewarding (Huneycutt, 2013).

According to some theorists, motivation to participate in altruistic activities, including volunteering, has been found to be higher when the participant takes part for intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, reasons. Warneken and
Tomasello (2008) found that the addition of extrinsic rewards for altruistic behaviour led infants to help less than they had when there was no reward (Huneycutt, 2013).

Another biological explanation of altruism states that a sacrifice done by altruism is not a sacrifice but an investment in a system of interdependence that maximises an altruist’s genetic compatibility. Such behaviour challenges the theories claiming different species evolve because climate change maximises genetic adaptation. Efforts to link altruism with gene selection theory indicate that altruists maintain genetic compatibility by helping those who have a genetic link with them or are trying to preserve the species to which they belong (Edwards Wynne, 1962).

A limitation of these two approaches is that sometimes the people receiving help are genetically like the helper. Evolutionary research forms a useful background for this study, but is of limited use in explaining variations among individuals in the level of altruistic motivation or action. Since all human beings evolved from primate ancestors, evolutionary theories cannot explain why some individuals act differently from others, the focus of this dissertation (Einolf, 2006).

**Psychological Approach**

The psychological approach maintains that the biological basis for altruistic actions is not essential. Psychologists do not involve themselves with the survival of altruism in natural species. Several theories of social psychology seek to fill the void of biological approaches. With an emphasis on social learning and the role of parents, they explain the difference in people’s altruistic actions. According to the learning theory, people learn to help by getting a boost and seeing others help. Psychologists have examined the experiences of early childhood, particularly focusing on parenting styles and how moral norms are learned from parents, schools, religious institutions, and the community. These childhood experiences and influences motivate adult altruistic behaviour through the development of empathy, and through the development of internalised moral norms of helping (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1989; Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989; Lapsley, 1996).

Wuthnow (1985) found that school clubs, community organisations, and religious organisations were all important in teaching moral norms of helping and recruiting young people to the actual practice of volunteer work (Einolf, 2006).

Researchers have argued about the importance of characteristics of parents and norms learned in childhood affecting altruistic behaviours in adulthood. Colby and Damon (1992) criticise the emphasis on characteristics of parents and childhood experiences, and state that the choices people make in adulthood, the self-reinforcing nature of altruistic behaviour, and the lifelong development of a moral orientation are more key factors than childhood experiences in determining altruistic behaviour. Wuthnow (1985) goes farther, postulating that nearly all people learn basic values of caring in childhood, and that service experiences in adolescence
and early adulthood are the determining factors in adulthood altruistic behaviour (Einolf, 2006).

However, Mustillo, Wilson and Lynch (2004) found that parental modelling of volunteering has a considerable influence on the volunteering habits of young adults, but not at later stages of life.

In other words, in the process of re-socialisation that usually follows the stage of adolescence, the role of institutions of socialisation, such as schools, media, and peer groups, are more important than family. In other words, the role of social networks is more prominent than family in the process of re-socialisation. People who participate in various social networks develop social awareness. These people have a higher social capital that increases the probability of altruistic actions. Wilson and Musick (1997) focused on the impact of social and cultural capital on altruistic actions. They define social capital as the access to social networks that help people learn charitable deeds and cultural capital as the skills and education of the person. Bourdieu worked on cultural and social capital while he believed the two are determined by economic capital (Einolf, 2006).

These are noteworthy points investigated in this paper. The authors examined the role of economic, social, and cultural capital and altruistic attitude on altruistic actions of three groups of people of Tehran: married, single, and divorced or widowed.

**Hypotheses**

There is a significant relationship between marital status and altruistic action.

There is a significant relationship between social capital and altruistic action based on marital status.

There is a significant relationship between altruistic attitude and altruistic action based on marital status.

There is a significant relationship between cultural capital and altruistic action based on marital status.

There is a significant relationship between economic capital and altruistic action based on marital status.

**Validity and Reliability**

In order to measure and evaluate the ultimate questionnaire, 30 primary questionnaires were distributed among respondents and pre-test was done; lastly, the outputs were examined and scales were finalized.

Construct and face validity were used to evaluate the validity and reliability of the research. Factors of the variables were identified using factor analysis and varimax rotation, consistent with and derived from theoretical discussions. The factor analysis determines validity and supports reliability of the research. Factor loadings, which show the correlation of each item with the desired factor or scale, are mentioned in the table of operational definition of variables. To determine face validity, viewpoints of several social scientists and teachers were asked, and the questionnaire was finalised after two pre-tests.
The population, sample size and sampling method

The population was selected based on the 2005 study of the index of development of twenty-two districts of Tehran, from men and women 18 years old and above, from regions 3 and 19 as the least and most developed districts of Tehran. The sample size was 419 and calculated using the Cochran formula. In 2015, the research was conducted with the same sample size and multi-stage cluster sampling in four stages as follows:

First: Choosing two regions from existing districts of Tehran based on development index.
Second: Selecting several apartment blocks from each district randomly based on a random numbers table.
Third: Selecting households from the residents of each block from the list.
Fourth: Choosing eligible people from the sample households.

Operational and Theoretical Definitions

Altruism is a voluntary action done to help others without expectation of reciprocity or compensation. In this type of action an individual places the interests of others before his or her own. The person who does altruistic actions goes beyond social relations corresponding to social norms and social responsibilities into the realm of morality. Generalised emotional attachment and generalised commitment are dimensions of altruism. Items in the Likert scale would assess the scale.

Economic Capital

Economic capital describes financial resources possible to convert into cash and institutionalised in the form of property rights (Smith, 2001). Economic capital is the total assets that determine the economic power. This concept is investigated by asking about the income, house, and vehicle.

Social Capital

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources linked to possession of a durable network of institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu, 1986; Field, 2003). Putnam (2000), Effeh, and Fuches views on the dimensions of social capital, and three-dimensional association binds, consciousness, and generalised trust were considered. Items of the scale were assessed using a Likert scale.

Cultural Capital

Cultural capital is the aggregate of relationships and knowledge and privileges that the individual acquires in the process

In this article the likert scale number is 1=too high, 2=high, 3=moderate, 4=low, 5=too low. According to this scale, low number means high altruism or social capital, and so on. Moreover, in scales, for instance, if we had 4 items, the minimum was 4 and the maximum was 20. Accordingly, 4-10=high and too high, 11-13=moderate, and 14-20=low and too low.
of socialisation from family and formal education and helps to achieve or maintain social status. Three forms, “objectified”, “embodied”, and “institutionalised” states, are considered for cultural capital. Questions in a Likert scale were used to measure the scale.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

It is a survey; research and data were collected using questionnaires. The hypotheses were tested using one-way ANOVA and LSD test.

According to data obtained, 52.5 percent of respondents in 2005 and 51 percent in 2015 were female. 47.8 percent of respondents in 2005 and 49 percent in 2015 were male. The age range of respondents in 2005 was from 17 to 89 years old and in 2015 from 17 to 81. Age was categorised into three groups: 17-29 (young), 30-50 (middle-aged), and 51-89 (old). In the 2005 sample, 44.2 percent of respondents were 17 to 29 years old, 35.6 percent were 30 to 50 years old, and 2.20 percent were 51 to 89. In the 2015 sample, 36.8 percent of respondents were 17 to 29 years old, 35.6 percent were 30 to 50 years old, and 2.20 percent were 51 to 89. In the 2005 sample, 39.3 percent were single, 57.3 percent were married, and 3.4 percent were divorced or widowed. In the 2015 sample, 32.7 percent were single, 65 percent were married, and 2.3 percent divorced or widowed.

The educational status of 34.6 percent of the respondents in 2005 was bachelor’s degree. In 2015, 42.3 percent of the respondents had a bachelor’s degree, which was the most frequent answer among respondents. In the 2005 sample, 41.1 percent of the respondents were employed, 6.24 percent were housewives, 16.4 percent were students, 8.9 percent were retired, 8.7 percent were unemployed, and 0.2 percent of respondents marked the option “none”. In the 2015 sample, 44.6 percent of respondents were employed, 28 percent were housewives, 15.3 percent were students, 6.6 percent were retired, 5.3 percent were unemployed, and 0.3 percent marked the option “none”.

In the 2005 sample, among 170 employed respondents, 15.5 percent had education jobs, 5.9 percent had technical jobs, 22.6 percent had administrative jobs, 1.2 percent had farming and gardening jobs, 13.1 percent were workers, 8.3 percent had high ranking jobs, and 2 people did not mention their jobs. In the 2015 sample, among 170 employed respondents, 8.9 percent had education jobs, 22.2 percent had technical jobs, 8.27 percent had administrative jobs, 11.2 percent were shopkeepers, 15.4 percent were workers, and 10.1 percent had high ranking jobs.

Final Description of the Main Indicators
Results of the two surveys show that the number of people performing altruistic actions has declined by 7 percent from 2005 to 2015 (26 percent in 2005 and 19.2 percent in 2015). The number of people having high altruistic attitudes in 2005 was more than that of 2015 (90.9 percent versus 86.6 percent). Also, the number of people with high social and economic capital in 2015 is slightly higher than that of 2005, while the number of people with high cultural capital in 2005 was more than that of 2015. Accordingly, altruism among Tehranian citizens has declined within a decade, while the economic and social capital has slightly increased.

Statistical Relationships

First hypothesis: there is a significant relationship between marital status and altruistic action.

Table 1
Distribution of participants in terms of the main indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>408</td>
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<td>397</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social Capital</td>
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<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cultural Capital</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Economic Capital</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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</table>

Table 2
Altruistic action and marital status

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<td>Percent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
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<td>83</td>
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<td>Divorced or widowed</td>
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<td>42.9</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marital status 2015</td>
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<td>Single</td>
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<td>Married</td>
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<td>Divorced or widowed</td>
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</table>
Data from Table 2 shows that there is a significant difference between altruistic behaviours of the respondents based on their marital status in both surveys. Based on data from both surveys, altruism among single people is lower than married and widowed or divorced people. The findings of both surveys show that in a period of ten years, altruism among married and unmarried people has declined, although more severely for married than singles. The rate of married people having high altruism has dropped from 31.2 percent to 20 percent, from 2005 to 2015, and the percentage of married people having low altruism has risen from 33.3 percent to 47.1 percent. According to chi-square test in two surveys (2005-2015), altruistic action and marital status are not independent of each other and there is correlation between them. One-way ANOVA testing shows that the hypothesis is confirmed at a 99 percent confidence level. Sheffeh & LSD post-hoc show that altruism of single and married people is different significantly but there is no significant difference between them and divorced or widowed people.

Second hypothesis: there is a significant relationship between social capital and altruistic action based on marital status.

Table 3
Impact of social capital on altruistic action based on marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>High</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20.0</td>
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<td>23.6</td>
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<td>Percentage</td>
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<td>25.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td>16.8</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>26</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The data from two surveys shows that in 2005, 83.3 percent of singles with high social capital had moderate altruism while 16.7 percent of singles with high social capital had low altruism. Also in 2005, 78.9 percent of married people with high social capital had high altruism, 10.5 percent moderate, and 10.5 percent had low altruism. In 2015, 60 percent of singles with high social capital had low altruism and 40 percent of them had moderate altruism. Also in 2015, 15.4 percent of married people with high social capital had low altruism, 23 percent had moderate altruism, and 61.5 percent had high altruism. Based on the results of both surveys, altruistic action was significantly related to social capital according to marital status.

**Third hypothesis:** there is a significant relationship between altruistic attitude and altruistic action based on marital status.
Table 4
Altruistic attitudes and altruistic action based on marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Altruistic action</th>
<th>Altruistic attitude</th>
<th>Spearman Correlation &amp; Kendall’s tau-b</th>
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<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Moderate</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Frequency</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Married</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divorced or widowed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Frequency</td>
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<td>Percentage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2015, 57 percent of single people with “Agree” on altruistic attitudes had low altruistic actions, 23 percent had moderate altruistic actions, and 20 percent had high altruistic actions. Generally, in 2005, 27 percent of people with “Agree” position on altruistic attitudes had low altruistic actions, 33 percent had moderate and 40 percent had high altruistic action. Also, generally in 2015, 49 percent
of people with “Agree” altruistic position had low altruistic actions, 31 percent had moderate and 20 percent had high altruistic action. Statistical tests suggest a significant relationship between altruistic attitude and altruistic action in both surveys.

**Fourth hypothesis:** there is a significant relationship between cultural capital and altruistic action based on marital status.

### Table 5

*Cultural capital and altruistic action based on marital status*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Altruistic action</th>
<th>Cultural Capital</th>
<th>Spearman Correlation &amp; Kendall’s tau-b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Percentage</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
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</table>
Results of the two surveys show there is not a significant relationship between cultural capital and altruistic action based on marital status.  

Fifth hypothesis: there is a significant relationship between economic capital and altruistic action based on marital status.

Table 6
Economic capital and altruistic action based on marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Altruistic action</th>
<th>Economic capital</th>
<th>Spearman Correlation &amp; Kendall’s tau-b</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Percentage</td>
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</table>
According to data from both surveys, there is not a significant relationship between altruistic action and economic capital based on marital status.

CONCLUSION

Altruism is a voluntary action aiming to help others without expectation of reward. In this type of action, the individual cares for others’ interests rather than those of his or her own. This type of behaviour goes beyond social norms and social relations of social responsibility and falls into the sphere of morality. In other words, a person behaving pro-socially puts himself in another person’s shoes. The frequency of such actions in the society promises ethical behaviour, and the lack of it is a threat to social order. In this regard, the role of the family as one of the most important agents of socialisation is highlighted. Children mimic many right and wrong behaviours of their parents in observational learning. Therefore, parents with altruism have children with such behaviours. The main conclusion of this article is:

Results of the two surveys show that the number of people having altruistic actions has declined by 7 percent from 2005 to 2015. The number of people with high altruistic attitudes in 2005 was more than that of 2015. It shows that the gap between morals and ethics has been increased in that decade. The decrease of altruistic actions threatens social order. The increase of egoism, instrumental rationality and bureaucratisation of human relationships have influenced caused the declining altruistic actions.

Also, the number of people with high social and economic capital in 2015 is slightly higher than that of 2005, while the number of people with high cultural capital in 2005 is more than that of 2015. Accordingly, altruism among Tehranian citizens has declined within a decade, while the economic and social capital has slightly increased.

Based on data from both surveys, altruism among single people is lower than married and widowed or divorced people. This result is similar to the findings of some researches like Wilson and Musick (1997), Rotolo (2000), and Einolf (2006). This seems to also be true for people having more children than those having no children (Smith, 2001).

The findings of both surveys show that in a period of ten years, altruism among married and unmarried people has declined, although more severely for married than singles.

The rate of married people having high altruism dropped between 2005 and 2015, while the percentage of married people having low altruism has risen in this decade. The data from two surveys show that in 2005, 83.3 percent of singles with high social capital had moderate altruism. 16.7 percent of singles with high social capital had low altruism. 78.9 percent of married people with high social capital had high altruism, 10.5 percent had moderate altruism, and 10.5 percent had low altruism.

In 2015, 60 percent of singles with high social capital had low altruism and 40 percent had moderate altruism. 15.4
percent of married people with high social capital had low altruism, 23 percent had moderate altruism, and 61.5 percent had high altruism. Based on the results of both surveys, altruistic action was significantly related to social capital according to marital. According to Putnam (2000) social networks and associations encourage charitable and philanthropic activities. This networks reinforce empathy and consider the welfare and comfort of others. In his view, the active people in these networks more than nonactives allocate their money and time to charity affairs. Generally, in 2005, 27 percent of people with “Agree” altruistic attitudes had low altruistic actions, 33 percent had moderate and 40 percent had high altruistic action. Also, generally in 2015, 49 percent of people with “Agree” altruistic attitudes had low altruistic actions, 31 percent had moderate and 20 percent had high altruistic action. Statistical tests suggest the significant relationship between altruistic attitude and altruistic action in both surveys.

REFERENCES


Women’s Reflexive Identity and Spirituality Case Study: Iranian Employed, Degree-holder Women

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ABSTRACT

The massive entrance of Iranian women into the labour market and higher education has formed a type of women’s experience of modernity in Iran, which is followed by many consequences for women who are both educated and employed. Women with traditional identities and roles, above all, were defined within the home environment and with traditional sexual roles. It was within this traditional framework that most important religious socialisation and practices of women were defined. The main subject of the present article is the consequence of women’s reflexive identity on their religious and spiritual identity. For this purpose, interviews and ethnographic methods were used. The reflexive identity of Iranian women has led them to move out of traditional roles and find a combination of traditional roles (housekeeping, motherhood, and wife-hood in the traditional sense) and new roles (defined by individualism and realisation of self and reflexive identity) as a result of higher education and employment experiences. Field data indicate the shift by this group of women from traditional spirituality as the realm dominated by traditional religious institutions to modern spirituality and consequential redefinition of individual assignments and inner life accordingly. The results show that Iranian women’s choice to achieve social ideals through education and employment and by following the principle to consecrate life have transformed the spiritual aspects of their lives.

Keywords: Female identity, higher education, reflexivity, spirituality

INTRODUCTION

Women, Cultural Changes, and Religious Identity

Identity is a dynamic process constructed diversely in various layers and forms and is
constantly relative and transient. Meanwhile, social identity cannot be reduced to a single fixed form because the entire socio-cultural factors can exert great impact on our identity through the processes and the ways in which various identity resources influence us. This was the concern of various investigations in contexts where cultural transformation is on the agenda. This phenomenon is more tangible in Iran where women encounter broad socio-cultural transformations due to their novel experiences in education and employment.

Religion, as an institution, shapes one of the identity’s central resources and make up the religious and spiritual layers of both individual and social identity. Religious experiences are considered among the main influential elements on women’s identity experiences. If we accept religious and spiritual principles as temporary and inconsistent resources, then we expect to observe diverse categories of religious acts. Religious conceptual frameworks demonstrate relative and, at times, fundamental transformations that are indicative of corresponding transformations in religious outlooks as a result of applying process-oriented conceptions of identity that emphasise the mutual impacts of structure and action.

Because transformations in various social strata could influence the individual and social dimensions of women’s identity, intensity of religious and spiritual identity could crystallise the ways in which this construct could transform. In other words, this aspect of women’s identity has, in the meantime, encountered and challenged many transformations daily. Women’s identity expansion and boundaries have transformed greatly and were investigated pluralistically. However, in the current study, we focus on the ways that women reflect on traditional identity and its connections to their personal reflection on this identity. On the one hand, religious identity could be reflected as a principle of social identity in analysing the ways that women’s new identities are constructed. Intellectual development, inclusive of religiosity and spirituality, could influence the social transformation. Various studies have demonstrated the significant relationship between religion and identity. These studies reveal that religiosity plays a major role in diverse aspects of commitment by and determination of identity, which is more robust in modern times compared to the past (Oppong, 2013).

Social Identity: Discourse of Religion and Society

Considering diverse theories on religion, religiosity, and its various categorisation for the study on individuals and communities, there is not a universal criterion in relation to the form and extent of religiosity. Here, we evaluate women’s religiosity with emphasis on Glock and Stark’s (1966) theory where women’s own perception of spirituality and religiosity are taken into account. Social actors experience religious identity through beliefs, rituals, religious experiences and knowledge, and
its consequences (Khodayarifard et al., 2012). This was prominent in our religious approach to the Iranian Muslim women and was investigated previously from another perspective (Rafat Jah & Rouhafza, 2012). Various studies have explored the effect of globalisation on religious identity and have observed its effects on diverse dimensions of religiosity. Components of globalisation challenge religious identity as a result of expanding people’s experiences. This informs the transformation (Tajik Esmaeili & Tajik Esmaeili, 2015).

Women’s view on their own religious identity is modified by social, individual, gender-based, and structural positions and situations. The structural factors and the multiple social roles are influential in eliminating gender-based discrimination. In addition, education and employment result in women’s participation in socio-economic realms beyond the confines of their home. All of these have contributed to the relearning of a woman’s identity (Safiri & Nematollahi, 2012, p. 29). Women’s new experiences have made them aware and transformed their traditional perspectives about the ideal woman through the gaining of new ideals and values. The variety of women’s social roles and the expansion of social experiences have formed a proper backdrop to reflect on women’s religious and traditional roles and identities.

Higher education is one of the novel experiences that change women’s perception of life. The experience of student life in university is one of the factors that contribute to the development of individuality because of independence (Dehghani et al., 2015). Over the past decades, scholars like Michele (1968-1976) have rejected the idea of stable orientations and personality characteristics. They have observed behaviours as personal expectation and explanations, with an emphasis on cognitive and social learning rather than the qualities of a fixed personality Inglehart. Other studies on the relationship of education and religious attitudes indicate that personal attitudes toward religion, in terms of traditional definitions, are decreased with the increase in education. Higher educational levels, such as undergraduate or graduate studies, generally reduce women’s religious attitudes. If we accept social identity as an interactive process that is reconstructed in all spheres of life, then religious transformation is also indispensable. Every religious identity frame is also subject to culture. In such a perspective, religious identity is social and constructed.

Religion introduces a special form of ideology, which, in turn, establishes the value frames for us. All of these religion’s cultural manifestations in the form of rituals are considered as part of religiosity. Religion, as a socio-cultural issue, has a significant relationship with social behaviours through the social construction. On the one hand, religion is the product of culture and, on the other hand, it is the producer of the very same culture (Hamilton, 2008). Weber’s view of
religion as a semiotic system is affected by individual choices (Weber, 1970, p. 122). Accordingly, the cultural phenomena that are the outcome of lived experiences are the same incentives for an individual’s acts and behaviours, where most people are voluntarily engaged. Hence, religion forms the main and most fundamental semiotic resource in people’s daily lives.

Today, it is not acceptable that materialistic values are replaced by the traditional, spiritual ideologies of life. Inglehart, though, recounted three reasons for the decrease of socio-religious and gender-based traditions in modern societies. First, there is an increase in the sense of security, which lowers the need to depend on the absolute norms and people’s need to make sure of the events. Furthermore, there is no need for security due to the regulation in metaphysical perspectives, because all kinds of dispersion essentially result in kinds of insecurity and anxiety. The second reason is the applicability of norms. Its firmness decreases in modern time because most socio-economic dimensions of life is spent outdoors. The educational spaces were transformed via families, and the functionality of the concepts were lost. Therefore, these transformations do not necessarily mean a change in values. People’s opposition to these norms does not suggest they are bad or good as it is not a value decision. These norms could weaken for various reasons. The third reason is the cognitive similarity through which people’s ideology becomes identical with their daily experiences.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The Ethnography of Women Who Seek Transformation

The current study is conducted with an ethnographic approach using deep interviews and participatory observations in the field. Ethnography is not only a data collection method, but a research approach comprised of social understanding and people actions in the field. It is done through its known approach of close relationships and actual participation in people’s lives (Duranti, 1997). Applying an ethnographic approach and grounded theory, the current study investigates women who fulfilled multiple social roles as spouses, mothers, employees, and university students simultaneously. Deep interviews were applied as the main data collection technique, and the interviewee was selected on the basis of theoretical sampling from the city of Tehran. This article emphasises women as active and reflective subjects and acknowledges their creativity. Through targeted sampling, the experience of 35 women and their ways of religious identity construction were analysed. First, data were examined and textually categorised through comparison to reach the frequency of concepts. Then, data were codified through the process of representation. Open-ended interviews were applied to make people free in narrating
their personal life experiences. Encouraging people to talk was very crucial in this study, so the interviews were open-ended to make participants feel free to articulate their own feelings.

The subjects of the study were 30-year-old women who have fulfilled several social roles at the same time. They were randomly chosen without considering their university majors and school campus. Finally, we focused on understanding women’s religious identity transformation after graduation and in response to the role system, and we reached it through the grounded theory approach with the aim of building a conceptual framework (Corbin & Strauss, 2013). To analyse the data, we used the approach of open, central codification. First, we examined the data and textually categorised them. Then, the codification and data reduction were applied (Table 1).

In the final stages of data analysis, these categories, strategies, the intervening conditions, and their consequences were modelled three-dimensionally to form the theoretical model of the research (Figure 1). Codifications of categories were represented as “women’s reflexive identity in redefining spirituality”. The study enjoys an analytic paradigm that helps the collection and maintenance of data to make sure the structure and process go hand in hand.

Women in this study included middle class, Iranian women living in Tehran, who grew up in a traditional women identity process, in homes and environments dominated by the Iranian traditional culture. These women also had religious parents. These women went to school and were married at the age of 17. Their marriages were arranged by their families and parents. Therefore, their main space for individual and social identity was indoors. Home was the main context for their identity construction. After doing interview, we used coding strategy to identify main codes and make the final theoretical model. This model should explain the impact of reflexive identity on women’s spiritual identity.

**Multiple roles: Motherhood, employee and student**

Bahareh, the 37-year-old graduate student of economics and university teacher, stated that, “My husband has never helped me in the household chores because he has his own beliefs in this regard, and he believes that the household woman should be feminine, and husbands should be masculine. I did not have a problem with this matter, as from childhood, I have seen my mother do all the tasks without any difficulty. I was raised in a religious, extended, and large family. Nothing was surprising or new to me. I only had to do my housework chores in the best possible way through my household management, for which I was empowered”. The girl’s identity after marriage, the identity of a woman, a wife, and a mother is constructed for her through family and the encompassing social systems. Throughout the study, the term traditional
identity refers to the traditional approach to identity construction in the home that includes female traditional roles.

These women personally decided to continue their education based on their situations. Their studies were approved and supported by their husbands originally, but later resulted in their husbands’ covert discontent because the gradual engagements in education made these women fall behind in household chores and taking care of the children. These women were employed in low-ranking jobs and could gradually manage to pass graduate and PhD studies. These two experiences have taken them out of the confinements of the home and allowed them to experience modern new roles. Fariba, a 35-year-old graduate student employed in a magazine, believes that, “Maybe the working condition has tempted me not to back off, because I felt an emptiness in the working environment and I had to work hard for my personal improvement. At first, this was really difficult. My husband used to tell me that he would help me, but he did not ever help through this. First, he told me that he would support me but, practically, he did nothing to help. This was really difficult until my kid grew and I started my MA studies. At one moment, I was on the verge of quitting my studies because my husband did not cooperate with me”. Such transformation from indoor spaces to university and employment outdoors is the main root of these women’s identity transformation in various dimensions.

From these women’s perspectives, the “primary identity” is constructed through family, friends, schooling, and experiencing the institutionalised female roles as mothers and wives. The hybrid identity is rooted in mental aspects of value, with an emphasis on collective norms, and in terms of feelings, based on family and kinship, and interaction between the roles of mother and wife, the dominant stereotypic norms.

“The secondary identity” is also the identity constructed through women’s social participation in educational and working roles. It is the continuation of the primary identity and a combination of the primary identity and women’s voluntarily roles, which are mentally based on a self-governed constructed identity, values and personal norms, and are sensationaly in compliance with eminence and personal development.

In fact, “role” and “space”, in a concurrent combination, construct the fundamentals of primary and secondary identities. Nonetheless, we do not accept the inevitable overlap of all modern and traditional identities due to the existing contradiction of women’s identity segregation in a stereotypic dichotomous division of identity into traditional and modern. However, our justification of such division is that it classifies women’s interaction with two roles of mother and wife in the primary identity and a social
role in the secondary one. A role border of being wife and mother in a social process is determined and simultaneously selective and voluntary. This means that within the traditional frame of identity, women consider marriage and childbearing as social imperatives and the ideal form of identity, while in the secondary identity, they continue to experience the traditional roles but in a whole new selective and voluntary process.

Women have turned their homes into the optimal form through their institutionalised roles of wife and mother and have started to create their own secondary identities from within the very same space and role. In their secondary identity, women choose a new approach to their social identity construction as creative, active, and reflective actors.

This identity transformation, especially from the home indoor space to the outdoor space through employment and university, is not suitable politics for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In terms of legislation, all women activities in the realm of employment and education should be in line with their primary objectives of motherhood, being wife, and being confined to the home. From this perspective, family is the fundamental element of the Islamic society and women are its fundamental elements. Therefore, the Islamic constitution has paid specific attention to the issue of family in the detailed negotiations of the Parliament and in the Constitution, Volume 1 (p. 440). Therefore, women’s employment is not appreciated by the Constitution in the sense that women employment may harm their family integrity. The underlying philosophy is recounted in the Council of Experts under the terms of preventing family decline. Therefore, these transformations are to be regarded as enjoying the covert function and the consequence of women’s unnecessary employment and education.

This transformation not only leads to the changes in the individual and social identities, but also has a significant effect on religious transformation and the redefinition of spirituality in women’s mentality and practices. The housewife, within the confines of the home and household interactions, and motherhood, as the source of optimal family identity, are the female desired symbols. The experience of religiosity in such a context and the sacred roles as the construct identity has its roots in religious principles and customs where motherhood is the crucial metaphor of social identity. The cherished principles of the primary identity, which are rooted in religious rituals, are exemplified in motherhood, wifehood, the hijab, observing rituals, and contribution to family peace. Although home is always the suitable stage for this kind of identity, as stated earlier, women’s ideal social expectations are in close proximity and a severe resonator of the primary identity. The simultaneous birth of the ideal socio-cultural stereotypes is formed around the existing social themes and women who have found a novel experience of modernity choose to reflect this by devising novel social approaches.
Table 1
*Main ideas and issues within interviews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Selected Categories</th>
<th>The Main Categories</th>
<th>Open Categories (Second Level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interested in making dreams come true</td>
<td>Interested in education, continual activities, development, success, and understanding the joy of development; likes to prove oneself, searches for a way to turn to oneself, believes in personal capabilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-oriented individualism</td>
<td>No need for others’ help, self-satisfaction, reflexive and re-thinking, individual strategies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal mentality</td>
<td>Voluntarily chooses values and norms, non-accepting of the structural imperatives, interested in innovation and deconstruction, accepting the logical affairs, critiquing the superstitions, norm violation, logical, analytical</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral-oriented</td>
<td>Observance of citizenship rights, human-oriented, responsible, committed, respecting, loyal, uniquely intimate</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>Spiritual beliefs, respectful to others’ sacred things, social respect, welcoming the collective rituals, believes in God and the human mission, thankful to God</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual religious Experiences</td>
<td>Voluntarily participation in religious rituals, redefining religious rituals, intending management of religious feeling, personally prioritizing religious duties</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary identity</td>
<td>The primary sociability (family, school, friends and institutionalised experiences), first experiences of women roles, emphasis on obeying collective norms, relying on family and kinship feelings, obeying the stereotypic norms of mothering</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary identity</td>
<td>Social participation in educational and occupational roles, self-oriented identity, construction of individual values and norms, relying on face logic, critical understanding, following goals and individual development, knowledge-oriented</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary reflection</td>
<td>Inevitable decisions, determining paths to social development, primary reflection, seeking transformation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realised reflection</td>
<td>Self-conscious selection-solving strategies, continual re-thinking, institutionalisation of reflection, realised reflection</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary reflection</td>
<td>Intended acceptance of traditional aspects, synthesis of new and traditional approaches, identity independence, identity balance, relative adherence to value and normative aspects, intending end to the reflection in favour of family and society, committed to social and family stability</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Women’s Religiosity and Reflexive Identity

In this part, we examine the ways religious transformation occurs and the way it is connected to women’s religiosity styles and identity transformation. In other words, we will examine the consequences of religious and spiritual identity through an identity transformation process and women’s experiences with modernity. University was able to direct women to the outdoor spheres through changing their position from women confined within the framework of tradition. Since popular and dominant discourses in science and employment often lead to contest and confusion, women are constantly confronted with numerous identity challenges due to the confrontation of their traditional identity roles and novel identities. Mahsa, a 38-year-old university student of psychology working in municipality believes that, “When you are both employee and student, you naturally come across many obstacles, like when the timing of the class intervenes with your working hours or you may have little time to study, or the works intervene with studies. Most of the time it is the lack of collaboration from your colleagues to take a day off”. Sara, a 37-year-old student of law who works in an insurance company says, “There are lots of universities and there is an easy way to get into the university. I did not want to be humiliated by others, despite all the hardships and difficulties I endured and am satisfied.” Therefore, understanding women’s religious identity from the pool of multiple discourse-based identities in Iran is the important objective of the study.

We can also examine the issue completely regarding these women, too. Popular discourses reproduce women religious identity in terms of what can naturally and normally constitute a proper model of a religious woman. The spiritual identity and its social construction that women choose in terms of the simultaneous undertaking of four respective roles of spouse, mother, employee, and student, and a fragment of identity and the way these women construct their various layers of identity is the primary focus of this article. To know the religious transformation and religiosity styles of women, it is crucial to understand the two types of women’s identities and the ways they are distinguished from one another. Therefore, it is necessary to demarcate them within the identity boundary.

The Experience of Modernity and Reflexivity

In this study, our first priority was to find women’s new identity stimulus and their personal reflection on the traditional roles after fulfilling a) their primary female identity at the beginning of the identity transformation, and b) their reflective identity as its most optimal form. Fatemeh, a 27-year-old woman who pursues her graduate studies in information technology and works as a trade expert, says: “I cannot lock myself up at home to solely to get married and have children. I love to be in
line with society and its developments and I like to improve and live the life I desire”. If we consider this phase as the first stage of reflecting in women’s life, then the second step starts with motivations to freely choose their own role. These choices look minute and consciously decided on, but are, in fact, imperative. Women choose education as a way to prove themselves and to achieve social growth, but continuing their existing roles (spouse, mother, and housekeeper) would contradict employment and university study.

Roya, a 36-year-old woman studying education recounts, “I feel that women find their own identities through working and studying”, although in the end, these efforts and women’s problem-solving strategies lead to reflecting, or the “reflecting identity”, which is constructed as part of the women’s transformed identity. In other words, reflection is a kind of strategy to solve women’s challenges by confronting new roles with traditional ones, a strategy through which the combination of roles and priorities are created so that women are rescued from challenging situations and identity crises. Shima, a 37-year-old student of education and school principal says, “I had many problems in the beginning, but I gradually took control and could eventually manage it”. When women internalise the reflective identity as the main component of their identity, it is the time that transformation constructs a novel identity for them that is dynamic and continual.

Modernity, along with employment and education as its vital elements, has an important role in changing women’s mentality and meaning structures. In fact, the social backgrounds of identity transformation in modernity and globalisation mingle with the individual life and with her (Giddens, 1999). What creates an identity balance and integrity in its most relative terms is a balance between social and individual affairs. This is the position where women’s individual discrimination tends to be similar to education and employment.

The Experience of University: An Introduction to Women’s Spiritual Transformation

Moulin (2013) believes that to understand the effects of education on religious identity construction, there should be a theory sensitive to the social background and context, the structural factors and to power, a theory that examines the way these elements are interpreted and enacted by individuals. In the present research, we exclusively examine the transformations that occur in the context of university and that have challenged women’s primary religious identity and changed their awareness through the emphasis on individualism, the freedom of thought, equality, and humanism. Women attempt to change their condition through establishing strong wills rooted in their modern feminine experiences. Brian Hastie (2007) believes that the student years is the phase when young people’s thoughts and beliefs are very vulnerable to change (Dehghani et al., 2015). One of the consequences of women’s mental transformation is the combination of
awareness, reflective thinking, knowledge, and a kind of self-centred individualism; a continuum from individualism to narcissism. N.A., a 37-year-old student of social work who works in a welfare organisation, says, “I think everything changes with education and your thoughts would be logical and sanguine. You do not accept everything on the basis of their face value, and you would think about it twice before you decide. Studying makes you feel that the individual has a proper inference in life, behaviour, relationships, and everything. I have the same position regarding religious issues. I really cannot accept every superstition. I believe in things with the logic behind it, not by my feelings. I do not wear a Hijab, because I cannot find a logical reason for that, and I do not see any necessity to say my daily prayers, but I say my daily prayers and try to follow morality. All these issues are not directly related to studying and education. These are the same related to personal experiences. But, I generally believe that the behaviour of an educated person is not comparable to an illiterate.”

Our research results show that we are not faced with any motivations that are based on religious imperatives in dictating the process of realizing everything. Although, some personal ethical codes seem to stem from religious learning, such as self-constructions and the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge, the author of this study believes that these are all in line with non-religious motivations and on the basis of personal development. In fact, there is no way a religion reference could be made. Mina, a 43-year-old and graduate student of MBA, says, “Not at all, I do not like stagnancy, I like to improve like anybody else and have something to say”. The aspiration to the “realisation of goals and interests” is our primary theme on the basis of Table 1 and reveals the non-religious motivations behind these women’s motivations.

**Consequences of Social Identity Construction for Modern Identity**

The research findings revealed women’s identity dimensions in four areas of mentality, feelings, actions, and interactions. Presuming the hypothesis that identity structures in these four aspects are dynamic and constantly subject to change, the identity transformation will also occur within these dimensions.

Glock and Strak have enumerated many different specifications for religiosity and have introduced an operational definition...
of religiosity. On the basis of their study, the five dimensions of religious identity are religious practices (rituals, prayer), religious experiences, religious knowledge, and consequences (Khodayarifard et al., 2012). As mentioned, the components of social identity is in accordance with religious identity, just as every social identity construction might cut through religious identity in some point of its path.

Therefore, women’s religious identity in the mental dimension leads to the transformation in the “religious knowledge and beliefs” dimension, and women’s perceptions of knowledge and spiritual attitudes are prone to change as a result. One of the main categories of the current research is the “faith” rooted in women’s found beliefs. Sima, a 32-year-old of management working in Telecommunication Company, says, “I see God as an observer of our deeds and I do not do anything against His will. I have God to rely on and I am satisfied with his will.” Although women have experienced more transformations in other aspects of religiosity, they purport strong faiths, respecting others’ beliefs, and value other’s collective rituals, spaces, and situations.

The other women’s transformation is in terms of “religious practices” and could be in line with the transformation in practices but is typically experienced in rituals. Maryam, a 39-year-old student of sociology, says, “I do not participate much in the religious rituals and I believe the way to worship God is not similar for all. I love to talk to God in my own way”. Some women determine the social behaviour in their relations with emphasis on logic and their own attitudes and respect their own independence and personal goals (Safiri & Nemaollahi, 2012). Women often expand their presence in religious rituals voluntarily towards their traditional religious identity or in compliance with the novel religious approaches in an innovative way. “Individual religious experience”, in the current study, reveals the redefinition of rituals and inventing methods among women. Women usually reveal their feelings in innovative and personal ways during religious ceremonies and rituals and their prioritisation of the rituals and presence in religious spaces is defined more on the basis of their personal rather than collective priorities.

Fariba, a 32-year-old student of computer, says, “I prefer the religious rituals where I feel at peace and I can relate to God more in this way”. Here, the religious practice is decided on by women and is not dependent on the religious society. For instance, the way women relate to spiritual resources are categorised as prayer and religious worship and is not in compliance with women’s spiritual relations. At times, it can take innovative and creative forms. In “religious experience” as one of the main dimension, the individual regards herself to have a higher understanding compared to others (Khodayarifard, Faghihi, Ghobari Banab, Shokoohi, & Rahiminezhad, 2012). Women understand this experience in a proper model of womanhood, which is well defined for other people and in a social
perspective. These women still believe in religious ethical principles (commitment, loyalty, and virtue), while they might experience personal development, and any religious experience could also change their religious behaviours. Elham, a 35-year-old graduate student of management, says, “I define a good woman as one who is aware and chooses the best ways for solving problems. A good woman should be a good mother, be committed to her husband, follow the path of development while presuming chastity, and always follow development, just like society follows the very same factors. Society requires women who rear good children and use all their power to protect family”. Women’s religious identity ideals approximate to “personal development and the interest in realisation of goals and interests” and the construction of social participation in the ethical framework accepted by society replaces sheer religious experiences. These elements are comparable to social ethics within the dimension of religious ethics.

In the “religious consequence”, as another religious dimension that means the transformation of interaction where daily non-religious behaviour is supervised, interactions often sound like a religious identity, but sometimes are non-religious. Meanwhile, shared aspects of religion and society are not yet observable and this is exactly the moment when women choose personal strategies for their own objectives. Leila, a 36-year-old student of psychology, says, “I have a very good definition of myself. Although you might say this is really arrogant, I consider myself as a capable and successful woman. I could manage to perform several roles successfully and this is what makes me feel satisfied.” “Being ethical” represents a consequential dimension of redefining spirituality in women’s mind. Through abiding to human rights and citizenship rights, women show respect to others in social realms and remain committed to their responsibilities as the standards of humanity and spiritual prophecy to human rights through their interactions in social and individual realms. Mina, a 36-year-old student of English literature, says, “I think that everyone should be free and choose his/her own religion freely just like respecting others’ privacy and rights”. Likewise, Zahra, a 37-year-old student of sociology, believes that, “We have to abide by and respect values, unless society looks at us in another way. Therefore, I think that every society should be abiding to these values. Therefore, when I do not wear a hijab, while this may be a personal decision, I think it should be abided to because it is a social value and is respected. But, in personal spheres, I could not obey that. But it should not be in a way that harms the society and leads to a series of problems”. Therefore, a combination of scientific understanding due to academic studies, logic resulting from higher education, and social understanding through data analysis in women’s daily problems gives the new constructed identity in our study.
As stated, the elements of mental transformation among women affects individual and social motivations and can alter women’s awareness of their rights and duties. This, in turn, leads to self-oriented strategies that are developing among women. Throughout time, women trust these strategies through a positive self-evaluation. The trust in change and improvement of mental analysis on the traditional aspects of their duties and responsibilities make them re-think the situation. In this way,
women make self-reliant decisions without considering others’ judgements (social indifference) and construct a novel identity for themselves.

Leila, a 34-year-old student of architecture, says, “Others define me as a determined and a very strong person. Although I do not care about other people’s opinions, it is important that I feel satisfied with myself. When I am satisfied with my deeds, other people will have a good impression of me”. As mentioned earlier in the section on religious identity, women’s religious dimensions change relatively. This identity transformation of the women under investigation is called “reflexive identity”, a kind of identity which is self-informative, and where it is necessary to be aware of one’s surrounding social structures.

Therefore, through creativity, women change their traditional religious identity. The main theme of “free mentality” of women includes the voluntary selection of norms and values, rejection of the structural determination, the tendency to innovate and destruct the stereotypic structures, the logical acceptance of issues, the critique of popular beliefs about women in the name of “superstition”, and finally, logical mentality. Somayeh, a 39-year-old student of cultural affairs and a teacher, says, “What I believe to be my personal right is being free as a person who lives securely, freely, and without any preoccupation. It is my right to have a good life, live freely, be peaceful and secure, think freely, and face no limitation in my beliefs and speeches”.

**CONCLUSION**

**Various Forms of Transformation in Women’s Religiosity Patterns**

Spirituality transformation has positioned women of religious and mass-oriented identity within a mutual dialectic relationship and changed them to self-centred religious women with observable changes in their behaviour.

The consequence of women’s religious identity transformation is categorised into three dimensions of “traditional, combined and new”. The key point is that one’s inspiration toward any of these discourses is a personal choice. Even the back and forth of traditional religiosity and discourse of traditional religion is the result of their choices and the great challenge between the traditional and the modern. They sometimes increase their religious activities within and beyond these frameworks. In a “hybrid dimension”, which includes the majority of Iranian cases, women consciously accept some of traditional aspects of religion and intend not to abide by some of the new approaches to religiosity. In fact, a combination of traditional religion and new approaches are the product of their religious identity transformations. This stage happens during “secondary reflection”, where women reflect on their practices in order to protect their religious morality and reach the thought independently of religious matters. In this way, women reduce the challenges and harms of transformation to some extent. It seems that the identity damage is lower due to women’s adherence to religious
principles and beliefs. Meanwhile, these women have tried to balance their individual and social identity through the experience of individual religious independence.

The third dimension is the new form of religious identity transformation where women reflect on their previous decisions and approach a “new personal religion”. In fact, when the traditional values dominating the home are the consequence of their experience of modernity through university and employment, it leads to the commitment to individual values. These groups of women believe in the knowledge of religion and sometimes introduce it as the reason behind gender-based inequality, assuming that it prevents them from their personal rights as a free person.

The meaning of humanity is not necessarily defined through the logic of religion. It seems that being a good citizen, in their perspective, is not necessarily in line with being religious, and religiosity does not solely have a religious definition and logic and is not actualised through the performance of shared practices. They also believe that being secular does not mean a total devoid of religious thought. This is not synonymous with irreligiousness. It worth mentioning that women of these ideas experience more harm and identity crises than other women due to the pressures that used to be bearable for them in their traditional religiosity but is unjustifiable now.

Family disruption, emotional separation, and the decision to change the individual life has put these women in a contradictory path where, at times, children constitute their sole connection to the family. Women’s minds are engaged in a kind of justice of the past and treatment of the dominances in (social and religious) outdoor spaces. Although, considering these individual identity crises in society are a necessity, truth is that these crises are almost due to individual difficulties in achieving a problem-solving strategy and reaching the main objectives and fundamental values. In fact, these are a potential for survival and independence that pinpoint value and norm crises. Therefore, the priority of personal benefits is not suppressed; rather, it is a safety regulator to avoid social destruction.

We are not facing the social abnormality, but customary compatibility (Moeidfar, 2011). The solution these women innovate is an individualistic choice that, at times, turns to a traditional religious identity, which is a combination of religious identity or a completely new one. The shared spaces for all these various identities are the centrality of individual choices in the religious ideology construction and women’s religious world.

REFERENCES
Women’s Reflexive Identity and Spirituality


A Study of the Effects of Drug Addicted Fathers on Families in Tehran, Iran

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ABSTRACT

Drug addiction is a social problem that destroys families and communities. It has disastrous social effects, not only on the addicted individual, but also on their families. The present study is a sociological analysis of people’s experiences living in households with a drug addicted member. This research is based on qualitative investigation of these types of families with the focus on wives and daughters of the addicted member. It was conducted in Tehran, the capital city of Iran. To better understand these experiences, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 participants. The interviews were analysed using a qualitative framework. Our results show that these families have endured agonizing periods. The problems they encountered can be divided into two groups: (1) Problems related to their primary needs (i.e. shelter, food, health and treatment, education, security, and peace), and (2) The rest of their problems related to their relationships and interactions with the rest of the community. The experiences of families with a member who is suffering from substance abuse include tension, uncertainty, anxiety, indifference from the individual addict, threat to their livelihood, shame, damaged dignity, isolation, loneliness, deprivation of support from others, and feelings of pain and misery. Furthermore, these issues in addition to a lack of adequate social support (emotional, consultation, and financial) provide the ground for further social harms and other pitfalls for these families.

Keywords: Addiction, drug, family, the sociological effects of an addict father

INTRODUCTION

Reports indicate there is a rise in drug abuse worldwide. In Iran, drug addiction was an increasing trend over the past few years. Addiction does not only harm the
individual addict, but also has an impact on their family. In this type of situation, family members are usually neglected and not seen by society and, thus, they suffer from variety of problems. Despite the high level of harm experienced by these family members, they receive very little attention. Social services are primarily focused on the individual drug addict. In addition, these types of services only try to get the addict off drug use, and does not deal with the root of problems that lead to addiction.

Generally, people do not consider addicts as citizens and, in fact, they are viewed as harmful and detrimental to society. Even drug addicts themselves do not believe that they are citizens and part of the society. People blame them for violating laws and undermining social norms. In these situations, families of addicts may become subject to exclusion too. Often, the potential effects of addiction on immediate relatives are overlooked.

It is important to remember that, to this date, no solution was offered to effectively root out the addiction problem from our societies. In addition, substance abusers are not perceived as patients in need of medical and/or psychological care. If they were viewed this way, paths to treatment and prevention would open up. On the contrary, some violent policies were executed against them. In Iran, there is no official support from any government agency for the families of addicts and, as such, families are overlooked. Although there are some NGOs in Iran that help these types of families with their basic needs (e.g. food, clothes, etc.), the number of these NGOs is not adequate, and few people are covered by these philanthropic services.

In our research, the effects of addiction on family members were studied. In the past, the damage of addiction on narcotic users were analysed in numerous studies (Boyd, 1993; Brick, 2004; Newcomb & Bentler, 1988; Shedler & Block, 1990). However, in some countries, the effects of drug addiction on family members were well documented (Arria, Mericle, Meyers, & Winters, 2012; Copell & Orford, 2002; Copello, Velleman, & Templeton, 2005; Orford, Velleman, Natera, Templeton, & Copello, 2013; Orford, Templeton, Velleman, & Copello, 2005; Orford, Velleman, Copello, Templeton, & Ibanga, 2010b; Ray, Mertens, & Weisner, 2007; Schäfer, 2011, Velleman & Templeton, 2007). In Orford et al. (2013) study, they developed the ‘stress-strain-coping-support (SSCS) model’. According to Velleman et al. (2011), unlike other models in the addiction field, the SSCS model focuses on the experiences of affected family members and the consequences of drug use on them. It treats the affected family member as a person exposed to seriously stressful circumstances:

“…The SSCS model states that the behaviour of the substance misuser causes stress for the family member, that stress leads to strain (for example, physical and psychological symptoms) and that amount of strain any family member experiences from a given level of stress (caused as a result of
living with a relative with a serious alcohol or drug problem) will be mediated by two key factors: how they cope with this problem, and the amount and quality of social support that they can access...” (Velleman et al. 2011, p. 363).

Orford, Copello, Velleman, & Templeton (2010a) mentioned that previous models about substance misuse and the family attributed the issues of dysfunction or deficiency to families or family members. Copello et al. (2009) cited that the SSCS model rejects the idea that families or individual family members are pathological or dysfunctional. In the studies that were done in a number of countries during the last twenty-six years, Orford et al. (2010b, p. 44) found that, in these families, the relationship with a relative becomes disagreeable and sometimes aggressive. In these situations, conflicts over money and possessions grow. As a result, the experience of uncertainty becomes bothersome, worry about the relative increases, and home and family life is threatened. Another research done by Velleman and Templeton, (2007, p. 80) demonstrates the negative experiences children and adolescents living with an addict parent may undergo, including high levels of violence, suffering from or witnessing neglect or abuse (physical, verbal or sexual), inconsistent, poor, and/or neglectful parenting by one or both parents, and having to adopt responsibility or parenting roles at an early age, along with feeling negative emotions, such as shame, guilt, fear, anger, and embarrassment. There may also be possible neurodevelopment consequences of substance misuse in pregnancy that may contribute to developmental delays or intellectual disabilities. In Schafer’s study (2011, p. 1), it was found that family members experienced various forms of family disruption, such as loss of custody of their children, loss of employment, marital breakdown, physical and psychological abuse, depression, and poor health.

Most studies in Iran, such as Behravan and Miranvari (2010); Feizy, Alibabayi and Rahmati (2010); Gholami Kotnayi and Ghorbannejad Shahrodi (2014); Kianipoor and Pozad (2012); Moefifar and Zamani Sabzi (2013); Motiee Langrudi, Farhadi and Zare (2013); Norozi, Khoshknab and Farhodian (2013), Rasekh and Panahzadeh (2012); Shamsalinia, Safari and Mosavizade (2014) have solely focused on the drug abuser’s problems rather than the problems faced by their family members. In reviewing the literature, few data were found on the difficulties of such families in Iran. Also, research conducted by Aghakhani, Mosavi, Eftekhari, Eghtedar, Zareei, Rahbar, Mesgarzade and Nikoonnejad (2013); Mahdizade, Ghodosi, and Naji (2012); Manchery, Sharifi Nistanak, Seyedfatemi, Heidari and Ghodosi (2013) and have primarily considered certain psychological issues, such as depression, anxiety, and aggression. In Fereidouni, Joolaee, Fatemi, Mirlashari, Meshkibaf and Orford (2015, p. 99) a few physicians studied the spouses of addicted men in Iran and four main themes were identified: (1) Heart-breaking news of
the husband’s addiction, (2) Coping alone, (3) Progressive deterioration and suffering, and (4) Disruption of family relationships and finances. Reactions after learning about the husband’s addiction involved shock and collapse, and/or fear, disbelief, and confusion. Spouses tried to hide the problem and to solve it alone, making them feel as if they were “walking in the dark” without any social support and exposed to stigma. As time went by, the spouses experienced distress and turmoil, and mixed feelings, including loss of trust and confidence in, towards their husbands, whose behaviour progressively became less reliable. This led to impairment in the relationship, financial stress, and a general degradation and disruption of normal family life, leading to strain for spouses, akin to a state of burnout.

Still, much of the suffering experienced by these families remain undisclosed in Iran. Very few sociological studies (Fereidouni et al., 2015) have focused on the circumstances of these families. Social dimensions, such as the impact of the relative’s addiction on the social interactions of family members, the community’s view of such families, and its impact on social norms remain to be investigated.

Drug abuse affects not only the addict, but also the whole social system. Not only does it have financial and administrative costs, but also, more importantly, it has heavy social costs. In a sociological study, the social dimensions of addiction in a family were analysed, including its effects on the interactions among family members, the quality of the interactions between the addict and his/her family with the rest of the community, and the children’s future family life, occupation, and education. For example, in these families, due to the negative attitude of the society toward their addicted father, children may not choose to model their behaviour after their father’s. Furthermore, it may harm the inter-generational relationships in a way that, later in life, children may act very possessively in their own marriages, and try to support and control their own children so obsessively that it could lead to restricting their autonomy. Also, people with substance abuse issues may feel alienated from their families and, as a result, prefer to socialise with other drug users, and engage in other antisocial activities. This sort of association gives them a false sense of support and strengthens them in their misbehaviour.

Due to the scarcity of sociological studies on such families in Iran, these problems remain hidden. Therefore, this study’s aim is to gain a better understanding about the issues these families face in Iran. For this purpose, we used a qualitative method to observe the members of such families (wives and daughters) who live in the capital city of Iran, Tehran. We have raised two questions in our investigation: (1) What problems do family members (spouses and adult daughters) of an addict deal with, and (2) Do they receive any support when encountering these problems?
Findings from this study will increase public awareness about the type of problems such families have and, therefore, direct public attention towards them. It will provide the background necessary for further research in identifying their needs. Additionally, it can gradually help to form intervention efforts that will decrease the suffering experienced by these family members, improve their situation, and prevent exacerbation of their problems. Our findings can also draw more attention to substance abuse issues, and lead to actions that would prevent drug addiction.

METHODS
This study used a set of qualitative, semi-structured interviews with family members living with a drug-abusing father in Tehran, Iran, to investigate the challenges they face. The sample was selected purposively and was not intended to be representative of the wider population in Tehran. Snowball sampling technique was used. In 2014 and 2015, the author selected participants who were living in families with a drug addicted member. Wives and adult daughters were family members that were the focus in the study. A woman who frequently participated in ladies’ religious events and had a diverse social relationship with women from her own and surrounding neighbourhoods were used to help identify a few families with a drug addict head of household.

Participants described the problems they encountered. The sample included 15 individuals, all of them females between the ages of 22 and 50 years. Since each participant could be interviewed more than once, this study used data from 24 interviews. Each interview lasted for approximately 2 hours and was conducted in each participant’s home when the father was not there or was in a place that was safe for family members. Interviewing such families can involve certain difficulties. Due to the hideousness of addiction and the way it is generally viewed in the society, addicts and sometimes their relatives are unwilling to give out any information and find it necessary to hide it from others. Sometimes, family members are even forbidden by the addict to say anything about their situation to any stranger and will be punished if they did so. All of these issues contributed to the difficulties of conducting these interviews. Thus, it was necessary to anticipate these problems in advance and take preventative measures. So, the settings of these interviews were carefully selected, as we wished the interviewees to feel comfortable and be at ease.

An overview of the participants’ characteristics is presented in Table 1.
The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim for coding and analysis. Transcripts were analysed after each interview was completed. The author conducted all interviews. After each interview, the author listened to the tapes while writing the transcripts in detail. Transcripts were reduced to codes by line-by-line reading of the text. The audio taped interviews and notes were reviewed repeatedly to identify emerging themes and relationships among them. The objective was to offer a comprehensive summary of the challenges the interviewees face.

RESULTS
In this study, three participants previously experienced homelessness. None of them received any support from governmental or non-governmental organisations. During the interviews, they described their experiences of living in a family with an addicted

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<th>Number</th>
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member. A few main themes were identified in the research data. Of course, some themes were overlapping. The effects of drug use were so intertwined that it is sometimes impossible to draw clear boundaries between them. This is especially obvious in quotes, where some quotes touched on multiple issues. In the following sections, some of the most important experiences of family members, who were affected by the drug addiction of their father, are expressed.

Tension

When family, which is regarded as a haven for peace, is affected by the behaviour of an individual member, who is under the influence of drug abuse, then it becomes the epicentre of tension, restlessness, and disturbance. The inability of an addicted father to satisfy the mental, emotional, and natural needs of his wife and children, his indifference, family disputes, verbal and physical violence, and related financial problems all cause tension in these types of families. It is difficult to talk about peace and calmness in these types of settings. In the following paragraphs, some of the statements made by three research participants are presented:

“I had nothing to feed my children and I was afraid to go out on my own.” (15)

“When he is at home, he breaks things and I have to go buy them again. He has broken the windows, mirrors, and things in the closets many times. If he comes back from jail, I will suffer more; I prefer his absence. For example, after drinking tea, he’d throw away the cup or the sugar bowl, and this meant that he wants more tea. He wouldn’t say ‘Go get me another tea.’ He’d throw the cup.” (6)

Feelings of Insecurity and Uncertainty

Family members of an addict do not feel security (in terms of livelihood, shelter, emotional relationship, employment, marriage, etc.). Life for these families is always full of conflict and tension. Their health, livelihood, family, and social relations are threatened by this sense of insecurity. When one does not have a sense of security, it is easier for other individuals or a group in the society (like gangs, or other illegal groups, etc.) who offers them a sense of belonging to convince the individual to join them.

The drug addiction of a father has an influence on the personality of his wife. Addicted fathers have devastating impacts on their children’s future, education, career, marriage, and family life. In these families, sometimes children drop out of school
as teenagers (due to poverty and lack of resources to pay for school fees, the demands of child labour, or lack of mental focus and intellectual discipline caused by the ongoing tension and conflict in their family environment). Lack of education has a long and short-term consequence for them, including the intensification of their sense of insecurity. In fact, in such families where there is always a high level of tension, risk, disorder, and conflict, it is impossible to think of a long-term investment in areas like education. Deprived of education, it is difficult to be hopeful for the mental development of these individuals and expect them to learn informal social subtleties, while obeying the laws of society. Of course, sometimes in these families, with the relentless efforts of the mother, children do stay in school and continue their education.

As far as the prospects of marriage for these children is concerned, it is highly probable that they will remain single, especially the girls. Due to their father’s addiction and the stigma in the society for these types of individuals, people have very little desire to marry these girls. Even if the father has stopped using drugs for several years, people are still reluctant to marry the daughters.

Instability, uncertainty, disorder, and obscurity are the distinctive features of these types of families. The possibility to set certain goals for the future and reduce uncertainty is non-existent. The addicted father does not have much control over the affairs and is unable to make appropriate decisions on different issues. In families where the father is also involved in narcotics smuggling and distribution, there are additional worries for the family, including the possibility of the father’s arrest or further damage to the family’s reputation. These are additional reasons to be more uncertain about the future.

“We weren’t sure if my father could pay the rent for our home and the store this month... or make any payments on his old debt... or if he’d have to borrow money again to pay for this month’s rent. The landlord had threatened to throw out our belongings. We weren’t sure if we would be in this house for another month or not. He comes home late at nights. Sometimes, he gets home at dawn. When he was using methamphetamine, he was awake till the morning. We couldn’t sleep well. He was making a lot of noise. Actually, there was no order in our lives. I couldn’t get much sleep at nights, so I couldn’t study well the next day.” (1)

Anxiety

Family members worry about what is happening to their addicted relative, the rest of the family, and themselves. The anxiety that the wife and children experience puts a lot of pressure on them. Anxiety can be created by an uncertain future, the breadwinner’s loss of job, threat to their livelihood, financial debt, the possibility of becoming homeless, mental and physical
effects of addiction on children, their health, education, future marriage and its related expenses, worries about the family’s reputation being tainted in the eyes of relatives, friends, and neighbours, and fear of being excluded from society. In cases where there is a separation in the family, the wife may worry about her and her children’s fate in the period after the divorce, their sustenance, and provisions, further increasing family anxiety. Issues related to the addicted individual also may cause additional concerns and worries, such as: anxiety about the addicted member changing the type of drug they use to synthetic drugs (causing more harm), return to addiction by the husband (or father) after quitting, changes in the appearance of the addicted member, their behavioural disorders, sleeping disorders, mental and physical illnesses, the possibility of acquiring certain infections such as HIV and Hepatitis (when drug use gets done by injections), and the possibility of death.

Problems, anxieties, and worries increase more dramatically if family members are involved in other harmful situations, such as children escapade (which is another source of social harm), the mother becoming addicted too, pregnancy, children becoming addicted, children’s delinquency, and illegitimate sexual relationships of the spouse with other people.

“When I was younger, whenever my dad was having a fight with my mom, he’d always say ‘I’m leaving’. I thought he’d leave us and we would have no money. That’s why as soon as I finished high school, I went and got a job so that we wouldn’t ever run out of money and be stranded penniless on the streets.” (12)

“My father was a drug abuser. I have two brothers who became addicted too. When I was in fifth grade, my mother died. I wasn’t able to continue studying because I was worried about my brothers and sisters. I did all the house chores. I took a job in a production unit. I tried so hard to help my brothers quit drugs, but it was in vain. Once, I took pills to kill myself and then they promised to quit. I took them to NA [Narcotics Anonymous]. Now they acknowledge my toil and say that you went through so much trouble and hard work for us. You dedicated your life to us.” (11)

“My father got two marriage loans with our marriage certificate. He let us keep one for ourselves which we’ve paid it off already. He took the other one for himself but didn’t pay his payments. Three years passed, and the bank was calling once in a while, telling him to make the payments. I told my dad to please go make these payments, our reputation has become tainted in front of my husband. He says he’d do it. There were two people
who had signed off as guarantors on our loans; they were calling us repeatedly as well. Their pay checks were being cut and taken as payments. The bank manager was a relative of one of the co-workers at the place where my husband and I were working. So we were very embarrassed. At last, my husband felt bad for me and started making payments instead of my dad. Another time, he took a check from my husband and did not have enough money in due time to cover it. So the check was dishonoured and returned. My husband became very angry about it, because I was pregnant and any money we made was being spent on visiting doctors, sonographs, and medicine, and there was little money left for anything else and now we had to pay for that check as well. I became very nervous. One night my heart was pounding so hard. Two days later, my baby died prematurely in my womb. My doctor told me that it was due to fear and stress.” (14)

The Indifference of the Individual Addict

Family members witness an extreme indifference and lethargy from addicted members. Lack of adequate control over the family’s resources, weak or no sense of responsibility towards family members, their profession, the future, and children’s fate are other issues that these types of families face. A drug addict is not able to play the proper role of a father or a husband and tends to neglect his responsibilities. Thus, the suffering and anger increase for family members. In such families, the wife has heavy responsibilities and carries out her husband’s duties as well. Sometimes, children take on their father’s responsibilities and behave in a manner that does not suit their age. For example, they drop out of school and try to cover the family’s livelihood needs.

“We were experiencing a hard life. My father’s indifference to our life was at 90 percent. He didn’t pay rent several months in a row. He’d sleep in until noon, while his shop was closed. He used to have many customers, some from out of town and faraway cities. But, he gradually lost his customers. I knew he couldn’t afford to pay the rent for another house after this one, because the deposit rates for rentals had gone up and he couldn’t afford it anymore. Then, the landlord gave us an eviction notice since we had not paid rent for months. Ever since then, I lost my peace. We were in a state of crisis, expecting the landlord to evict us any day now. Nevertheless, due to Methamphetamine consumption, my father was carefree. I had never seen him so carefree. He had no worries even if the house collapsed
on him. So, eventually the landlord, with the help of a police officer, threw our stuff out on the street. My father put all our things in his friend’s back yard, and then rented the second floor of a small old house. A year later, the new landlord evicted us again.” (1)

“On my wedding, he gave us 500000 Rials in an envelope as a gift. That night, as we were going home, he asked me to give him back the money since he was short on cash. Without letting my husband notice, I stealthily gave him the money. He didn’t come home till the next morning, as he was out indulging himself. He had bought me two carpets as my dowry. The sales person from the carpet store was calling me for a year to collect the payments for it. So, I told my father that you only bought me a carpet, but you haven’t paid for it, and because of that I want you to return it since I don’t feel right about it.” (13)

Livelihood in Danger

Loss of job, reduction or complete loss of income (as a result of an addict’s lethargy, and irresponsibility), spending money on drugs which further reduces the family’s resources (while the spouse’s and children’s needs get neglected), debt, the inability to provide the basic needs of the family (food, health, hygiene, etc.), not being able to pay the rent for the house, selling house items and wife’s jewellery, vagabondism, demanding (sometimes forcefully) wife’s little income (low wages from the work she does to help meet the primary needs of the family), and homelessness are some of the other problems such families deal with. In some of the mentioned cases in our interview sections, the wife (and sometimes the grown up children) is in charge of providing income to pay for the family’s expenses. If they are unemployed too, the family’s livelihood is in danger. If the addicted member gets imprisoned for smuggling or some other crime, the family’s economic insecurity and worries will intensify even further. In this situation, the wife’s and children’s employment is of vital importance. So, if the wife does not have the minimum necessary capabilities (literacy, skill, and the ability to be present in the society) for work and children are too young to work, then the family’s living conditions fall into a critical situation.

“He was jailed for five years. A week after his release, he committed another crime and got arrested again and is in jail for another three years. Since then, seven months have passed. He was out for one week between his prison terms. I’ve been doing housework for people, washing carpet, working for neighbours, cleaning glasses, and doing New Year’s cleaning.
Because my husband is in jail, I receive some aid from Emdad Committee. Also, I get the monthly subsidy from the government. I always give him his. He calls so much for it that it gets on my nerves. The day before yesterday I told him “Shame on you! Instead of greetings and asking about your children you call and ask for money”. When he is not in jail, I can do nothing. He doesn’t work and doesn’t let me work either. It’s better for me when he is in jail. Whenever he is home, he gives me a hard time, a lot. He was both a user and a supplier. That’s why he is in jail. If he comes back, he’d do it again. He was arrested many times, but he’d do it again. But no matter where he is, all household chores and our son’s responsibilities have always been mine. It’s all on my shoulders.” (6)

“He earns money from drugs but can’t pay his wife’s and children’s expenses, because he is spending it on his own drug use.” (10)

Shame and Damage to Self-Esteem
Due to the presence of an addicted individual in the family and his unusual behaviours, the wife and children may be embarrassed when they visit relatives, friends, acquaintances, and neighbours, or when they would go to public places. As a result, their sense of self-worth and self-confidence can become damaged. This affects their interpersonal and social interactions. Family members may try to disguise his addiction from everybody. They may become concerned about how other people view them.

“As I’d get older, I was feeling more pain. I’d notice the difference between my own family and my friends’ families. I was embarrassed for having such a father in front of our neighbours. Wherever we lived, after a while, people would find out that my father’s a drug addict. Maybe some of my classmates knew too. I was living in a miserable, tearful environment full of tension. Every night, I couldn’t fall sleep because of the grief I was feeling. I was in tears every night.” (3)

“Once my parents-in-law were visiting us from out of town. My father came over to see them. Then he asked me for a nail file. I gave him one. Then, for the whole one hour that he stayed with us, he was filing his nails, and not even looked at our guests while he was talking to them. This behaviour from him is due to his drug usage, especially methamphetamine. I felt so embarrassed. I’m glad my in laws don’t live in Tehran, otherwise they’d find out about his addiction.” (2)
The Effects of Drug Addicted Fathers on Families in Tehran

Isolation and Loneliness
The amount of interaction between these families and the rest of the people in society is negligible. They don’t have much contact with others. They want the addiction issue to remain disguised. This worry may last forever, even after the addict member quits the habit. When others discover the drug addiction of a head of a household, two situations may emerge. Some people may feel reluctant to interact with the addict’s family, and in some cases, it was observed that they are no longer invited to events, such as weddings or other ceremonies. The second scenario is the avoidance of people by the addict’s family in order not to feel more shamed and disrespected, or to avoid encountering other’s sarcasm and put-downs. Broadly speaking, it is highly probable that the addict and his/her family get excluded and isolated in their society (at school, in their neighbourhood circles, relative network, or workplace).

“As a child, we were always alone, didn’t have many guests, and didn’t go to many social gatherings. We had very little interaction with relatives. Now, I understand the reason. My father was an addict. Even now that I’m a grown up and don’t live with my dad anymore, I’m still worried. Worried that one-day my colleagues and friends discover the fact that my dad used to be an addict. If that happens, I’d lose my dignity.” (3)

Deprived of Support and Help from Others
Often, the issues of drug abuse remain hidden within the family. Due to the fear of feeling shame and embarrassment, family members try to cover up. This situation causes them to keep the heavy burden of their issues and sufferings to themselves. This attitude leads to self-deprivation of all the help and social support they can receive from friends and relatives. It is worth noting that the relatives of our research participants were mostly in other faraway towns. In fact, these subjects migrated to Tehran years ago for job-hunting, and currently, they are far away from their relatives and hometowns. Sometimes, friends and relatives find out about the addicted individual, but shun the addict and his family. Either for the sake of keeping their self-perceived dignity intact, or their unwillingness to provide any financial help, they try to avoid the family of their addicted relative and make as little contact as possible.

Social service organisations pay very little attention to such families too. These organisations mainly pay attention (restricted and inadequate) to the addicted individual rather than their families. Drug rehab centres are very costly and usually addicts cannot afford them. Therefore, their rehabilitation gets delayed. Although drug rehab is necessary, it cannot solely function as a successful policy. First of all, the causes of addiction must be prevented to reduce the number of addicts and their at risk families in society.
Murder of Family Members
A very important issue currently is the fact that, with the widespread use of synthetic drugs, the lives of family members are in danger too. One of the consequences of using new synthetic drugs is the development of hallucinations in the individual addict, and in that state of mind, the murder of the addicted individual’s wife and children has occurred on several occasions.

“I had a sister whose husband was addicted to meth. Last summer, her husband killed her. Since then, I feel nothing anymore. My sister used to work so hard, her husband was useless, always sitting in a room. He used to lean back while she worked to be able to get him his drug. He hit her too, but not a lot. My sister was afraid of him so she tried not to make him angry. The last days, he had the hallucination that my sister was going to kill him. My niece says whenever her mother served food, he exchanged our plates saying we might’ve poisoned his food to kill him.” (5)

Feeling Pain and Misery
Considering the mentioned issues in these types of families, it is obvious that family members would feel constant pain and misery. Families in these situations are no longer a haven for peace and happiness. Members of such families rarely experience joy. When their children grow up, they suffer much more than before from their family’s state of disarray. They notice the differences when they compare themselves to others, including friends, neighbours, and relatives. This awareness adds to their grief. When in this type of situation, children may get separated because of getting married or running away from home, but they still do not feel happy because they remember their tragic past and the calamitous situation of their drug-addict relative and that saddens them. They rarely can be happy and have a good time again. They dream about a good family situation. But, some of them can never form a family and will keep yearning for it.

“After that year, my father divorced his second wife. Then, he was with us all the time and I was happy about it, about our life becoming a bit normal again. But, after six months I noticed some changes in his behaviour; it wasn’t normal. Till I found out he was using a new substance (meth). He’d stay up all night. Sometimes, he spent several hours doing something, such as cleaning the kitchen. I remember his yelling and screaming angrily. At nights, I stayed up because he wasn’t coming home and I was worried. I was embarrassed in front of the neighbours for this situation. He had become a total careless person. I was tired of his ways and did most of my crying in that period.” (3)
“I have everything now, education, a job, a house, and money. But, I don’t feel happy because I don’t have a family. Nobody likes to marry me. If someone would ask for marriage and then find out that my father used to be an addict, surely they’d change their mind. And, sometimes I think about my dad. He quit drugs. But he is by himself and alone. He is ill. I’m sure he is suffering from his loneliness. And sometimes I remember my mother’s pains and cry for her.” (1)

These mentioned family members feel a lot of sorrow. Sadness, crying, patience, and tolerance are some of their tactics to deal with their situation. Attempts to get the addict member rehabilitated are their other tactic. They really want this badly. To get the addicted member to go for rehabilitation, they use encouraging talks, arguments, and admonishment. If the family’s breadwinner is the addict member and they have no savings or any other source of income, the addicted member’s rehabilitation is postponed because if he doesn’t work for a while, then the family’s livelihood is threatened. Also, addicts have to pay some fees to these types of rehab centres. Drug rehabilitation centres have high costs and the addicted person is usually unable to pay for it. The effort made by the rest of the family members (i.e. wife and children) to cover the living costs is another strategy in these families. Both the wife (if she has any skills) and the children (if they are old enough) try to earn money.

The studied women in our research do not think about divorce. That is due to the fact that divorce is considered to be vile and there is a great deal of social pressure on individuals after becoming a widow. The belief that a wife marries in a white dress and leaves after death in white is a traditional norm in Iranian society. So, there is a great deal of emphasis on the importance of maintaining the family and the marriage. Fear of being away from your own children and their future and the issues of becoming homeless and jobless after divorce also function as deterrents to divorce. Women, who do not have an adequate education and lack sufficient skills to support themselves and their children after divorce, don’t even think about it. But women with proper education and skill and a job to support their lives are likely to get divorced if their situation becomes really intolerable.

“In our family, women are docile and content. Although my sister’s husband was a Heroin addict and she was miserable, she didn’t think about divorce. She used to work while her husband used to sleep carefree. Because of his addiction, they had so much debt too.” (7)

“My first son got addicted too. He got married too. His wife was very young. After she learned about

his addiction, she left him. She was really young. The girl was in junior high when they met and got married. After she found out about his drug addiction, she left. They have a child too...” (8)

DISCUSSION

Due to a complex and intertwined relationship between narcotic addiction and the outbreak of certain social issues, drug addiction appears to be a major threat to society. “Women and other family members witnessing addiction of the head of their family tend to live in a situation that makes them really vulnerable” (Orford et al., 2013, p. 71). Findings of the present study confirm the results of similar studies in other countries. The addiction of the head of a family has counter-productive effects on other family members. The problems such families face can be divided into several groups. Certain problems are associated with their essential and basic needs (i.e. shelter, food, security, health, education), while some are related to their interactions and relationships with other society members. Members of these families experience tension, lack of security, lack of certainty, anxiety, the indifference of the addicted individual, threat to their livelihood (shelter, food, etc.), shame and low self-esteem, isolation and loneliness, deprivation of help and support from others, murder of family members, and the feelings of pain and misery. Also, sometimes certain conditions develop that lead to substance abuse by other family members. Although there are certain differences between Iran and some other countries, similar studies from other countries show that these types of families suffer from all the problems cited above (Orford et al., 2010b; Vellman et al., 2011; Vellman & Templeton, 2007).

Unlike some countries, the participants in this study do not receive any particular social support. They were not members of any NGOs to receive their services. The obstacle in being referred to places like active NGOs is usually the unawareness of the existence of such centres, or it is the fear of incurring damage to their dignity and self-esteem. Overall, there are still not enough actions in Iran to improve the situation for these types of families. Unlike the subjects in other studies, none of the women in our study was divorced. The reason for it is the importance put on family maintenance in Iranian culture. The wives of addicted individuals, despite their many problems, do not abandon their families easily. Patience, tolerance, and attempts to send their addicted husbands to rehab are special characteristics of Iranian women. One of the other factors that prevent women from leaving their families is the negative view of divorce in society. Homelessness, as well as being unable to provide for their livelihood after divorce, deters some women (especially the poor and those without any support) from leaving their marriage. At the moment, Iran’s social security system does not offer much support for women after divorce.

Additionally, addiction prevention measures are very limited in Iran. In
organisations responsible for tackling addiction, treatment is more important than prevention. They don’t use very efficient methods in treatment practices either. In fact, they consider treatment only when the situation has turned into a crisis and undesirable effects have become quite apparent. Inattention to prevention confirms the principal of human life being dominated by events rather than humans dominating events. While prevention of social problems is very important, and without a doubt the first actions taken must be concentrated on prevention measures, the next step we must think of is treatment. To be successful in prevention efforts, we need to use new sciences and employ successful experiences of others in this area. It is vital to study new theories in the field, empirical research, and successful experiences and achievements of organisations and institutions that work on the prevention of addiction worldwide and adopt measures to prevent the expansion of drug addiction in Iran.

CONCLUSION
In this study, by using semi-structured deep interviews, we have come upon some findings about the experiences of family members encountering their father’s addiction issues. This study’s findings improve our understanding of these families’ problems and show that they experience and suffer from tension, uncertainty, anxiety, indifference from the addicted member, threat to their livelihood, shame and damaged self-esteem, isolation and loneliness, deprivation of support and cooperation from others, and the feelings of pain and misery.

Creating awareness in the community about the dangers of drug addiction, especially related to mental disorders and their devastating consequences on the family members of the addicted individual, plays an essential role in addiction prevention. Informing the public through lectures, educational textbooks and academic materials, mass media, and various prints can make a difference as well. The Iranian state-run television, radio, and other media play a pivotal role in producing programs that reflect the repercussions for addicts and their family members. It is obvious that it is highly important to use the findings of sociologists, psychologists and cognitive science, and neuroscience experts in the production of such programs.

Overall, paying attention to the empowerment of people is more important than any other issue. Attempts to empower people from their childhood are considered as an important step in addiction prevention. Formation of any kind of belief system (true or false) in humans is made possible by learning. Using some well-known scientific theories about learning and mental empowerment is fundamental to immunisation against addiction. Undoubtedly the education system plays a critical role in this area.

Children in these families are subject to various harms due to the carelessness of the head of the family. It is necessary to consider measures to support the families of addicted individuals. Their needs are not only
limited to material ones, but their emotional and spiritual needs may be more acute. Emotional and intellectual support systems for women and children in these families can prevent further harm. They need counselling to face the tensions arising from living with an addicted member and to find solutions. Knowing how to cope with emotional and mental pressures and finding some solutions to improve self-confidence and self-esteem can prevent depression. So, it is essential to develop and provide accessible inexpensive and high-quality counselling services in every neighbourhood, in order to reduce the side effects of living with an addicted member. Providing counselling services can definitely prevent certain harms among the family members, especially teenagers.

Financial support is necessary, and it paves the way for the rehabilitation process of the addicted individual. Financial support is important in several ways. Money can be used for treatment and rehab costs, providing family’s living costs during the rehabilitation process of the addict (some fail to go to rehab centres due to their concerns about the livelihood of their family during rehabilitation), and initial seed money for those who seek to restart their old profession or those who set out to start a new business. Of course, as it was mentioned before, eliminating the causes of addiction in the society should be the focus of all efforts.

Further studies about how to prevent and eliminate the root causes of addiction in Iran are needed. Also, studies are needed on how to support the family members of a drug addict so that their exposure to harm and suffering is minimised.

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Afghan Refugees and Iran’s Open Door Policy in the 1980s

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ABSTRACT

Iran is one of the top refugee-hosting countries in the world. After the beginning of war in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s, Iran opened its borders to Afghan refugees. Unlike Pakistan, Iran allowed Afghans to enter the country and reside in the mainland, in cities, and villages, instead of accommodating them in border camps. That was an unusual decision that was not effectuated by Iran’s government during the 1990s ongoing wave of immigrations. This paper explores the main causes for the open door policy adopted by Iran in the mentioned period and investigates the consequences that resulted from this policy. Unlike many scholars who claim the immigration policy of the time to be the result of either ideological or calculated decisions, this paper argues that there was no other alternative for the new government in the peculiar circumstances of a post-revolutionary country.

Keywords: Afghan refugees, border camps, economic competition, immigration policy, Islamic revolution, refugee accommodation, split market, UNHCR

INTRODUCTION

A report, published by UNHCR Refugees Magazine in 1997, introduced Afghan refuge in Iran as an “Iranian surprise.” The author stated that although Iran is an “isolated and less known” country, “it is one of the most generous countries worldwide in hosting refugees because, unlike many other countries, Afghans are allowed in to settle throughout the country instead of being settled in border camps” (Wilkinson, 1997). In fact, the source of this refugee crisis in the region was the political turmoil in Afghanistan. After the 1978 coup, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power which resulted in a set of drastic changes known as the Thor Revolution.
The temporary and seasonal migration of Afghans to Iran was prevalent prior to 1979, mainly due to poverty and drought at home and economic opportunities abroad. Most of these immigrants were from the western and central parts of Afghanistan, and it is estimated that nearly 600,000 Afghans were in Iran before the 1979 coup (Rubin, 1996, p. 3). As a result, Afghan workers were familiar faces especially in eastern parts of Iran. However, after the communist surge in Afghanistan and USSR military intervention, an unprecedented migration of Afghans in terms of nature and magnitude took place.

As PDPA took power, the new government put socialist reforms on agenda: the national flag of Afghanistan changed from the traditional green to something resembling the flag of Soviet Union, land reforms began, women were granted the right to vote, and similar reforms began to take hold nationwide. Reforms were not welcomed by traditional religious factions of the Afghan community, giving way to a mass exodus of angry Afghans to two neighbouring Islamic countries: Iran and Pakistan. Many traditional families considered reforms to be contradictory to Islamic teachings and preferred to leave Afghanistan. As Hoodfar (2004) points out, most of those who migrated to Iran were illiterate villagers irritated by the government mandatory education programs that forced families to enrol their daughters in public schools. Another reason for the anxiety was marriage laws, which required the bride’s consent and set the consent age for marriage at 16. For many, these were signs of the Soviet agenda to eliminate Islam.

With the establishment of the communist government, internal conflicts between PDPA and Islamic groups rivaling to overthrow the government began. In 1979, with the intensification of war between the Mujahedeen and the central government, the Soviet Union, fearful of the anticipated loss of a major ally in the South, started a military intervention in Afghanistan. One of the outcomes of the invasion was the flow of Afghan refugees toward the borders to evade war, because of which about 600,000 Afghans arrived in Iran and Pakistan within a week. As Kakar (1995) puts it, targeting Mujahedeen and ordinary people through rocket attacks on civilians, the destruction of the infrastructure under the shared control of the Mujahedeen and people, retaliatory attacks of Soviet forces, targeting farmers at the harvest time, confiscation of farmers’ crops and livestock, and forced evacuation of villages, made life so insecure that many Afghans decided to leave.

The rate of refugee departure from Afghanistan in 1980-81 was about 180,000 migrants per month; in 1982-85, the rate decreased to 15,000-20,000, and in 1987 it was further reduced to five to six thousand (Goodson, 2001, p. 149). As the population arrived at Iranian borders, they were transferred to Iran’s cities and villages after simple and short administrative procedures. Unlike Pakistan, Iran permitted the refugees to reside in different cities and villages without any restrictions. Refugees
Afghan Refugees and Iran’s Open Door Policy

had access to the labour market and allowed to stay in Iran until the end of war in Afghanistan. Most of the refugees with a rural background entered the market as low-skilled workers in urban and rural areas, occupying the location at the lowest layer of Iran’s working class.

In November 1981, an Iranian Interior Ministry official told media that the number of Afghan refugees was about 1.5 million; most of whom were settling in two main provinces in eastern Iran (Sorouroddin, 1981). With the arrival of new Afghan refugees, the figure increased annually, reaching an unprecedented number of four million people in 1991. Not all these refugees were Afghan, however, since by that time, Iran had hosted around 2.2 million Iraqi refugees from western borders (Hosseini, 1993, p. 277). Although most Iraqis returned to their country, Afghans remained in Iran and, today, there are nearly three million Afghan refugees and immigrants living across the country.

After the flow of Afghan displaced population toward its borders, Iran welcomed them with an open door policy; a policy that provided Afghans with access to its labour market while the government had to provide the immigrant population with basic education, medical services and subsidized food like Iranian nationals. The open door policy had many short-term and long-term consequences. The sudden settlement of millions of refugees in the eastern provinces of Iran led to some domestic problems at the time and sparked dissatisfaction among local communities (British Refugee Council, 1987; Pahlavan, 1988). In the long term, the presence of refugees in various regions of Iran and the following non-integration policies aimed at persuading the refugees to return to Afghanistan caused Afghan refugees to lose hope for access to Iranian citizenship rights. The open door policy and settlement of refugees in cities and villages had such severe implications for the Iranian government that in 1990s under similar situations, Iran refused to let Iraqi and Azeri refugees to cross its borders.

The main question here is why such an uncommon refugee policy was implemented by Iran in the 1980s. Several answers have been given to the question. Some believe that it was a calculated decision by Iran to replace labour force shortage agriculture and the construction industry in a time when many young Iranians were sent to the war front in western borders beside using afghans as political tools to influence the situation in Afghanistan (Milani, 2006). Others emphasise on the ideological character of the new revolutionary government in Iran and attribute the reason behind the policy to the Islamic principles of the new government (Yarbakhsh, 2018). This paper argues that Iran’s generous policy toward Afghan refugees should be understood, considering the specific features of a post-revolutionary era after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the newly established government. Locating the policy at the social and political context, this article shows that the decision to open borders was the result of the impossibility
of other practical alternatives rather than a rational calculation of the perceived benefits or any other revolutionary agenda.

Moreover, the consequences of this policy at that time are investigated to show why the government did not implement same policy in similar situations a decade later. A close look at Iran’s conditions in the early years after the Islamic Revolution, including the engagement in an imposed war with Iraq, and the internal political power struggles, shows what factors shaped the open door policy and what implications it had for the Iranian government, native population of Iran, and Afghan refugees in next decades.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This article uses a qualitative approach in the study of its subject matter. So far, any study of Afghan refugee presence in Iran has been made possible only by second-hand sources. This study, however, takes advantage of the access to the recently declassified official documents, tries to clarify the new dimensions of the situation at the time under discussion. The main source of information in this research are the official documents and letters related to Afghan refugees during 1980s. A total of 2,175 documents, official letters, and reports issued to Zanjan, Qazvin, and Markazi Provincial Governments during the 1980s were accessed at the Documentation Centre of Iran’s National Library. The documents were declassified as limited access since 2014 and the authors gained authorization to view them following an official agreement between Tehran University and Iran’s National Library. Each document that seemed to be relevant for the purpose of the study were photographed by authors and coded following the procedures of the National Library (documents in this paper are cited with their document number in the National Library). Moreover, all the official comments and interviews published in newspapers about Afghan refugees and immigration policies at the time, were gathered and analysed as supplementary sources of information; the newspapers kept in the National Library of Iran Archive, and Etelaat Newspaper Archive, have been the main sources of this data. In addition, reports released by international organisations (including UNHRC, the Refugee and Immigrant Committee of the United States, and British Refugee Council) on the status of Afghan refugees and immigrants or the policies of the Iranian government have also been gathered through their official websites. All the data gathered from different sources, were analysed by qualitative content analysis approach. First, all data were categorized in a chronological order. For each year, all data were classified under six main categories: 1) number of refuges (legal and illegal) and official statistics, 2) refugee’s access to healthcare, education, and so on, 3) refugee’s accommodation and travel, 4) refugee entrance policy and deportation, 5) job market policies and regulation, and 6) tensions with local Iranians. Some documents were simultaneously located in two or more categories based on their contents. Every piece of information was
labelled with a code showing the date (year and month) and the main theme. Second, based on the available data for each year, a narrative was formed covering the important aspects of the refugee presence focusing on 1) official policies, and 2) the condition of refugees. The final report was written by combining different segments into an integrated text. The first part of the report explores the causes of open door policy and the second on the consequences of this policy for Iran. Three main themes were extracted from the data for the second part, including identification of refugees and security issues, refugees and Iran labour market, and the problem of repatriation which is discussed in the following section.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Settlement of refugees in Iran

As stated before, during late 1970s and 1980s, Iran opened its borders to afghan refugees and permitted them to reside in the mainland country instead of border camps. The reasons for accepting millions of Afghan refugees should be analysed according to the circumstances of the newly established government and social atmosphere of a post-revolutionary country. As explained further in this section, unconditional admission of refugees was the only option that could be implemented at that time, due to the complicated situation of the country and the newly established revolutionary government. All in all, it can be argued that three major factors resulted in the adoption of an open door policy by the Iran government of the time.

First is the collapse of bureaucratic structures and decision-making procedures after the Islamic Revolution. Following the Revolution, the government structure underwent a fundamental change and the entire system of decision-making and administration was radically transformed. At that time, it was not possible to address all national issues with structured and calculated decision-making processes. The newly established administration, which was involved in internal political conflicts and, a year later, imposed war with Iraq, all of a sudden faced the flood of Afghan refugees into the country. In such circumstances, the new government chose the easiest solution: to admit and settle Afghans in cities and villages without any restriction. In fact, the new and somehow inexperienced young bureaucrats wasn’t prepared to decide on the matter based on the rational calculation of predictable outcomes of the open door policy.

Second, the new government was busy with more serious problems than Afghan refugee arrival; the main focus was on consolidating power and fighting the imposed war with Iraq. In a situation where the country was involved in internal conflicts during the period of power construction after the 1979 Revolution, the onset of the war and its consequences did not actually leave room for attention to the issue of Afghan refugees. The war resulted in the displacement of a large part of the Iranian population residing in western areas (near the border with Iraq). In this context, the management and settlement of internally
displaced people became the top priority of the government. As a result, the country was so involved with internal and external problems that there was no opportunity to consider the issue of the arrival of foreign war refugees. The Minister of Interior, during his visit to Sistan and Baluchistan province in April 1981, explicitly stated to reporters “Unfortunately, due to government engagement with the imposed war, we have not yet been able to decide on the issue of refugee settlement”1. He assured local residents that the issue of Afghan refugees in eastern provinces would be properly addressed soon by the central government. Therefore, at that time, the situation was such that, on one hand, the state’s energy was spent on the war with its costs and consequences, and on the other hand, after each Soviet bombardment, thousands of Afghans fled to the Iran border.

Third, the lack of sufficient funds to build border camps in the absence of international assistance was a major factor in implementing open door policy. In contrast, Pakistan’s success in settling refugees in the camps was largely due to the Western aids, considering Pakistan’s role in equipping Mujahideen in the fight against the Soviets. Unlike Pakistan, Iran did not have the necessary facilities for building refugee camps; therefore, allowing them in the country was inevitable. The country faced with enormous costs of the war with Iraq, and there was practically no possibility for building and equipping camps and accommodating more than one million refugee population in a brief period. Relations between Iran and Western countries became hostile after the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979, exactly a month before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Political tensions with the West denied Iran international assistance in the problem of refugee settlement. Iran’s reluctance to trust international institutions due to the fear of intelligence operations under the cover of assistance (Halliday, 2001, p. 5) was another obstacle to receiving assistance from the UNHCR. Between 1979 and 1990, Pakistan received about $850 million in international assistance, while Iran’s share of international aids was slightly over $100 million (Eisenberg, 2013, p. 15). Moreover, UNHCR donations were handed based on the population residing in the camps, not those active in the labour market.

In addition to these three main causal factors, there are two facilitators that made open door policy work and created a favourable social and political climate for refugees in the country. First is the ideological approach of the newly established revolutionary state in Iran at the time: a revolution that defined itself as an advocate of the oppressed people in all parts of the world with the announcement of its mission defying the Eastern and Western imperialism. The Islamic Republic, right from its establishment, considered its duty to protect the oppressed and back all

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1Afghan refugees will be accommodated in Iran, said interior minister (1981, April 10), Keyhan newspaper.
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liberation movements in the world. Based on this attitude, the phrase “Islam does not have borders” quoted from Ayatollah Khomeini was the legitimating basis for the open door policy. It was for this reason that for many years the term “Afghan brothers” were used in Iran to address Afghan refugees.

In fact, for the government, sheltering Afghan refugees was more of a religious duty and an emphasis on the commitment of the Islamic Republic to play a leading Islamic revolutionary role in the region and worldwide. Recently, a former Afghan government official in Iran claimed that at the beginning of the arrival of Afghans in Iran, the incumbent Prime Minister was in favour of settling refugees in border camps; the idea was rejected by the “scholars of the Islamic Republic and especially Ayatollah Khomeini” (Afzali, 2014). He quoted Mohammad Montazeri, a high-rank revolutionary cleric, to have said, “There is no difference between Iranians and Afghans. Here in Iran, Islam rules. Let them come, work, and learn. Why stopping them?” It is not easy to verify the quotation, since there is no evidence to confirm; but based on the revolutionary rhetoric of the time, however, it could be said that the “revolutionary” section of the government had a welcoming approach toward Afghan refugees. Meanwhile, it should be noted that even if the pragmatic section of the government had a different view on the issue, practical options to do otherwise were feeble.

The second facilitator was the revolutionary atmosphere of the Iranian society in the early years after the revolution, which provided the social context for the acceptance of Afghans. After the revolution, the social mood created a sense of fraternity and solidarity in the society, which facilitated the acceptance of foreign refugees in Iran. The importance of the revolutionary social atmosphere of the early 1980s on the Afghan refugee’s situation in Iran is undeniable since in the following decade, distancing from the early revolutionary atmosphere, the living conditions of Afghans worsened as the public acceptance of refugees declined.

In addition to the factors discussed above, some researchers pointed out two other issues in explaining the open door policy and accommodation of refugees inside the country. One claim is that the beginning of the war with Iraq, and Iran’s desperate need for human workforce, means that Iran’s refugee policy was a pragmatic decision rather than an ideological approach. To be more precise, the cheap labour force of Afghans workers would compensate the workforce shortage in a time when part of Iran’s manpower was deployed on the battlefields. According to the claim, the presence of Afghans in Iran when the country was involved in the heavy war had great benefits for the country.

The second claim is that the presence of Afghans in Iran has enabled the government to form multiple organisations of Afghan fighters who could later be used in the political and domestic power struggles of Afghanistan. Milani (2006) believes that Iran used the “Afghan Card” as a means to put pressure on the Soviet Union and
halt the transfer of Soviet weapons to Iraq during the eight-year war. In his opinion, Iran supported marginalised Shi’a groups, like the Hazaras and Qizilbash, to create a sphere of influence in Afghanistan and tried to organise them in the form of unified forces (p. 237). During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Iran was a base for armed resistance in Afghanistan, but still different from Pakistan in some respects. In Pakistan, the government openly supported resistance to the Soviet axis and worked closely with local and international groups to provide political and military support to the Islamic fighters (Bhatia and Sedra, 2008, p. 45). However, Iran could not take an apparent position toward Afghanistan because it was fighting at home and its relationship with the Soviet Union was strategically important.

However, many Afghan resistance groups were operating in Iran who enjoyed less freedom of action and received less support compared to their peers in Pakistan (Wannell, 1991). The presence of Afghan refugees in Iran made it possible for Iran to train militias for a right moment to deploy in Afghanistan (Milani, 2006, p. 237). According to Harpviken (2009), the role of these organisations became particularly apparent after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran tried to influence the Mujahedeen government and later used them in the war against the Taliban (p. 84).

To what extent have the two above-mentioned arguments been a decisive factor in the adoption of Iran’s Open Door Policy? The importance of these arguments cannot be ignored but what matters here is whether these factors can be considered explanatory factors behind Iran’s open door policy; the two arguments seem to be rather a function of open door policy rather than the reason behind it. As argued before, the open door policy was not adopted based on the precise calculation of economic and political benefits of Afghan refugees’ presence in Iran, but was largely due to unique social, political, and bureaucratic situations in a revolutionary condition. In fact, basic requirements for a rational and calculated approach toward the issue of Afghans entering the country were absent. In the context of the socio-political contexts of post-revolutionary Iran, it is evident that at the time, there was no other way for decision-makers but to adopt refugees without restrictions.

Rajaee (2000), in examining Iranian refugee policies, shows that after the stabilisation period, Iran managed to create a balance between its constraints and the urgent need for a response to the refugee crisis; for example, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1991, the war between the Azerbaijan and Armenia, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced, causing the Azeri refugees to rush to the Iranian border in 1993. However, Iran’s policy towards this group of refugees was not opening the country’s doors but creating camps inside Azerbaijan that worked under the supervision of the Red Crescent. For this purpose, several camps were constructed by the collaboration of two sides. In 1995, one of the interior ministry officials explicitly stated that Iran did not
allow Azeri refugees to enter Iran because of what the government learned from the experience of Afghan refugees. He explicitly stated that if they could enter, their return to their country would be difficult (pp. 52-55).

Once again, in 1994, during the clashes between the two Kurdish Iraqi parties, KDP and PUK, many leaders and supporters of PUK fled to Iran. The result was the flooding of more than 200 thousand people to Iranian borders. Iran, whose new policy was to deny refugees entrance, declared that it was ready to accept refugees, with the condition of receiving international help. Eventually, Iran allowed 75,000 people to enter the country but settled them in border camps. This time, Iran asked for major international institutions aid and, as a result, was able to receive a great deal of assistance (ibid, pp. 53-55).

Consequently, Iran’s policy of accepting refugees in later decades was different from the 1980s. In fact, all the factors that previously led to the open door policy were either absent or had diminished drastically. The bureaucratic apparatus was stabilised, and the policy environment and decision-making procedures were different from the period of the revolutionary excitement of the early years. The social environment also did not support refugee admission due to economic issues, especially at a tough economic setting of the late 1980s.

**Predictors of Change from Open Door to Closed Door Policy**

The open door policy was the easiest solution for a newly formed revolutionary government dealing with domestic issues and a war with a neighbouring country. Acceptance of millions of refugees helped many Afghans survive fatal violence and gave them the opportunity to escape poverty and drought in their country. But for government in Iran, enormous issues started to appear over time as the proportion of refugees in local communities grew. The cheap Afghan labour force helped the Iranian economy in different sectors of agriculture, construction and manufacturing in a hard economic period. But these economic benefits costed dearly for the government and led to dramatic policy changes in later decades. The main negative consequences of open door policy for the Iranian government were as follows:

1- **Identification of refugees and security issues**

The identification of refugees in Iran was one of the issues faced by the government from the beginning of the crisis. Afghan refugees crossed the borders into Iran without passing any special legal procedures. They were only registered at the border and were deployed to any area they wanted to reside. As a result, there were no definite figures and information about the individuals entering or how they scattered in the country. According to official documents reviewed, in August 1979, a letter (Interior Ministry, 1980) was sent from the Ministry of the Interior to the governorates of all provinces, in which the need to identify Afghans was indicated and the issuance of identity cards was emphasised. The directive calls for the
establishment of a “Coordinating Council for Afghan Refugees Affairs” in each province to identify Afghan refugees and encourage them to register and receive ID cards. These ID cards were supposed to be issued to every household and the names of other household members were to be mentioned in the profile of the family head.

According to one official letter (Mazandaran Provincial Government, 1980), in October 1980, the Ministry of Interior ordered that the issued ID cards be printed with the phrase “no specific rights for the cardholder” at the bottom. This action shows that the government considered refugees’ temporary guests and made it clear to Afghans that the ID card did not indicate a permanent residence permit. The first identification attempts by the government having failed, the issuance of the first identification documents began the following year; in 1981, ID documents were issued for each head of household in the form of large white folders containing information of all household members. These documents were prepared by the Interior Ministry and were filled by officials at mosques in different cities. This plan was the first government action to identify and regulate the Afghan refugee population in Iran, which distinguished legal refugees from unauthorised Afghans entering the country. These documents were not issued for every individual, and its size made it difficult for refugees to carry, made it difficult for Iranian security forces to control IDs. Moreover, given the fact that these documents were completed only at the request of the applicant, and there was no database to control all the recorded information, it was possible for refugees to obtain several identity documents for each household in various parts of the country. This attempt to identify Afghan nationals somewhat reduced the problems of identification and improved public services for refugees but was not much of a success due to poor documentation.

The complexities of identity issues added to the government’s problems in meeting the basic needs of refugee population. During the Iran-Iraq war, because of financial constraints and the difficulties in importing goods caused by the siege of Khorramshahr and insecurity of other ports, the government monopolised the distribution of primary goods. For this reason, an organisation called Basij-e Eghtesadi (Economic Mobilisation) was established with many headquarters throughout the country. The duty of this organisation was to ration and distribute basic goods through the coupon mechanism. With the increase in the number of Afghan refugees, the general needs of this population were also placed on the agenda of the headquarters and the legal refugees were registered. The major problem in providing Afghan refugee supplies was a poor identification system and a lack of reliable statistics.

With problems that gradually became evident in governing a large population of refugees, the first national refugee identification plan was implemented in 1984. Under this plan, an ID card, known as the White Card, was issued to each person.
Contrary to the previous plan, this time, by filling out a special questionnaire by each person, a file was issued for every individual that was archived in the governorate of the area. To enjoy public services, including receiving coupons, enrolling in schools, using healthcare services, and obtaining work permits, one ought to have an ID card. Cards would expire in one year, but it took almost two years to replace it with the new Blue Card. In 1988, a program was implemented entitled the “Electronic Identification of Afghan Refugees” (Interior Ministry, 1988), which failed in the development of electronic database due to the shortage of funds, but the registered data in this plan remained the main source of information of Afghan refugees until 2000.

One of the consequences of the lack of precise identification of Afghan nationals was a security problem in the country. It is not surprising for the security forces to face a variety of social disorders, security threats, and high levels of crime in a society where over two million people have no identity documents. In official documents and media reports, there have been many reports of security problems in the eastern parts of the country. Limited control over the borders would increase the possibility of smuggling guns and narcotics to the country which caused social discontent among the local population. In fact, it was the failure of the government to identify and regulate the refugee population that resulted in some social disorders. However, for many local people, Afghans were responsible for the crimes and wrong-doings which most of the time were exaggerated by media. Abdi (1988) has shown that during 1980s, the homicide rate among Afghans was higher than the national average. But the point he made was that firstly, killers and victims were usually both Afghans, and secondly, failure of judicial courts in Iran to resolve disputes among Afghan refugees resulted in higher homicide rates among them. Therefore, the negative stereotyping of Afghan refugees in Iran, still prevalent today, is mostly the remnant of the chaotic situation in the 1980s where the power of government to control the situation was very limited.

2- Refugees and Iran labour market

The settlement of refugees in cities and villages, rather than border camps, gave Afghan refugees access to Iran’s labour market right from the beginning. The issue that gradually grew from the presence of many Afghan workers in Iran was the economic competition between Afghan workers and local labourers, leading to dissatisfaction among the local population. From the beginning, there was competition between immigrants and locals for primary goods and housing, especially in the two eastern provinces where most immigrants resided, but the labour market competition was the main source of local tensions.

A sizable portion of the Afghan immigrants who generally were low skilled was employed as simple workers in various rural and urban sectors and was welcomed by employers due to their hard work and low wages. The preferences by Iranian
employers for Afghan workers enabled them to gradually gain a greater share of the local labour market and made the competition intense. With the intensification of this conflict, the government was forced to intervene and in 1984, a directive was issued by Iran’s Ministry of Labour titled the “Implementation Procedures for Temporary Employment of Afghan Refugees” (Labour and Welfare Ministry, 1985). The directive only allowed for specific occupations to be delivered to Afghan workers, including twelve job categories like brick laying, urban construction, loading cargos in ports, tannery, agriculture, mining, glazing, poultry, small industries and plastic melting, road construction and canalisation, and leather manufacturing. Later, in 1986, four other job categories were added to this list, including work in stone cutting, mosaics, discharging and loading in silos, and concrete masonry unit manufacturing. In addition, the new directive banned the employment of Afghan workers in bakeries, referring to the “importance of public health” and the “poor health” of refugee workers (Zanjan Office of Labour and Welfare, 1985). According to the directive, the employers should receive a work permit from the government by filling out specific questionnaires along with showing identity documents issued for the Afghan workers to officials.

After the government’s efforts to identify Afghan nationals and providing identity cards for refugees, efforts to draft laws and regulations on the employment of Afghan citizens became a top priority in regulating the presence of Afghan refugees in Iran. The “Implementation Procedures for Temporary Employment of Afghan Refugees” enlisted Afghan workers in most simple and generally hard jobs and emphasised the need for a work permit from the Ministry of Labour. These occupations were generally labour-intensive and low-paid jobs that replaced Afghan labourers for Iranian workers from the start of their arrival. In many cases, the entry of this workforce has led to the withdrawal of Iranian labour from these professions, and vacancies in many areas have become a monopoly of Afghan workers. In fact, the directive officially recognised the split labour market (Bonacich, 1972) that had been developed over time. According to the split labour market theory, immigrants enter labour market at a cheaper rate since “they have fewer economic and political resources and less information and because they are willing to put up with worse working conditions and they avoid labour disputes in the short term” (Kunovich, 2017, 1965). A large differential in price creates racial/ethnic “antagonism” between local workers and immigrants which in some cases results into “caste” system.

According to the directive, for each region, a maximum threshold of 40 percent of the labour force was allocated to Afghan workers, and it was only possible to issue a work permit for local governments if it follows the limit. But in practice, many employers did not limit themselves to this quota, causing the increasing share of Afghan labour force and therefore
the intensification of job competition among locals and refugees. The directive aimed at regulating the employment of Afghan workers in the labour market and supporting domestic labour; but in practice, the employers did not accord the law. In fact, a significant part of the temptation of the refugee workforce was the fact that it was outside of the formal labour regulations, which greatly reduced the direct and indirect cost of manpower for employers.

During the 1980s, the Ministry of Labour and local authorities spent much of their efforts regulating Afghan workers and preventing them from engaging in unauthorised or unlicensed jobs. There are numerous documents of the time that indicate the correspondence between the administrative departments and the units of production employing Afghan workers. Manufacturing units were seeking permission to use more Afghan workers, while the government agencies pushed manufacture units to keep the Afghan labour force below the 40 percent.

3- The problem of Repatriation

Iran and Pakistan refused to recognise the status of “refugees” accorded in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol for Afghans. Although Iran signed both documents, it only agreed to recognise the Afghans as “immigrants”, because refugee admission required the granting of rights and access to services and, more importantly, the requirement for the government not to return refugees to their country of origin without a legitimate legal basis. Therefore, Iran preferred to declare its assistance to Afghan refugees as humanitarian and Islamic action, instead of a legal obligation (Safri, 2011, p. 591). Moreover, Afghan refugees in Iran did not enjoy the rights of the refugees obligated by the Convention, and the principle of “return” from the outset was complementary to the open door policy.

As mentioned in the previous sections, Iran opened the country’s doors to refugees in the 1980s, but from the outset considered it an emergent, temporary residence. This insistence on the necessity of a return of refugees to Afghanistan was clear both from public comments made by the Iranian authorities and the rules and regulations set for Afghan population in Iran.

For example, in the early years after the arrival of refugees, the government insistently blocked the purchase of land by Afghans. According to Iran’s civil code, trading by foreign nationals is subject to strict rules, and the legal possibility of land ownership is very limited. In a media interview with Etela’at Newspaper an official in the Interior Ministry announced that “Iranian people will be soon be warned to refrain from selling homes, farms, workshops, etc. to the refugees” (Bashir, 1983). This warning suggests that from the very beginning, concern about the return of Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan was very serious.

In fact, the difference in welfare condition in Iran and Afghanistan led many refugees to be reluctant to return home. For this reason, the government tried to control the privileges of this population in Iran to
a degree that it would not eradicate their motivation to return. But the dispersion of this population in every part of the country and its powerful links with the labour market had undermined the government’s chances of deporting them. The issue of return was not the main problem of the Iranian government during the 1980s, since the internal situation in Afghanistan did not allow the refugees to return. But, a decade later in 1990s, the issue became the top priority in Iran’s immigration policy. From the beginning, however, it was clear that the permission to live in the urban and rural areas would make it almost impossible to get the refugees back to their country.

As mentioned before, there is a well-known statement from Ayatollah Khomeini that emphasises on the idea of Islam without borders. This sentence has been the main idea legitimising the presence of refugees in Iran so far. According to that, the national geographical and national boundaries do not matter in the unification and solidarity of Muslims. The basic question is how this religious approach has been aligned with official policies and insistence on the return of refugees to their country. An official in the Interior Ministry explained this apparently paradoxical situation in a newspaper interview way:

Our general policy is … while in Islam, the borders do not have the conventional meaning, and all Muslims are considered a unitary nation, but this does not mean that when Muslims were invaded in one part of the planet they have to leave the front and flee to other Islamic countries. Although we accept that Afghans are now in the house of their brothers, but you acknowledge that brother’s house is not one’s own house, so they should not forget that they must return to their homes one day and they should constantly try to clear their homeland of unwanted enemies. We hope that one day all Afghans return to their country (Sorouroddin, 1981).

In many official comments in that period, the phrase “the house of one’s brother is not one’s own home” is repeatedly mentioned and the necessity of eliminating “material attractiveness” of Iran for refugees was emphasised. All of that indicates the two-sided approach of the Iranian government exercising the principle of brotherhood and the necessity of returning simultaneously. What matters most here is the interpretation of the phrase “Islam doesn’t have borders”, which was presented by Iranian officials in the quotation above. If the foundation of the immigration policy had been based solely on this fundamental religious principle, then speaking of Iranians and Afghans as different nationals or insisting on the return of Afghans would have been meaningless. It is clear that at the executive level, this slogan could not be the only criterion for deciding on the future of refugees in Iran. What made this principle moderated and, of course, largely ineffective, was the importance of “not leaving the Muslim front” mentioned in the
quotation above. In fact, with the argument that whenever Muslims were attacked and forced to leave their land, they should return and retrieve the lost land, there will be a complementary principle to the principle of “Islam has no borders”. The practical result of this combination was that Afghan refugees are temporary guests at their brother’s home. Therefore, it can be concluded that the introduction of the principle of Islam with no borders was to provide legitimacy for a policy for which there wasn’t any alternative at the time.

CONCLUSIONS

During the 1980s, Iran witnessed a unique experience of hosting millions of refugees from the neighbouring country. The specific policies and actions of government within this period could only happen in a revolutionary society that defines itself as the representative of all oppressed people in the world. This article tried to answer two main questions: 1) why did Iran’s government in the early 1980s apply the open-door policy in the Afghan refugee crisis and settle them in cities and villages instead of border camps? and 2) what were the consequences of this policy for Iran that led to closed door policy in later decades? These two questions are important because Iran did not repeat this policy in the following years, but the results of this policy are still evident in the country.

Three possible explanations have been offered by scholars for the implementation of open door policy. Some authors emphasized on the importance of afghan labour force for Iran during 1980s when many young Iranians were fighting in western borders with Iraq (UNHCR, 2004). Others argue that afghan refugees gave Iran the opportunity to train and mobilize afghan fighters to influence power balance in Afghanistan (Milani, 2006). The third explanation focuses on Iran’s revolutionary attitudes of the time and its openly stated support for all oppressed people (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005; Yarbakhsh, 2018). Although all these parameters worth noting but this paper argues that with close examination of the situation it is evident that the open door policy was not the result of any calculated decision or a solely ideological one.

It is emphasized that open door policy should be analysed in the light of socio-political contexts of the post-revolutionary Iran. The fundamental transformation of the bureaucratic system after the Islamic Revolution and the dismantling of the previous regime’s decision-making apparatus left the revolutionary government few options in evaluating its immigration policy. Moreover, being engaged in domestic political affairs and the imposed war with Iraq, it was not possible to decide other than to open the borders to Afghan refugees and let them settle throughout the country. Funds were limited for the construction of camps and the international institutions did not contribute much due to hostile relations between Iran and the West. The revolutionary atmosphere of the Iranian society at that time, and the importance of defending the oppressed population of the world as a universal strategy of the
revolutionary government, was also two facilitating factors in opening the borders and legitimising the acceptance of the Afghan population. In the years to come, all these conditions changed, and as a result, the open door policy gave it’s place to a closed door policy in similar circumstances in 1990s.

The consequences of this refugee policy should also be analysed considering the economic conditions of the Iranian society in the 1980s. Economic pressure resulting from engaging in war with Iraq and hostile relationships with Western powers made it difficult for the government to provide the primary needs of its population. In this situation, hosting millions of refugees was a generous action by the government. In a situation where the country was suffering from a shortage of goods and acute economic problems, local dissatisfaction with the presence of Afghan citizens and their use of the country’s resources and services was a common phenomenon, especially in the eastern provinces. Competition over limited resources, goods, and job opportunities had resulted in a hostile confrontation between locals and refugees on some occasions. Wide public dissatisfaction with Afghan immigrant’s presence in local communities especially in eastern Iran is supposed to be a main force in restrictive immigration policies in later decades.

As ethnic competition theory suggests, antagonism toward immigrants among ethnic majority members intensifies as the competition over scarce resources such as jobs, housing and welfare grows (Scheepers et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008). Phizacklea and Miles (1980) showed that the working class can play a central role in the problematisation of immigrants through projecting their misfortunes to the migrant’s presence. Limited evidences available from 1980s and presented in this paper indicate social pressure on the authorities to handle the refugee situation and control the size of afghan population in local communities. Toward the end of this decade, despite the ongoing insistence of political leaders on their support for the earlier refugee policy, opposition grew stronger especially in the parliament.

Later in the 1990s, the official immigration policy changed dramatically, and constraints on Afghan refugees intensified. Refugees became problematized by the government to the extent that repatriation policy led to violent actions at some points (Monsutti, 2005). Up to this time, Afghan refugees have remained a socially excluded population in Iran; with the failure of the repatriation policy, their living conditions requires much more attention from scholars and policymakers.

The lack of available data on Iran’s refugee policy during 1980s was the main limitation of this study. There are thousands of official documents related to afghan refugees in Iran’s National Library which are still classified under limited access documents. Access to these documents can reveal more about the situation and clarifies the reason for policies and regulations of the time.
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An Anthropological Study of the Shift from Ritual, Embedded Economy to Shapeless, Disembedded Economy

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ABSTRACT

Folkways and Rituals as one of the central aspects of culture in every society have entertained the minds of anthropologists and sociologists. Researchers have analysed rituals in religious and mythological frameworks, but the current article has taken a different approach toward the phenomenon by articulating it within the important sphere of economy, hence ritual economy. The analytical framework of the current research is based on the formulation of two embedded and disembedded economies as scaled on the ideal type economy. The specification of ideal type market in the present study is a combination of Karl Polanyi’s theoretical approach toward the embeddedness of economic activities within the pre-modern economy and its disembeddedess toward the modern one, with a glance at Weber’s ideal type of traditional and modern economies. The findings of the study show that the economic action of bazaaris has transformed from the ritual, embedded economy toward a disembedded one. The inherent changes could be analysed to have resulted from the conventional order, action orientations, conventional forms of interaction, and the logic behind action in bazaar. The findings indicate that modern economy is imposing its logic onto non-modern economies.

Keywords: Bazaar, disembedded economy, economic anthropology, economic action, embeddedness, ritual economy

INTRODUCTION

One of the interests of anthropologists from early on was the understanding of material specificities of cultures and societies. It is, however, a few decades since the interest has been systematically pursued in the
economic anthropology discipline. The subject of this field of inquiry is the study of events and techniques of production, distribution, and consumption, various models of consuming material and symbolic commodities, the predominant economic order in each society, norms of social exchange activity, and different models of economic embeddedness in society and culture (Depuy, 2006, p. 8). Despite all the recent transformations in Iran’s traditional economy, in the face of modernity, the consequential emergence of new economic forms that have their own, sometimes contradictory, mechanisms, the scientific inquiry into the issue is even more necessary. Still, the discipline has been glossed over in Iran. The mentioned transformation in the Iranian traditional economy, including Iran’s market, increasingly challenges the idea of an economic order exempt from cultural, social, and political constraints, and counterposes economy as interwoven with diversifying cultural contexts and social structures. In this way, economy, economic activity, and its requirements are defined and understood within social and cultural constraints with all their varieties. What is concerning in economic anthropology is the traditional institutional mobility of the society and the encounter with a series of inevitable modern elements that are defectively internalised to create or become replaced by interrelated, hybrid products, urging scientific studies more than ever before. The current article acknowledges the demand and intends to analyse the qualitative transition of a crucial socio-economic phenomenon in Iran, the grand bazaar, that has long been one of the most powerful and influential social fields and whose tradesmen used to stand as the front, leading social and economic agents of contemporary Iran. The analysis takes place with an economic anthropological approach aiming to understand the economic action based on a systemic backdrop.

The central concern of this article is whether Iranian tradesmen action is an area independent of socio-cultural constraints. To answer the question based on ritual economy, it tried to demonstrate that economic activity is not an independent activity from the rest of social life aspects, including culture; it is, rather, an activity embedded with the social structure and cultural models, however unstable it seems to be nowadays. As a result, the main questions of the study are “what socio-cultural principles affect the bazaaris’ action as an instance of ritual behaviour?” and “what changes have these patterns undergone within the past few decades?”

The significance of the present study lies in its analysis of one of the most important economic fields of Iran with a long historical background and as a main importing and distributing economic pole. Resulting from modern transformations, bazaar is detached from its original logic without yet adopting the requisites of modern economy. The analysis of bazaar demonstrates how traditional economies shift to modernity, discharging a series elements and replacing new ones.
METHODS

The present study is methodologically influenced by Bourdieu’s research program in which ontological, epistemological, and methodological layers are different from the usual conventions of social sciences. Ontologically, the approach toward social reality is relational. Here, the study of social facts requires evading the reductionist mentality of structure/agency, subject/object, and objective/subjective dualities. As such, the method of the present study is synthetic. In this way, statistical data can be combined with direct observation and through interactive, discursive, and documentary interpretation. The significance of synthetic methodology comes from the usual holistic approach of anthropological studies that necessitates the consideration of bazaar as an entire social phenomenon. Unlike the quantitative methods, the holistic approach attempts to promote the process of breaking off and diagnosis of the social phenomenon, unify various and farfetched aspects of phenomena, and present a holistic panorama for enhancing observation and diagnosis. Synthetic methodology provides the scope of rich data and information for the researcher.

The data for the current research are gathered by qualitative methods such as constant observation, in-depth interviews and conversations, and documentary analysis, especially of bazaar activists’ media interviews, print material about bazaar, and the available information and statistics about bazaar and Iran’s economic field regularities. In the following, these methods are concisely reviewed.

a) Observation: this technique is used for “the discovery of new lands” (Rafipoor, 2003, p. 56). The aim at this stage is gaining an initial understanding of the environment in bazaar. For constant observation, the researcher frequented bazaar for a duration of six consecutive months. This method of somewhat temporary living in bazaar could be called “encamping”. With this method, all events ad observations about the stream of daily life in bazaar are recorded. The technique here has been a combination of participant and non-participant observations. The understanding of bazaar, and that the traditional bazaar with its specific formal structure and resulting complexities and relationships, seems so improbable that pure observation becomes unavoidable. Gradually, by observationally confronting it, the awe of bazaar disappears, and the alien atmosphere becomes research friendly. Without this observational experience, the analysis of bazaar regularities and activities was almost impossible.

b) Interview: the interviewees of this article are divided into two groups. The first group includes persons who have stable positions in bazaar and are trading there. These are inclusive of and retail bazaaris in various guilds (textile, carpet, blanket, gold, etc.) who are informed about everything that goes on
in bazaar. They are selected randomly, and it was attempted to include different age groups. The second group consists of persons who are apprenticed in bazaar. The dialogue with this group who were introduced by a middleman was so beneficial for the study and produced a knowledge that could not be attained through the interviews with first group bazaaris.

The form of interview was decided by the interviewer and interviewee’s limitations, and was, therefore, changing between predetermined questions, semi-determined questions, free chats, and conversations. The last item was a sort of un-determined question that allowed for the untold and shadowy points to be revealed and new hints to be made.

c) Document analysis: since a proportion of questions in the current study had a historical outlook, document analysis seemed inescapable. “Document” indicates the bazaaris’ interviews archive, surveys conducted on bazaar and bazaaris, and the rulings and principles running in bazaar.

This research relies on qualitative content analysis. “The qualitative content analysis is a method that applies a qualitative approach and uses various techniques to systematically analyse the data gathered through interviews, diaries, observational records, and documents” (Hariri, 2012, p. 264). Qualitative content analysis fitted the flexible nature of the research plan in this study best because, in comparison with other qualitative analytical methods, it is well structured and always allows for the review of categories in accordance with the accumulating data. Here, the purpose of analysis is not counting predetermined, exact categories, but reaching deep interpretive and cognitive layers of texts. Therefore, the authors tried to divide the text into analytical units in a systematic and step-by-step manner, so that categories emerge based on the theoretical grounds under consideration. The category extraction was done based on summarisation technique, where the inductive categories were reached by reducing, interpreting, and generalising the inter-related parts of texts. The parts with less relativity and the phrases with similar content were ignored, and the identical descriptions were grouped then summarised; lastly, the analysis was performed on the extracted categories and according to the theoretical concepts. Constant observation, extended contact with the environment, and evaluating the many aspects of the subject are the main strategies for improving the validity of the survey.

Review of Literature

Bazaar is a term with a variety of meanings including a physical space for the exchange of goods and an abstract concept suggesting a whole economic system. Various researchers have studied bazaar based on these two dominant understandings without presenting a certain definition in the majority of cases. Farbia Adelkhah (2000) is among such researchers. Skocpol (1982) defines bazaar as a socio-economic
world, while Keshavarzian (2007) gives four images of bazaar including bazaar as the traditional market, bazaar as a class, bazaar as an informal network, and bazaar as the product of informational dearth. Ashraf (1988) defines bazaar in the Islamic cities of Iran as shopping centers placed in old neighbourhood, a platform for social interaction outside of family, a socio-cultural atmosphere in traditional urban life, a quarter for Shiite religious conglomeration, and a front for political mobilisation. Slater and Tonkiss (2002) divides bazaar into geographic and abstract forms, the latter of which is attached with theorizing functionality in modern social thought. Classic economists hypothesized bazaar as equivalent to the physical and geographical space, and in consequence, with underscored productive, as against the exchange aspect of bazaar, to come to its abstract conception (Swedberg & Granovetter, 1992, p. 257).

The review of literature leads us to the conclusion that bazaar has been grasped in three main definitions: bazaar relations as a practical pattern of exchange, geographic bazaar as a socio-cultural platform, and bazaar as a rather formal pattern of economic order and the centrepiece of studies. In the present article, by bazaar is meant a socio-cultural space in which exchange takes place.

Empirically, in Iran, the traditional market of Tehran is understood as the geography of exchange. Such studies generally view bazaar in an anthropological approach and as a geographic space for exchange, where, at the same time, certain features like architecture, material skeleton, merchants’ moral system and their relations with the state, the condition of each guild like the sale rates of carpet sellers or gold sellers, are not out of sight. The general body of studies indicate that the economics of traditional bazaar is an aspect of the general traditional economy. In these studies, bazaar is understood as a socio-cultural institution in connection with tradition and a manifestation of traditional economy. The association of economy with religion and state manifested in form of the skeletal conjunction of bazaar with the Jame’ mosque and Arg square are particularly under consideration - although it has changed as a result of the transformation of traditional order. The outlook of bazaar is functional and founded on integrity and convergence among bazaaris.

Theory

The rationality of market order and personal action is a shared concept adopted by economics and social sciences. Anyhow, the historical background of the two disciplines shows a divergence between the two in the distinction they made between rational and irrational behaviour, back in the early twentieth century (Samuelson, 1955, p. 90). Rationality was, by then, defined as the rational calculations that were allegedly to be found in the marketplace, hence making the subject of economics different from that of social sciences. Economics occupied itself with the rational action, or the optimisation of profit in the market, and
left the irrational to the sociologists and anthropologists. This reductionist definition was severely challenged by those within sociology and economic anthropology.

Although there is hardly a consensus over a unitary definition of the nature and function of the market in economics, there is a single general principle therein that says the market functions in a distinctive realm and enjoys acceptable degrees of autonomy from other socio-political structures. Sociologists and anthropologists, however, hesitate to inform the idea. The two define the market as a social institution and its relationships as a prolonged chain of mutual social actions. With this perspective, economic activity is constrained in a web of non-economic networks, institutions, and interactions that produce a kind of fundamental relationship between social and economic processes; therefore, market interactions are born to the wider social networks and inclinations (DiMaggio, 1994; Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1992). In addition, interactions are formed within more durable social frames, as “economic institutions are built via the mobilisation of resources through social networks” (Swedberg & Granovetter, 1992, p. 18). Numerous congregational bodies like financial institutions, corporations, banks, malls, fairs, and more prepare tools for producing and maintaining social interactions. Economic action is irreducibly a social action and economic organisations are similarly the same as social formations.

“The model that uproots the market is challenged in two ways. First, the interpretation that alleges the market as a distinctive alternative of provisioning and exchange is criticised. In this group, the work of well-known anthropologist Karl Polanyi is remarkable. Second, is questioning the logic by asking if the modern market economy is multidimensionally estranged from its roots more seriously than other types of economic structuring in other societies are” (Slater & Tonkiss, 2002, p. 157).

Plani’s reading of economic roots provides an anthropological interpretation of market relationships, according to which market exchanges are rooted in the grander social exchanges, while market behaviour is connected to the more general cultural models and norms of integration. The social and cultural roots of the developed market economy have been noticed in later works as well. Although the social roots of economy are turned to the centrepiece of sociology and anthropology, the idea is being replaced by another valuable concept, namely the “economy as instituted process” (Polanyi, 1992, p. 33). This interpretation of market as an instituted process presumes that market interactions should be explained based on certain social institutions and legal and political strategies (Slater & Tonkiss, 2002, p. 175).

**Theoretical framework**

The current article uses the ritual economy approach to analyse the shift of the Tehran bazaar from the ritual to the shapeless
Within economists’ established approaches, economy is declared to be independent of religion, rituals, worldview, and social morality, just the way politics and science are independent of these. Economic principles are not considered embedded in cultural, historical, and social structures and specificities, but are fathomed to be fixed, universal, timeless, and all-encompassing. Its rules are assumed to be as physical and mathematical as natural and biological rules are. This perception is challenged in sociology and anthropology, where an attempt is made to invent theories to analyse the economy in substitutive systematic studies. One such theoretical approach is ritual economy. Ritual economy is a theory of economic anthropology according to which worldview, economy, power, and human agency are interconnected rather than distinct spheres, independent of each other. Ritual economy demonstrates the process of how worldview becomes material; therefore, according to this approach, ritual activity shapes the economic behaviour without determining it (McAnany & Wells, 2008, p. 1). The idea of ritual economy is not a new one, especially when it is used for explicating economic motives and choices. Anthropologists and sociologists such as Firth (1939); Godelier (1978); Malinowski (1922); Weber (1978), and Rappaport (1984) earlier elaborated on the connection of economic choice with religion and mythical behaviour under the debates of ritual behaviour (McAnany & Wells, 2008, pp. 1-16). Christian Wells tried to explain three common understandings of ritual economy:

1) Provisioning, storage, and consumption which Douglas (1979); Karl Polanyi (1944); Malinowski (1922); Marcel Mauss (1925); Weber (1978) and held. The emphasis in this approach is on the embeddedness of economy in social institutions. Here, it analyses provisioning and consumption not based on the common standards and norms of price and income, but by the informal requirements of culture and society. These thinkers postulate that the analysis of provisioning based on feelings, meanings, habits, heritage, traditions, attitudes, social, and economic consciousness precede the formal and normative assumptions held by economists.

2) Materialising the worldview through rituals either formally or informally; Bourdieu (2000); Rappaport (1984); Wells and Salazar (2007) and are in this camp. They highlight the transformation of habitus because of economic conditions; Bourdieu created the term economic habitus to explain the structural role of situations, preferences, and regulations in shaping the economic choice and action. Economic habitus

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The author has invented *shapeless economy* to describe the current patterns and order of Tehran bazaar as an unregulated market exempt from ritual and traditional economy where tradesmen activity was entirely embedded inside culture, politics and society, and simultaneously remain devoid of the characteristics of disembeddedness. Therefore, bazaar is referred to as *shapeless economy* until it is settled in either extreme.
are internalised through family, social participation, social class, and personal experiences of daily life.

3) Constructing meaning and interpretation. In Well’s opinion, ritual economy tells about the decisions people make and motives that push them to do so. In other words, ritual economy problematizes the structural causation of meaning and interpretation construction. Althusser’s structural causation (1970) and Eric Wolf (1990), and Marshal Sahlins’ structural power (1981) fall under this category. (McAnany & Wells, 2008, pp. 1-16).

The theoretical framework of the present study is influenced by the research program of Karl Polanyi (1944). His main teachings could be summarized as follows. In his opinion, the economic life, when it is not based on market, is formed around social institutions, giving way to values and norms other than those ruling the market economy. Polanyi’s second teaching is the rejection of essentialist modern economy relying on the idea that the behavioural pattern of avidity due to the restriction of resources is not human nature, but arises from the adaptation of methods that institutionalise economic activity. From this, Polanyi’s third teaching evolves stating that the world is transitionary; we are not destined to thrive in narrow avaricious and materialist societies as it is perceived based on some superstitious beliefs about natural order and human essence. This situation is brought about by changes in social structuration and the linearity of development. Polanyi’s last teaching is that earth, work, and capital are three components of societies and necessary in people’s subsistence and functioning of family and persistence of society and social order. When the three transform into commodity (or pseudo-commodity), the whole society, including individuals and communities, and moral norms and values are determined by market determinants. The market-based economy transform into the market-based society (Sedaghat, 2010, pp. 36-45).

The analytical framework of the current research is based on the formulation of two embedded and disembedded economies with reference to the ideal type economy. The specification of ideal type market in the present study is a combination of Karl Polanyi’s theoretical approach toward the embeddedness of economic activities within the pre-modern economy, and its disembededess from the modern one, with a glance at Weber’s ideal type of traditional and modern economies. The ideal type composed of the embedded and disembedded economies are configured as Table 1 shows. The table could be inclusive of further specifications but the idealisation processes of distinction, unification, abstraction, and generalization, restricts us to the following.
FINDINGS

Definition of Bazaar

The historical study of the skeletal development of Tehran city shows that the growth of Tehran texture is determined by the skeleton of bazaar. Tehran bazaar is the space-based concentration of main economic, social, and cultural bodies. Today, 52 percent of wholesale units, five percent of retail units, seven percent of production units in Tehran are located within bazaar in an area of 110 acres. The daily traffic of approximately 400 thousand people in it has made Tehran bazaar the urban centre of the city (Yousefifar, 2011, p. 50). As a result, even the widespread transformation in the economic, social, and cultural structures of Iran have not undermined the role and function of bazaar in the urban life of Tehran citizens.

Presently, bazaar is located in the 12th municipal region of Tehran in an area of about 110 acres surrounded by 15 Khordad in the North, Khayam in the West, Molavi in the South, and Mostafa Khomeini in the East.

Reportedly, there are more than 37,240 units including shops, hojreh, workshops, and warehouses in bazaar. These units are active in both wholesale and retail forms. In wholesale, textile and clothing claim the highest share of bazaar exchanges with 49.5 percent, followed by home appliances (12.1 percent), bags and shoes (10.1 percent), foodstuffs (8.4 percent), and stationary (6.9 percent). In retail, textile and clothing takes the first rank with 31.2 percent of total exchanges, followed by 27.5 percent in carpet retail, 11.5 percent in home appliances, and 11.5 percent in stationary.

Tehran Bazaar Skeleton: The Skeletal Order Embedded in Socio-Cultural Structures

Tehran bazaar’s outward is built upon a thoughtful order that suggest its compliance with the constraints of society, culture, and economy. The location of rudimentary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Embedded Economy</th>
<th>Disembedded Economy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skeletal order</td>
<td>Identity giving and meaning giving to space</td>
<td>Pragmatic function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional order</td>
<td>Institutional ethical regulations</td>
<td>Institutional competition-based regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action orientation</td>
<td>Economic orientation</td>
<td>Economic orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action quality</td>
<td>Economic action embedded in Social structure</td>
<td>Economic action disembedded from social structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social structuration of bazaar</td>
<td>Pluralist, based on powerful group and network</td>
<td>Individualist, based on weak group and network</td>
</tr>
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Table 1
The characteristics of the embedded and disembedded economies

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The business area of tradesmen and merchants (Dehkhoda, 1995: 7706), a small space usually placed within sara, tims and timchehs.
urban elements of the central mosque, Arg historical complex, and bazaar, all beside each other, represents the interlink between three religious, political, and economic areas. The contemplation on Tehran bazaar skeletal specificities indicates the importance of social, cultural, and political significance of the bazaar beyond the perceptive economic import.

The evolution of the skeletal form and economic nature of Tehran bazaar from the date of its construction in early 13th hijri century (late 19th century) up until now, shows that it has undergone up and downs during its history, the gravest of which took place during the Pahlavi era. In this era, the escalation in urbanisation and the need for new urban interactions of trade guilds separate from Tehran main area urged the government and its affiliate organisation to pay attention to it. The scatteredness of the Tehran trade centres began from the bazaar at this time. Pahlvis favoured modern models of urban development, hence the indifference toward the Tehran bazaar and its skeletal development. As the Pahlavi era modernisation progressed, the urban communities, including that of the bazaar, witnessed structural changes; the construction of modern streets adjacent to the bazaar transformed its general structure and disturbed the social and cultural integrity of the bazaar and its neighbourhood. Because of these changes, the natural process of guilds expansion and positioning of trade elements therewith paused, and bazaar trading activities in the surrounding streets diminished. Several crucial guild line-ups, like Lab-e Khandaq Bazaar, Chicken Bazaar, and Tobacco Bazaar, disappeared in this period (Yousefifar, 2011, p. 29). The other major transformation of the period was the relocation of Arg as the heart of the political power to another part of the city, thus disrupting the traditional bazaar-politics interconnectedness. The skeleton of Tehran bazaar transmuted once again under second Pahlavi, when industrial and semi-industrial workhouses either migrated into the existing bazaar building or were annexed to it. The changes gradually gave a new character to parts of the bazaar. The economic boom of 1340s (1960s) entailed the demand for greater areas inside the bazaar and demolished the residential neighbourhood by giving them commercial functionality. Modern public and administrative constructions soon erected in the adjacent areas and space transitions for the sake of improving access to urban facilities and utilities--with all the emerging values accompanying them--took precedence (Sultanzadeh, 1991, p. 444).

The skeleton of the Tehran bazaar possesses an inward character, too. The inward atmosphere of the Tehran traditional market maintains an order that administers the bazaaris’ action. This very skeletal order has brought the bazaar its distinction and individuation and created identities appropriate to each guild and profession. The identity might have faded during the interactive and structural changes of the bazaar; yet, it maintains its significance and identification repute by constituting parts of the bazaari historical memory. The
architecture of the bazaar and the methods of locating guilds, like rasteh\(^3\), charsoq\(^4\), tim & timche\(^5\), etc., gave it an inward environmental order and functionality that claims meaning and is vital for understanding the bazaar action. Enclosed, maze spaces imply complexity, ambiguity, conservatism, originality, and traditionalism of the bazaar, by which the bazaar’s particular action system is influenced. Along with functional changes in the bazaar, its texture tends to dispossess of meaning. This clearly signifies the nature of changes in the bazaar, its inherent currents, the general traditional market of Tehran, and its actors. Even though the traditional bazaar of Tehran has endured in skeleton, it has lost its habitual meaning.

**Peculiarities of Embedded Economic Action in Tehran Bazaar**

This research sketches the characteristics of ritual economy by referring to issues of the institutional order of the bazaar, the bazaar’s worldview, and the social structure stemming from ethnic, religious, kinship, and local rationality. The totality of peculiarities shows that the analysis of the bazaar’s actions—with emphasis on economic action—based on the established economic analytical frameworks of modern economics is by no means viable; therefore, the economics of the Tehran traditional market could, leastways, be analysed based on its once ritual economy. The concession is made because structurally, the Tehran bazaar has not attained an independent structure from the community, politics, and culture; this is informed by its performance and functionality throughout the years. In action, bazaaris, as the main body of the Tehran economic actors, have not been economically rational humans whilst chasing optimal profits, particularly the way the established economics purports economic action. Evidences show the shift from this traditional approach.

**Shift from Customary Institutional Order to Quasi-Formal Institutional Order**

Institutional order in the bazaar indicates trends that rule the bazaar through informal conventions and formal regulations, and guide bazaar interaction norms. This institutional order is constructed in two models. The conventional, customary model is an order that is generated with the bazaar by adhering to the traditions; it is constitutive of a set of indicators and aspects including trust and morality, as the ones concentrated on in this study. A major reason for the strength of the bazaar in the past has been the confidence and trust system

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\(^3\)Rasteh (direction): is a main street or pathway in the traditional market on two sides of which rows of retailshops are placed. The term has several meanings in bazaar including, for example, guild. (Youseffar, 2011, p. 31)

\(^4\)Charsoq (intersection): is a Persian word applying to parts of bazaar where two rastehs meet (ibid: 35).

\(^5\)Tim and timche: are two major bazaar trading elements that imply the concentration of several trade offices and wholesale merchandise centers in which expensive and voluminous exchanges take place (ibid, p. 35).
of bazaaris among themselves and toward customers. This characteristic has nowadays disappeared among bazaaris except for carpet sellers, who continue to observe the traditional professional requirements. The belief in informal regulations that shaped bazaaris’ relationships together and made up their social capital has transformed with the passage of time. It is, thereby, included that the Tehran bazaar is shifting from a worldview that is built on trust and moral adherence, to earning halal and taking each other’s hand, to one that cherishes legal mechanisms of credence and optimisation of profit.

*Earning is bestowed by God and He considers all when He hands out. Formerly, bazaaris used to pass customers to each other. Nowadays it is interrupted, and things are not like before* (garment seller, 54 years old, 30 years bazaari).

*The former bazaar was a bazaar that concerned people and was trusted by them, it participated in social activities like building underground cisterns or schools. If you see, most old schools were situated beside bazaar because the founders were bazaaris. But nowadays, to earn, and that at any rate, comes first. Money is everything for today bazaaris* (bazaari, 79 years old, more than 60 years bazaari).

An element in the endurance of the Tehran bazaar was the protective guild relationships founded on seniority. Guild relationships adjusted the self-regulation of the bazaar and protected it against crises; if a problem emerged, it took moral grounds resembling the seniority system to resolve it. This system, most of the time, prevented the bankruptcy of individual bazaaris. In contests and clashes, the elderly society played their unrivalled role in preventing the escalation of problems. The exemplary attention of the senior bazaaris to the sick or troubled, taking the lead in visiting or pooling assistance, spontaneous moves in facilitating youth’s marriage ceremonies, valuing kinship in the bazaar, and celebrating national and religious occasions prospered the morale for cooperation and intimacy, and discouraged clashes. The traditional market of Tehran was respectable to people and its dominating moral system was reproduced into the whole society. Thanks to the guild societies, self-regulation was an unwritten rule of the bazaar that invited all bazaaris to respect principles that countermanded formal institutions’ intervention. Today, this is changing in the bazaar to take on formal dispositions. Contrary to the past, the transforming bazaar of Tehran is replacing intimate, informal, kin relationships with formal strangeness.

Bazaaris relationships with customers were, by then, centred on informal, moral approaches that normalised relationships by encouraging truthfulness in exchange and observing mutual interest. The persistence of this system among some guilds, like
carpet sellers, has guaranteed them a stable atmosphere of healthy rivalry. The principle for prominent bazaari tradesmen is mutual trust. Trust is best exemplified in the regulation of trade and financial relations inside gold and carpet guilds. Here, an individual’s word supersedes any formal agreement, and many contracts, payments, and loans are carried out verbally. In the Tehran carpet bazaar, high-volume exchanges are accomplished only by phone contact. Such incidences, for better or for worse, are being substituted under circumstances where formal demands of bank notes guarantee the health of the exchange. Sometimes, even bank notes could not guarantee the health of the exchange. The emerging mechanisms are symptomatic of the shift from outward, trust-based, moral social capital into a closed, restricted, and inward condition within the bazaar.

Shift from a Potent Group-Potent Network to an Impotent Group-Impotent Network

For systematising inter-cultural analyses, Douglas (1996) has taken advantage of concepts like group and network. He divided the inter-relation between the two into four conditions of potent group-potent network, impotent group-impotent network, potent group-impotent network, and impotent group-potent network. “Group” means the experience of a consistent social unit and “network” means a set of regulations that link individuals on a self-relying basis (Moore, 2010, p. 333). In the current article, the classification of Tehran bazaar relations and transformations is put to analysis based on this conceptual framework. A group-network analysis is a method for finding out a spectrum of beliefs that are interlinked inside a framework of relational patterns. These beliefs should not be considered, per se, but they do cause action. The Tehran bazaar is experiencing a shift from the potent group-potent network condition into an impotent group-impotent network. In conditions with the former specifications, individuals’ social experience is defined first by the social border between the group and the outside world, and second by terms of the well-established behaviour norms among members. Individual behaviour is controlled in the name of group and there are completely defined fractions inside each group that might possess expert roles and have, thereby, varying degrees of access to resources. There is also a set of mechanisms to get out of problems in the event of a disagreement. Such a combination could endure longer in the case of internal fissure. It also enacts restrictions upon members for optimising survival. However, there are occasions applying to impotent groups and networks when, under no circumstance, individuals’ social experience is lined up by external forces, and neither does the assigned class base confine individuals. In such situations, interpersonal relations become vague, their duties get implicit, and individuals interact in void; as a result, a demand for the supervision of some personal behaviour, like the regulations for the prohibition of the violation of contracts.
evolves. The benchmark of the success is the number of its followers and customers. Cruel rivalry and struggle for survival purported by individuals is demonstrated in worldviews that show symptoms of anxiety and cherish rewards and benefits as characteristics of rivalry. The Tehran bazaar has moved away from a structure that was founded on ethnicity, religious identity, and kinship networks, and is transforming to shaped atomic identities and producing an impotent network. Ethnic, local, religious, and kinship devotions are determining social factors that regulated bazaaris. As the national hotspot of capital and commodity, the Tehran bazaar has always entertained guild activists, and, during the migration of regional and ethnic groups, has established networks of lingual, dialectical, and local associations incorporated by the larger socio-economic body of bazaaris; the presence of ethnic minorities with different dialects has always been substantial in the bazaar and throughout guilds. Intimate, face-to-face relations of people in the bazaar created social, cultural, and economic associations inside guilds or among shareholders and, as such, one could speak of the ethnic and local identities of the bazaar. Traditionally, potent group and network identity led to the formation of the bazaari identity in pursuance of shared interests, and whose function against state and political structures more indicated their group and network might. Without doubt, these identities played crucial roles in maintaining trade between the Tehran bazaar and bazaars of other major cities of Iran. Nonetheless, the permanence of traditional trading functions in Iran has assisted the tradesmen in utilising lingual and local resources for fulfilling their needs and distributing commodities inside Tehran and beyond. The bazaaris’ economics and interactions both together and outside of Tehran were obviously facilitated in a socio-cultural backdrop of shared lingual, historical, and cultural grounds.

The other powerful element strengthening the idea of the bazaar as a potent group and a potent network was the social interchanges through kinship. The importance of this factor has diminished during the presumable shift to the impotent group-network. In the past, trade relations in the bazaar were consolidated by strong kinship links. The bazaar was of a larger kinship network than today; among bazaaris, endogamy was preferred to exogamy. Endogamy turned bazaaris into the human capital of a single family. Trade relations and economic exchanges prospered, and new marriages were entailed (Karimi, 2008, p. 114). The preference of bazaaris for enriching their family’s professional skills in managing the chamber, accumulating wealth within the family, and improving a social face in the marketplace were all effective in the embrace of endogamy. Although the rich social environment of the bazaar still demands endogamy and kinship, the past three decades’ multifaceted changes have undermined the system (Keshavarzian, 2004, p. 25). In the passage from the potent group-network to
the impotent group-network situation, the shape and type of relations have altered. Today’s bazaaris prefer to not supersede the professional relations with guild colleagues and evade extra-guild interactions. Formerly, networks of social relationships in bazaar took place through patterns of kinship expansion in form of endogamy or by attendance in civil and religious occasions of charities, mosques, tekiyeh, and the like. Not only were these networks the source of individual interactions with each other, they also provided frameworks for resolving problems, reaching consensus, facilitating cohesion within the bazaar, awareness-raising, widespread coordination in matters, bargaining with authorities, and exerting influence over power relations. Consequently, the traditional market of Tehran shaped its own social network through various institutions and administered its activities therein, too.

**Shift from Social Orientations of Action to Economic, Instrumental Ones**

A major issue that the established economics takes with sociologists and anthropologists is the logic behind the action of economic actors. Ritual economy approach as an alternative within anthropology aims to analyse this logic in socio-cultural terms. For this reason, it emphasises the diversity of the actors’ choices in different settings to highlight specific rationalities as the logics of action. Based on this approach, one can hardly expect rational (in the sense of calculating) behaviour from the side of actors by always assuming they rely on the provision of ultimate profit. Social structures and relations have a significant share in economic decision-makings and, in many cases, the actors’ choices cannot be explained by the frameworks the established economy suggests; this is because action orientation does not concern the optimisation of profit, but the social motives of maintaining a social face and preserving social capital. Bazaaris used to maintain an ideology, meaning that they were not calculating their profits all the time; besides economic gains and by adhering to traditions, they fulfilled their social duties of assistance to peers, passing customers to each other, public benefit activities, running charities, participation in religious delegations, feeding the poor, etc. These were generally performed during rituals and did not necessarily pertain to economic orientations; as a result, this part of bazaaris’ actions could not be analysed with instrumental rationality tools—even though evidences indicate a turn in the bazaaris’ action-orientation toward instrumental rationality. The following conversation clearly points to the transformation, taking place in the action logic among the Tehran bazaaris:

Author--how are things going regards with charity in bazaar?

Interviewee--it is not like before. These have faded away. These have polluted bazaar:

Author--who do you assist and whom do you invite to assist?

Interviewee--whenever there is the need, we ask others to participate to help.
Look, this is a roster we made some day ago and helped a needy family. Haj Agha called me and said me about a needy family and asked me to assist. I referred to colleagues and gathered 430 thousand Tomans. Two persons from this guild and the rest from other guilds. These are all youthful and fresh. They don’t care.

Contemporary bazaaris’ action-orientation in Tehran is egoistic and individualistic. Under these circumstances, personal profit and the optimisation thereof is the goal. The following quotation shows the shift in orientations among bazaaris:

“Earning is bestowed by God and He considers all when He hands out. Formerly, bazaaris used to pass customers to each other. Nowadays it is interrupted, and things are not like before” (garment seller, 54 years old, 30 years bazaari).

CONCLUSION
The Tehran traditional market has not been merely an economic institution but has maintained social, cultural, and political missions, besides economic functions; that is why it is called “the institution of the bazaar”. Recent evidences indicate the mitigation of the bazaar institutional function. The Tehran traditional market as the epitome of the traditional economy of Iran has witnessed changes in the past decade and evidences indicate orientations other than what ruled it previously are emerging as the dominant mode of action. The current article tried to analyse the transformation of the Tehran bazaar by using the ritual economy approach and the theory of embedded economy. Accordingly, the traditional specificities of the Tehran bazaar, presumably under the influence of elemental ritual economy factors, were conceptualised. The main idea among such specificities are the bazaar’s wholehearted embeddedness in social, political, cultural realities, and currents. The observed currents, however, are indicative of the incomplete disembeddedness from non-economic realms of society, politics, and culture. The new situation could not be understood as a fixed condition. What goes on in the Tehran bazaar and how it conducts its orientation is a question that remains to be answered in future studies. The traditional bazaar with its powerful history embedded in kinship, ethnicity, religion, and the like is a unique instance that needs adaptation methods for modern requisites in a way that entails the least economic damage.

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